

CUBA'S STRUGGLE

AGAINST



SPAIN

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RICHARD WAINWRIGHT, CMDR OF THE
GLOUCESTER

Property of Lillian Michelson



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Cuba's Struggle

Against Spain

WITH THE

Causes for American Intervention and a Full Account
of the Spanish-American War, including
Final Peace Negotiations

By FITZHUGH LEE,
MAJ. GEN. U. S. V.; LATE CONSUL GENERAL TO CUBA, and
JOSEPH WHEELER, MAJ. GEN. U. S. V.

With a Story of Santiago

By GOVERNOR THEODORE ROOSEVELT, OF NEW YORK,
LATE COLONEL OF THE ROUGH RIDERS

A Description of the Destruction of the "Maine,"

By COMMANDER RICHARD WAINWRIGHT, U. S. N.,
EXECUTIVE OFFICER OF THE "MAINE" AND COMMANDER OF THE "GLOUCESTER"

Illustrated

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
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JOHN D. LONG,
SECRETARY.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON.

The American sailor is worthy of the name. He has maintained the high prestige of the men who, during the Revolution and the War of 1812 and the Civil war, won for the American navy historic renown. He is intelligent, patriotic, and animated by the spirit of the Republic. It is the universal testimony of naval officers that there were never better crews. The Navy is proud of the American seaman and marine. Nothing could be finer than the tribute with which Captain Evans closes his report of the part taken by the navy in the naval battle off Santiago:

“ I cannot express my admiration for my magnificent crew. So long as the enemy showed its flag, they fought like American seamen; but when the flag came down they were as gentle and tender as American women.”

A large, stylized handwritten signature in dark ink, likely belonging to John D. Long. The signature is fluid and cursive, with a prominent loop at the end.

Secretary of Navy.


WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON.

The American Soldier needs no tribute from me. Nothing that I might say would add to the glory of his name. The campaign of Santiago adds a new and illustrious page to the history of his matchless valor and indomitable spirit, for that was achieved by irresistible courage.

In spite of hardships never before experienced by our army, and notwithstanding that the American forces were confronted by an enemy of great courage and of greater numbers, intrenched in a position that seemed madness to assault, the American army — the American soldier — by individual bravery won a victory equal to any in the history of battles.

Manilla and Porto Rico would have witnessed like deeds of daring had opportunities been given.

The American soldier is a patriot — and in the broadest sense — a man.

A large, stylized handwritten signature in dark ink, reading "Rufus H. Hayes". The signature is written in a cursive style with large, sweeping loops.

Secretary of War.



MAJOR-GENERAL FITZHUGH LEE.



CUBA'S STRUGGLE AGAINST SPAIN.

By FITZHUGH LEE, MAJOR-GENERAL, U. S. V.

CHAPTER I.

DISCOVERY AND SETTLEMENT.

Columbus in Cuba—The Most Beautiful Land Ever Seen—A Dream of the Land of Gold—Character of the Natives—Seeking the Great Kahn—Tobacco—A Heathen's Exhortation—Colonizing the Island—Founding Havana—Naming the Island—Slavery and Slaughter—Las Casas and His Work—Negro Slavery Introduced—Final Extermination of the Natives.

It has been well said that Spain has been ruined by her colonies. Up to the reign of Charles V. the Spanish were distinguished for energy and audacity. The confines of the sea, and the great chain of the Pyrenees, which had given it strength and individuality before the struggle with the Moors, could confine no longer Spanish ambition. Spain started out, therefore, to plant her banners, upon which was inscribed the fierce motto "Conquer or die!" upon new worlds; and, had she governed wisely and well the territories annexed to the home government by her seamen and soldiers, she would to-day have been in the front line of the great Powers of the globe. Consultation, or compromise with, or affection for her new subjects never had place in a colonial policy which resembled the Bourbon Government's, that Gladstone characterized as "The negation of God erected into a system." Had the Spanish pioneers who first seized and occupied the many countries which originally they took possession of organized a progressive, humane, and enlightened government, allowing the natives to regulate their own domestic affairs, so that her colonial possessions would have occupied in reference to the home government a position similar to the American States to their central government, or had they been given a liberal and enlightened form of government,—such as we find possessed by the colonies of the first-class Powers,—what a magnificent position Spain would have occupied in the history of the world, and what a splendid record the Spanish people would have made for themselves! They have done just the

reverse. Spain has always considered that she owned the countries of which her sailors and soldiers had taken possession, just as if they were purchased estates, and that it was her duty to get as much as possible out of them with as little return. Very soon she began to depend upon the metals, mines, and resources of her allied possessions, rather than the development of her own resources at home, and to-day her statesmen, as a result of such policy, are witnessing the golden stream of her colonial gleanings running dry, but ready to burst forth again to cheer the hearts of a foreign people and fill the coffers of new governments.

The people who have for so long contributed to the profits of Spain have at last resented the loss of economic strength and have insisted upon using their revenues for their own advantage. The inhabitants, whether direct or colonial descendants of the Spanish or Indians, negroes, creoles, or half-castes, have always been regarded not only as inferiors, but with a certain degree of hate, which has alienated them from Spain, until they are ready in every case to take, if necessary, a complete revenge and be driven to fight for independence or a change of Flag, that they might have some voice in shaping their own destinies, and be permitted to organize a government which would be under no obligation to pay a tribute to the purse of Spain, and whose people could hold profitable appointments in their midst, and not have all offices filled by appointments from the Madrid Government.

So far as the United States is concerned, it can be safely asserted that had Spain given a just, legal, peaceful, and humane government to her colonies lying near the borders of the American Republic, so as to insure the lives and property of American citizens who had found homes in her rich possessions, and which would have preserved uninterruptedly life, liberty, and property, and proper exchange of commercial relations, there would have been no desire on her part to see the Spanish flag replaced either by the independent flag of Cuba or the "Star-Spangled Banner," but, on the contrary, she would have continued her policy of assisting Spain, if necessary, to resist any attempt upon the part of other Powers to seize and hold her colonial territory.

The continent of which Spain of the fifteenth century was capable of grasping is dissolving because Spain of the nineteenth century is incapable of retaining it, and we can almost see the spirit of Columbus and hear the clanking of his handcuffs in the forefront of the most

dramatic picture in all history. The flag which has floated unchallenged over thousands of square miles for three centuries, before the print of the white man's foot was ever placed upon them, and compared to which the British Empire of to-day, and the Roman Empire at the height of its glory, was far inferior, is about to be lowered before the march of modern civilization.

The colonization of the North American continent and its results, contrasted with the colonization of new lands by Spanish explorers, is a most striking and impressive lesson. In one case, though wars took place between the early North American settlers and the Indians found in possession of the lands, it must be remembered that the latter were the aggressors and that every effort was made by the forefathers of the people of the United States to preserve peace, to be friends with the natives, and, if possible, avoid armed conflicts. Had these early Spanish settlers pursued the same tactics, at this hour Spain would have probably been abreast with that great Republic in all that constitutes the glory of a nation, and been living in peace and amity with her own colonies and with the United States. No colonial revolutions would have marked her triumphal progress, no smoking villages and bloody paths would have been a part of her record, and no blush would have crimsoned the face of her National Glory.

Christopher Columbus as a discoverer was a great success. He gave more than any man who ever lived to a country of which he was not a native. The world is familiar with his history and his voyages. In his diary, under date of October 28, 1492, he wrote, "This is the most beautiful land ever beheld by human eyes." On that day he had discovered the island of Cuba. It is true that sixteen days before he had landed upon another and smaller island, and had been sailing for a number of days among a group of such islands, admiring their semi-tropical luxuriousness and their strange new beauty. "I know not," he said, "where first to go! Never could my eyes weary of gazing upon the beautiful verdure. The song of the birds is so sweet that one might desire never to go hence. There are trees of a thousand species, each having its particular fruit, and all of exquisite flavor." But Columbus was not looking for islands; he was in quest of the Asiatic continent, the fabled Cipango, the East Indian land of gold where Kublai Khan ruled, and of which Marco Polo had written. After leaving the lesser islands he thought the goal of his ambition had been reached, when he came to a place surpassing all others in beauty, and apparently a continent in size. The natives

told him it was rich in gold and sparkling with gems, and when he saw its blue mountains, green plains, and the beautiful tropical sky, he was convinced the object of his voyage had been accomplished. It was then an earthly paradise; to-day, after more than four hundred years, cruelty, oppression, bloodshed, famine, and war are encamped throughout "this most beautiful land."

Cuba is the largest and the westernmost of the four islands known as the "Great Antilles," which differ from most other tropical lands in possessing unique features so as to belong to a class to themselves, and is due to certain peculiarities of configuration and soil formations possessing unusual productiveness.

Columbus first landed at the north coast, at or near what is now known as Nuevitas del Principe in the province of Del Principe. This town of seven thousand people is the seaport now of Puerto Principe, the largest inland city in Cuba, with which it is connected by a railroad forty-five miles long, and with other Cuban ports by steamship lines. Its splendid harbor, nearly circular and the second in size in Cuba, must have presented a most inviting appearance to Columbus on that October day 406 years ago. He became more and more enchanted with the charming outlook, and with the people, who seemed to be gentle, hospitable, and intelligent, and who, being interested in him, gave him information and aid.

Among other things he noticed that the natives had a habit of rolling up the leaves of a certain plant, setting fire to them, and inhaling the smoke. The natives called it tobacco. Several of his men tried it, found it grateful, and adopted the practice; and in this way, it is said, the smoking of tobacco was first made known to the civilized world.

Columbus still thought he had found a continent, and on his second voyage reached what is now called Cape Maisi, the most eastern extremity of the island. He then sailed along the southern coast for some distance, in consequence of the natives telling him that a land of gold lay further on—they probably meant South America. On this voyage he found the island of Jamaica. If he had sailed west along the Cuban southern coast three or four days longer he would have reached the western end of the island, and then have learned that he had not discovered a continent, but an island. This great discoverer made a third and last visit to Cuba at the end of May, 1503, but he never knew the real nature of the land he had found, and always supposed it to be the mainland of a continent.

The first attempt at colonization in Cuba was made by his son

Diego, in 1511. He sent an expedition there of 300 men, led by Diego Velasquez, who had been with his father on his second voyage. A landing was made, and a town was commenced at Baracoa, and two or three years later Trinidad and Santiago de Cuba were founded. Batabano, as it is called, now directly opposite Havana on the southern coast, was next settled, and called San Cristobal de la Habana.

In 1519 the name of the settlement was transferred to the location now known as Havana, which was then founded and afterward became the capital of the island, the original name being Puerto de Cabañas. At Batabano Cortez prepared his expedition for the conquest of Mexico, sailing for that place in February, 1519. Afterward those who remained at Batabano removed to Cabañas, giving it the name of Havana. Upon their arrival they celebrated a Mass under a great ceiba tree, the site of which is to this day marked with a large stone column and a small temple at the east side of the Plaza de Armas. The island was first called Juana, in honor of Prince Juan, the son of Ferdinand and Isabella. After the death of Ferdinand it was renamed Fernandino, and later called Santiago after the patron saint of Spain; later still it was called Ave Maria, in honor of the Holy Virgin. The natives had, however, from time immemorial called it Cuba, and Cuba it remains to this day.

Velasquez began the settlement of the island in characteristic fashion. Instead of making friends of the natives he treated them as enemies marked for destruction. Those who gave themselves up as his slaves he spared from death, and used them as beasts of burden; all those who resisted he massacred, frequently with tortures.

Hatuey, who had been a celebrated chief in San Domingo, but fled from that island to escape the Spanish, organized an army, and for a time led his men against his enemies, even at fearful odds. Afterward he was captured, doomed to be burned at the stake, and bravely met his fate. Before the fire was kindled he was approached by a priest, who began to exhort him to believe in Christ in order that his soul might be taken to heaven. Hatuey interrupted him with the inquiry, "Where do the souls of the Spanish go?" The priest replied, "To heaven." "Then," said Hatuey, "I prefer to go to hell."

Bartholomew Las Casas, the famous apostle of the Indies, accompanied Velasquez. He first tried to mitigate the horrors of the Spanish conquest, but ultimately acquiesced in the brutalities of the conquerors.

It would have been well indeed for Cuba to have remained in the

hands of the English after the capture of Havana in 1762. The restoration to Spain under the treaty of 1763 was simply a reversal to Spanish control, which meant a reversion to the old state of things. Cuban ports were closed to foreign ships and the commerce of the island limited to Spain, and within these legislative Chinese walls people were born who grew up in dense ignorance.

Eighty-five years ago Spain practically awakened to the fact that she had not been exercising a wise and liberal government over her dominions outside of her own borders, for the spirit of revolution had become so frequent in Spanish America that a more generous policy was at last determined upon for Cuba; so the ports of the island were thrown wider open to general commerce, and a decree was issued doing away with the monopoly on tobacco, which had a very marvelous effect on its growth. Sugar, too, experienced prosperity from this policy, so that four times as much was exported of these products as before. If the same liberality had been shown in the political government of Cuba, to-day's history of that island might have been very different, and the breach promptly healed between those citizens who were born in Spain, and who were called in Cuba "Peninsulars," and those who were born in Cuba, termed "Insulars"; and there would have been no record on the pages of history of the many attempts at rebellion in the island.

There was no attempt ever made to give it its own government, but the Captain Generals were sent from Madrid, who exercised despotic power. And to increase the antagonism springing up between these two classes, smoldering political fires were ever present, and at stated intervals broke out into rebellious flames.

Havana, the principal city of "The Ever-faithful Isle" (as it will no longer be called), has many interesting incidents in its early history.

Away back in 1538 French pirates burned the town and destroyed the inhabitants. Santiago de Cuba, which has lately become so prominent to the public mind, was then the capital.

In 1555 we find Havana was again destroyed, this time by a French corsair, De Sores, who landed at San Laraza and destroyed the city by fire, killing many of its inhabitants. It was in consequence of these hostile raids that the idea obtained a footing to give to the city permanent fortifications, so as to make it more secure from attacks by sea. The construction of Morro Castle was commenced as far back as 1589, the work on which occupied eight years. It did not, however, prevent the siege and capture of Havana by the English in 1762.

An expedition under Lord Albemarle sailed from Spithead, England, March 5th of that year. The expeditionary forces were rendezvoused in Martinique, and sailed from that point on the 27th of May through the old Bahama passage on the north side of Cuba.

There were 200 vessels of all classes which passed the bay of Matanzas on the 5th of June, and the next day began to debark fifteen miles east of Havana.

While the troops were landing, the admiral, with 13 ships of the line, 2 frigates, and 36 small boats made a feint attack at the mouth of Havana harbor. At that time 12 Spanish ships of the line were laying inside of the harbor, besides a number of smaller vessels. The Spaniards were taken by surprise at the unexpected appearance of the English, who had 9000 seamen and marines, 1400 militia of all colors, 3500 infantry, 300 artillery, 810 cavalry, making a force of 27,610 men.

These troops were finally landed about six miles east of Morro Castle. Most of the Spanish force was stationed in Guanabacoa, on the bay opposite Havana, for the purpose of resisting any attempt of the English to march around the city and take it from the south side.

Albemarle went straight at the Cabañas Fortress, carried it, and drove the Spaniards into the Morro, a feint being made by the English admiral at the same time west of the mouth of Havana harbor. The naval and military forces, which seem to have been in complete harmony, co-operated with each other.

Batteries were then planted by the English on this neck of land for the purpose of reducing the Morro, as it was easily seen that after the capture of that strategic point the city would be at the mercy of the English land guns as well as the guns of the fleet. The English had thirty-four guns including the mortars and howitzers, and the Spaniards even a greater number; but the firing of the English was more effective.

On the 1st of July, twenty-three days after landing, the English guns opened on the Morro; at the same time three of their ships of the line cannonaded it on the sea front. There had been no rain falling for two weeks, and the troops were suffering much from extreme heat. The English army was reduced to one-half of its effective force, but on the 12th of July re-enforcements were received from Jamaica. The Spaniards made a brave defense, in spite of the fact that sapping and mining operations were gradually bringing the English close to their walls. At one time the Spanish troops were carried across the harbor, and

the attempt made to assault the English near the Morro, but they were repulsed and beaten back.

About this time a ship arrived from New York with the first division of troops from the English-American colonies. On the 29th of June the British mine was exploded, and a breach made large enough for the assaulting party to march into, which they did with great dash and courage.

The Spanish commander of the Morro was a naval officer named Don Luis de Valesco. A desperate resistance was made, Valesco falling mortally wounded. He was shown every mark of respect on the part of his British captors during the short time that he lived. After his death his son was made commander of the Morro by His Spanish Majesty, and it was ordered that there should always be a ship named Valesco.

The Spanish lost about 130 killed; 400 laid down their arms; and the remainder, it is said, were drowned in attempting to escape the city.

The Marquis de Gonzales, second in command of the Morro, was also killed. The English only lost 2 officers and 30 men.

There is no question of the bravery of the Spanish defenders of the Morro. When Valesco was requested by Albemarle to surrender the fortress, he declined, deciding to abide the fate of arms.

The capture of the Morro was the beginning of the end, and on the 10th of August Albemarle sent a demand to the Governor of the city of Havana to capitulate. The bearer of his flag of truce was kept from sunrise to four in the afternoon, and then sent back without an answer. The next day forty-five English guns opened upon the city. The Spanish batteries at the Punta were soon silenced, and at two that afternoon the Spaniards sent a committee to propose a capitulation to Albemarle, and arrangements were made, and by the 14th the English had entered and hoisted the British flag over the city of Havana.

The total loss by the English amounted in all to 1799. These facts are interesting, as recent operations by the American Army at Santiago de Cuba show similar soldierly traits in the Spaniards of to-day. The idea then and now seemed to prevail that it is necessary, however grave the situation and certainty of results, to fight desperately for a time for what they are always calling "The honor of Spain."

It will be remembered that France, Austria, and Russia were at war against Great Britain and Prussia; Spain added her arms to those of the former, and, as a result, the English captured Havana.



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MORRO CASTLE.

HAVANA HARBOR.

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It was restored to Spain by the treaty of 1763, in exchange for Florida, which, in another treaty ten years later, was restored to Spain. Had the island remained in England's possession the interests of civilization and good government in Cuba would have made of that island a very different country.

As soon as the British left, the construction of the present Cabañas fortress began, and the defenses of the harbor were thus greatly strengthened. This work was completed in 1841, at a cost of fourteen million dollars. Fort Atares and the Castillo del Principe were also constructed about the same time. Hundreds of slaves and convicts were brought to Havana to work on these forts; and, being brought over in foul ships, packed closely with no regard to health or cleanliness, a terrible pestilence broke out among them never before known. It proved most contagious, and soon became a permanent epidemic at Havana and other coast towns, and gave to the world, it is said, the dreadful scourge now called yellow fever.

In the latter part of the eighteenth century many handsome public buildings were erected in Havana, including the Palace, which has been occupied ever since by the Captain Generals. Fine parks and boulevards were also constructed, and the whole place greatly improved and adorned.

Las Casas, so well known in the early history of Cuba, first began to work for the abolition of native slavery. He returned to Spain and appealed to his Government, with the result that a commission was sent from Spain to investigate the condition of the natives, and effect such a reform as might be desirable, with Las Casas at the head of the Commission with the title of "Protector of the Indians."

His associates on the commission, it seems, were indifferent at that day, just as the Spaniards of the present day have been, to reform, so nothing practically was accomplished. Las Casas then conceived the idea of abolishing slavery of the Indians by substituting negro slavery, and proposed a system of emigration from Spain under which each Spanish settler in Cuba should have the privilege of taking there twelve negro slaves from Africa; but it was a hopeless failure, because the Spaniards demanded that the Indians should purchase their freedom with gold-dust, which was impossible because the Indians did not have the gold-dust.

The slight physique of these Indians rapidly succumbed to ill treatment, and those who sought to escape from slavery were hunted down with bloodhounds and were worried, and torn to death in some in-

stances, by the dogs. In about half a century the population was exterminated.

Early testimony, including that of Columbus, will show that these natives were affectionate, tractable, and peaceable. "The Discoverer" says of those he found in Hayti, who were of the same race and habits as the natives of Cuba, that there was not a better race of men in the world. "They love their neighbors as themselves, their conversation is the sweetest and mildest in the world, and always accompanied with a smile. And although it is true that they go naked, yet Your Highnesses may be assured that they have commendable customs; the king is served with great state, and his behavior is so decent that it is pleasant to see him, as it is likewise the wonderful memory which these people have, and their desire of knowing everything, which leads them to inquire into its causes and effects."

As long as Isabella lived it is said the Indians found a protector, but "her death," says the venerable Las Casas, "was the signal for their destruction." So much so that it has also been said that "Every step of the white man's progress in the New World may be said to have been on the corpse of a native." It will thus be seen that the Spaniards did not begin their early settlements in Cuba in the true Christian spirit. A writer has said that "Their behavior to the Indians, and, indeed, to those who afterward became in their term 'The Natives,' brought down the retribution of Heaven, which has seen fit to turn this fountain of inexhaustible wealth and prosperity to the nation into the waters of bitterness."

Irving, in his history of Columbus, gives a weird picture of Spanish treatment of slaves, in which is pictured the suffering of these poor people under their conquerors.

Much labor and little food was given them; and if they fled from incessant toil and insufficient nourishment, and took refuge in the mountains, they were hunted out and scourged, and laden with chains to prevent a second escape. Las Casas says he found many dead in the road, and others, gasping under the trees in the pangs of death, faintly crying "Hunger! Hunger!" "The toils and sufferings," says Las Casas, "of this weak and unoffending race dissolved them, as it were, from the face of the earth. Even mothers forgot the powerful instincts of nature, and destroyed the infants at their breasts to spare them a life of wretchedness." This history has repeated itself in many cases among that portion of the present natives of Cuba styled "Reconcentrados."

MacKenzie charges ten million victims to inhumanity, against the Spanish conquerors. Vasco Nunez wrote that on one expedition he had hanged thirty chiefs, and would hang as many as he could seize, because, he says, the Spaniards were so few in proportion to the natives that there was no other means of securing their safety. "The native orphans," wrote a merciful Spaniard, "are as numerous as the stars of the heavens and the sands of the sea." And yet the conquerors often slew the children and parents together.

When Columbus first beheld the splendid beauty and luxuriant landscape and received the hospitality of the gentle and docile inhabitants of Cuba, that island contained a population of one million souls; about fifteen years afterward the number of inhabitants did not amount to over sixty thousand. It is doubtful whether human history has ever recorded more blood causelessly and wantonly shed than in the destruction of the native population of Cuba by the Spaniards. The genial climate and rich soil of Cuba naturally attracted many colonists from Spain, and rapid advance was made in settlement and prosperity. Towns were founded, and the island became the center of commerce for the Western Hemisphere. In spite of this fact, the adventurous newcomers were actuated by a desire for new conquest and the attainment of wealth by quicker methods than those of agriculture and grazing.

It was Diego Velasquez who conceived and proposed the conquest of Mexico and Florida, although the work was done and the fame enjoyed by Cortez and De Soto. The expeditions led by these two adventurers took from Cuba many of its most enterprising settlers. Then came the conquest of Peru by Pizarro, and many were attracted there because there was no gold or silver in Cuba; indeed, a Cuban official declared that, with the news from Peru, Cuba was threatened with depopulation. So the island fell into a state of lethargy and neglect, and became a sort of way-station between Spain and Mexico; and for a century and a half it had little history of any kind. The colonists merely devoted themselves to fruit-growing and cattle-raising.

There being no gold or silver on the island prevented raids from buccaneers, so that it escaped the attacks which were made upon Hayti and the cities of the Spanish Main, and seemed almost forgotten alike by friends and foes.

In the early part of the eighteenth century Cuba contained scarcely one hundred thousand inhabitants, and twenty or thirty thousand negro slaves, for the original natives had all been exterminated.

The British siege and capture of Havana in 1762, and its possession by the English for nine months, brought most important results. Pezuela, the Spanish historian, says: "During the nine months the British held the capital of Cuba they introduced nearly one thousand loaded vessels in a port which up to that time had received only ten or twelve a year. They also imported several thousand negroes, began the establishment of extensive agricultural operations, and augmented the productions and exports of the island." "After the restitution of Havana," says this historian, "the Government then secured its possessions, with the superb fortifications which now defend it, and slowly and jealously began the concessions of commercial privileges."

The revolution in Hayti in 1796, under the famous Toussaint L'Ouverture, drove a large number of white people from that island, and a multitude of families and individuals. Some with considerable fortunes took refuge in Cuba. The concurrence of this unexpected prosperity was most fortunate, inasmuch as, in 1818, the freedom of commerce had been decreed for Cuba. This measure was the true beginning of the prosperity of the island. From the time of its cession, excepting a short period during the constitutional agitation of Spain from 1820 to 1823, there has been to a certain extent some progress made in Cuba in wealth and population.

To this record we may add that a second Las Casas became Governor General of Cuba in 1790, and that under his administration many great public works were executed, and fine progress was made in the island in arts and industry, which should have proved a fountain of blessing, because the ports of Cuba were opened to foreign commerce and the Spanish monopoly of the tobacco trade was revoked; but unfortunately for Cuba, Spain, having lost all of her colonial possessions in the Western Hemisphere except Cuba and Porto Rico, endeavored to make these two supply her with the revenue which had been previously obtained from a continent, and acts of oppression and injustice soon began to counteract the promise of prosperity and happiness.

The island was managed as a conquered province for the selfish profits of the conquerors. Even the national constitution adopted in Spain in 1812, in which Cuba was to be represented in the Cortes on equal terms with other parts of Spain, was abrogated by the despotic Spanish king Ferdinand VIII., and not restored until three years after his death in 1863.

The appeal to the President of the United States in 1817 by the

fourteen Americans who were captured by the Spaniards on the charge of being privateers furnishes a striking proof of the manner and methods of those days. They said that they were "cut and mangled to pieces with cutlasses, bound back to back until blood ran from under their finger-nails, and were at present in a Cuban jail on an allowance of Spanish ration of one pint of rice and beans, half cooked, for twenty-four hours, and without clothing."

"The Ever-faithful Isle," as it was called because it refused allegiance to Napoleon Bonaparte in 1808, when he drove the Spanish king from his throne, began to attract about this time the close scrutiny and attention of the United States; and that Government took the position that Cuba must do one of three things, become independent, remain Spanish, or join the United States. The American Republic was scarcely then able to interfere, in case some European Power should take the island, so practically declared that she would not interfere with affairs upon the island, except to prevent the overthrow of Spanish authority. The ardor of the Cuban people for liberty began to display itself more and more. In 1819 there was an insurrection in which a number of Americans took part, and no less than twenty-two American citizens were arrested and thrown into prison at Havana for complicity in the revolt.

It is true that Cuban deputies were permitted at last to sit in the Cortes at Madrid, and in 1821 they made a vigorous protest against the burdensome and oppressive tariff which the Spanish Government proposed to place on the islands. Commercial freedom, they said, should be of the greatest interest to Spain as well as to Cuba; that the island had not the twelfth part of the population it was capable of maintaining; and urged such measures as would attract more settlers. Indeed, they told Spain frankly that, if she persisted in her present policy, she would lose Cuba altogether. Oppressive measures continued to be adopted, and the spirit of discontent and disaffection steadily grew. The Spanish Government repelled instead of welcomed the settlers.

At the beginning of 1822 the Captain General decreed that every newcomer must, before landing, present a memorial to the Government setting forth the object of his visit to the island, which memorial had to be indorsed by some responsible person, who would be answerable for his conduct while he was in the island. Soldiers enforced all rules of the Captain General, and frequently took the law into their own hands and became a mob. For example, in 1822 a paper in Havana

printed temperately what was thought by many to be a well-deserved criticism upon some features of the policy of the Captain General. The next day soldiers took the office of the paper, destroyed the press and type, and personally abused the editor and staff. The Captain General approved, if he did not incite this outrage; and the people of the city were made to feel that they were at the mercy of a violent and lawless soldiery.

In a written remonstrance over three thousand of the best citizens of Havana warned the Government that if such practices prevailed there must be sooner or later a revolution, but the only effect of this paper was increased tyranny. Then, for the first time, two political parties were formed, one being composed of native Cubans, and one of Spanish officers; the Cuban party being committed to the principle of home rule, and independence—if necessary to secure it.

Anyone familiar with the history of the Spanish Government on the island of Cuba up to the present day will recognize that there has been no material change in the policy of the Spanish rulers from that time to this. The Governor, or Captain General, of Cuba is appointed by the Crown, and the office is considered a most desirable one from a financial standpoint. His power under the decree of the Spanish Government issued May 28, 1825, is absolute; and practically he holds in the hollow of his hand the life and liberty of all the citizens of the island.

“His Majesty the King, our Lord, desiring to obviate the inconveniences that might in extraordinary cases result from a division of command, and from the interferences and prerogatives of the respective officers: for the important end of preserving in that precious island his legitimate sovereign authority, and the public tranquillity, through proper means, has resolved, in accordance with the opinion of his council of ministers, to give to your Excellency the fullest authority, bestowing upon you all the powers which by the royal ordinances are granted to Governors of besieged cities. In consequence of this his Majesty gives to your Excellency the most ample and unbounded power, not only to send away from the island any person in office, whatever their occupation, rank, class, or condition, whose continuance therein your Excellency may deem injurious, or whose conduct, public or private, may alarm you; replacing them with persons faithful to his Majesty, and deserving of all the confidence of your Excellency; and also to suspend the execution of any order whatsoever, or any general provision made concerning any branch of the administra-

tion, as your Excellency may think most suitable to the Royal service."

This decree, placing in office a despotic ruler clothed with full authority, did not have the effect intended, but, on the contrary, was another step toward setting in motion a series of insurrections which have at last culminated in the present war, and which at last has ended in the displacement of the Spanish flag from the island.

We find that the first real insurrection occurred in 1823, being organized by a secret association called the "Soles de Bolivar," and was inspired to some extent by the example of the "Great South American Liberator." The attempt, it is true, was frustrated by the authorities before it reached maturity, and all of the leaders and participants who did not escape from the island were punished, but it did not prevent other revolutions from breaking out in 1826, 1828, 1830, 1848, 1850, 1851, 1855, 1868, 1879, and finally in 1895.

Secret organizations were prohibited by law after 1823, especially Freemasons, and those who persisted in belonging to such organizations were judged guilty of high treason and put to death; and many innocent men were garroted therefor.

A military commission was established for the purpose of ferreting out and punishing suspected cases of treason, a sort of Holy Inquisition applied to politics. The king himself suggested this commission, in order, as he said, the more effectually to preserve his dominions in America from the horror of ruin with which they were threatened by the spirit of reform, for all spirits of reform were regarded as disloyal to Spain.

Even at that day Spain had become uneasy about the fate of the island. The Bishop of Havana had been compelled to flee to New Orleans for safety, as he was suspected by the Governor General of being liberal in his political opinions, and an English paper in 1825 declared that Cuba was the "Turkey of transatlantic politics, tottering to its fall, and kept from falling only by the struggles of those who contend for the right to catch her in her descent."

The revolution in 1826 was planned in 1826 by Cuban refugees in Mexico and Colombia, and it was led by no less person than Simon Bolivar himself. It failed to receive the expected encouragement from the United States, and came to naught.

Two years later a more serious attempt was made by the same parties by organizing a secret league called "The Black Eagle," with headquarters in Mexico and branches in the United States. A con-

siderable army was recruited, but the United States opposed this scheme, and many of the soldiers of the plot were captured by the Spanish and put to death.

In 1844 we find another outbreak—not to be classed, however, among attempts at independence. It was an uprising of the negro slaves in and about Matanzas. A general revolt was planned, but resulted in thousands of slaves being arrested and put to the torture of the thumbscrew and rack to make them testify, and on the strength of evidence thus obtained some 1346 persons were convicted, of whom 78 were put to death.

In 1848 the famous Narciso Lopez of Venezuela appeared on the scene, the base of his operations being in the United States, where was organized a band of 600 well-drilled soldiers who were to serve as the nucleus of his army in Cuba. He evaded the neutrality laws and made a landing in Cuba with this force, and was joined by a considerable number of Cubans, both black and white; but his army was too small to hold its own against the Spaniards, and a precipitate flight from the island was necessary. It is said that the offer by this Government, made directly after the return of Lopez from Cuba, to buy the island for one hundred million dollars in cash was due largely to Lopez's representations and work.

This adventurous spirit attempted to organize another expedition in 1849, but was not successful, as the United States Government prevented the sailing of his men; but in the following year Lopez got off with some 600 men, which he landed safely at Cardenas. There he was attacked by an overwhelming Spanish force and compelled to flee back to his ships, and upon reaching Key West disbanded his party.

In 1851 this indomitable revolutionist went from New Orleans to Cuba with Colonel Crittenden of Kentucky and 450 men, landing near Havana, where they were attacked by a superior force. Lopez was put to death, but a portion of his men were released, and a detachment of 150 men under Crittenden fought until they were reduced to 50 men and out of ammunition, when they were captured and all put to death.

Colonel Logan Crittenden was a nephew of the Hon. John J. Crittenden, so long a distinguished United States Senator from Kentucky, and was a brother of ex-Governor Thomas T. Crittenden of Missouri. He behaved most courageously. His hands, and the hands of his men, were tightly bound with cords, and they were kept in this condition

for eighteen hours, when on the morning of the 16th of August, 1851, they were taken out and shot in platoons of six at a time, after having been made to kneel with their backs to the firing squad. Crittenden, who was reserved to be executed last, when ordered to kneel declined to do so, and with a curl of scorn upon his lips, said, "An American kneels only to his God, and always faces his enemy!" They shot him down, but with his face to his foe.

In 1855 there was another insurrection led by a Spaniard named Pinto and two comrades, Estambes and Aguero. They were captured and put to death.

Proclamations of the Governor and Captain Generals have been curious productions from time immemorial in giving flattering pictures of "The Ever-faithful Isle," calling it an abode of peace and plenty and loyalty, because it had always enjoyed the mild government of a king and the blessings which spring from security of property and the uninterrupted progress of arts and sciences. "All men of sense," one of them said, "in this isle are faithful to the king, our master, from affection and a conviction that loyalty to the parent state was the only guarantee for their well-being, and that the day which severs these sacred bonds will be the last day of the happiness of Cuba, and even of her existence; and that the heart of the king only throbbed with pleasure when it contemplated the people of Cuba as contented and happy."

These oft-repeated revolutions produced more and more friction between the United States and Spain, and the feeling between these two countries was intensified in 1850 by the "Black Warrior" incident.

The "Black Warrior" was a steamship regularly plying between American ports and Havana. Under strict interpretation of the Spanish law, a steamer touching at a Cuban port was required to exhibit a manifest of her cargo, but this provision had been passed over in the case of regular liners.

The "Black Warrior" had thirty-six times in succession entered and left Havana without making a manifest, but calling herself "in ballast." All of this was done with the full knowledge and at the suggestion, it is said, of the Spanish authorities, who wished to save themselves needless work. On this occasion the ship entered the port with a cargo of cotton from Mobile for New York. As before, she was reported "in ballast"; then the authorities seized her, confiscated the cargo and took it ashore, and levied a fine against her for twice the

value of her cargo. The captain refused to pay it and protested against the whole performance as illegal. He finally pulled down his flag and abandoned the ship, and reported to the United States that the Spanish had forcibly seized her. After five years the United States succeeded in making Spain pay an indemnity of three hundred thousand dollars.

Hon. J. P. Benjamin of Louisiana, in a speech in the United States Senate in 1859, speaking about the grievance of the island of Cuba, said:

“That with arms General Tacon despoiled the island of Cuba of the Constitution of Spain, proclaimed by the powers of the monarchy, and which these powers had ordered to be sworn to, as the fundamental law of the entire monarchy.

“That the Cortes deprived the Cubans of the rights which all Spaniards enjoy, and which are naturally conceded to persons the least civilized.

“That the decree was issued which deprived the sons of Cuba of all right of being chosen to occupy public offices or of employment in the state.

“That military commissions existed which, in other countries, the law permits only in extraordinary cases, during the time of war, and then only for offenses against the state.

“That the continual increase of the army and the creation of the new mercenary bodies, under the pretext of public security, are put upon the natives for the purpose of augmenting the burdens that lie upon Cuba, and of exercising with greater vexation the system of subordination and espionage over its inhabitants.

“That obstacles and difficulties are placed in the way of each individual for exercising any industry, nobody being sure that he will not be seized and fined, by reason of some defect of authorization or want of license at every step that he makes in the island.

“That exactions of all kinds are imposed upon its inhabitants by inferior officers with the greatest disregard to the opinion of mankind.

“I return now, sir,” he said, “to the year 1836, when the Cuban deputies were convoked to a meeting of the constituent Cortes at Madrid. The Cortes assembled in 1837, but the Cuban deputies were not admitted to their seats. Cuba was deprived of her representation, nor was this the only outrage inflicted on her rights. It was decided that she should be governed in the future by exceptional laws, and not

by the laws common to the rest of the monarchy. These special laws were never passed, but the royal ordinance has continued in force until the present hour, maintaining martial law, and Cuba has thus remained ever since a helpless victim, subject to the despotic control of a single man, the extent of whose powers can only be described by the word invented to express them—*omni-modas* (of all kinds).

“Ever since this monstrous system has been adopted, Cuba has not been blessed with one year of peace. Constantly attempts have been made to shake off the Spanish yoke, but all in vain. Twenty thousand bayonets on the land, and a powerful fleet off Cuba’s coasts keep the dread watch of the tyrant and suppress the first symptoms of revolt. The whites have been disarmed, and four companies of colored men have been added to each of the sixteen regiments of peninsular troops stationed on the island, thus holding before the unfortunate inhabitants the constant threat of a war of races, a renewal of the horrors of San Domingo. Their pride of race has been shocked by a Governor’s decree authorizing marriages between the two races, except when one of the parties is a noble.

“The army is maintained faithful solely by a rigorous isolation, all communication between the inhabitants and troops being interdicted. No security for life, person, or liberty against the caprice of a despot, no arms of self-defense; the size of a walking stick being limited to dimensions small enough to pass through a ring furnished the policeman.

“The Cubans have not even the idea of a trial by jury. Cases are tried before the judges of royal appointment, the venal favorites of the Spanish court, who are speedily removed to make room for more hungry aspirants.

“The Captain General, himself a mere soldier, presides by law over the supreme court of justice. All offices, with the exception of a few of the lowest order, are in the hands of Spaniards. The penalty for carrying weapons of any description is six years’ hard labor in the chain-gangs of the penal colonies of Africa.

“The Cuban cannot have company at home without a permit, for which he must pay \$2.50, and he must be provided with a license at the same cost if he is to absent himself from town or from his home in the country. Neither can he change his domicile without notifying the police, obtaining a permit, and paying for the same.

“He cannot lodge any person, whether foreigner or native, stranger, friend, or relative, in his house without previous notice to the police.

"Mayors of cities are not elected by the people, but by the aldermen of the common councils and under the dictation of the Spanish Governors. These aldermen serve for life, and their offices are either inherited or purchased from the Crown at public auction for prices varying according to the perquisites thereof.

"Thus it happens that even they who should be the immediate guardians of the people often become speculators, who, far from extending them protection, extort the full interest of the capital invested in the purchases of their offices.

"No affidavit is required in Cuba; but a suspicion, or a secret denunciation, is sufficient to tear a man from the bosom of his family at any hour of the day or night, throw him into a dungeon, there to linger for days or months, if it so please the authorities, and then to set him free with the mere acknowledgment of his innocence, or send him to transatlantic exile, if, though innocent, he still remains suspicious.

"Such is the sad, the dreadful condition of the unfortunate islanders."

So it will seem that the condition of Cuba and its future history was receiving already the scrutiny of some of our leading statesmen. John Quincy Adams, while he was Secretary of State, in 1823, wrote to the United States Minister at Madrid that, "It will be taken for granted that the dominion of Spain upon the American Continents, North and South, is irrevocably gone. But the islands of Cuba and Porto Rico still remain nominally, and so far really, dependent upon her that she yet possesses the power of transferring her own dominion over them, together with the possession of them, to others."

It was inevitable that from an early date the United States should take a deep interest in the affairs of Cuba. The nearness of the island to our southern coast made it naturally a part of our domain. At any rate, it was seen that commercial intercourse between the two countries must be very close and that the possession of Cuba by a hostile power would be a dangerous menace to the peace and welfare of this country. The great question to be solved was the duration of the Cuban conditions, and how long a time should elapse before the United States should interfere in the interest of humanity, law, order, and peace. The state of affairs described by Senator Benjamin, with but few changes, still existed from year to year—a repetition of the past, without a change of Spanish policy. There must be sooner or later

outside interference. No foreign Power shall interfere, said the United States. So the responsibility rested alone with our Government, and at last has been taken.

“Cuba and Porto Rico, from their local position [writes Mr. J. Q. Adams, when Secretary of State in 1823], are natural appendages to the North American Continent, and one of them, almost in sight of our shores, from a multitude of considerations has become an object of transcendent importance to the commercial and political interests of our Union. Its commanding position, with reference to the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indian seas; the character of its population; its situation midway between our southern coasts and the island of San Domingo; its safe and capacious harbor of Havana, fronting a long line of our shores destitute of the same advantages; the nature of its productions and of its wants, furnishing the supplies and needing the returns of a commerce immensely profitable and mutually beneficial, give it an importance in the sum of our national interests with which that of no other foreign territory can be compared, and little inferior to that which binds the different members of this Union together. Such indeed are, between the interests of that island and this country, the geographical, commercial, moral, and political relations formed by nature, gathering, in the process of time, and even now verging to maturity, that, in looking forward to the probable course of events for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself. There are laws of political, as well as physical, gravitation. And if an apple, severed by the tempest from its native tree, cannot choose but fall to the ground, Cuba, forcibly disjoined from its own unnatural connection with Spain, and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only toward the North American Union, which, by the same law of nature, cannot cast her off from her bosom.”

To this Mr. Adams added that the transfer of Cuba to any other power would be an event unpropitious to the interest of this Union, which we should prevent, if necessary, by force.

Thomas Jefferson, a few weeks later, expressed almost exactly the same ideas in a letter to President Monroe, saying that the addition of Cuba to this Union “is exactly what is wanted to round out our power as a Nation to the point of its utmost interest.”

Henry Clay also put himself on record, in 1825, to the same effect. He was then Secretary of State, and in an official letter to the various American ministers in Europe, he said: "We could not consent to the occupation of those islands [Cuba and Porto Rico] by any other European Power than Spain under any contingency whatever."

Mr. Van Buren, in one of his state papers, said, on this same subject:

"The Government has always looked with the deepest interest upon the fate of those islands, but particularly of Cuba. Its geographical position, which places it almost in sight of our southern shores, and, as it were, gives it the command of the Gulf of Mexico and the West Indian seas, its safe and capacious harbors, its rich productions, the exchange of which for our surplus agricultural products and manufactures constitute one of the most extensive and valuable branches of our foreign trade, render it of the utmost importance to the United States that no change should take place in its condition which might injuriously affect our political and commercial standing in that quarter. Other considerations connected with a certain class of our population make it to the interest of the southern section of the Union that no attempt should be made in that island to throw off the yoke of Spanish dependence, the first effect of which would be the sudden emancipation of a numerous slave population, which result could not but be very sensibly felt upon the adjacent shores of the United States."

The United States Government also played the part of Spain's friend and protector. On more than one occasion other European Powers were at the point of seizing Cuba from Spain by force. They were restrained simply by the warning that such a proceeding would be regarded by the United States as an unfriendly act. The American Secretary of State wrote to the American minister at Madrid, in 1840, as follows:

"You are authorized to assure the Spanish Government that in case of any attempt, from whatever quarter, to wrest from her this portion of her territory, she may securely depend upon the military and naval resources of the United States to aid her either in preserving or recovering it."

Again Mr. Buchanan, when Secretary of State in 1847, wrote:

"The United States will not tolerate any invasion of Cuba by citizens of neutral states."

OFFERS TO PURCHASE.

The question of acquiring Cuba by purchase had long been considered by the United States, and in 1848 it was put into concrete form. In that year the Secretary of State, Mr. Buchanan, wrote to the American minister at Madrid on the subject, as follows:

"With these considerations in view, the President believes that the crisis has arrived when an effort should be made to purchase the island of Cuba from Spain, and he has determined to intrust you with the performance of this most delicate and important duty. The attempt should be made, in the first instance, in a confidential conversation with the Spanish minister for foreign affairs; a written offer might produce an absolute refusal in writing, which would embarrass us hereafter in the acquisition of the island. Besides, from the incessant changes in the Spanish cabinet and policy, our desire to make the purchase might thus be made known in an official form to foreign governments and arouse their jealousy and active opposition. Indeed, even if the present cabinet should think favorably of the proposition, they might be greatly embarrassed by having it placed on record, for in that event it would almost certainly, through some channel, reach the opposition and become the subject of discussion in the Cortes. Such delicate negotiations, at least in their incipient stages, ought always to be conducted in confidential conversation, and with the utmost secrecy and dispatch.

"At your interview with the minister for foreign affairs you might introduce the subject by referring to the present distracted condition of Cuba and the danger which exists that the population will make an attempt to accomplish a revolution. This must be well known to the Spanish Government. In order to convince him of the good faith and friendship toward Spain with which this Government has acted, you might read to him the first part of my dispatch to General Campbell and the order issued by the Secretary of War to the commanding general in Mexico and to the officer having charge of the embarkation of our troops at Vera Cruz. You may then touch delicately upon the danger that Spain may lose Cuba by a revolution in the island, or that it may be wrested from her by Great Britain, should a rupture take

place between the two countries, arising out of the dismissal of Sir Henry Bulwer, and be retained to pay the Spanish debt due to the British bondholders. You might assure him that while this Government is entirely satisfied that Cuba shall remain under the dominion of Spain, we should in any event resist its acquisition by any other nation. And, finally, you might inform him that, under all these circumstances, the President had arrived at the conclusion that Spain might be willing to transfer the island to the United States for a fair and full consideration. You might cite as a precedent the cession of Louisiana to this country by Napoleon, under somewhat similar circumstances, when he was at the zenith of his power and glory. I have merely presented these topics in their natural order, and you can fill up the outline from the information communicated in this dispatch, as well as from your own knowledge of the subject. Should the minister for foreign affairs lend a favorable ear to your proposition, then the question of the consideration to be paid would arise, and you have been furnished with information in this dispatch which will enable you to discuss that question.

“The President would be willing to stipulate for the payment of one hundred million dollars. This, however, is the maximum price; and if Spain should be willing to sell, you will use your best efforts to purchase it at a rate as much below that sum as practicable. In case you should be able to conclude a treaty, you may adopt as your model, so far as the same may be applicable, the two conventions of April 30, 1803, between France and the United States, for the sale and purchase of Louisiana. The seventh and eighth articles of the first of these conventions ought, if possible, to be omitted; still, if this should be indispensable to the accomplishment of the object, articles similar to them may be retained.”

The offer was declined by the Spanish Government, with an air of being offended at the very making of it.


THE OSTEND MANIFESTO.

But the matter was not permitted to rest there. In the summer of 1854 the American ministers at London, Paris, and Madrid, Mr. Buchanan, Mr. Mason, and Mr. Soulé, met together at Ostend, and from that fashionable watering-place issued the famous “Ostend Manifesto.” This was a letter signed by them and addressed to the



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THE PRADO—PRINCIPAL STREET IN HAVANA.



THE CHURCH WHERE COLUMBUS WAS BURIED.

Secretary of State, urging that immediate steps be taken for the acquisition of Cuba. Their plan was first to offer to purchase the island for one hundred and twenty million dollars. If Spain declined to sell it, the United States should seize it by force. They said:

“Our past history forbids that we should acquire the island of Cuba without the consent of Spain unless justified by the great law of self-preservation. We must, in any event, preserve our own conscious rectitude and our self-respect. Whilst pursuing this course, we can afford to disregard the censures of the world, to which we have been so often and so unjustly exposed. After we shall have offered Spain a price for Cuba, far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to consider the question, ‘Does Cuba, in the possession of Spain, seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union?’ Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we possess the power; and this upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home. Under such circumstances we ought neither to count the cost nor regard the odds which Spain might enlist against us.”

This advice was not followed by the Government. But a few years later, when he became President, Mr. Buchanan in his messages more than once recurred to the subject and urged the desirability of American ownership of Cuba. Indeed, in every one of his annual messages he strongly recommended the purchase of the island.

LATER UTTERANCES.

Then the Civil War in the United States came on, and attention was drawn away from Cuba for a time. But soon after the restoration of peace here the Ten-Years' War broke out there, and the subject of Cuba was forced upon us again in a very direct manner. What the feeling of the Government then was may be judged by some of the utterances of Mr. Fish, the Secretary of State under President Grant. He wrote in 1874 to the American Minister at Madrid that

“Cuba ought to belong to the great family of American Republics. The desire of independence on the part of the Cubans is a natural and

legitimate aspiration of theirs, because they are Americans. That the ultimate issue of events in Cuba will be its independence, however that issue may be produced, whether by means of negotiation, or as the result of military operations, or of one of those unexpected incidents which so frequently determine the fate of nations, it is impossible to doubt. It is one of those conclusions which have been aptly termed the inexorable logic of events. Entertaining these views, the President at an early day tendered to the Spanish Government the good offices of the United States for the purpose of effecting, by negotiation, the peaceful separation of Cuba from Spain, and thus putting a stop to the further effusion of blood in the island, and relieving both Cuba and Spain from the calamities and charges of a protracted civil war, and of delivering the United States from the constant hazard of inconvenient complications on the side either of Spain or of Cuba. But the well-intended proffers of the United States on that occasion were unwisely rejected by Spain, and, as it was then already foreseen, the struggle has continued in Cuba, with incidents of desperate tenacity on the part of the Cubans, and of angry fierceness on the part of the Spaniards, unparalleled in the annals of modern warfare.

"Meanwhile this condition of things grows, day by day, more and more insupportable to the United States. The Government is compelled to exert constantly the utmost vigilance to prevent infringement of our law on the part of Cubans purchasing munitions or materials of war, or laboring to fit out military expeditions in our ports; we are constrained to maintain a large naval force to prevent violations of our sovereignty, either by the Cubans or the Spaniards; our people are horrified and agitated by the spectacle, at our very doors, of war, not only with all its ordinary attendance of devastation and carnage, but with accompaniments of barbarous shooting of prisoners of war, or their summary execution by military commissions, to the scandal and disgrace of the age; we are under the necessity of interposing continually for the protection of our citizens against wrongful acts of the local authorities of Spain in Cuba; and the public peace is every moment subject to be interrupted by some unforeseen event, to drive us at once to the brink of war with Spain. In short, the state of Cuba is the one great cause of perpetual solicitude in the foreign relations of the United States."

The Cuban patriots sought and thought they had found their opportunity in the distress of Spain. In September, 1868, the long-

standing disgust of the Spanish people with the corrupt government of Queen Isabella came to a culmination in open revolution. A few weeks afterward the Cubans also rose in revolution for their own independence. It was on October 10, 1868, that Carlos M. de Cespedes, a lawyer of Bayamo, Cuba, with 128 poorly armed men at his back, raised the standard of revolt and of Cuban freedom. He issued a formal proclamation of his intentions and of the reasons therefor, as follows:

“The laborers, animated by the love of their native land, aspire to the hope of seeing Cuba happy and prosperous by virtue of its own power, and demand the inviolability of individuals, their homes, their families, and the fruits of their labor, which it will have guaranteed by the liberty of conscience, of speech, of the press, by peaceful meetings; in fact, they demand a government of the country for and by the country, free from an army of parasites and soldiers that only serve to consume it and oppress it. And, as nothing of that kind can be obtained from Spain, they intend to fight it with all available means, and drive and uproot its dominion on the face of Cuba. Respecting above all and before all the dignity of man, the association declares that it will not accept slavery as a forced inheritance of the past; however, instead of abolishing it as an arm by which to sink the island into barbarity, as threatened by the Government of Spain, they view abolition as a means of improving the moral and material condition of the workingman, and thereby to place property and wealth in a more just and safe position.

“Sons of their times, baptized in the vivid stream of civilization and therefore above preoccupation of nationality, the laborers will respect the neutrality of Spaniards, but among Cubans will distinguish only friends and foes, those that are with them or against them. To the former they offer peace, fraternity, and concord; to the latter hostility and war—war and hostility that will be more implacable to the traitors in Cuba where they first saw the day, who turn their arms against them, or offer any asylum or refuge to their tyrants. We, the laborers, do not ignore the value of nationality, but at the present moment consider it of secondary moment. Before nationality stands liberty, the indisputable condition of existence. We must be a people before becoming a nation. When the Cubans constitute a free people they will receive the nationality that becomes them. Now they have none.”

PROGRESS OF THE INSURGENTS.

A week after this proclamation was issued the insurgents were sufficiently increased in number to capture the town of Bayamo. Ten days after that the entire district of Holguin was in revolt against Spain, and by the end of the month Cespedes was at the head of an army of 15,000 men, poorly armed and drilled, but resolute. Among those who joined him were the Marquis of Santa Lucia, General Quesada, Maximo Gomez, Calixto Garcia, Antonio Maceo, and many others who have been identified with Cuba's latest fight for freedom. The patriots were quickly recognized by most of the South American republics as belligerents, and by April 10, 1869, they were able to organize a regular government, with an elected legislature, and to promulgate a national constitution. Cespedes was elected President of the republic.

The Spanish Captain General at Havana was seriously alarmed, as he had cause to be. He at first tried to check the movement by appealing to the people of Cuba to remain loyal to Spain, promising them all possible reforms and favors if they would do so. "I will," he said, "brave every danger, accept every responsibility for your welfare." He congratulated them on the fact that the revolution in Spain had swept away the Bourbon dynasty, "tearing up by the roots a plant so poisonous that it putrefied the air we breathed." He told them they should receive all the reforms which they required and that Cubans and Spaniards should henceforth be brothers; Cuba would be considered a province of Spain; freedom of the press, the right of public meeting, and equal representation in the Spanish Cortes should be granted to them. The only effect of this proclamation was to arouse the contempt and derision of the Cuban people and to strengthen their determination to free their country once for all from the Spanish yoke.

Then, finding that soft words produced no good effect, the Captain General sent to Spain for troops in large numbers. The freedom of the press was abolished throughout the island and martial law was proclaimed everywhere. The citizens of Havana were compelled at the point of the bayonet to contribute the sum of twenty-five million dollars for the use of the Government.

Serious fighting began in February, 1869, and for several months continued, the rebels being almost uniformly successful. Their first important victory was at San Cristobal, about 65 miles west of Havana. The second took place at Guanajay, not far from Havana, on the

coast. Santiago de Cuba narrowly escaped capture, General Valmaseda arriving with re-enforcements just in time to save the city. In a few weeks Havana was threatened.

The insurgents pursued very much the same plan that has proved so troublesome to Spain in the last war. When they found the Spanish army too strong for them to meet in the open field, they resorted to guerrilla warfare, moving swiftly from point to point, baffling pursuit and striking heavy blows wherever they could. The Spanish Government hurried tens of thousands of troops to the island and began a campaign of savagery. This policy appeared to be that no quarter should be granted; that all prisoners should be immediately killed, and even sick and wounded men captured in hospitals should be put to the sword. The Spanish garrisons managed to keep possession of the cities, large towns, and fortified camps, but the vast bulk of the open country and small towns had soon to be abandoned to the rebels.

In March, 1869, the Insurgent Government issued a formal decree absolutely abolishing slavery. It arranged that the patriots should receive pay for the loss of their slaves, and that the liberated slaves might become farmers or enter the army, according to their pleasure. A great many of them did enter the army and made good soldiers. The Cuban President then sent an address to the President of the United States explaining the object of the insurrection and the causes that provoked it, and arguing strongly in favor of recognition of the insurgents as belligerents and as an independent power. It was an eloquent document and strong in logic. Its appeal to the American President and to the American people was effective, yet the stability of the Insurgent Government did not seem at that time sufficient to warrant the recognition that was asked. Mexico, however, recognized the Cubans as belligerents, and Peru recognized their government as an independent sovereignty, on June 13, 1869.

Three brief addresses are worthy of record here, as indications of the spirit in which the war was waged on both sides. The first is an inaugural address of President Cespedes. He said:

"Compatriots: The establishment of a free Government in Cuba, on the basis of democratic principles, was the most fervent wish of my heart. The effective realization of this wish was, therefore, enough to satisfy my aspirations and amply repay the services which, jointly with you, I may have been able to devote to the cause of Cuban independence. But the will of my compatriots has gone far beyond this, by

investing me with the most honored of all duties, the supreme magistracy of the republic.

"I am not blind to the great labors required in the exercise of the high functions which you have placed in my charge in these critical moments, notwithstanding the aid that may be derived from the other powers of the State. I am not ignorant of the grave responsibility which I assume in accepting the Presidency of our new-born republic. I know that my weak powers would be far from being equal to the demand if left to themselves alone. But this will not occur, and that conviction fills me with faith in the future."

Address to the Army.

The second is the proclamation issued to the Cuban army by General Queseda, who was appointed its commander-in-chief. He said:

"In the act of beginning the struggle with the oppressors, Cuba has assumed the solemn duty to consummate her independence or perish in the attempt; and, in giving herself a democratic government, she obligates herself to become a republic. This double obligation, contracted in the presence of free America, before the liberal world, and, what is more, before our own conscience, signifies our determination to be heroic and to be virtuous. On your heroism I rely for the consummation of our independence, and on your virtue I count to consolidate the republic.

"I implore you, sons of Cuba, to recollect at all hours the proclamation of Valmaseda. That document will shorten the time necessary for the triumph of our cause. That document is an additional proof of the character of our enemies. Those beings appear deprived even of those gifts which nature has conceded to the irrational—the instinct of foresight and of warning. We have to struggle with tyrants, always such—the very same ones of the Inquisition, of the Conquest, and of Spanish domination in America. We have to combat with the assassins of women and children, with the mutilators of the dead, with the idolators of gold. If you would save your honor and that of your families, if you would conquer forever your liberty, be soldiers."

Valmaseda's Bloody Order.

The third is the hideous proclamation of Valmaseda, the Spanish Captain General, who has ever since been known as "The Butcher." He said:

“Inhabitants of the country! The re-enforcements of troops that I have been waiting for have arrived; with them I shall give protection to the good, and punish promptly those that still remain in rebellion against the government of the metropolis.

“You know that I have pardoned those who have fought us with arms; that your wives, mothers, and sisters have found in me the unexpected protection that you have refused them. You know, also, that many of those we have pardoned have turned against us again.

“Before such ingratitude, such villainy, it is not possible for me to be the man that I have been; there is no longer a place for a falsified neutrality: *He that is not for me is against me*; and that my soldiers may know how to distinguish, you hear the order they carry.”

It was thereafter war to the knife, and the knife to the hilt. Throughout 1869 the Cubans were generally successful. Many outrages were perpetrated by the Spaniards, and a large part of the island was laid desolate. In the fall of that year a Cuban junta was organized in New York and thereafter did excellent work for the patriot cause in enlisting American sympathy and securing and forwarding supplies of arms and ammunition. By the summer of 1870 it was evident that war would be a long and bitter one. The insurgents then had more than 50,000 men in the field. These were chiefly in small parties, poorly armed and carrying on a irregular system of warfare, which was, however, most effective in annoying and injuring the Spanish Government.

The first serious blow to the insurrection occurred in the spring of 1871, when a considerable number of their troops operating in the district of Camaguey, in the central part of the island, surrendered to the Spanish Government on the condition that their lives should be spared. Their Commander, General Agramonte, would not surrender, but organized another force and maintained the conflict for two years longer, when he was killed in battle.

The year 1873 was perhaps the most bloody of the whole war. Fighting was almost incessant, and, though the engagements were individually small, in the aggregate they meant a vast amount of bloodshed. In the fall of that year President Cespedes was removed from his office by the Cuban Congress and retired to private life. Some time afterward he was found by the Spaniards, living in peace and quiet and taking no part in the war, and was brutally put to death.

The Marquis of Santa Lucia was elected President in his place. His estates had already been confiscated by the Spanish Government and he now renounced his title and became known thereafter simply as Señor Cisneros.

The war was conducted on the Spanish side with all the severity and cruelty hinted at in Valmaseda's order, and deliberate attempt was made to exterminate the entire population of the island. No exception was made in behalf of sex or age—helpless women, infants in the cradle, and infirm old men were alike put to death, often with every possible insult and torture. One of the officers of the Spanish army wrote in the fall of 1869 concerning a certain engagement:

“We captured seventeen, thirteen of whom were shot outright; on dying they shouted: ‘Hurrah for free Cuba! hurrah for independence!’ A mulatto said, ‘Hurrah for Cespedes!’ On the following day we killed a Cuban officer and another man. Among the thirteen that we shot the first day were found three sons and their father; the father witnessed the execution of his sons without even changing color, and when his turn came he said he died for the independence of his country. On coming back we brought along with us three carts filled with women and children, the families of those we had shot; and they asked us to shoot them, because they would rather die than live among Spaniards.”

Another wrote a few days later: “Not a single Cuban will remain in this island. We shoot all those we find in the fields, on the farms, and in every house. We do not leave a creature alive where we pass, be it man or animal.”

In these statements there was no exaggeration. The acts described were repeated a thousand times throughout the island during that dreadful war.

“It could not,” says one of the most trustworthy observers of the war, “be expected that the insurgents on their own side should abstain from taking a fearful revenge.” The practice with them when a prisoner, especially an officer, fell into their hands, was to hang him by his feet to the branch of a tree and build a fire beneath his head.

“Indeed, it would not be easy to ascertain on which side the atrocities first began, or are carried to greater lengths. The rule is that all prisoners be shot without discrimination. Nay, the conquerors even



SHOOTING CAPTURED INSURGENTS.



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THE FAMOUS FILIBUSTER "DAUNTLESS."

grudge their powder and shot, and the victims are usually dispatched with machetes, a kind of long chopping-knife or cutlass peculiar to a cane-growing country, and to be almost invariably seen at the side of every combatant as well as in every laborer's hand. Some of the soldiers and volunteers have acquired such skill in the use of this weapon that they cut off a man's head with all the mastery of a professional executioner. These men march in the rear of their detachments; and upon any suspected person being apprehended, the officer in command, after a brief examination, orders the prisoner to the rear, where he is immediately hacked to pieces by the inexorable macheteros. As a rule also, the bodies of the slain are left unburied on the spot where they fall. The turkey buzzards swarming everywhere in the island, and whose life is protected by law on account of their usefulness as public scavengers, fatten on the rotting human carcasses; and it is not without a shudder that one sees these foul birds hovering everywhere in the air, and poising themselves on their wings above the forests where the remnants of their hideous feasts in every stage of decomposition still attract them."

Throughout the war the insurgents received much aid from the United States. That is to say, their friends and sympathizers here sent them arms and ammunition whenever possible. Under the neutrality laws of the United States it was perfectly legitimate to do this, but of course there was much danger of the vessels carrying such supplies being seized by the Spaniards upon their arrival in Cuban waters. Some were thus seized, but many more succeeded in eluding the Spaniards and landing their supplies upon the Cuban coast.

Case of the "Virginus."

About twenty-six years ago the civilized world in general, and the United States especially, were greatly shocked and stirred up by the capture of the "Virginus," and the murder of a portion of her crew. The "Virginus" was said to be an English-built, side-wheel steamer originally called the "Virgin," and was distinguished as a daring blockade runner during the war between the States. In 1870, it is said, she was sold in Washington to an agent of the Cuban junta, and her name was changed to the "Virginus." For three years thereafter she made a number of successful and daring expeditions to the Cuban coast, carrying clothing, food, ammunition, and arms to the insurgents. On the 23d of October, 1873, the "Virginus" cleared

from the U. S. Consulate in Kingston, Jamaica, as a United States vessel bound for Port Limon, Costa Rica. On board were a number of Cuban insurgents, and the crew was composed of Americans, Cubans, and some others. On board, too were a number of enlisted men to join the insurgent army. The commander of the "Virginus" was named Captain Joseph Fry, a citizen of the United States. A Spanish gunboat, "Tornado"—constructed, it is said, by the same English firm that built the "Virginus"—discovered the latter on the 31st day of October, as she was approaching the Cuban coast, and chased her for eight hours, capturing her about ten o'clock that night, and taking her to Santiago de Cuba; Captain Fry claiming that his boat flew American colors, had an American crew, and was an American ship. The 155 men captured were taken ashore, placed in close confinement, and court-martialed, and the most of them sentenced to be shot.

The whole proceedings were very summary and rapid. Four days thereafter the first four were shot, Brigadier General Ryan being one, though he claimed to be a Canadian, and therefore a British citizen. These men, according to the usual Spanish style, were shot in the back, and afterward their heads were cut off and displayed on spikes, while their bodies were trampled by horses. After an interval of twelve days, twelve more of them were shot, and five days later thirty-seven were executed, these last being the officers and crew of the "Virginus" and some of them American citizens. It is said that the American flag was not flying from its staff and that the American consul was directed to keep in his office. Captain Fry was among the first ten who were shot; and some of the men, it is reported, were not killed by the firing, but were shot afterward through their mouths by the Spanish soldiers. Burriel, the Spanish general, seemed to have been a regular butcher. He promptly refused all protests of the American and British vice consuls, and would not allow them to use the telegraph to communicate with their governments. It is said the American vice consul, Schmidt, wrote repeated communications to General Burriel, but failed to get replies, except in one instance when this blood-thirsty Spaniard told him that he should have known that the day previous was religious festival, during which he and all of his officers were engaged in meditation on the divine mysteries, and could not consider temporal affairs. Fortunately news of what was going on reached Jamaica, and the British gunboat "Niobe," Captain Sir Lambton Lorraine, left for the scene of massacre. The captain was on

shore at Santiago almost before his ship had dropped anchor, and declared that he would bombard the city if there was another man executed. Ninety-three men were still alive, and their execution he demanded should be suspended.

These acts at Santiago were in keeping with much else which had been done of similar nature, but perhaps on not so large a scale, and aroused the public indignation of the United States, and mass meetings were held demanding vengeance on Spain. Admiral Polo de Bernabe, the father of the last Spanish minister who succeeded De Lome, wanted to submit the matter to arbitration, but Hamilton Fish, then Secretary of State, very properly replied to him that the capture on the high seas in a time of peace of a vessel bearing the register and papers of an American ship was not deemed referable to other powers to determine. The nation must be the judge and custodian of its own honor. And on November 4 Fish cabled to Sickles, then American minister to Madrid, that, "In case of refusal of satisfactory reparation within twelve days from this date, close your legation and leave Madrid. If Spain cannot redress these outrages the United States will." The matter was finally settled by Spain agreeing to surrender to an American ship the "Virginus" and the survivors of those who had been captured with her, and that on the 25th of September the United States flag should be saluted by the "Tornado." Of course these terms contemplated that the "Virginus" should be surrendered in Santiago, or taken to Havana for that purpose, but the Spanish took the vessel to an obscure harbor, Bahia Honda, and there delivered her to Captain W. D. Whiting, chief of staff of the North Atlantic Squadron. Lieutenant Marix was his flag lieutenant, the same officer who was recently judge advocate on the court of inquiry on the "Maine" disaster. The salute to the flag never took place, and no indemnity was ever paid for the lives of the American citizens who had been executed. Right then and there the United States should have declared war on Spain; but, in lieu thereof, she allowed the incident to be closed and the vessel to be surrendered in a little obscure place in order to avoid the publicity of the "Virginus" being returned; and this publicity was one of the principal subjects the United States was supposed to have in mind when she arranged the terms. Spain came out of the affair with flying colors. The "Virginus" was of no use to her, or, indeed, to anybody else, because she was not seaworthy, and a little later sank on her way to New York. The United States went through the form of exacting certain conditions in order to appease

some of her people, but at the same time was very careful not to insist upon conditions which Spain might refuse, and thus leave her the alternative of declaring war. An eye-witness of this transfer of the "Virginus" writes:

"While the Spanish officer was courtesy itself, we were all impressed with the fact that the ceremony was lacking in dignity and that the Spaniards had purposely made that lack as conspicuous as they dared. It appeared that the 'Virginus' was towed from Havana by the first-class man-of-war 'Isabella la Catolica,' the commander of which retired immediately and left the surrender to be made by the commander of the 'Favorita,' which had been in the vicinity of Bahia Honda for several months engaged in surveying duty. The surrender should have taken place either at Santiago de Cuba or at Havana, and a Spanish officer of like rank with Captain Whiting should have discharged the duty. A quick survey by our officers showed the 'Virginus' to be in a most filthy condition. She was stripped of almost everything movable save a few vermin, which haunted the mattresses and cushions in cabin and staterooms, and half a dozen casks of water. The decks were caked with dirt, and nuisances recently committed, combined with mold and decomposition, caused a foul stench in the forecastle and below the hatches. In the cabin, however, the odor of carbolic acid gave evidence that an attempt had been made to make that part of the vessel habitable for the temporary custodians of the ship. Our officers were reluctant to put the men into the dirty fore-castle and stowed them away into hardly more agreeable quarters afforded by the staterooms of Ryan and his butchered companions. Some attempt seemed to have been made, as shown by the engineering survey, to repair the machinery, but a few hours' work put the engines in workable order. The ship was leaking considerably and the pumps had to be kept going constantly to keep the water down. After a few hours of hard work we got under way, but had only gone two hundred yards when the engine suddenly refused to do duty, and it became necessary for the 'Dispatch' to take us in tow. As we passed the fort at the entrance to the harbor the Spanish flag was rather defiantly displayed by that antiquated apology for a fortification, and there was no salute for the American flag, either from the fort or the surrendering sloop of war.

"We had a hard time that night, those of us who were aboard the 'Virginus.' It seemed hardly possible that we could keep afloat until

morning. During the night the navy tug 'Fortune' from Key West met us and remained with the convoy. At noon the next day, when we were about thirty miles south-southeast of Dry Tortugas, the vessels separated, the 'Virginus' and 'Dispatch' going to Tortugas and the 'Fortune' returning, with me as a solitary passenger, to Key West, whence I had the honor of reporting the news to the admiral and of sending an exclusive report of the surrender.

A Scurvy Spanish Trick.

"It was the general opinion among the naval officers that Spain had endeavored to belittle the whole proceeding ordering the smuggling of the 'Virginus' out of Havana, by selecting an obscure harbor not a port of entry as the place of surrender, and by turning the duty of surrender over to a surveying sloop, while the 'Tornado,' which made the capture, lay in the harbor of Havana and the 'Isabella la Catolica,' which had been selected as convoy, steamed back to Havana under cover of the night. The American officers and American residents in Cuba and Key West agreed that our government ought to have required that the 'Virginus' should be surrendered with all the released prisoners on board either at Santiago de Cuba, where the 'Tornado' brought her ill-gotten prey and where the inhuman butcheries were committed, or in Havana, where she was afterward taken in triumph and greeted with the cheers of the excited Spaniards over the humiliation of the Americans.

"An attempt was made to take the 'Virginus' to some Northern port, but the old hulk was not equal to the journey. On the way no pumping or calking could stop her leaks, and she foundered in mid-ocean. The Government had been puzzled to know what disposition to make of her, and there was great relief in official circles to know that she was out of the way.

"The surrender of the surviving prisoners of the massacre took place in course of time at Santiago, owing more to British insistence than to our feeble representations. As to the fifty-three who were killed, the Madrid Government unblushingly denied that there had been any killing, and when forced to acknowledge the fact they put us off with preposterous excuses. 'Butcher Burriel,' by whose orders the outrage was perpetrated, was considered at Madrid to have been justified by circumstances. It was pretended that orders to suspend the execution of Ryan and his associates were 'unfortunately' received

too late, owing to interruption of telegraph lines by the insurgents, to whose broad and bleeding shoulders an attempt was thus made to shift the responsibility. There was a normal repudiation of Burriel's act, and a promise was made to inflict punishment upon those who have offended, but no punishment was inflicted upon anybody. The Spanish Government, with characteristic double-dealing, resorted to procrastination, prevarication, and trickery, and thus gained time until new issues effaced in the American mind the memory of old wrongs unavenged. Instead of being degraded, Burriel was promoted. Never to this day has there been any adequate atonement by Spain."

This war dragged on for ten years, and was finally ended by negotiations conducted by General Martinez de Campos, who was sent to Cuba as Captain General for the express purpose of ending the war. How he did his work has been told by himself at great length. The simple fact is that he prevailed upon the leaders of the insurgents to lay down their arms, partly through bribery and partly through promises of reforms in the government of the island. The final bargain was made at a place called Zanjón, and has since been known as the "Treaty of Zanjón."

General Campos was undoubtedly sincere in his promises to the Cubans. He urged upon the Spanish Government the desirability of fulfilling them to the letter. In his report to the Government he said:

Campos' Wise Words.

"I do not wish to make a momentary peace. I desire that this peace be the beginning of a bond of common interests between Spain and her Cuban provinces, and that this bond be drawn continually closer by the identity of aspirations and the good faith of both.

"Let not the Cubans be considered as pariahs or minors, but put on an equality with other Spaniards in everything not inconsistent with their present condition.

"It was on the other hand impossible, according to my judgment and conscience, not to grant the first condition; not to do it was to postpone indefinitely the fulfillment of a promise made in our present constitution. It was not possible that this island, richer, more populous, and more advanced morally and materially than her sister, Porto Rico, should remain without the advantages and liberties long ago planted in the latter with good results; and the spirit of the age, and

the decision of the country gradually to assimilate the colonies to the Peninsula, made it necessary to grant the promised reforms, which would have been already established, and surely more amply, if the abnormal state of things had not concentrated all the attention of government on the extirpation of the evil which was devouring this rich province.

"I did not make the last constitution; I had no part in the discussion of it. It is now the law, and as such I respect it, and as such endeavor to apply it. But there was in it something conditional, which I think a danger, a motive of distrust, and I have wished that it might disappear. Nothing assures me that the present ministry will continue in power, and I do not know whether that which replaces it would believe the fit moment to have arrived for fulfilling the precept of the constitution.

"I desire the peace of Spain, and this will not be firm while there is war or disturbance in the richest jewel of her crown. Perhaps the insurgents would have accepted promises less liberal and more vague than those set forth in this condition; but even had this been done, it would have been but a brief postponement, because those liberties are destined to come for the reasons already given, with the difference that Spain now shows herself generous and magnanimous, satisfying just aspirations which she might deny, and a little later, probably very soon, would have been obliged to grant them, compelled by the force of ideas and of the age.

"Moreover, she has promised over and over again to enter on the path of assimilation, and if the promise were more vague, even though the fulfillment of this promise were begun, these people would have the right to doubt our good faith and to show a distrust unfortunately warranted by the failings of human nature itself.

"The not adding another 100,000 to the 100,000 families that mourn their sons slain in this pitiless war, and the cry of peace that will resound in the hearts of the 80,000 mothers who have sons in Cuba, or liable to conscription, would be a full equivalent for the payment of a debt of justice."

Results of the War.

It remains to be said that the Spanish Government quickly repudiated almost every promise that had been made by General Campos, and that the state of the island soon became as bad as it had been before the war.

What the war cost Cuba and cost Spain can never be exactly told. According to official Spanish statements, 145,000 soldiers were sent from Spain to the island. It is known that the losses of the patriots, in killed, were more than 45,000. The majority of these were murdered in cold blood in prison after they had surrendered or been captured. Some 13,000 estates belonging to Cubans were confiscated. The cost of the war in money has been estimated at about one billion dollars. It is believed that the Spanish losses, in killed and from disease, amounted to fully 85,000. During the war a university professor at Havana kept a careful record of the number of Cubans the Spaniards officially reported as killed, wounded, or captured. He found at the end of the war that the totals amounted to considerable more than the entire population of the island. This was a fair illustration of the truthfulness of Spanish reports.

After the end of this Ten-Years' War, as it is called, Spanish misgovernment was continued as badly and in many respects worse than before. All the cost of the war was charged against Cuba as a public debt. Dishonesty and corruption became more flagrant than ever before. This was recognized by Spanish leaders at Madrid themselves. Señor Romero Robledo said in the Cortes in 1890 that certain defalcations by the public officers at Havana amounted to nearly twenty-three million dollars. The Government knew of it, but did nothing. General Pando at about the same time said in the Cortes: "How can anyone doubt that corruption exists in the island of Cuba?" General Prendergrast has furnished a list of 350 persons employed in the customhouse and the administration, against whom proceedings have been taken for fraud, and not one of whom has been punished.

Another member of the Cortes in 1895 asserted that since 1878 customhouse frauds in Cuba had amounted to more than one hundred million dollars.

In this manner the Government at Madrid repudiated its own solemn pledges and drove the people of Cuba to despair. Thus the way was cleared for the latest and last rebellion in the "Ever-faithful Isle."



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PRISON OF EVANGELINA CISNEROS.



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ENTRANCE TO HARBOR OF HAVANA — PUNTA PARK.

THE CUBA OF TO-DAY.

CHAPTER II.

Size, Shape, and Situation of the Island—Its Rivers and Harbors—The Vegetation and Climate—Agricultural Products—Mineral Resources—Something about the People—The Negro Population—Religion and Education—The Spanish Government a Military Despotism—Revolting Tyranny.

THE island of Cuba is by far the largest and most important of all the West Indies. Its area is much larger than that of any other; its natural resources are more varied and valuable; and its population, in spite of the ravages of war and the discouragements of bad government, is more numerous than that of any of its neighbors. Its position, whether from the point of view of commerce or of war, lends it especial importance. It is less than 100 miles from the southern extremity of the United States and 130 from Mexico. It commands three important maritime gateways—viz., the Straits of Florida, leading from the Atlantic Ocean into the Gulf of Mexico; the Windward Passage, which leads from the Atlantic into the Caribbean Sea, and the Yucatan Channel, which connects the Caribbean Sea with the Gulf of Mexico.

The general outline of the island has been compared by the Span- ish with that of a bird's tongue. It also resembles that of a hammer-headed shark, the head of which forms the straight south coast of the east end of the island, while the body extends to the westward in a great curve. This analogy is made still more striking by two long, fin-like strings of small islands which extend along the opposite coasts, parallel with the main body of the island. The island extends through 11 degrees of longitude, from the 74th to the 85th meridian, and through nearly 4 degrees of latitude, from 19° 40' to 23° 33'. Its length is 730 miles, and its width varies from 90 miles at the eastern end to less than 20 miles at Havana. Cape Maysi, the eastern extremity, lies directly south of New York, and Cape San Antonio, at the extreme west, is exactly south of Cincinnati. The area of the main island is nearly 43,000 square miles, and that of the smaller adjacent islands about 2600 square miles.

The total area, therefore, is about equal to that of the State of New York.

On this area are to be found almost all kinds of land, including swamps, level plains, plateaus, hills, and high mountains. About one-fourth of the total area is mountainous, while three-fifths are plains, valleys, and low hills. The remainder is swampy. The coast line, with its many curves and indentations, measures nearly 2200 miles. In some parts it is high and steep and at others low and marshy. Along the north coast, between the cities of Havana and Matanzas, are ranges of hills which Humboldt declared to contain some of the most beautiful scenery in the world. In the central part of the island these hills change into extensive plateaus, and at the south side become mountainous and reach a high altitude.

RIVERS AND HARBORS.

The rivers of Cuba are necessarily short, but are numerous and afford excellent drainage to the entire island. The heavy rainfall gives them a copious volume, despite the limited area of watershed. No island in the world of comparable size has anything like so many good harbors as Cuba. Indeed, no equal stretch of coast line in the world is blessed with so many. They are not only numerous, but capacious, deep, and safe. Most of them are pouch-shaped, entrance to them being gained through a comparatively narrow gateway, with high headlands on each side and the interior harbor almost entirely landlocked, expanding into a large open bay. Chief among these harbors are Havana, Matanzas, Nuevitás, Gibara, Nipe, and Baracoa on the north coast, and Guantanamo, Santiago de Cuba, Manzanillo, Trinidad, and Cienfuegos on the south. The last-named is said to be one of the very finest harbors in the world.

THE FLORA.

The surface of the island, as described by Professor Robert T. Hill of the United States Geological Survey (from whom this chapter is largely quoted), is clad in a voluptuous floral mantle which, from its abundance and beauty, first caused Cuba to be designated as the Pearl of the Antilles. In addition to those introduced from abroad, over 3350 native plants have been catalogued. Humboldt said: "We might believe the entire island was originally a forest of palms, wild limes, and orange trees." The flora includes nearly all the characteristic forms of the other West Indies, the southern part of Florida, and the Central American seaboard. Nearly all the large trees of the Mexican

Tierra Caliente, so remarkable for their size, foliage, and fragrance, reappear in western Cuba. Over 30 species of palm, including the famous royal palm (*Oreodoxa regia*), occur, while the pine tree, elsewhere characteristic of the temperate zone and the high altitudes of the tropics, is found associated with palms and mahoganies in the province of Pinar del Rio and the Isle of Pines, both of which take their names from this tree.

Among other woods are the *lignum vitæ*, granadilla, the cocoa wood, out of which reed instruments are made, mahogany, and *Cedrela odorata*, which is used for cigar boxes and linings of cabinet work.

Although three hundred years of cultivation have exterminated the forests from the sugar lands of the center and west, it is estimated that in the hills of those districts and the mountains of the east nearly thirteen million acres of uncleared forest remain.

Rich and nutritious grasses are found throughout the island, affording excellent forage for stock. The pineapple, manioc, sweet potato, and Indian corn are indigenous to the island. When the flora of Cuba is studied geographically, it will doubtless be divided into several subdivisions.

THE CLIMATE.

Climatologic records are not available, except for Havana, and these are not applicable to the whole island, where it is but natural to suppose that the altitudes and positions of the high mountains produce great variations in precipitation and humidity, such as are observable in adjacent islands. The Sierra Maestra probably presents conditions of temperature very nearly the same as the Blue Mountains of Jamaica, where the thermometer at times falls almost to the freezing point.

Everywhere the rains are most abundant in summer, from May to October—the rainy season. As a rule, the rains, brought by the trade winds, are heavier and more frequent on the slopes of the eastern end. At Havana the annual rainfall is 40 inches, of which 28 inches fall in the wet season. This rainfall is not excessive, being no greater than that of our Eastern States. The air at this place is usually charged with 85 per cent. of moisture, which under the tropical sun largely induces the rich mantle of vegetation. The average number of rainy days in the year is 102. There is but one record of snow having fallen in Cuba, namely, in 1856.

At Havana, in July and August, the warmest months, the mean temperature is 82° F., fluctuating between a maximum of 88° and a minimum of 76°; in the cooler months of December and January the thermometer averages 72°, the maximum being 78°, the minimum 58°; the mean temperature of the year at Havana, on a mean of seven years, is 77°; but in the interior, at elevations of over 300 feet above the sea, the thermometer occasionally falls to the freezing point in winter, hoar frost is not uncommon, and during north winds thin ice may form. The prevailing wind is the easterly trade breeze, but from November to February cool north winds (*los nortes*, or "northerners")—the southern attenuation of our own cold waves—rarely lasting more than forty-eight hours, are experienced in the western portion of the island, to which they add a third seasonal change. From 10 to 12 o'clock are the hottest hours of the day; after noon a refreshing breeze (*la virazon*) sets in from the sea. In Santiago de Cuba the average is 80°; that of the hottest month is 84° and that of the coldest 73°.

The whole island is more or less subject to hurricanes, often of great ferocity. The hurricane of 1846 leveled nearly 2000 houses in Havana and sank or wrecked over 300 vessels. In 1896 the banana plantations of the east were similarly destroyed. Earthquakes are seldom felt in the western districts, but are frequent in the eastern.

All in all, the climate of Cuba is much more salubrious than it has been painted. The winter months are delightful—in fact, ideal—while the summer months are more endurable than in most of our own territory. The current impressions of insalubrity have arisen from an erroneous confusion of bad sanitation with the weather. While it is true that sickness follows the seasons, the former would be greatly allayed—almost abated—if public hygiene received proper official consideration.

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS.

Cuba is almost exclusively an agricultural country. Its chief products are sugar from the sugar-cane, tobacco, coffee, bananas, corn, oranges, and pineapples, which are of importance in the order named. The production of cane-sugar is incomparably the most important of all, and heretofore has been the mainstay of the island. This industry had its origin as long ago as 1523, when the king of Spain gave a bounty to everyone who engaged in it. In times of peace the whole vast central plain of the island has been practically one continuous field of sugar-cane. In the year 1892-93 it yielded more than one

million tons, valued at eighty million dollars. The Cuban sugar lands are all on upland soils, far different from the swamps of Louisiana, and excel in fertility all others in the world. It is necessary to replant the cane only once in seven years, instead of every year or two as elsewhere. The plantations vary in extent from one hundred to one thousand acres each, and employ an average of one man to every two acres. Before the plantations were ravaged by the revolution, they were equipped with the most perfect manufacturing machinery in the world.

Tobacco stands next to sugar in importance, and far exceeds it in the profit per acre. It grows well in all parts of the island, but is chiefly cultivated in the extreme western end, which produces the finest tobacco in the world. In addition to plantations for growing leaf tobacco, there are numerous cigar factories in Havana, giving employment to thousands of people. In 1893 more than six million pounds of tobacco and one hundred and thirty-five million cigars were exported.

Coffee growing has declined in importance in recent years. The coffee plantations have all given way to sugar. Bananas and oranges of the finest quality grow wild in all parts of the island. Pineapples are extensively cultivated. Mahogany and logwood have also been among the exports, and at one time indigo formed a considerable article of commerce.

In the eastern provinces of the island, the cattle industry, owing to the fertile grazing lands, reaches large proportions. Horses, goats, and sheep are also bred, though the latter do not do well. Poultry flourishes everywhere, and was, before the war, abundant in all markets. In 1895 the island contained more than one hundred thousand farms and plantations, valued at more than twenty million dollars.

MINERAL RESOURCES.

The mineral resources of the island are iron ores, asphaltum, manganese, copper, and salt. A little gold and silver were mined in past centuries, but never in large quantities. The silver mines of Santa Clara yielded in 1827 140 ounces to the ton, but were soon worked out. The iron mines situated in the mountains a few miles east of Santiago de Cuba are of importance. The production of the Juragua Iron Company in 1890 was 362,068 tons, and constituted one-fourth of the total importation of iron ores into the United States for the same period. These mines were owned by an American company, which

had invested extensive capital in them, but the production has been almost destroyed by the present revolution. The ores are mineralogically peculiar, being the result of replacement in limestone. They are mixed brown and red hematite (turgite).

Asphaltum (chapatote) of unusual richness occurs in several parts of the island, in the beds of late Cretaceous and early Eocene age. At Villa Clara occurs an unusually large deposit of this material, which for forty years has supplied the material for making the illuminating gas of the city. American investors bought these mines the year preceding the revolution, and their investment up to date, which would otherwise have been profitable, has proved a total loss.

Copper of extraordinary richness has been worked on the leeward side of the Sierra Maestra range, twelve miles from Santiago de Cuba. In former years these mines yielded as high as fifty tons per day. Current report asserts that they are still very valuable, but are awaiting the return of peace and development. Salt of great purity is found in the cays adjacent to the north coast.

No manufacturing industries except those of tobacco and sugar have been encouraged, the persistent policy of Spain having been to promote the importation of manufactured articles from the mother country. In the writer's travels over the island only a single industrial establishment was seen, namely, a mill at Baracoa for extracting oil from cocoanuts and making soap.

COMMERCE.

The shipping trade of Cuba, both foreign and coastwise, has been very extensive, the American tonnage alone amounting to 1,000,000 tons a year. About 1200 ocean-going vessels annually clear from the Port of Havana. In 1894 the tonnage of the largest nine ports of the island amounted to more than 3,500,000 tons, carried by 31,181 vessels.

The island is not well supplied with roads. There are less than 1000 miles of railroad—none of it first-class. Wagon roads are poor. Telegraph lines in 1895 measured something more than 2800 miles, including nearly 1000 miles of cables along the coast.

THE CHIEF CITIES.

The capital city, Havana, which boasts of the title of Key of the New World, lies on the west and south side of a splendid harbor, which,

however, has been sadly neglected. It is a picturesque and beautiful city, presenting a brilliant appearance of a European capital. Its commerce is ordinarily enormous, and its extensive parks, drives, and numerous clubs and public institutions give it picturesque variety. It comprises extensive wharfs, fortifications, hospitals, university, a botanical garden, government palaces, and several churches—including a cathedral, which contains the tomb of Columbus, although his dust is not certainly known to repose therein.

West of Havana are several small ports of secondary importance, such as Mariel, Cabanas, and Bahia Honda. Seventy-five miles east is the second city and seaport of northern Cuba, Matanzas. This is the chief outlet for an extensive sugar region. Nature endowed it with a superb harbor, but Spanish neglect has allowed it to become filled up with silt and rubbish, until it is no longer able to receive the largest steamships.

Cardenas is one of the few towns in Cuba founded as late as the present century. It dates back only to 1828.

Cienfuegos, on the southern coast, has a superb harbor, which was first visited in 1508. It is second in commercial importance only to Havana. Trinidad, east of Cienfuegos, has three harbors and is of much importance, dating back to the earliest years of the Spanish conquests.

The great port of the eastern end of the island is Santiago de Cuba. It lies at the inner extremity of one of the largest and finest of the pouch-shaped harbors and commands one of the most magnificent views of land and water to be had in the whole world. There are also numerous inland cities of importance—such as Santa Clara, Esperanza, Puerto Principe, Holguin, and Bayamo.

Upon few subjects connected with Cuba is the world at large so ill-informed as that of its population. No trustworthy census has been taken by the Government for half a century. One was taken in 1887, but is probably filled with errors. It showed the total population to be something more than 1,600,000, of whom more than two-thirds were white and only thirty-two per cent. of the negro race.

Of the total population of Cuba about 30,000 are Chinese male laborers. The Spanish-born, not counting the present army of invasion, probably do not exceed 30,000, while counting all others there are not over 50,000 Caucasian foreigners. This foreign population, except the Chinese, is engaged in office-holding, trade, and shipping, and is largely confined by residence to the cities, which contain fully


one-third of the total population. These foreigners, having no other interest in the welfare of the country than gain of wealth, and possessing no intention of permanent residence, should not be considered in any manner as representative of the Cuban people, although, alas! their voice has, in recent political events, almost drowned that of the true inhabitants.

To the Cubans the foreign Spaniards are known as *Intransigentes*, and between the two classes, the governors and the governed, owing to the despotism of the former, a bitter hatred has existed since 1812, and has been more strongly accentuated since the surrender of Zanjón, in 1876, when the rebellious Cubans laid down their arms under unfulfilled promises of autonomy and local self-government similar to schemes lately presented.

THE CUBANS.

Seventy-five per cent. of the native population of the islands is found outside of the Spanish capital of Havana, which, being the seat of an unwelcome foreign despotism, is no more representative of Cuban life or character than is the English city of Hong-Kong of the rural Chinese. While the Havanese have had the freest communication with the United States during the last three years of the revolution, Americans have had little opportunity to hear from the true white Cuban population. The Cubans are mostly found in the provinces and provincial cities, especially in Pinar del Rio and the eastern provinces of Santa Clara, Puerto Principe, and Santiago. Although of Spanish blood, the Cubans, through adaptation to environment, have become a different class from the people of the mother country, just as the American stock has differentiated from the English. Under the influence of their surroundings, they have developed into a gentle, industrious, and normally peaceable race, not to be judged by the combativeness which they have developed under a tyranny such as has never been imposed upon any other people. The better class of *Camagueynos*, as the natives are fond of calling themselves, are certainly the finest, the most valiant, and the most independent men of the island, while the women have the highest type of beauty. It is their boast that no Cuban woman has ever become a prostitute, and crime is certainly almost unknown among them.

While these people may not possess our local customs and habits, they have strong traits of civilized character, including honesty, family attachment, hospitality, politeness of address, and a respect for the



A BULL FIGHT.



A COCK FIGHT.

Golden Rule. While numerically inferior to the annual migration of Poles, Jews, and Italians into the eastern United States, against which no official voice is raised, they are far too superior to these people to justify the abuse that has been heaped upon them by those who have allowed their judgment to be prejudiced by fears that they might by some means be absorbed into our future population.

Notwithstanding the disadvantages under which the Cubans have labored, they have contributed many members to the learned professions. To educate their sons and daughters in the institutions of the United States, England, and France has always been the highest ambition of the creoles of Cuba and Porto Rico. The influence of their educated men is felt in many countries: the most distinguished professor of civil engineering, two leading civil engineers of our navy, and the most eminent authority on yellow fever in our country belong to this class. Thousands of these people, driven from their beloved island, have settled in Paris, London, New York, Mexico, and the West Indies, where they hold honorable positions in society, and even the exiles of the lower classes, with their superior agricultural arts, have been eagerly welcomed in countries like Jamaica, Mexico, and Florida, which hope to share with Cuba the benefits of its tobacco culture.

The negro population of Cuba, both pure black and mulatto, are much more independent and manly in their bearing than their kinsmen in the United States. Their social privileges are also much greater, and, indeed they are largely treated almost as the equals of the white race. They belong to several distinct classes. Most of them are descendants of slaves imported during the present century. Many of them, however, are descendants from slaves brought into the island by the earliest Spanish settlers. There are also a few who have migrated hither from the United States. As there are no more than half as many negroes as whites in Cuba, and the proportion of negroes is steadily growing smaller and will continue to do so at an increasingly rapid rate, all fear of "negro domination" in the island may be dismissed as idle.

RELIGION AND EDUCATION.

The Roman Catholic religion prevails throughout Cuba. The island is divided into two dioceses. One, under the Archbishop of Santiago de Cuba, contains 55 parishes; the other, under the Bishop of Havana, contains 144 parishes. In the whole island there are prob-

ably not a dozen priests of Cuban birth; the ecclesiastical, as well as the political, functionaries of the island, being imported from Spain.

Education is much neglected. There is not a parish on the whole island that supports an endowed school. At Havana there is a university and four or five professional schools, and, of course, a number of private and public schools of common grade, but for the mass of the people educational facilities are most meager, while all who are able to do so send their children away from the island to the United States or to Europe for instruction.

Since its first settlement Cuba has been treated as a subordinate crown colony. The central and absolute authority of the Crown has been exercised by a Captain General, who has generally wielded the arbitrary power of a czar. He has had the right even to set aside, at will, any judgment of the courts. His authority has been backed, even in times of peace, by a Spanish army much larger than the army of the United States, and with police powers unknown in this country. In addition to the army, there have been thousands of office-holders, high and low, attending to all the public business of the island and drawing all the salaries, and of these ninety-nine per cent. have been mere "carpet-baggers" from Spain.

The lower classes of the Havana male population—porters, draymen, and clerks—are organized into a dangerous and oftentimes uncontrollable military force, known as the Volunteers, who, while never having been known to take the field, are a serious menace to the peace of the city, being feared equally by the authorities, over whose heads they wave the threat of mutiny, especially upon any indication of granting reforms, and by the resident and unarmed Cubans, over whom they hold the threat of massacre. Up to date the record of this organized mob has been a series of horrible crimes, such as shooting down a crowd of peaceable citizens as they emerged from the theater, firing into the office and dining room of a hotel, assaulting the residences of Cuban gentlemen, and in 1871 forcing the authorities to execute forty-three medical students, all boys under twenty, because one of them had been accused of scratching the glass plate on a vault containing the remains of a volunteer. Fifteen thousand volunteers witnessed with exultation this ignoble execution.

While the primary functions of the Government have been to attend to the prerogatives of the Crown and the collection of revenues, its attention has been largely devoted to the personal enrichment of the officials through misfeasance and the prevention of the secession of

the island. It has practically ignored the other functions of government, such as the collection of statistics, the promotion of education, and the establishment of public works and proper public sanitation. Few, if any, educational institutions have been erected at public expense; no public highways have been constructed, nor have any improvements of a public character been made outside of the city of Havana. Even when the Cubans have undertaken such improvements, they have been heavily taxed for the benefit of the Spanish officials. The administration of Cuba is and has been since the settlement of the island an absolute military despotism on the part of the mother country. At periods, dependent upon the personality of the Captain General, there have been epochs of peace and prosperity, but since the middle of the present century the island has been in a state of insurrection, dormant or eruptive, accompanied by a growing hatred between the governing and the governed classes, with constantly increasing restrictions upon the latter. At times the revolting people were reduced to subjection by promises of local self-government, which have invariably been broken.

MILITARY DESPOTISM.

During the present century the Spanish Crown has made various pretenses of giving to the inhabitants of the island greater political privileges, but all of these, down to the latest and present autonomy scheme, have been the merest subterfuges, void of the true essence of local self-government, with a string attachment by which absolute and despotic power remained in the hands of the Spanish Governor General. Thus it was that in February, 1878, the ten-years' revolution was ended by General Campos. Under the stipulations of the treaty the island was allowed to be represented in the Spanish Cortes by 16 senators and 30 deputies; but restrictions were so thrown around their selection that Cubans were practically debarred from participating in the choice of these members, notwithstanding that these so-called representatives were utterly powerless to press any Cuban measure in the Cortes of over 900 members or to put it to a vote.

This military despotism has been accompanied by a system of exorbitant taxation, such as has never been known elsewhere in the world. This has included at times an average of 40 per cent. on all imports, in addition to taxes upon real estate, the industries, arts, professions, the slaughtering of meats, and an odious system of stamp

taxes, which even included in its far-reaching application the affixing of an impost stamp upon every arrival at a hotel. The processes of possible direct taxation being exhausted, the Government even resorted to the establishment of a most nefarious and contaminating lottery system, which yielded a profit of \$4,000,000 annually.

In 1879 the total revenue collected was about \$35,000,000, or \$25 per capita, all of which, except \$98,000, was spent—mostly in the payment of the parasitic horde of intransigente soldiers and office-holders and the Spanish debt. In addition to the legal taxation, the commerce is burdened by a system of illegal taxation in the form of bribes, which are necessary to the securing of any legal action. Little or none of this money was devoted to education, science, public construction, harbor improvements, highways, sanitation, or other benevolent purposes, such as those to which our free government devotes its per capita tax of \$13.65. It is also a remarkable fact, notwithstanding the extravagant taxation, that only about \$100,000,000 have been remitted to the mother country during the past century, most of the revenue having been diverted to maintain the official classes. It is a common assertion that, with the exception of Martinez Campos, no captain general has ever returned to Spain after a four years' intendency except as a millionaire.

REVOLTING TYRANNY.

The right of free speech on the part of the individual citizen has not only been restricted, but the rigorous press law of 1881 requires every editor or manager of a paper to send, duly signed by him, two copies of each issue to government headquarters and two other copies to the district attorney as soon as printed, that it may be seen whether any objectionable remarks are contained therein. Nearly every publication in Cuba has been suspended at some time or other, and its editor fined, imprisoned, or deported to the penal colonies.

The American who undertakes to investigate the history of the Spanish Government in Cuba inevitably finds he has undertaken an unpleasant task. Greed, injustice, bribery, and cruelty have been practiced with such frequency that volumes could be filled with details. Beyond and above all this, however, prominently stands the fact that Spain has thrice endeavored to extinguish the entire native population. The first of these attempts, practiced in former centuries upon the aborigines, was successful. The second attempt was made during the Ten-Years' War by Valmaseda, who wrote:

"Not a single Cuban will remain on this island, because we shoot all those we find in the fields, on their farms, and in every hovel. . . We do not leave a creature alive where we pass, be it man or animal. If we find cows, we kill them; if horses, ditto; if hogs, ditto; men, women, or children, ditto. As to the houses, we burn them. So everyone receives what he deserves—the men with bullets, the animals with the bayonet. The island will remain a desert."

The intentions of this officer were only foiled by the arousal of foreign public sentiment against him, and his replacement by the humane General Campos, who tried to restore peace. The third attempt at extermination, a matter of present history, was made by Weyler, who expressed sentiments as ferocious as those of Valmaseda.

How successful Weyler's policy has been, partially carried out, can be answered by the graves of a fourth of the population, which have been recently filled with victims. The sole remnant of the Cuban people would at this time have consisted of the soldiers of Gomez if Weyler's policy had been continued.

Martinez Campos, who has the reputation of being the best Spaniard ever placed in high authority in Cuba, was sincere when he negotiated the treaty of Zanjón, and thought the Spanish Government was sincere in the liberal plan of reforms, which were generally expected in good faith by a large majority of the people, but as the years went on it became manifest that the whole plan was an illusion and a mockery.

The few deputies Cuba was allowed to send to the Cortes had no weight or position there, and any protests that they made were either ignored or derided. The government of the island became worse and worse. Taxes increased, public works were more neglected, and jobbery and corruption prevailed in all parts of the government. The peninsula stood first—the island last.

Spain, however, recognized the fact that her hold on this colonial possession was gradually weakening, and that something would have to be done to prevent the sword being unsheathed there. Impelled by these considerations, and hearing the first growl of a new "dog of war," she determined to go through certain forms which would give her colonies some faith in her assertions that a more just and liberal government should be meted out to them. So she concocted a farcical home rule for Cuba, put forward in all apparent seriousness, but

only to be a grim joke. Under the name of "home rule," as it was called, it would have fastened the Spanish yoke more firmly than ever upon the island. It must have taken considerable labor and work to get it up, for it was diffuse and extensive. Many rumors reached Cuba of this great and generous act on the part of Spain, and many reports came also that it would *soon* be put into operation. At last it was acknowledged that a huge document labeled "Home Rule" had been received in the palace by General Valeriano Weyler, then Governor and Captain General, which this officer had been instructed in due time to put into operation by properly starting its cumbersome machinery.

Weyler, being bitterly opposed to any and every thing that savored of local Cuban government, found no difficulty in letting this first bundle of "Home Rule" sleep quietly in his official desk. Indeed the time had passed for Spain to make any proposal of this sort. It was too late, and the memory of recent broken pledges too fresh. The Cubans regarded this proposal as a mockery and an insult, and began to see that they would have to fight again before they ever expected to get freedom and justice. Then Spain began to find out that it would be necessary to grant fuller reforms than she had ever granted before. Indeed the idea was conceived in the brain of a statesman at Madrid that the Cubans must have an autonomistic government, purporting to be a real liberal, general, local self-government controlled by a majority of the voters. This autonomistic government was a very curious mechanical contrivance. It looked just and fair, but, on examination, the close observer could see a string attached to almost all of its most important features, one end of the string being in Madrid after passing through the hands of the Spanish Captain General at Havana.

But at that time the storm had gathered; heavy clouds, dark with discontent and rebellion against the Spanish authorities, were ready to burst, and war was an accomplished fact. "We have not counted the number of our enemies," said one of the Cuban leaders, "but we have cast up an account of our grievances, we have weighed the mass of injustice which crushes us." "We may find ruin and death a few steps ahead; so be it, we do our duty." "The people of Cuba require liberty and independence to become a factor in the community of civilized nations." "The field lies entirely with Spain." "Cuba is the defender of its rights."

The first "Home Rule" bill was finally published on the 24th of

February, 1895, and a few weeks thereafter the new Cuban Republic was proclaimed.

José Martí was the chief organizer of this movement. He had been in New York City for many years, gaining knowledge in literary and artistic pursuits. After making an attempt to get up an expedition, which was stopped by the United States authorities at Fernandina, Fla., he went to San Domingo to see Maximo Gomez, who had been one of the leaders in the Ten-Years' War, and with him landed in the month of May, and raised the flag of the Cuban Republic at Cubitas, a small town among the mountains of the province of Puerto Principe, near the eastern end of the island. At that time there were some 19,000 Spanish troops on the island in addition to 50,000 volunteers. It was not until Martí, Gomez, and other leaders arrived in Cuba that the magnitude of the movement was appreciated. As soon as the Madrid authorities were informed that another revolution was in progress they sent over 7000 additional troops at once, making on the island about 76,000 men.

Martí, at the outbreak of the Ten-Years' War, was only thirteen years old, but seemed to be considered a dangerous person, because he was sent to Spain for conspiring against the Government, and was kept him in an unwholesome prison until his life was in danger, and was then released under the condition that he would remain in Spain the rest of his life.

While in Spain he went to the University of Saragossa, where he graduated with much honor; after that he went to France, and then came to the United States. The Ten-Years' War was then nearly at its end, but he immediately joined it.

An expedition which he organized and brought from Mexico proved a failure, but Martí escaped and went to Central America, where he became a university professor.

As is known, he came to Cuba afterward and lost his life in defense of her cause.

During the summer or rainy season practically a truce prevailed. The prevalence of yellow fever and other diseases, the intense heat and daily thunderstorms, forced to a great extent the suspension of active operations, though the Cubans were affected less by these climatic changes than were the Spaniards. The Spanish army was largely increased before the opening of the fall campaign, for the purpose of promptly suppressing this insurrection. The Cubans upon their side had been recruiting and drilling, and thus were made more effective.

On the 19th of September at Anton, in the province of Puerto Principe, a formal proclamation of the independence of Cuba was made, and a form of republican government was organized, and the Constitution promulgated. The officers of state were the following:

President, Salvador Cisneros Betancourt of Puerto Principe; Vice President, Bartolomé Maso of Manzanillo; Secretary of War, Carlos Roloff of Santa Clara; Vice Secretary of War, Mario Menocal of Matanzas; Secretary of Foreign Relations, Rafael Portuondo y Tamayo of Santiago de Cuba; Vice Secretary of Foreign Relations, Fermin Valdis Dominguez of Havana; Secretary of Finance, Joaquin Castillo Duany of Santiago de Cuba; Secretary of the Interior, Santiago Canizares of Remedios; Vice Secretary of the Interior, Carlos du Bois of Baracoa; General in Chief, Maximo Gomez; Lieutenant General, Antonio Maceo. José Maceo, Maso, Capote, Serafin Sanchez, and Rodrigues were appointed Major Generals: José Maceo to lead the operations in Baracoa, Guantanamo, Mayari, and Santiago de Cuba; Maso in Manzanillo, Bayamo, and Holguin; Sanchez in the Villas; and Rodrigues in Camaguey.

Betancourt, the President, was also the President during the Ten-Years' War, and was known as the Marquis of Santa Lucia. Maso, the Vice President, has been noticed before. Roloff, the War Secretary, was born in Poland, but came to Cuba at an early age. He was also in the Ten-Years' War, and afterward became a leading citizen of Cienfuegos. Menocal came of a well-known family, one of whose members has long been in the United States service, and has been much heard of in connection with the Nicaragua Canal.

A battle was fought in the later part of August midway between Santiago de Cuba and Guantanamo, where the Spanish Colonel, Canellas, attacked the camp of José Maceo, the Spaniards being victorious. After this another battle was fought at Peralejo, Marshal Campos commanding the Spanish troops, and Antonio Maceo the Cubans. In this encounter the Spaniards were routed with heavy loss, Campos himself narrowly escaping capture.

The town of Baire was next taken by the Cubans, and another victory was won at Decanso del Muerto. Gomez then desired to march west in the direction of Havana, declaring he would eat his Christmas dinner between Havana and Matanzas.

An order was issued by him to the sugar planters in the provinces of Havana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara, forbidding them to grind cane or to manufacture sugar. This was done in order to deprive the Span-



GOVERNOR GENERAL'S HOUSE, HAVANA.



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MAXIMO GOMEZ — GENERAL-IN-CHIEF OF THE CUBAN ARMY
OF LIBERATION.

ish Government of the revenue received from the sugar trade. The order was as follows:

"In accordance with orders of the Provisional Government, and to the end that no one may allege ignorance, I hereby make known to the sugar manufacturers, cane planters (Colonos) and proprietors of the zone under my command:

"First. The building and cane fields of all plantations will be considered and respected, provided no work is given to any able-bodied laborer, nor the operations of grinding begun.

"Second. When there are no fortifications nor forces located in the same for their protection.

"Third. A term of ten days is hereby granted for the suspension of all work, the destruction of the fortifications, and the withdrawal of the troops.

"Fourth. Those who contravene this order will be severely punished and their buildings and cane fields reduced to ashes."

Campos met this with a counter proclamation, ordering the planters to go on with their usual work, and promising them full protection. The richest parts of the island were desolated, and they were filled day and night with the smoke of burning plantations along Gomez's line of march. The planters obeyed Gomez and stopped grinding, whereupon he issued the following proclamation:

"HEADQUARTERS OF THE LIBERATING ARMY OF CUBA,

"Sugar estate, 'Mirosa,' January 10, 1896.

"In consideration that the crop has been suspended in the western districts, and, whereas, it is not necessary that the burning of the cane fields should continue, I dispose the following:

"Article 1. The burning of the cane fields is now prohibited.

"Article 2. Those who contravene this disposition, whatsoever be their category or rank in the army, will be treated with the utmost severity of military discipline in behalf of the moral order of the revolution.

"Article 3. The buildings and machinery of the sugar estates will be destroyed, if in spite of this disposition they should intend to renew their works.

"Article 4. The pacific inhabitants of the island of Cuba, what-

soever be their nationality, will be respected, and agricultural laborers will not be interfered with.

"The General in Chief,

"M. GOMEZ."

To prevent the insurrectionists from continuing their march to the western end of the island, and invading the rich tobacco plantations of Pinar del Rio, the Spaniards constructed clear across the island a trocha or ditch with a barb-wire fence on one side of it, and block-houses at intervals. It did not seem, however, to answer the purpose, because Antonio Maceo finally reached the province of Pinar del Rio, and upon this march proved that he was an excellent soldier and possessed daring and dashing qualities.

Marshal Campos was too conscientious and honest a man to deal with the questions now rapidly coming up for solution as Spain would like to have them dealt with, or to carry out the instructions his Government thought necessary to give to meet the situation, and was too humane to please the Spanish official ring.

Valeriano Weyler, who had been one of Valmaseda's lieutenants in the Ten-Years' War, was then made Governor and Captain General. It is reported that Campos said of him at the time that if he ever returned to Cuba the very dead would rise to fight against him, and a Spanish soldier also said of him in the *Saturday Review*:

"When Don Valeriano Weyler came out to command us he got together the greatest rascals in the country under the name of Volunteers, and if the regular soldiers under Weyler were cruel to the country folk, the Volunteers were far worse. They perpetrated every crime on the defenseless country folk, and the women and children suffered every outrage at their hands.

"Weyler believed in killing people wholesale to strike terror into the insurgents, but it did very little good. The insurgents played the same game. They killed all of our men whom they took prisoners. When Gomez broke through the 'trocha' between Jucaro and Moron a couple of years ago, he shot all of his prisoners. We had been doing the same by Weyler's orders, and indeed he forced us to shoot down defenseless non-combatants.

"It was enough to be discovered to be a distant relation of an insurgent to receive sentence of death. Boys and women were shot, sick and wounded in Cuban hospitals were bayoneted, and when once

or twice a lad in the ranks, fresh from Spain, refused to obey the order to kill, he was promptly shot by his own officer.

"We soldiers, however, generally got into the habit of killing, and did not think much of it, but we were never such savages as the Volunteers. Who were the Volunteers? They were the fellows enlisted from the Spaniards of the towns, and were ten times as bitter as we soldiers against the Cubans, and the Cubans hated them worse than they hated us.

"He was certainly a strong man, Weyler, and a great deal harder and crueller than Martinez Campos; but he was just like the others; he filled his pockets while he was in office, and they say he came home with a big fortune."

Weyler reached Havana on the 10th of February, 1896, on the steamer "Alfonso XIII.," and was received with great enthusiasm by the Spaniards.

In landing he made a short speech to the soldiers, "You know my record; well, I intend to live up to it." The next day he issued a formal address to the army in which he said:

"The address which I made yesterday will give you an idea of the spirit and policy of your new Governor General, and similarly the direction of the general opinion in Spain favoring the bringing of all necessary means to bear upon the suppression of the insurrection. Knowing these and knowing my character, I would add nothing else to direct the line of conduct which you may follow. But I think it convenient to add some instructions at present, and to state that the insurrection and the recent march of the principal leaders thereof without its being possible for the Spanish columns to prevent it, indicates indifference on the part of the inhabitants, and also fear and discouragement. I cannot understand their inactivity while their property is being destroyed. Spaniards cannot sympathize with insurgents. It is necessary, at any cost, to oppose this state of things, and reanimate the spirit of the inhabitants.

"I have come disposed to help all loyal citizens. I am at the same time disposed to make use of all the rigor of the law against those who in any form help the enemy, speak well of them, or discredit the prestige of Spain, of its army, or volunteers. All who are with our side must demonstrate the fact with acts, and leave in their attitude no place for doubt in proving that they are Spaniards.

"Because the defense of the country demands sacrifices, it is neces-

sary that towns should establish their own defenses. They should not fail to provide guides for the army, and to give news of the enemy when they are in the vicinity. The case should not be repeated that the enemy be better informed than ourselves. The enemy and the vigor which they employ should serve as an example to show us the line of conduct which we must follow in all circumstances.

"You will detain and put at my disposal, or submit to the tribunals, those who, in any way I have described, show help or sympathize with the rebels. I promise myself that you, by fulfilling these instructions, will give valuable help to the good of the Spanish cause."

He also issued an address to the people of Cuba, in which he said:

"I take charge with the confidence which never abandons the cause of preserving the island for Spain. I shall be always generous with those who surrender, but will have the decision and energy to punish rigorously those who in any way help the enemy.

"Without having in mind any political mission, I would not oppose the government of his Majesty when in its wisdom, having peace in Cuba, it should think it convenient to give this country reforms with the same spirit of love in which a mother gives all things to her children. People of Cuba, lend me your help! So you will defend your own interests, which are the interests of the country."

We are told General Weyler promised to end the war in thirty days. He told the delegation of sugar planters who called upon him on the 15th of February that by the 15th of March he would have peace and order established throughout the island so that they could go to work everywhere without fear of molestation. Twenty per cent. of the crop had already been destroyed, but if he could keep his promise it meant the saving of forty-five million dollars' worth of sugar, but the difficulty of these planters commencing grinding lay in the fact that they did not have Weyler's promise indorsed by Gomez and Maceo. The new Captain and Governor General issued at this time the following proclamation; defining those who were to be subject to trial by court-martial:

"First. Those who invent or circulate by any means whatever news or information directly or indirectly favorable to the rebellion

will be considered guilty of acts against the security of the country, as defined by Article 223 of the military code, as they thereby facilitate the operations of the enemy.

"Second. Those who destroy or damage railroads, telegraphs or telephones, or interrupt the operation of the same.

"Third. Those who are guilty of arson.

"Fourth. Those who sell, carry, or deliver arms or ammunition to the enemy or in any other way facilitate their introduction through the customhouses. Parties failing to cause the seizure of such arms or ammunition will incur criminal responsibility.

"Fifth. Telegraph operators delivering war messages to other persons than the proper officials.

"Sixth. Those who by word of mouth, through the medium of the press, or in any manner, shall belittle the prestige of Spain, the army, Volunteers, firemen, or other forces operating with the army.

"Seventh. Those who by the same means shall praise the enemy.

"Eighth. Those who shall furnish the enemy with horses or other resources of warfare.

"Ninth. Those who act as spies will be punished to the fullest extent of the law.

"Tenth. Those who shall act as guides to the enemy and fail to surrender themselves immediately, and give proof of their loyalty and report the strength of the force employed by the enemy.

"Eleventh. Those who shall adulterate the food of the army or alter the prices of provisions.

"Twelfth. Those using explosives in violation of the decree of October 17, 1895.

"Thirteenth. Those who shall use pigeons, rockets, or signals to convey news to the enemy.

"Fourteenth. The offenses above mentioned are punishable by the penalty of death or life imprisonment, the judges to take summary proceedings."

In another proclamation he commanded all the inhabitants of the provinces of Santiago and Puerto Principe to present themselves at army headquarters and obtain passports. To go about the country it would be necessary to have these passes. All stores in the country were to be closed and their contents given up. And all persons not obeying these orders were to be arrested and sent to Havana for military trial as traitors. The result of these orders was that thousands

of innocent non-combatants were arrested and many of them put to death.

Still another proclamation followed:


"The authorities of the villages who will show themselves friendly within a term of ten days, and those of the vicinity of the same, and all those within its limits that are engaged in the insurrection, are warned to surrender themselves within the space of fifteen days from the publication of this proclamation, otherwise they will be subject to arrest; and well-disposed persons will be held to their civil responsibilities, and to effect this it will be proposed to the Governor General to nominate a body which will see to carrying this out. If in the case of insurgent parties who have sacked, robbed, burned, or committed other outrages during the rebellion, anyone will give information as to the participation that such persons may have had in them, not only those who may have been in the rebel ranks, but also those who have succored them, or who have not remained in their homes, they will be fittingly punished; and, moreover, if any town or other place where robberies have been effected is known to them, they will be required to make identification that proper responsibility may be fixed."

Weyler's policy was quickly put into execution. On February 22 occurred the hideous massacre of Guatao, the first of a series of such affairs which shocked the world. A small body of insurgents fell in with a large Spanish force and took to flight after a little firing. Near Guatao they scattered and took to the woods. The Spanish troops, enraged at not being able to capture them, went on to the village of Guatao, which the rebels had not even entered, and wreaked their wrath upon it. They deliberately massacred all the inhabitants they could find, men, women, and children. A milkman who was making his rounds was the first victim. They then came to a cottage where a man lay sick. His wife came to the door to see what was wanted. They clubbed her to death with musket butts, and then went in and bayoneted the sick man in his bed. This was only a few miles from Havana. A report of the case was made to Weyler, praising the soldiers for their bloody crimes, and saying, "they have done to-day what your Excellency did so gloriously thirty years ago."

Nor was this the only massacre, but, as we have said, merely the first of many. Weyler gave his officers the power of life or death over all the people they came in contact with. A large portion of these

commanders believed Weyler to be a man who would quickly approve any extreme on their part. They looked for no punishment for summary executions of Cubans who sympathized with the insurgents. They expected praise and promotion for shooting prisoners, and for any and every act of brutality, committed under the guise of suppressing the insurrection.

Fitzhugh Hall



"NEW YORK" AND "PORTER" INTERRUPTING ITALIAN MAN-OF-WAR OFF HAVANA.

CUBA, 1492-1800.

By JOSEPH WHEELER, Major-General, U. S. V.

CHAPTER III.

Cuba, the "Queen of the Antilles," the key of the Gulf of Mexico, was for centuries the fairest gem in the crown of Spain. Fair and luxuriant as the fabled isles of olden mythology, it burst upon the admiring gaze of the Spanish explorers; for its discovery was coincident with the first voyage of Columbus to the New World. Sailing southwesterly from Guanahani, on the 28th of October, 1492, the mariners sighted the rocky shores of Cuba, and after coasting westwardly for three days, entered the harbor of Maternillos. The length of the coast line and the appearance of the land confirmed the belief of Columbus that he had reached the eastern extremity of India, and that he stood upon the shores of the continent which was the object of his search. Finding that the country was inhabited, he sent a number of officers to visit the Cacique and open friendly negotiations with him. The chieftain was found in a village consisting of about fifty houses, with 1,000 inhabitants. These people are described as gentle, friendly and hospitable, indolent and fond of ease, with little industry, and expert only as hunters and fishers. They regaled their visitors with abundance of native fruits, yams, and Indian corn. They slept in hammocks and made an immoderate use of tobacco. They were not acquainted with the use of iron, but used implements of wood, stone or shell. They had no domestic animals; in fact the only indigenous quadruped found on the island was the hutia, an arboreal creature, about fifteen inches long, black in color and resembling a rat.


It was discovered later that the government of these islands was portioned among nine tribes, each having its own ruler, and all living in harmony. Their religious belief was a very simple one, and included but one supreme Deity; indeed they received the Spaniards with open arms as messengers from God, and would have been ready and willing converts to Christianity, had their friendly docility later met with adequate response from the white invaders, who allowed their greed for gold and conquest to crush every sentiment of justice and humanity.



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*A Mr. Lee General y Consul de
 la ciudad de Valparaiso como recuerdo
 de amistad y
 buenas relaciones
 Valo Weyler*

TO MR. LEE, CONSUL GENERAL OF THE U. S., AS A SOUVENIR OF FRIENDSHIP AND GOOD WISHES OF VALO. WEYLER.



MAJOR-GENERAL JOSEPH WHEELER.

Columbus continued his explorations of the Cuban coast and returned to Spain fully convinced that he had discovered the eastern shore of Asia. He again visited the island, sailing thither April 4, 1494, from San Domingo. During this visit he discovered the Isle of Pines, and visited Guantanamo, sighting Cape Cruz and naming the ocean reefs in that vicinity "Jardines de la Reyna," (The Queen's Gardens). He first named the country Juana, in honor of Prince John. It was consecutively named Ferdinandina, Santiago, and Ave Maria; and it finally became known under its original Indian name, Cuba. It was also known by some of the old geographers as La Lengua de Pajaro, the Sparrow's Tongue, from a fancied resemblance in form to the shape of a bird's tongue.

Although Columbus and his officers had signed a statement declaring this land to be a continent, in a few years it was deemed necessary to prove this, and Sebastian Ocampo was sent to make further explorations. He circumnavigated the island in 1508, and strongly recommended its colonization, praising the fertility of its soil and its excellent harbors, especially that of Havana. The northern and western part was, however, for a long time neglected, all the earlier settlements being along the southeastern coast as more convenient and accessible from the islands already colonized by Spain, as well as from the mainland of South America.

In 1511, Diego Columbus, governor of San Domingo, sent Diego Velasques to explore and colonize the Island of Cuba. Landing near Cape Maysi he found himself opposed by the natives under the leadership of the Cacique Hatuei, who, having learned by bitter experience in San Domingo the real character of the white man, had fled to the Cubans and endeavored to arouse these gentle and peaceful people against the designs of the invaders. They were, however, easily subjugated and soon found that resistance was hopeless. They were either enslaved or exterminated, and in spite of the efforts of Queen Isabella, the many laws passed in favor of these unfortunate natives, and the protests of the zealous missionaries, in the course of a few years many thousands of these unfortunate people became victims of the rapacious greed and inhumanity of their conquerors. In beautiful contrast to the barbarous conduct of the Spanish cavaliers, stands out the noble character of Bartholomew Las Casas, the first priest ordained in the New World, the "Apostle to the Indians," whose long life of ninety-two years was a saintly protest against the iniquity of his fellow-countrymen. He made twelve voyages across the ocean

in the service of his Indian protégés. In 1522 he wrote his celebrated book on "The Destruction of the Indians." Twenty years later, fifty years after the discovery of the West Indies, he wrote his history of the rule of the Spaniards in these islands, and while the numbers of the natives given by him are greatly exaggerated, still he is held to be a trustworthy historian in other respects. In his celebrated thirty "Propositions" as to the duties of the Spanish sovereigns towards their heathen subjects, he says:

"The kings of Spain have from the first given and reiterated their orders against war and the ill-treatment of the Indians."

Las Casas has been criticised for having countenanced the importation of negro slaves into Cuba. He afterwards acknowledged that this was a mistake, and that he acted under a delusion. His impression at the time was that the negro slaves brought to America were to be only those born in servitude, and that by using these stronger and hardier laborers, the weak and delicate aborigines might be saved from total destruction. He survived Columbus sixty years, and his life and writings present a sad commentary upon the customs of the age and nation in which he lived. The wholesale slaughter of natives was checked by selfish motives only after there were a mere handful of these "gentle savages" left.

Las Casas was not the only one to lift his voice in behalf of the oppressed. Even before him the Dominicans, as early as 1501, informed Ferdinand of the abuse of the natives by the system of *repartimiento*, or dividing them among the white landholders; and long after his time there were repeated appeals made to the monarch, notably one by Mendosa, in 1650. But as we have seen, the royal decrees and the protests of the good were defied by these barbarous colonists; and such has been the case in the Spanish colonies, with a few shining exceptions, to the present day.

In considering these events we must not lose sight of the fact that the conditions of the age were so very different from those under which we live as to be difficult for us to realize. It is little more than a century since the first regular mail, and that only one of "once in three months" was established between Spain and her colonies. The sixteenth century was in many respects a wild and lawless age; the statute books of every country were disgraced by laws which at this day would be looked upon as barbarous and inhuman; voyages which are now accomplished in a few days then occupied as many months; there was no rapid nor reliable means of communication even be-

tween countries upon the same continent; land and sea swarmed with reckless and daring brigands and freebooters, ready to waylay and murder an inoffensive and defenseless traveler; and human rights were held of small consequence by those who had the power to trample upon them. Centuries of war against an encroaching, invidious foe in the fastnesses of Spain had developed in the Spanish people an overmastering passion for war and conquest and tyrannical oppression of the conquered, with a species of contempt for those heroic and gentle men and women who appealed to the higher and nobler attributes of man or threatened him with a retribution affecting only his spiritual and eternal destiny.

Another cause of the degeneracy of the settlers in the West Indies is found in the fact that the worst element of the Spanish population swarmed with the adventurers to the New World, drawn hither by the greed of gold and conquest and the prospect of unrestrained lawlessness. The very advantages of the country were against the moral uplifting of the colonists. Abundance of gold could be wrung from the timid, defenseless natives; the rich soil gave forth an exhaustless supply of fruit; the luxurious, enervating climate invited indolence. There was nothing in their surroundings to stimulate the austere virtues cultivated by the Puritans of New England, who had sought a retreat in the wilds of North America, and who were early trained to patient endurance of hardships, industry, rigid economy and self-reliance, and were checked by the very nature of their surroundings in the intolerance which would have ruined their free institutions.

Spain was not at this time behind the other nations of Europe; in fact she was at the zenith of her glory and excelled in diplomacy, in arms and in letters. A brilliant galaxy of scholars and writers surrounded the throne of Philip II. For centuries of mediæval history Spain had been the stronghold of civil liberty in Europe, and had held out stubbornly against the encroachments of feudalism; but the centuries of wars with the Moors had brought a change; and the narrow policy which confined the elevating and humanizing influences of intellectual culture to the privileged few, left the masses in a state of ignorance. The magnificence of the king and his court had to be maintained by gold and silver from the mines of the West. Extravagant waste of treasures, neglect of agriculture and commerce, made a constant demand for revenue which could be supplied only by grinding out the lives of the hapless Americans. The offices in the colonies were portioned out among the most reckless and worth-

less of the court favorites, and the governor who made the highest record at home was he who wrung from the wretched Cubans the greatest amount of gold. Another cause of the decadence of Spain in material wealth is found in the expulsion of the Moors by Philip III. These conquered people had almost monopolized the trades and commerce of Spain, pursuits scorned by the cavaliers, who cared only for military renown, and their sudden and violent expulsion caused the destruction of the main source of home wealth.

These reflections explain, while they do not palliate, much less excuse, the excesses of the men, who, while boasting of their faith and chivalry, made of them but a cloak for the most sordid and degrading passions, and set at naught the labors of the virtuous, self-sacrificing and devoted to be found in every nationality.

The capital of Cuba was established first at Baracoa in 1518. The seat of government was transferred in 1522 to Santiago de Cuba, which for a long time was the most important city. Early in the century, a town named San Cristobal de la Habana, in honor of the great discoverer, was founded in the southern part of the island, but the name was transferred in 1519 to the place where the city of Havana now stands. The city was destroyed by a French privateer in 1538, was rebuilt and fortified, and in 1549 became the residence of the governor; but the seat of government remained long in the South. In 1538, Hernando de Soto was governor, and during his absence on the continent the province was ruled by a lady, Dona Isabel de Bobadilla.

The incursions of the French privateers became more alarming every year. In 1555 Jacques Sorie surprised Havana, plundered and pillaged it; in 1599 Megander pillaged Port Rico, and John de la Roche plundered the ships and battlements near Carthagena.

In 1578, under the governor, Don Francesco Carreno, vast quantities of timber, we are told, were shipped from Cuba to the mother country to contribute towards the construction of the convent and palace of the Escorial. About this time the church of San Cristobal was built in Havana on the spot now occupied by the residence of the Captain-General. In 1589, Havana was formally made the seat of government, and Don Juan de Tejida was appointed Captain-General. During his administration the construction of the Morro and the Punta was commenced, the place received the title of Ciudad, and a coat of arms was granted consisting of three castles argent — alluding to the Fuerza, Morro and Punta — and a golden key, the whole

surmounted by a crown. Cuba has been known since the time of its first Governor, Velasques, as "The Key of the New World."

In 1607, the island was divided into two separate provinces. Piratical incursions increased to such an alarming extent that the seaboard was continually menaced. Santiago was strongly fortified in 1630, the defenses consisting of the fortresses Morro, on a rocky eminence overlooking the harbor, and La Estrella, a fortification on the same side of the bay, but much less elevated, being erected near the level of the water.

In 1655, the attitude of the English commonwealth, and the squadron sent to America by Cromwell, gave rise to apprehensions for the safety of the Spanish possessions, and these fears were realized when Jamaica was attacked, the Spanish defenders dispersed, the governor killed, and the Spanish inhabitants compelled to flee to Cuba.

About this time, the pirates became more and more formidable; the French by gradual encroachments got possession of San Domingo, assisted by the English in Jamaica. Up to 1697 San Domingo, where the first permanent Spanish settlements were planted, was a Spanish colony; but in that year the western portion was ceded to France; in 1785 that country obtained possession of the whole island; in 1801 it was abandoned by Spain; and with the exception of a fleeting sovereignty there, from 1806 to 1821, she never recovered possession of it.

In 1658 Puerto Principe and Santiago were sacked by pirates, and Puerto Principe a second time, shortly after. During the whole of this century piracy reigned supreme; and it was not for many years that, by erecting stronger fortifications and adopting the most forcible measures, the governors of the island began to get control of and finally exterminated piracy on their borders. In 1675 the city of Santiago was destroyed by an earthquake.

In the eighteenth century, riots broke out on the island, caused by some oppressive measures of the royal governors.

In 1716 the government of Havana was so arranged by royal decree that in case of the absence, illness or death of the Captain-General, the chief authority should devolve successively upon the Triente Rey, the castellano of the Morro, the sergeant-major of the garrison, the senior captain of infantry. By this arrangement the clashing of authority in time of disaster was effectually prevented.

In 1741 Admiral Vernon, with an English fleet, attempted the seizure of Santiago, but was repulsed. American colonists took part

in this expedition. It is thought that Lawrence Washington accompanied some Virginia troops thus engaged. Admiral Vernon was the officer in whose honor Mt. Vernon was named.

In 1755 the English made a landing and attempted to take Havana by storm; but, as the Spanish story goes, the noise made by the land-crabs and the lights of the fireflies impressed them with the idea that an immense army of defense was opposing them, and the invaders retreated precipitately to their ships. This was called by the Cubans "The miracle of the crabs." Those who have heard the march of the land-crabs and seen the display of the phosphorescent insects of Cuba will not find this story incredible.

June 6, 1762, Havana was attacked by the English under Admiral Pococke and Lord Albemarle. The city was at that time protected by a mediæval wall, flanked by the three fortresses already mentioned. Dense forests, which have since been cleared away, grew in the vicinity. The Spanish troops were hastily massed at Guanabacoa, but were driven back into the city, which was besieged for more than two months. In the course of the siege the Spaniards caused three large warships to be sunk in the mouth of the harbor to prevent the entrance of the English vessels, which anchored outside, thinking the channel was completely obstructed. After the fall of the city, they entered without difficulty, proving the uselessness of the sacrifice, which had not been made without loss of life on the part of the Spanish seamen.

The efforts of the English to overcome the fire from the forts by their naval guns was unsuccessful and resulted in great destruction to their vessels; but by feints at points where the noncombatants of the city had taken refuge, they so diverted the attention of the besieged as to gain a secure footing on shore, and gradually surrounded the city. They gained possession of an eminence which commanded the guns of the Morro; and the opportune arrival of a convoy from Jamaica enabled them to reduce the Spanish guns so effectually that by July 16th they were silenced altogether.


July 27th the spirits of the besiegers were raised by the arrival of long-expected reinforcements from North America, Colonial troops from New York, New Jersey and Connecticut, under General Phineas Lyman and Colonel Israel Putnam. On the 29th the investment of the city being completed and the Captain-General having positively refused to surrender, a breach was made in the walls and the victorious English troops swarmed in. The gallant Captain-

General Velasco and the Marquis Gonzales, next in command, fell mortally wounded, and Morro Castle was taken after a siege of forty-four days; but the capitulation of the city was not accomplished until the 13th of August, and included the territory surrounding the city, nine ships of war, more than a thousand prisoners and property amounting to about three million pounds sterling. The Spaniards had lost besides about one thousand killed and wounded, and five battle ships destroyed. The loss of the English was 1,790 killed, wounded and dead from exposure to the diseases incident to a summer campaign in the tropics. The brave Velasco was mourned and honored by both friend and foe; and it was ordered that to commemorate his heroism, there should always be a ship in the Royal Armada bearing the name of Velasco. His son was afterwards made Visconde del Morro, by the king of Spain.

The terms of the capitulation were very favorable to the vanquished, but they were not strictly complied with. Some of the church property was seized by the English governor, onerous taxes were imposed, and those who protested against these measures were expelled from the province as seditious characters, and were otherwise maltreated; but the foreign occupation came to an end with the declaration of peace in 1763, and the English garrison returned to Europe. The forts, hospitals and other institutions were rebuilt, and customs duties were established in 1764. About 1768 the Jesuits were expelled by Governor Bucarly, and their church became the cathedral.

In 1790, San Domingo was racked by a bloody revolution, but the Island of Cuba enjoyed profound peace, and welcomed with open arms many of the refugees from her sister isle. This is known as the golden age of Cuba, owing to the wise and beneficent rule of the Captain-General Don Luis de las Casas. The city was paved, schools were established, the administration of justice was improved, public roads were constructed, the first public library and the first newspapers were founded and the Casa de Beneficiencia, a noted charitable institution, was built. This is one of the most remarkable institutions, and it is said that similar ones exist in the other Spanish colonial possessions. Many hundreds of young people are educated and provided for, the young women being allowed to remain there as long as they wish, and if they marry from the institution being provided with dowries as daughters of the house. A description of Cuba, written about the year 1830, speaks of 230 young inmates at this home,


Another circumstance very beneficial to Cuba about the opening of the century was the influx of Spanish population of the better class from the possessions alienated from the mother country. Many of the judges who had continued to reside in San Domingo after the cession of that island to the French, thus greatly obstructing the administration of justice in Cuba, removed in 1797 to Puerto Principe. About this time the French made a descent upon the island, but were persuaded by diplomatic measures to depart without doing much damage. It was about this time that the cultivation of the coffee plant, which soon became the source of a most profitable revenue, was introduced into Cuba. Bees from Europe were introduced, and in 1772 the exportation of wax was commenced. The most important industrial pursuits were the manufacture of sugar, coffee, tobacco and wax. Rice and maize were also raised in abundance.



FIRING ON BATTERY AT SANTIAGO BY SEARCH-LIGHT.



GOVERNOR GENERAL'S PALACE, HAVANA.



HAVANA MARKET.

CUBA, 1800-1868.

CHAPTER IV.

The wise and humane administration of Captain-General Las Casas confirmed the loyalty of the Cubans to the throne of Spain, a loyalty boldly attested and stoutly maintained throughout the stormy days of revolution, when almost every country in Europe seemed rocked by the waves of popular uprisings or foreign invasion. When the news of the overthrow of the Spanish dynasty by Napoleon reached Cuba in 1808, the municipal corporations of the island unanimously declared war against the French emperor; and Jose Aleman, an emissary in the interest of King Joseph, was captured and executed in Cuba July 13, 1810. The loyalty of the island at the time merited the title of "Ever Faithful Isle."

Between the years 1810 and 1830 Spain lost one after another of her American colonial possessions, not so much through the action of a united people, inspired by the lofty motives of patriotism and a love of liberty, as through European hostilities and political intrigues, turned to advantage by more or less unscrupulous adventurers. Venezuela, Buenos Ayres, Chili, Peru, Mexico and the states of Central America followed one another in rapid succession, and with rare exceptions have groaned ever since in the throes of alternate anarchy and despotism.

Had Spain been as wise as England, and profited as the latter did by experience, she could have retained with little difficulty the fairest of her American possessions, the Pearl of the Antilles. But her policy has never advanced an iota towards the ideal of colonial government, where the laws are in favor of the governed and the advantages are on their side rather than on the side of the mother country. Cuba has been always governed by foreigners; to be a native of the island was in itself a mark of inferiority and a cause of being deprived of any share in the government. Arbitrary governors and swarms of officials, military and political, were always quartered upon the people with the uniform hope of returning to Spain rich on the spoils of office.

Up to the second decade of the present century Cuba, while subject to many hardships, was governed well or ill according to the

personal character of those who were in authority, and not as a consequence of laws bad and oppressive in themselves. She was not treated as a colonial province to be ground down and plundered. But as Spain gradually lost her power, and was racked by intestine struggles, and harassed by outside foes, until one by one her colonies slipped from her grasp, her government of Cuba became more selfish and oppressive in proportion to her troubles at home.

In 1812, a liberal constitution was granted to the island, but it was cast aside by Ferdinand VII in 1814 as soon as he regained power. Had the constitution of 1812 been honestly administered, it would have lifted Cuba at once into an enviable position; and prosperity and contentment would have riveted the bonds of loyalty which bound her to the mother country. She would have been recognized as an integral part of Spanish territory, as important and as independent as any of the provinces of the peninsula, which have from time immemorial so jealously guarded their provincial rights. But the brutal selfishness of Ferdinand VII caused him to overthrow the fairest hopes of the Cubans at the most favorable and promising period in the history of the island.

In 1836, after Ferdinand's death, a new constitution was granted to Spain, and Cuba was included in its provisions.

September 27, 1836, the barkentine "Guadaloupe" brought to Santiago the good news of the promulgation of the liberal constitution, adopted by the Queen Regent, mother of Isabella. This was immediately published by General Lorenzo, Governor of the Santiago province and leader of the liberal party, amid the acclamations of the delighted Cubans; but his action was instantly condemned by Captain-General Taçon, who brought the whole military and naval force against Santiago and drove General Lorenzo from the island. Taçon was armed with a commission enabling him to exercise supreme authority over all subordinates and to suspend at his own discretion the execution of any order concerning the general administration of the government. Even a royal decree was but a dead letter in Cuba if it conflicted with the judgment of the Captain-General, who was really the supreme arbiter of the fate of the Cubans. Taçon knew Spain well enough to appreciate that the action of the Queen Regent was merely a temporary ebullition of liberal sentiment, and that her majesty would be better served by a non-observance of the royal decree. He knew that to attempt to show impartial justice to the Cubans meant the loss of a princely revenue to the mother country;

and although outsiders could see that to continue her oppressive reign of plunder was sooner or later to "kill the goose that laid the golden egg," yet Spain could not understand this and could never be led to appreciate moral power as superior to brute force.

The three deputies who had been elected in spite of Taçon's prompt protest, presented their credentials in Madrid the following January. They were received with coldness and silence, and after waiting several months they were finally denied the right of admission to the Cortes. This action forever alienated the extreme party in Cuba, though there has always been a conservative party working and hoping to secure prosperity for their island without a forcible separation from the mother country. The incessant warring between the Carlists and the Queen Regent led to constant demands for money which was extorted in every manner from the landholders, the real producers of all the wealth of the island.

The captains-general were armed with despotic and almost unlimited power, and by laws little less odious than the infamous penal laws against Ireland, the natives were deprived of all rights and excluded from all offices.

There is great diversity of opinion in regard to the real character of the renowned Taçon. His name is associated with some of the most famous buildings of Havana, and history records numberless instances of an impartial administration of justice, correction of abuses and appreciation of true heroism. By his efforts, persons guilty of shameful misdemeanors were condemned to work on paving the streets, and in this manner the vicious and degraded classes were compelled to contribute to the comfort of the whole community. Assassination, which had become a very common crime, was so severely dealt with, that it became rare, and extortion and venality in high places were unmasked and punished. Yet, in spite of the benefits accruing from his stern administration of justice, the fact that he was the tool of a grinding despotism, and that he represented a policy which entirely excluded the Cubans from advancing towards their ideal of self-government has caused his memory to be held in execration.

Volumes are written detailing his acts of high-handed despotism, but it must be confessed that in many cases it was the guilty who suffered. It is further charged that he grew so rich on the spoils of the office, that he was recalled to Spain because the government "feared that he would leave nothing on the island for any one else."

The statutes in regard to the treatment of the negro slaves were lenient, but that they were not enforced is shown not only by the mortality among them being so great that the only increase in the slave population was from constant new importations of negroes and coolies, but also by the frequent uprisings among the blacks themselves. And although the law of 1820 forbade the importation of African slaves, we know that its violation was constantly tolerated — for a consideration — by the captains-general, and also that for many years of the present century the slave trade was the chief source of Cuban revenue. Another effort was made in 1853 to abolish the slave traffic, but slavery was not abolished until 1878, after the ten years' war, and then emancipation was gradual.

A pleasant picture is presented in the character of the Captain-General, appointed in 1841,—Valdez, who appears to have been liberal and conscientious; but he was soon recalled and he returned to Spain poor, a shining exception in the long list of Governors. He was succeeded by O'Donnell, who is described as rapacious, tyrannical and unscrupulous, one of the charges against him being the suppression of infant schools, and the general discouragement of education. Thus, Cuba was tossed to and fro like a shuttlecock from good to bad, from one extreme to the other, her governors seeming to come and go at the caprice of whichever party happened to be in power at the Spanish capital, without the slightest regard for the weal of the hapless natives.

Meanwhile one uprising succeeded another. An insurrection of the blacks occurred in 1826, followed by the conspiracies of the Black Eagle and kindred organizations, and a dangerous insurrection of the blacks, said to have been instigated by Turnbull, the British Consul at Havana, in the early forties.

In May, 1850, General Lopez organized an expedition, recruited to some extent from the United States. The first detachment, two hundred and fifty men, embarked at New Orleans April 25th on the "Georgiana," under the command of Major Theodore O'Hara, a brave soldier and a talented man, whose name is immortalized as the author of the beautiful poem, "The Bivouac of the Dead." The second detachment, under Lopez, reached the rendezvous, the island of Contoy, off the coast of Yucatan, in Mexican territory, a few weeks later, and all together set sail in the "Creole" for Cardenas. Fifty men under Major T. Pickett was the first to land. The railroad station was captured and the garrison were nearly taken by surprise, had

they not been awakened by the sudden discharge of a gun by a sleepy sentry. The citizens did not respond to the appeal of the liberating invaders, and the approach of the Spanish troops in large numbers forced them to take flight. The filibusters were pursued, but reached Key West and from there dispersed to their homes, having lost of their number fourteen killed and fifteen wounded. The Spaniards lost one hundred killed and nearly as many wounded. Lopez made preparations to return the following year.

In 1852 he sailed from New Orleans in the steamer "Pampero," with three hundred men. The second in command was W. S. Crittenden, a graduate of West Point, who, although only twenty-eight years of age, had already won renown as a hero of the Mexican war. The purpose of the expedition was well known in the Southern States, and the Spanish authorities in Cuba were informed. Letters were sent to Lopez, purporting to come from Cuban patriots, persuading him to land in the western province, where it was promised an uprising of patriots would be ready to support him. Deceived by these forgeries he changed his course, landed at Bahia, and marched into the interior, leaving a number of men with Crittenden at the seaside. Finding they were betrayed, these men attempted to escape, but were captured by the Spanish Admiral Brestillo. Crittenden and fifty men were shot August 15 under the walls of Fort Atares. Lopez, after two skirmishes, was captured and was executed as a malefactor, with the garrote, at Havana, September 1, forty-nine more of his men being shot. About this time General Houston organized a band of Cuban sympathizers, but the fate of Lopez and his men threw a damper upon their enterprise, and they failed to set out.

Lopez had a remarkable career. He was born in Venezuela in 1798 when that country was still a Spanish colony. Early in life he became embroiled in the strife which raged in the South American countries and generally fought on the side of liberty; but becoming disgusted with the conduct of some of the adventurers in these civil wars, he entered the Spanish army. His services in securing a favorable settlement of the war induced the Venezuelans to offer him the commission of colonel in the patriot army, the same rank he held in the Spanish army. He, however, refused this and went to Cuba, where he married and settled. During the administration of Taçon, he was accused of favoring the independence of Cuba, was tried and acquitted. Being in Spain at the time of a Carlist uprising, he fought on the side of the Queen Regent and rose to the rank of General. He

filled several offices in Spain; was Governor of Madrid, Chief of the National Guard, and Senator. He retained his affection for Cuba, but for some time was not allowed to return there, as his influence was feared; but finally he obtained permission to return in 1839. He became ambitious to lead a revolution to free Cuba, and for more than ten years was silently making his preparations. He had many friends and sympathizers in the United States, among them Crittenden, shot by the Spaniards at Fort Atares, and General John A. Quitman, Governor of Mississippi, Hon. John Henderson, Governor of Louisiana, and others, who were indicted and restrained by the United States authorities. The character of a man like Lopez must be judged according to the point from which it is viewed; by some he is considered a restless, visionary adventurer; by others a martyr to the cause of freedom; but all agree in the opinion that his expedition was ill-advised, not being supported by the Cubans themselves, and was an unnecessary sacrifice of life.

During an uprising in 1854, the Cuban junta in New York had made extensive preparations to assist the insurgents, but the prompt and energetic measures of Captain-General Concha prevented a general uprising. He organized and drilled a large number of blacks, armed the Spaniards and disarmed the natives. Ramon Pinto, the leader of the Cubans, was captured and executed and many leading citizens were banished. Concha was rewarded for his services by being created Marquis of Havana. He advised the home government to conciliate the Cubans, as the revolution was not confined to the negroes, but was supported by the Creole planters; but the only means taken to conciliate the Cubans was to tighten the shackles of the slaves, while the slave-holders themselves were becoming every day more and more burdened with excessive taxation. In 1868 the revenue of the country was about \$26,000,000, \$6,000,000 of which was sent to Spain, and a very small portion of the remainder was expended for the benefit of the island. This state of affairs was calculated to increase still further the dissatisfaction of the Cubans and to foment the spirit of rebellion against the mother country.

THE TEN YEARS' WAR.

CHAPTER V.

Meanwhile the revolutionary flame, which was temporarily smothered by the prompt and energetic policy of Concha, was not quenched, but was smouldering, ready to break out at any moment. In the summer of 1867, at a meeting in Bayamo, an organization was effected preparatory to the inauguration of a fierce and stubborn rebellion throughout the island of Cuba. The leading spirits in this movement were Francesco Maceo Osorio and the brothers Aguilera.

The armed conflict was deferred for more than a year, to give time for a more perfect organization of the forces and arrangement of the plan of campaign.

The revolution, under the command of Carlos Emanuel Cespedes, commenced October 10, 1868, after the dethronement of Isabella, and held out ten years. Cespedes was a graduate of the University of Havana and the School of Law in the University of Barcelona. In 1852, he had been imprisoned for five months in Morro Castle on a charge of favoring the liberation of Cuba. In proclaiming the independence of Cuba, he granted absolute, unconditional liberty to his own slaves. Many other Cuban leaders did the same. The flag of independence was unfurled on the field of Yara, and this outbreak was followed by simultaneous attacks upon various small towns.

On October 18, Bayamo was captured by the insurgents and the Spanish force sent to its relief was totally defeated. A republican form of government was organized with Salvador Cisneros, Marquis of Santa Lucia, and Ignacio and Eduardo Agramonte at its head. Other native leaders were Manuel Quesada, Acosta, Maximo Gomez, Sanguilly, Garcia and Maceo.

Captain-General Lersundi refused to treat with a committee of Spaniards and Cubans who came interceding with him to inaugurate a policy of reform. He continued to organize the volunteers, who, being aliens and drawn from the lowest classes of the people, became more obnoxious than ever to the Insulars, as the landholders called themselves. Lersundi was replaced by Dulce, who was inclined to a more liberal policy, but was hampered in his movements, and was replaced in 1870 by De Rodas.

Captain-General Valmaseda, who was in command for a time, carried on the war with great inhumanity, shooting down every male Cuban over fifteen years old found away from home without a pass, and removing the women and children by force from their country homes to the cities. This was the beginning of the horrible reconcentrado measures, afterwards employed by Weyler, in his efforts to depopulate the island. Under Valmaseda the volunteers committed great atrocities upon the helpless people, and it is estimated that during The Ten Years' War, not less than 50,000 prisoners and non-combatants were murdered. But this massacre of the helpless was not unavenged; for in addition to those killed in battle, many thousands of Spanish soldiers perished from diseases incident to campaigns in a tropical climate.

Thomas Jordan, an ex-confederate soldier and a graduate of West Point, was for a time in command of the insurgents, having landed at Mazari with a force of 175 men, ten pieces of artillery and ammunition for 2,500 men. In 1873 the Cuban cause was considerably helped by the battle of La Sacra, won by the insurgents, in addition to advantages gained by Gomez. Cespedes was betrayed and killed in 1874. In that year Captain-General Jovellar was sent out, and he was relieved by Captain-General Martinez Campos in 1876. Both these commanders carried on the war vigorously, and in 1877 the fortunes of the insurgents rapidly declined. The diplomacy of General Campos, not less than his military superiority, assisted in bringing this disastrous rebellion to a close; but the promises made by him were shamefully disregarded by the government of Spain, and the pacification was only temporary. Even had these measures been strictly carried out, it is doubtful whether the affection of the insurgents could ever have been regained after the cruel and bloody measures which had been enforced against them during the war.

There were several filibustering expeditions from the United States about this time, but one of the most tragic and lamentable occurrences of the period was the unfortunate "Virginia" affair, under the leadership of Captain Fry, an ardent sympathizer with the Cuban cause. Captain Joseph Fry was born at Tampa Bay, June 14, 1826. He was the son of Major Fry, who was killed in the Florida war with the Indians, and was himself a graduate of Annapolis and a gallant officer in the Confederate service. He left Port au Prince October 7, 1783, on the "Virginia," a wooden side-wheel steamer, with a crew of fifty-two men and carrying 113 passengers and a cargo



From Harper's Weekly.

CUBAN FORCES SUSTAINING AN ATTACK.

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CHURCH CONVERTED INTO SPANISH HOSPITAL.

of war material for the Cuban insurgents. While on the open sea the "Virginius" was sighted by the "Tornado," a Spanish gunboat, and attempted to run back to Jamaica, meanwhile throwing overboard the contraband goods; but she was overtaken and captured, still retaining unmistakable signs of her mission. The captain claimed that the "Virginius" was "an American ship, carrying American colors and papers, with an American captain and crew," and that the passengers were going to Costa Rica; but the Spaniards protested that the ship was a "pirate," the American colors were torn down and replaced by the Spanish flag, and the prize towed into Santiago. Four Cuban generals arrested on board, Bambetta, Cespedes, Del Sol and Ryan, were immediately shot; their heads were cut off and displayed on spikes, while their bodies were trampled by horses. The American Consul, who attempted to protest against this outrage, was restrained in his house by a guard. After this barbarous exhibition, Captain Fry and his crew were put through the form of a trial by court-martial and were condemned to be shot. They were executed in the afternoon of November 7, 1873. Fifty-three men in all were killed, and there were ninety-three passengers under sentence of death when the proceedings were arrested by the arrival of the British steamer "Niobe," under the command of Captain Sir Lampton Lorraine, who indignantly demanded that the wholesale massacre be stopped. The timely arrival of the American warship "Wyoming," and later on the Juanita," added to the moral effect of this demand, and the Spaniards desisted from their purpose. The surviving passengers were restored to the custody of the United States December 1, 1873. The vessel was given up to the United States, being delivered to Captain Whiting, commanding the "Dispatch" at Bahia Honda, and she was taken north, but being unseaworthy, she foundered in a storm and was sunk off Cape Fear.

At this time General Grant was President of the United States, General Sickles was Minister to Spain, and Castelar was President of Spain. It was claimed that the authorities at Madrid ordered the execution not to take place, but, if so, the order did not reach Santiago in time, and General Burriel, who superintended the trial, was never reprimanded nor censured for his action.

Before his execution, Captain Fry wrote a most beautiful and touching letter to his wife, in which he spoke of the fearful sacrifice of life on the "Virginius." The beautiful character of the chief victim and

the heroic manner in which he met his fate increased the sympathy felt for him and his companions by the people of the United States; and they loudly demanded the punishment of the government permitting such atrocities. There was an animated exchange of letters and protests, and a serious straining in the diplomatic relations between the United States and Spain; but the latter government insisted that the vessel was piratical and that the American papers were fraudulently obtained; and, as usual, Spanish diplomacy scored another triumph, and no atonement save the payment of \$80,000 to the heirs of the victims was ever made. The undeniable fact that the expedition was an unlawful one made it impossible for the United States to secure the satisfaction demanded by many of the American people.

While in Santiago, after the capitulation of that city in the summer of 1898, I visited the place made famous by the execution of Captain Fry and his comrades, and had the guides point out to me the spot where these brave men fell. They were made to kneel with their faces to the wall of a large butcher pen, and the place is known as "the slaughter-house." Captain Fry was allowed to walk along and tell the men goodbye before taking his own station in the line. It will be remembered that one of the last things he did, besides writing the letter to his wife alluded to above, was to write to General Grant, his old friend, asking him to secure for his wife some pay which was due him when he resigned from the United States Navy.

In the insurrection of 1868, bands of roving insurgents roamed throughout the wooded sections of the eastern part of the island, burning cane-fields and destroying the outlying farms. The Spanish government sent more than 150,000 men to Cuba and spent about \$700,000,000 in efforts to suppress this rebellion.

The treaty of Zanjón, secured in 1878 by Captain-General Martínez Campos, called the Pacificator, guaranteed the abolition of slavery and promised constitutional reforms. The title of Captain-General was changed to that of Governor-General, but the power of the individual remained unchanged. Provincial reforms were inaugurated and privileges promised, but the grinding taxation continued even worse than ever, augmented as it was by an enormous war debt. The tariff system, ruinous to Cuba, but profitable to Spain, continued without any change, its effect being to exhaust every industry and paralyze every enterprise; and while the Cubans were daily growing poorer, the Spanish officials were increasing their private fortunes.

The poll-tax was very large and the voting age was twenty-five years. The island was divided into two parties, the Conservatives and the Liberal Autonomists, but the whole power of the government was thrown on the side of the rulers and against the ruled.

No doubt Governor-General Campos, who is described as a humane and generous man, was sincere in his desire to fulfill the stipulations of the treaty whereby he had secured the cessation of hostilities, but the government of Spain acted with despicable falseness in the matter. Thousands of laws were enacted, but they were mere empty words. The government offices in a short time became the property of the highest bidder and the Cubans were gradually forced out of any opportunity to contend in a lawful way for self-government. Restrictions of all kinds were placed upon education and business enterprises, and the country people were deprived of all liberty of action. A short rebellion, called "the little war," took place in 1879, but was quickly suppressed. In 1885 a revolt broke out in Santa Clara and Santiago provinces while Blanco was Governor-General. It was put down with great cruelty, many of the Cubans being executed or assassinated without the slightest formality of a trial. General Seyti Vidal, a Cuban leader, was murdered when about to embark for Kingston under agreement with the authorities.

An economical crisis arose in 1889-92, owing to the depression of the sugar market. Sugar is the staple production of Cuba. The manufacture of beet sugar in Europe and the McKinley tariff in America, caused the complete stagnation of this industry and great distress prevailed. It was a question interesting to both Cubans and Spaniards, and promised to make a new bond of union between the contending factions, but the government discountenanced this policy and little relief could be obtained. The people lost heart and the elections proving only a farce, they ceased to trouble themselves to go to the polls. The abolition of slavery had made matters worse in an economical way, and the reckless extravagance of the government piled up the debt upon the people of Cuba until it became unbearable. The heavy poll-tax disfranchised the greater number of the natives, so that the right of suffrage was restricted to 53,000 out of a population of 1,600,000; and while there was a pretense of representation, the number of native Cubans in the Cortes has never exceeded six and seldom been more than three. The offices were distributed among the Spaniards; there was no personal safety, no freedom of speech nor of the press. Such was the corruption in the

collection of duties that in 1887 the Havana custom-house was cleared at the point of the bayonet by order of Captain-General Marin. Spanish products paid no duties, while foreign articles were heavily taxed and the Cubans paid enormous duties in Spain. Before 1895 Cuba groaned under a debt of \$295,707,264, most of which was incurred by Spain in foreign wars or the Carlist insurrections. This debt included "the expense of Spain's occupation of San Domingo, the invasion of Mexico, expedition against Peru, money advanced during Carlist wars, all that Spain had spent to uphold domination in Cuba and to cover lavish expenses since 1868," including the enormous military force sent to the island. The debt absorbed nearly 41 per cent.; after deducting other expenses, there was less than 3 per cent. left for internal development and improvement. While a subsidy of \$471,836.68 was paid to one company alone, the Spanish Trans-Atlantic Company, the island was allowed less than \$200,000 for education.

In 1894 a bill of reforms acceptable to the majority of the Cubans was introduced into the Cortes, but being discouraged by Sagasta failed to pass, and a very unsatisfactory one was substituted and became a law in January. The very terms of this bill, showing the reforms that were demanded, prove the utter falsity of the claims put forth by the government of Spain in vindication of her policy towards the Cubans.

Provision was made for a council of administration to consist of the Governor-General and fifteen councillors appointed by royal decree. The members of the council were to be selected from men having been for four years resident in the country, and having been one among the fifty largest taxpayers in the island, whether on real estate or for the exercise of a profession. In addition they must have occupied certain high positions enumerated in the bill. There were also to be fifteen councillors elected according to the same census as are the provincial deputies. Public works, telegraphic and postal communications, agriculture, industry and commerce, immigration, public instruction, beneficence and health, all were to come under the decrees of this administrative council, which was also to make up and approve the annual budget.

The law provides that—

"It shall be incumbent on the Governor-General, as the supreme head of the government of the island, to execute all the decrees of the council."

But it continues:

"Whenever the Governor-General shall judge any decision of the council to be contrary to the laws, or to the general interest of the nation, he shall suspend its execution, etc."

And, for certain reasons, the Governor-General may suspend the council of administration. He may also suspend the publication and fulfillment of royal decrees, suspend the guarantees granted in the interests of the people, and apply the riot act.

It will be seen that the authority of the Governor-General was not at all abridged, and his power remained as arbitrary as ever; for in addition to the privileges enumerated, he was given supreme command of all the armed forces on land and sea stationed in the island; and he was the acknowledged delegate of the minister of the colonies, of state, of war and marine; and all the other authorities of the island were made subordinate to him.

If the reforms allowed by the bill were any improvement on the existing state of affairs, it is not surprising that the Cubans found their condition unbearable. The law of January, 1895, precipitated the brewing storm and the banner of Cuban liberty was again unfurled February 24, 1895.

The law, when received in Cuba, was loudly applauded by the Autonomist party, which issued, April, 1895, a circular praising its provisions and stigmatizing the revolutionists, and affirming "faith in the means afforded by the Constitution, in the effectual agency of work, in the indisputable force of ideas." After enumerating the evils already caused in the islands by the threatened rebellion, such as the suspension of the constitutional guarantees, preventing free use of rights already secured, the circular describes the insurgents as "men who belong to the most ignorant and miserable classes, victims of the lamentable want of advancement in which they were left to live in that fine section of Cuba (the eastern province), as an easy prey for agitators, having no cohesion or discipline, for which reason it is expected they will have to disband or surrender." The people are exhorted to unite in assisting the "pacifier" of 1878, "who has come once more to solve the present problems in the same spirit of noble, righteous and generous confidence in the people."

THE REBELLION OF 1895.

CHAPTER VI.

After the close of the Ten Years' War, many of the chiefs of the rebellion left Cuba and continued their plans for the liberation of the island. The failure of Spain to keep the terms of the treaty of Zanjón still further embittered the partisans of free Cuba, and it was not difficult to organize revolutionary clubs. By 1890 there were 150 such clubs organized in the United States, Mexico, Cuba, Central and South America, with a war fund of \$1,000,000, and arms for 8,000 men.

The outbreak of the rebellion of 1895 was signalized by the simultaneous uprising of numerous small bands of insurgents in various parts of the island. Manuel García, a chieftain of the previous war, gave the signal for revolt in Matanzas; he was betrayed and killed. A planter named Brooks, subsequently killed, led a large band in Santiago province. The governors of Matanzas and Santiago having reported these outbreaks to the Governor-General, Calleja, martial law was declared on the 28th of February, and free pardon offered to all who should surrender within eight days. Other bands of rebels under the command of Antonio López Coloma, Dr. Martín Marrero and Joaquín Pedrosa did not make much headway, many of the leaders being captured and their men dispersed; but it was soon found that the organizations in Santiago were of a more formidable nature, especially that under the leadership of Bartolomé Masó, one of the most influential chiefs of the Ten Years' War. Nearly all the insurgents in the initial uprising were dispersed and fled to the mountains or swamps to perfect their organization and gather recruits, which were daily pouring in from the country homes and from the ranks of the militia.

The Cuban autonomists or home rulers threw their whole strength and influence on the side of the government, and used every means possible to prevent the spread of the revolution. They sought an interview with Masó, who requested ten days' time for consultation

with other Cuban leaders, but General Lachambre, the military commander of the province, demanded immediate surrender. A committee went to Havana to ask the Captain-General to stop hostilities, but he upheld the action of Lachambre, and all the efforts of the peace party were useless to stay the progress of the civil war.

The number of the insurgents was insignificant, and they were poorly armed, their principal weapon being the machete, a long-bladed sword-knife, which they used with great strength and dexterity. They relied for firearms upon what they could capture from the Spaniards, or could secure from friends abroad. They were generally mounted, being fine riders, and in small bands scoured the country, attacking outposts or blockhouses where weak garrisons were stationed, and raiding plantations, where they levied contributions of food, stock and ammunition. The formation of the country was favorable to this style of guerilla warfare and immense damage could be done with impunity by very small forces.

Meanwhile, Governor-General Calleja was recalled, and Marshal Martinez Campos was sent over to replace him, April 10. He landed at Guantanamo April 16, and visited the southeastern cities before proceeding to Havana he gave the most elaborate instructions in regard to every subject — the diet and medical attendance for his own soldiers, the protection of noncombatants, and the treatment of prisoners. He placed the troops in the eastern district under Generals Salcedo, Lachambre and Valdez, with headquarters, respectively, at Santiago, Bayamo and Gibaro. General J. Garrich was made military and civil governor of Santiago. In August, the same year, General J. J. Morena succeeded Salcedo, and General A. G. Munoz succeeded Lachambre. Campos had control not only of the military forces, but the men-of-war were at his disposal. He was very active, constantly moving from place to place, sometimes by special train, but generally by water.

Almost simultaneously with his appointment, two formidable enemies appeared on the southeastern coast. Antonio and Jose Maceo, Frank Agramonte and Flor Crombert, with a small body of insurgents, arrived from Costa Rica, landed near Baracoa March 31, and joined Perez near Guantanamo, after losing several of their number on the way. Jose Marti and Maximo Gomez, from San Domingo, landed at Cabonico April 14, and after perilous adventures reached the main body of insurgents, where Gomez was received and recognized as commander-in-chief. The revolt was at

this time centered in Santiago province. The insurgents numbered over 6,000 men, scattered in small bands over the country, while the standing colonial army of 20,000 soldiers and something like 50,000 volunteers or militia, was already reinforced by more than 25,000 fresh troops. There was heavy fighting in the southeast during the latter part of the spring. Flor Crombert, commanding about 300 of Maceo's men, was ambushed by a large force of Spaniards near Palmerito, early in April, and was killed by one of his own men. He was an able and enthusiastic leader and his loss was greatly deplored. Maceo attacked and nearly annihilated 400 Spaniards near Guantanamo, May 14; and, on the following day, the Spanish escort to a provision train to Bayamo was dispersed by a body of 800 insurgents. Gomez and Jose Marti rode into Carmaguez, while Maceo was diverting the attention of the Spaniards by terrorizing Holquin. Marti was killed in a skirmish at Dos Rios, May 19, and Gomez was wounded, but escaped capture. The corpse of Marti was embalmed and taken to Santiago, where it was identified and honorably buried. Marti was not a soldier, but he was a devoted, successful and enthusiastic organizer and civil leader. He had intended to leave Cuba and work for her from abroad after seeing the revolution well launched. Henri Rochefort speaks of him as "the Antillian Mazzini," and he is commonly known as the father of the Cuban rebellion. His death was a severe blow to the cause for which he gave his life. His place as organizer was filled by T. E. Palma, of New York.

Early in June, Gomez invaded the province of Puerto Principe and in a few days there was a general uprising throughout the province. The Marquis of Santa Lucia, an ex-Cuban president, joined the insurgents, whose ranks were daily increasing, and active hostilities were carried on, a regular plan of campaign on each side being commenced. The orders of Gomez to his followers were to attack all small Spanish posts and secure arms, to destroy railroads and telegraph lines, Spanish forts or buildings where resistance was made, to destroy all crops or mills whose owners refused to contribute to the Cuban war fund, and to keep on the defensive unless they could fight at great advantage.

Campos' orders were to protect sugar estates and railroads; to attack unless the enemy's forces were three to one, to release all rebels who surrendered unless they held rank as officers, and to keep the towns supplied with provisions.



ON THE TROÇA.



BUILDING A TROCHA.

The rainy season did not put an end to the conflict, although the Spanish troops suffered severely from the tropical climate. The first serious check given to the royal troops was at the battle of Bayamo, July 12, where General Santocildes was killed. The fight was long and bloody; the insurgent forces were skillfully managed by Maceo, and they claimed to have killed and disabled 300 Spaniards. The immediate presence and good generalship of Campos alone saved the army from a disastrous rout. In August, the revolt had spread to the Santa Clara province, a rich, level district where many Americans own property, and Gomez was preparing to invade the western provinces. Late in this month, the expedition of Rolof and Rodriquez from Key West, Florida, landed on the shores of Santa Clara province; and before long the insurgents were traversing the provinces of Matanzas, Havana, and Pinar del Rio, a portion of the island heretofore regarded as sacred from the torch of insurrection. The revolutionary government elected the Marquis of Santa Lucia, president, and Bartolome Masso, vice-president; Maximo Gomez was confirmed as general-in-chief of the liberating army, and Antonio Maceo, general-in-chief of the invading army, with the rank of lieutenant-general. After the defeat of General Suarez Valdez by Gomez, General Pando was sent over from Spain with 30,000 men.

The favorite method of repressing the Cubans seems to have been the construction of the trocha, a kind of fortified wall which the Spaniards seemed to regard as impregnable, but to their surprise it was broken through, and by the end of the rainy season, the rebel army was swarming over the western provinces. November 17, Maceo, with a force of 1,900 men, defeated General Navarro near the city of Santa Clara, and Gomez won another victory in the same neighborhood November 19 and 20. General Campos made a stand at Coliseo, in Matanzas province, and met with a severe check. Gomez attacked him with 7,000 men, and being reinforced by 1,500 insurgents, he made a bold charge, at the same time firing a cane-field in which the Spaniards attempted to make a flank movement, and thus driving them back to Havana province. This victory enabled the insurgents to carry the war to the very gates of Havana, for the burning fields fired by them could be seen from the city, and before the end of the year 1895, Maceo had a large force massed in the Province of Pinar del Rio, west of Havana.

The extent and consequences of the insurrection became so alarming that Campos was recalled January 17, 1896, and General Weyler, a man with a reputation for great sternness and severity, was sent

to take his place. This was to prove the end of civilized warfare in the island. General Campos had acted with humanity, and the Cubans, in the beginning of the conflict, had treated their prisoners in the same way; but after Weyler took command, February 10, 1896, such a carnival of blood was commenced that the cruelty exhibited on both sides was fiendish in its malignity.

At this time the Cubans claimed, in the various provinces, a total of 60,722 men, sixty per cent. of whom were white, and forty per cent. colored. Of their officers above the rank of captain, fifty were white, ten black, three mulatto, and one Indian. The sugar-cane plantations all over the island were laid waste by the insurgents; the country homes and stores were pillaged and destroyed, first by one side and then by the other, until the beautiful island became one vast scene of ruin and desolation; laborers were arrested in the fields and executed on the charge of being insurgents; women and children and aged men were killed or driven into the cities and corraled there to starve, not being allowed to go beyond a certain line under pain of death. The press was so restricted, and the accounts of all that took place in the island from the opening of the year 1896 are so garbled and contradictory that it is impossible to form a correct idea of the campaign.

The insurrection was at first very much underestimated, both at home and abroad, while public interest in this country was for a time greatly excited over the Venezuelan controversy, and the discovery of gold in the Klondike. But gradually the rebellion began to assume larger proportions, and attracted the attention of the nations of Europe as well as of the people of the United States. The humane and conciliatory policy of Campos was unsuccessful, and it was evident that nothing but absolute independence or the extermination of the Cubans would end the conflict.

The great difficulty of the insurgents was to get recognition as belligerents, but owing to the peculiar nature of the conflict, they found it hard to prove the existence of a local government. On this subject the greatest diversity of opinion prevailed. The Spaniards invariably characterized them as an unorganized mob of negroes, and yet within one year, in the face of more than 100,000 Spanish soldiers, the insurgents had traversed the whole length of the island and made more headway than they had been able to do in the whole Ten Years' War. They had almost undisputed possession of the eastern half of the island. Before the beginning of 1897, they had a civil admin-

istration organized for the provinces of Santiago, Puerto Principe and part of Santa Clara. These provinces were divided into districts, with regular officials, known as prefects. Salvador Cisneros was president, and Bartolome Masso, vice-president. Sundry laws had been enacted dealing with marriages and collection of taxes, a mail service was established and set in operation, four newspapers were printed, and primary schools were opened.

The seacoast was patrolled and a large part of it used by the insurgents, more than thirty shipments of arms and ammunition having been safely landed; still, on account of want of artillery, they could not hold a single seaport against Spanish men-of-war. The Spanish garrisons had to be withdrawn from the interior towns as soon as the insurgents received a few pieces of light artillery. Yet, in spite of these facts, it seemed impossible to prove that the Cuban rebels had an organized form of government and a capital city. Cubitas, the capital, was inaccessible to the outside world.

Captain-General Marin was in command for a few weeks before the arrival of the new governor. Captain-General Weyler reached Cuba February 10, 1896. The reputation he bore as a stern and relentless character had produced such consternation among the non-combatants that thousands of Cuban citizens in sympathy with the rebellion left the island before he arrived. On the day after reaching Cuba, he made a proclamation urging all the citizens to uphold the cause of Spain. March 8, another proclamation was issued in which he gave the insurgents fifteen days to surrender, offering pardon to those who would prove they were forced into the ranks of the insurgents and who would take the oath of allegiance to Spain.

March 11, Monteguelo was burned by the insurgents. In April, Maceo broke through the trocha line between Havana and Pinar del Rio and gained an important victory at the battle of Cacarajicara, which was given out as the usual Spanish victory. Maceo, however, remained undisturbed in his mountain fastness, while it required 30,000 men to keep the vicinity of Havana itself safe from the incursions of the rebels. About this time, General Garcia, who had been intercepted and detained in the United States in February, succeeded in reaching Cuba and was put in command in the extreme southeast, while General Gomez commanded in the center. On April 21, at a fight near Manzanillo, the Spaniards received a severe check. Generals Pando and Bernal, about this time, returned to Spain, not being in accord with the new regime introduced by Wey-

ler. In May the exportation of leaf-tobacco from Havana and Pinar del Rio was prohibited. Early in May, the "Bermuda" landed two Gatling guns, 1,000 rifles, 500,000 rounds of ammunition and 1,000 pounds of dynamite for the insurgents. The "Competitor" was not so successful, but was captured on a similar mission and carried to Cuba by a Spanish gunboat. In June the Spanish government made strenuous efforts to raise funds with which to carry on the expenses of the war, which were enormous. With the setting in of the rainy season, the campaign was for a time suspended, the insurgents holding their own, while the king's soldiers were being mowed down by thousands before the resistless advances of disease.

When Weyler reached Cuba, he sent back a demand for more troops, and they continued to pour into Cuba until there was an army of Spanish soldiers there exceeding 200,000. He began by scattering 150,000 of these in fortifications in the cities and in the numberless small forts along the trochas.

These defenses are so often mentioned in the course of a history of the Cuban War that a more detailed description of them will assist in understanding the situation. The trocha resembles a fortified wall. It is a cleared space between one and two hundred yards wide, stretching through an impassable jungle. The felled trees are piled up in rows about as wide as an ordinary street and some six feet high. Between these barriers runs a road and in some cases a single track of military railway protected by a line of forts and blockhouses; beyond them a maze of barbed wire and another barrier of felled trees and jungle. Ditches are generally dug parallel to the trocha. The principal trochas cross the island in its narrowest parts, one of fifty miles across the western part of the province of Puerto Principe, the other of twenty-five miles across the eastern part of the province of Pinar del Rio, hardly twenty miles from the city of Havana. The fortifications on the trochas are unique. Every half mile there is a large stone fort, painted white, so as to be easily seen from a great distance. Half way between these forts are blockhouses, and between the blockhouses and forts are what might be compared to large, fortified sentry boxes, very strongly built and skillfully protected by entanglements of barbed wire. It is evident that such obstructions as the trochas would prove very formidable to opponents without artillery, while of little value against the use of artillery. In point of fact, they were frequently crossed by spies and couriers, and several times by large bodies of insurgents.

In the fall, after the rainy season, Weyler himself took the field and there were continual bulletins announcing the pacification of the province or the fact that the insurgents were surrounded, and promising that the sugar plantations should be protected and that the grinding of the cane should be recommenced; but as soon as the rebels disappeared from one side they sprang up on the other.

In December the insurgents sustained a severe loss in the death of Maceo. It has been impossible to verify the accounts of his death, as the circumstances are represented so very differently. The Spaniards charge that he was killed in open fight; the insurgents that he was lured into ambush and treacherously murdered. The news of his death was received with great delight at Havana, was celebrated by illuminations and processions, and Don Francisco Cirujeda, who led the troops that killed the Cuban leader, was honored and promoted. Maceo was succeeded in command by General Juan Ruiz Rivera. Weyler's campaign in Pinar del Rio was continued with great ostentation and parade, accompanied by continual proclamations of pacification, while in fact the rebels were daily increasing in strength. January 19, Weyler started east with 19,000 men, increased from the garrisons to 25,000. He reached Santa Clara February 1, and issued concentration orders February 9, and marched to Placitas, thence to Sancti Spiritus. The concentration orders required all the noncombatants to go to certain towns within a limited period, or be considered as rebels and shot at sight. Indeed, the chief fury of the Spaniards seemed to be directed against these unarmed and helpless pacificos, who were herded like cattle in the most unhealthy locations, where they died by hundreds from contagious diseases and starvation. Frequently, unarmed laborers were shot in the fields or brought to the towns and executed as rebels, while every dwelling in the open country was burned to the ground and not a living creature was left in the devastated region.

Meanwhile Gomez and Cisneros crossed the central trocha in January and attacked Arroyo Blanco, whose garrison was relieved February 3. Gomez then sent Rodriguez in Weyler's rear to threaten the provinces of Havana and Matanzas, while he established himself at Arroyo; and, although the Spaniards reported three battles as victories, they failed to dislodge him. Gomez was so expert in misleading his adversaries that he acquired the name of "the wily fox." He seldom came to an open fight, but led his pursuers a roundabout chase, until fear of being ambushed obliged them to give up the pursuit, and he would return in safety to his headquarters.

In February the Queen Regent signed reform decrees, and in March Weyler was ordered to negotiate with the rebels. March 28, reaching Cienfuegos, he sent three Cuban leaders of the Ten Years' War to negotiate with Gomez, but the latter refused to receive them.

In April, Weyler returned to Havana, declaring the province of Santa Clara pacified. The rainy season was again approaching and the insurgents were prepared to recuperate in the well-guarded fastness, while the Spanish numbers dwindled daily from the effects of disease. The insurgents of Santiago province, under the leadership of General Garcia, were living on supplies captured from the Spanish columns. In the case of Bayamo, about twenty or thirty miles from Manzanillo, it is estimated that the Spaniards must have lost at least 5,000 men in the effort to keep the garrison supplied with provisions, and, after the insurgents secured artillery, many of these interior towns had to be abandoned.

July 31, General Weyler announced amnesty to the exiled Cubans. There was great opposition to his course and demands were made for his recall. In August, Canovas was assassinated and was succeeded by General Azcarraga. The Spanish policy remained for some time unchanged and Weyler was not recalled until October 9. General Blanco, his successor, arrived in Havana October 30. In November, Spain extended the suffrage and offered concessions to Cuba. The starving condition of the Cuban reconcentrados could no longer be denied and the authorities were compelled to accept the help of charitable Americans in caring for these destitute creatures. This was galling to the Spaniards in Cuba, and riots occurred in Havana early in the year 1898, when the American consulate had to be protected by a large body of troops. General Lee informed the authorities of the critical situation of Americans in Cuba, and the White Squadron, under the command of Admiral Sicard, was ordered to rendezvous in the neighborhood of Key West. Excitement all over the country ran high and urgent measures were taken to improve the navy and protect our seaboard in case of hostility.

Meanwhile, Marshal Blanco had proceeded to carry out the reforms suggested by the Sagasta cabinet, and the promised plan of autonomy was inaugurated. Cabinet officers were selected to assist the Governor-General in the home government. Jose Maria Galvez was president of the cabinet; Antonio Govin, minister of the interior; the Marquis of Montoro, leader of the autonomist party in Cuba, minister of finance; Laureano Rodriguez, minister of commerce;

Francesco of Zayas, minister of education, and Eduardo Dolz, minister of posts and telegraphs. In addition to the establishment of the new form of government, commissioners, or more properly speaking, emissaries were sent to the various rebel headquarters to endeavor to persuade or bribe the leaders into accepting the new régime. The messengers were badly received; in fact, they failed to return, and it was soon made known that one of them, Col. D. Joachin Ruiz, aide-de-camp to General Blanco, and sent by him to the camp of the insurgent chief, Rodriguez, had been court-martialed and shot as a spy. The sacrifice of this brave and popular young officer was deeply deplored and aroused great indignation; but it was justified by the Cubans on the ground that he came as an emissary to corrupt the loyalty of a subordinate commander; that the Spaniards had already published false reports as to the defection and desertion of various rebel leaders, and that the only way to offset this treachery was by dealing summarily with any agent attempting to treat with them, or offering to make any concessions short of the absolute independence they had proclaimed.

On January 25, by order of the Navy Department, the battleship "Maine" took leave of the rest of the fleet at Key West, and proceeded to the harbor of Havana. There had been serious riots in Havana and it was considered that the presence of an American man-of-war would be a safeguard to American interests there. The plan was acquiesced in by the Spanish Government and arrangements were made that the courtesy should be returned by the visit of the "Vizcaya," a large, heavily-armed Spanish cruiser, to the port of New York. The unfortunate De Lome matter fanned the flame of discord and the relations between Spain and the United States were strained to a degree which needed not such a terrible catastrophe as the destruction of the "Maine" to produce an irreparable breach.

The officers of the "Maine" were: Captain, Charles D. Sigsbee; executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Richard Wainwright; navigator, Lieutenant George F. W. Holman; lieutenants, John Hood and Carl W. Jungen; lieutenants, junior grade, George P. Blow, John J. Blandin and Friend W. Jenkins; naval cadets, Jonas H. Holden, Watt T. Cluverius, Amon Bronson and David T. Boyd, Jr.; surgeon, Lucien G. Heneberger; paymaster, Charles M. Ray; chief engineer, Charles P. Howell; passed assistant engineer, Frederick C. Bowers; assistant engineers, John R. Morris and Darwin R. Merritt; naval cadets (engineer division), Pope Washington and Arthur Cren-

shaw; chaplain, John P. Chidwick; first lieutenant of marines, Albertus W. Catlin; boatswain, Francis E. Larkin; gunner, Joseph Hill; carpenter, George Helms; pay clerk, Brent McCarthy. The crew numbered 328.

The night of the explosion was overcast, hot and sultry. The "Maine," lying peacefully at the buoy where she was moored by the Spanish pilot on her entrance into the port, had swung around into an unusual position; in fact, she was in exactly the position she would have had to take to open fire on the shore fortifications. Nearly astern of the "Maine" was the American steamer "City of Washington;" on the starboard side were the "Alfonso XII" and the "Legazpi." Suddenly, at forty minutes past nine, an awful explosion shook the vessel, which caught on fire and instantly commenced to sink. The electric lights went out and the quarters were left in intense darkness and smoke. All the crew were on board, and, except those on duty, had turned in. Only four of the officers were absent — Assistant Engineer Bowers, Cadet Washington, Paymaster's Clerk McCarthy and Gunner Joseph Hill. Some of the officers were in their state-rooms or the messrooms below, in the officers' smoking quarters, or on the main deck. The captain was in his cabin writing. The force of the explosion being on the side occupied by the men's sleeping quarters, made the escape of the majority of the crew impossible. Those of the officers and crew who were able hurried to the deck, and, without confusion or disorder, reported for duty and did all that could be done to save the vessel and the crew.

Only three of the fifteen boats were found available; three manned and went to the work of rescuing the men who were floating in the water and crying for help. Boats from the American and Spanish ships also aided in the work of rescue. Meanwhile, the vessel was burning and was sinking rapidly. It was supposed that the magazines were flooded, but there was momentary danger of explosion of ammunition, which had become mingled with the wreckage; and the group of officers who had remained on deck until the last moment, having done all that was possible, sadly and reluctantly left the wreck and took refuge on the "City of Washington," a Ward Line steamer, commanded by Captain Stevens, who did good service in behalf of his unfortunate countrymen. The injured men were cared for on this vessel and the Spanish men-of-war in the neighborhood, and were afterwards sent to the Spanish hospitals in Havana, where they were nursed with great kindness and consideration.



THE UNITED STATES BATTLESHIP "MAINE."



CAPTAIN C. D. SIGSBEE.

A few moments after reaching safe quarters, Captain Sigsbee sent the following dispatch:

"SECRETARY NAVY, *Washington, D. C.*:

"'Maine' blown up in Havana harbor at nine forty to-night and destroyed. Many wounded and doubtless more killed or drowned. Wounded and others on board Spanish man-of-war and Ward Line steamer. Send lighthouse tenders from Key West for crew and the few pieces of equipment above water. No one has clothing other than that upon him. Public opinion should be suspended until further report. All officers believed to be saved. Jenkins and Merritt not yet accounted for. Many Spanish officers, including representative of General Blanco, now with me to express sympathy.

"SIGSBEE."

Consul-General Lee, upon hearing of the disaster, immediately hastened on board to offer sympathy and assistance. Several Spanish officers, including General Salano, chief of staff to General Blanco, also called upon Captain Sigsbee immediately after he boarded the "City of Washington," expressed their great sympathy, and asserted that the authorities in Havana were entirely ignorant of the cause of the explosion.

Two hundred and fifty-four were lost that night, seven of the wounded afterwards died, and many were crippled for life. Only two of the officers were lost — Lieutenant Jenkins and Assistant Engineer Merritt. The Spanish authorities offered to give public burial to the dead whose bodies had been recovered; the offer was accepted, and, on the afternoon of February 17, the funeral of nineteen of the victims took place amid demonstrations of profound sympathy and respect. The funeral cortege was very imposing; thousands of all ranks took part in the vast procession which followed the dead, who were laid to rest in the beautiful Colon cemetery just outside the city of Havana. Most of the remaining bodies, as they were recovered, were buried there, Chaplain Chidwick identifying them and conducting the funeral services. After it became possible to forward the bodies to Key West, they were buried there, and the wounded were also sent back to the United States, as soon as they were able to travel, with the surviving officers and men, except seven officers and two men, who remained in Havana with the captain.

The divers arrived on the 19th, and among the first articles recovered from the captain's cabin were the keys of all the magazines and

shellrooms, showing that these keys had been safely turned in upon the night of the accident. The work of diving for the bodies may be better imagined than described, and conspicuous among the many brave deeds of officers and men was the heroic fortitude of the gentle chaplain in personally inspecting and identifying the remains of these unfortunate men, who in life had found in him a warm and sympathetic friend. He also answered fully and kindly the hundreds of sad and terrible letters received from sorrowing relatives of the dead.

By the 21st of February 143 bodies had been recovered, and several more were brought up later. The remains of the two officers who were lost were among the last recovered.

The life of Captain Sigsbee, during the days succeeding the disaster, was full of the most harrowing details and distressing scenes, but through it all he had the consolation of knowing that he was upheld by the entire confidence of the American people, who exonerated him from all charges of carelessness long before the court of inquiry met. He remained in Havana until March 26, when he returned to Washington, where he was received by the Secretary and the President with every mark of respect and sympathy, and some weeks after was assigned to another command.

It was uncertain at first whether the accident was due to an internal explosion, caused by the firing of the magazines, or to some external cause. A board of inquiry was immediately appointed by the United States authorities to investigate the matter, and it seemed decided beyond question, based upon evidence that the hull was bent inwardly, that the destroying agency was an external one, probably a submarine mine in the harbor. This construction was always denied by Spain, excepting a short and perfunctory examination, but no serious efforts were made by that government to investigate the matter or to place the guilt. This was natural. If they did not admit the findings of the American board as correct, but persisted in maintaining that the explosion was from some internal cause, it was hardly to be expected that they would seek to throw blame, which they did not admit to exist, upon one of their own officials in the city of Havana. The indignation felt in the United States, on account of this terrible affair, was little less than that felt in Spain over what the Spanish people considered an unjust and unproven charge; and feelings of intense bitterness were engendered between the two nations.

The destruction of the "Maine" was not the alleged reason for war, but it was the most important factor in precipitating the inevitable conflict.

RELATIONS OF CUBA AND THE UNITED STATES IN THE PAST.

CHAPTER VII.

The geographical situation of Cuba is remarkable, commanding as it does the two most important approaches to the Gulf of Mexico.

With an area of about the same as that of Alabama, its configuration is peculiar and almost crescent-shaped. It is 790 miles long, 117 miles wide in its broadest part and 22 in its narrowest. It is 50 miles from Hayti, 95 miles from Jamaica, 124 miles from the extremity of Florida and about an equal distance from Yucatan. Early in its history, the strategic value of the island was recognized, and it was the base of the most important expeditions to the Gulf Coast, those of Cortez and De Soto, and, at a later date, the expedition of the Prince de Joinville against Mexico. It was here also that General Packenham's forces stopped on their way home after his disastrous encounter with the Americans at New Orleans.

The position of Cuba, the Key to the Gulf of Mexico, or, as it is called by Mr. Murat Halstead the "Guardian of the gates of the American Mediterranean," renders the island an object of intense interest to the citizens of the United States, and while there has never been any question as to Spain's right of possession, the cession of Cuba to a foreign power has always been considered a "purely American question." In the same degree the secession of Cuba from the mother country and the securing of her absolute independence, has always been a question more interesting to Americans than to any others. The paramount importance of its commanding position has always been acknowledged, although our statesmen have been divided in their views with regard to the advisability of annexation, particularly during ante-bellum days before the abolition of slavery, when the economic conditions of our country were vastly different from those since existing. But even in those early days, Jefferson thus expressed himself (Jefferson's Works, Vol. 7, p. 316):

I candidly confess that I have ever looked upon Cuba as the most interesting addition that can be made to our system of States, the possession of

which (with Florida Point), would give us control over the Gulf of Mexico and the countries and isthmus bordering upon it, and would fill up the measure of our political well-being.

April 27, 1809 (Ibid, Vol. V, p. 444), Jefferson wrote as follows:

He (Napoleon) will with difficulty consent to our receiving Cuba into our Union, to prevent our aid to Mexico and other provinces. That would be a price, and I would immediately erect a column on the southernmost limit of Cuba, and inscribe on it a *ne plus ultra* as to us in that direction. We should then have only to include the North in our confederacy, which would be, of course, in the first war, and we should have such an empire for liberty as she has never surveyed since the creation; and I am persuaded no Constitution was ever so well calculated as ours for extensive empire and self-government. * * * It will be objected to our receiving Cuba, that no limit can then be drawn to our future acquisitions. Cuba can be defended by us without a Navy, and this develops the principle which ought to limit our views. Nothing should ever be accepted which would require a Navy to defend it.

June 11, 1823 (Ibid, Vol. 7, p. 288), he wrote to the President:

Cuba alone seems at present to hold up a speck of war to us. Its possession by Great Britain would, indeed, be a great calamity to us. Could we induce her to join us in guaranteeing its independence against all the world, except Spain, it would be nearly as valuable to us as if it were our own. But should she take it, I would not immediately go to war for it; because the first war on other accounts will give it to us; or the island will give itself to us, when able to do so.

And again, on June 23d, the same year (Ibid, Vol. 7, p. 300), he wrote, speaking of Cuba:

It is better then to lie still in readiness to receive that interesting incorporation when solicited by herself. For, certainly, her addition to our confederacy is exactly what is wanting to round out our power as a nation to the point of its utmost interest.

Our Secretaries of State since the time of Jefferson have always watched with jealous care the development of foreign interests upon this continent and have always insisted that Cuba should never be suffered to pass into the hands of any other European power, if released from the dominion of Spain.

John Quincy Adams, Monroe's Secretary of State from 1817 to 1825, said:

* * * Looking forward to the probable course of events for the short period of half a century, it is scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the annexation of Cuba to our Federal Republic will be indispensable to the continuance and integrity of the Union itself. * * * Cuba, forcibly disjointed from its own unnatural connection with Spain and incapable of self-support, can gravitate only toward the North American Union, which by the same law of nature can not cast her off from its bosom.

This letter was written to the United States Minister in Spain and shows plainly how naturally the inference was drawn that Cuba no longer dependent on Spain would seek alliance with or entrance into the American Union. Spain was at this time losing her American possessions, and that she would retain Cuba for a very long period was considered highly improbable.

The celebrated Monroe Doctrine about which there has been so much controversy, was announced about this time, and showed plainly that any attempt at interference by European powers on the American continent, or any attempt to recover lost dominion over states which had achieved their independence, would be regarded by the United States as unfriendly.

Henry Clay, while Secretary of State during the administration of John Quincy Adams, 1824-1829, writing to the United States Minister in Spain, said:

If the war should continue between Spain and the new Republics, and those islands (Cuba and Porto Rico) should become the theatre of it, their fortunes have such a connection with the prosperity of the United States that they could not be indifferent spectators, and the possible contingencies of such a protracted war might bring upon the Government of the United States duties and obligations, the performance of which, however painful it should be, they might not be at liberty to decline.

In 1825, Spain endeavored to secure a treaty with the United States offering commercial advantages in exchange for a guarantee to Spain of perpetual possession of Cuba. The effort coupled with an attempt to recover her lost colonies, was unsuccessful, the utmost concessions made being an expression from the President that all our efforts should be to preserve the existing state of things. At the same time the United States discountenanced attempts made by the Spanish-American Republics to carry their war with Spain into Cuba.

In 1826, the Minister of Foreign Affairs was instructed that the United States would not countenance the passage of Cuba to any other

European power. Thus it seems there has always been a mutual distrust in regard to Cuba, and the attitude of the United States seems to have been tolerance of Spain's claims so long as the mother country was able to enforce them. It seems to have gone much further during the last thirty years, for the condition of Cuba has been a serious menace to the commerce and welfare of the United States; at the same time it must be admitted that while the Government did its full duty in keeping faith with Spain, the people of the United States did much to foment and encourage the uprisings upon the island, and without the moral support and material assistance derived from American sympathizers, Cuba could never have successfully defied Spain, because a vast number of the better class of Cubans were not disaffected, but clung with unshaken loyalty to the mother country.

In 1852, Mr. Everett, Secretary of State, protested against European interference in Cuba, and in 1853, Governor Marcy, then Secretary of State, said that Cuba "must be to the United States no cause of annoyance in itself, nor must it be used by others as an instrument of annoyance." He wrote July 23, 1853, that it was very difficult for Spain to retain Cuba or to sustain without assistance her connection with the island, but he declared that while Spain remained in fact as well as in name the sovereign of Cuba, she could depend on us "maintaining our duty as a neutral nation towards her, however difficult it might be." It was contended that neutrality laws could not be made more restrictive without violating the constitutional rights of our citizens. Reference was also made by Governor Marcy to the idea of purchase, and it was stated that there had been no intention of purchase "unless the inhabitants were very generally disposed to concur in the transfer."

The seizure of the steamer "Black Warrior," packet ship of the New York and Alabama line, in February, 1854, on some technical charge of irregularity, aroused great indignation, and Soulé, United States Minister to Spain, presented this claim in terms which the Spanish Minister of State considered "harsh and imperious." Soulé then referred to the great carelessness of the Spanish Government in making redress for former claims of the same character. A bitter correspondence ensued. The Secretary of State advised a conference between the ministers to Madrid, Paris and London, and this took place at Ostend in October of the same year and resulted in the famous document known as the Ostend Manifesto.

THE OSTEND MANIFESTO.

AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, *October 18, 1854.*

SIR.—The undersigned, in compliance with the wish expressed by the President in the several confidential dispatches you have addressed to us respectively, to that effect, we have met in conference, first at Ostend, in Belgium, on the 9th, 10th, and 11th instant, and then at Aix-la-Chapelle, in Prussia, on the days next following, up to the date hereof.

There has been a full and unreserved interchange of views and sentiments between us, which we are most happy to inform you has resulted in a cordial coincidence of opinion on the grave and important subjects submitted to our consideration.

We have arrived at the conclusion, and are thoroughly convinced that an immediate and earnest effort ought to be made by the Government of the United States to purchase Cuba from Spain at any price for which it can be obtained, not exceeding the sum of \$

The proposal should, in our opinion, be made in such a manner as to be presented through the necessary diplomatic forms to the Supreme Constituent Cortes about to assemble. On this momentous question, in which the people, both of Spain and the United States, are so deeply interested, all our proceedings ought to be open, frank, and public. They should be of such a character as to challenge the approbation of the world.

We firmly believe that, in the progress of human events, the time has arrived when the vital interests of Spain are as seriously involved in the sale, as those of the United States in the purchase of the island, and that the transaction will prove equally honorable to both nations.

Under these circumstances we can not anticipate a failure, unless possibly through the malign influence of foreign powers who possess no right whatever to interfere in the matter.

We proceed to state some of the reasons which have brought us to this conclusion, and for the sake of clearness, we shall specify them under two distinct heads:

1. The United States ought, if practicable, to purchase Cuba with as little delay as possible.

2. The probability is great that the Government and Cortes of Spain will prove willing to sell it, because this would essentially promote the highest and best interests of the Spanish people.

Then, first. It must be clear to every reflecting mind that, from the peculiarity of its geographical position, and the considerations attendant on it, Cuba is as necessary to the North American Republic as any of its present members, and

that it belongs naturally to that great family of States of which the Union is the providential nursery.

From its locality it commands the mouth of the Mississippi and the immense and annually increasing trade which must seek this avenue to the ocean.

On the numerous navigable streams, measuring an aggregate course of some 30,000 miles, which disembogue themselves through this magnificent river into the Gulf of Mexico, the increase of the population within the last ten years amounts to more than that of the entire Union at the time Louisiana was annexed to it.

The natural and main outlet to the products of this entire population, the highway of their direct intercourse with the Atlantic and Pacific States, can never be secure, but must ever be endangered whilst Cuba is a dependency of a distant power in whose possession it has proved to be a source of constant annoyance and embarrassment to their interests.

Indeed, the Union can never enjoy repose, nor possess reliable security, as long as Cuba is not embraced within its boundaries.

Its immediate acquisition by the Government is of paramount importance, and we can not doubt but that it is a consummation devoutly wished for by its inhabitants.

The intercourse which its proximity to our coast begets and encourages, between them and the citizens of the United States, has, in the progress of time, so united their interests and blended their fortunes that they now look upon each other as if they were one people and had but one destiny.

Considerations exist which render delay in the acquisition of this island exceedingly dangerous to the United States.

The system of immigration and labor lately organized within its limits, and the tyranny and oppression which characterize its immediate rulers, threaten an insurrection at every moment which may result in direful consequences to the American people.

Cuba has thus become to us an unceasing danger, and a permanent cause of anxiety and alarm.

But we need not enlarge on these topics. It can scarcely be apprehended that foreign powers, in violation of international law, would interpose their influence with Spain to prevent our acquisition of the island. Its inhabitants are now suffering under the worst of all possible governments, that of absolute despotism, delegated by a distant power to irresponsible agents, who are changed at short intervals, and who are tempted to improve the brief opportunity thus afforded to accumulate fortunes by the basest means.

As long as this system shall endure, humanity may in vain demand the suppression of the African slave trade in the island. This is rendered im-



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INSURGENT HOSPITAL.



SPANISH HOSPITAL.

possible whilst that infamous traffic remains an irresistible temptation and a source of immense profit to needy and avaricious officials, who, to attain their ends, scruple not to trample the most sacred principles under foot.

The Spanish Government at home may be well disposed, but experience has proved that it can not control these remote depositaries of its power.

Besides, the commercial nations of the world can not fail to perceive and appreciate the great advantages which would result to their people from a dissolution of the forced and unnatural connection between Spain and Cuba, and the annexation of the latter to the United States. The trade of England and France with Cuba would, in that event, assume at once an important and profitable character, and rapidly extend with the increasing population and prosperity of the island.

2. But if the United States and every commercial nation would be benefited by this transfer, the interests of Spain would also be greatly and essentially promoted.

She can not but see what such a sum of money as we are willing to pay for the island would effect in the development of her vast natural resources.

Two-thirds of this sum, if employed in the construction of a system of railroads, would ultimately prove a source of greater wealth to the Spanish people than that opened to their vision by Cortes. Their prosperity would date from the ratification of the treaty of cession.

France has already constructed continuous lines of railways from Havre, Marseilles, Valenciennes, and Strasburg, via Paris, to the Spanish frontier, and anxiously awaits the day when Spain shall find herself in a condition to extend these roads through her northern provinces to Madrid, Seville, Cadiz, Malaga, and the frontiers of Portugal.

This object once accomplished, Spain would become a centre of attraction for the traveling world, and secure a permanent and profitable market for her various productions. Her fields, under the stimulus given to industry by remunerative prices, would teem with cereal grain, and her vineyard would bring forth a vastly increased quantity of choice wines. Spain would speedily become what a bountiful Providence intended she should be, one of the first nations of continental Europe — rich, powerful, and contented.

Whilst two-thirds of the price of the island would be ample for the completion of her most important public improvements, she might with the remaining 40,000,000 satisfy the demands now pressing so heavily upon her credit, and create a sinking fund which would gradually relieve her from the overwhelming debt now paralyzing her energies.

Such is her present wretched financial condition, that her best bonds are sold upon her own bourse at about one-third of their par value; whilst another

class, on which she pays no interest, have but a nominal value, and are quoted at about one-sixth of the amount for which they were issued. Besides, these latter are held principally by British creditors, who may, from day to day, obtain the effective interposition of their own Government for the purpose of coercing payment. Intimations to that effect have been already thrown out from high quarters, and unless some new sources of revenue shall enable Spain to provide for such exigencies, it is not improbable that they will be realized.

Should Spain reject the present golden opportunity for developing her resources and removing her financial embarrassments, it may never again return.

Cuba, in her palmyest days, never yielded her exchequer, after deducting the expense of its government, a clear annual income of more than a million and a half of dollars. These expenses have increased to such a degree as to leave a deficit, chargeable to the treasury of Spain, to the amount of \$600,000.

In a pecuniary point of view, therefore, the island is an incumbrance instead of a source of profit to the mother country.

Under no probable circumstances can Cuba ever yield to Spain one per cent. on the large amount which the United States are willing to pay for its acquisition. But Spain is in imminent danger of losing Cuba without remuneration.

Extreme oppression, it is now universally admitted, justifies any people in endeavoring to relieve themselves from the yoke of their oppressors. The sufferings which the corrupt, arbitrary, and unrelenting local administration necessarily entails upon the inhabitants of Cuba can not fail to stimulate and keep alive the spirit of resistance and revolution against Spain which has of late years been so often manifested. In this condition of affairs it is vain to expect that the sympathies of the people of the United States will not be warmly enlisted in favor of their oppressed neighbors.

We know that the President is justly inflexible in his determination to execute the neutrality laws; but should the Cubans themselves rise in revolt against the oppression which they suffer, no human power could prevent citizens of the United States and liberal-minded men of other countries from rushing to their assistance. Besides, the present is an age of adventure in which restless and daring spirits abound in every portion of the world.

It is not improbable, therefore, that Cuba may be wrested from Spain by a successful revolution; and in that event she will lose both the island and the price which we are now willing to pay for it — a price far beyond what was ever paid by one people to another for any province.

It may also be remarked that the settlement of this vexed question, by the

cession of Cuba to the United States, would forever prevent the dangerous complications between nations to which it may otherwise give birth.

It is certain that, should the Cubans themselves organize an insurrection against the Spanish Government, and should other independent nations come to the aid of Spain in the contest, no human power could, in our opinion, prevent the people and Government of the United States from taking part in such a civil war in support of their neighbors and friends.

But if Spain, deaf to the voice of her own interest, and actuated by stubborn pride and a false sense of honor, should refuse to sell Cuba to the United States, then the question will arise, What ought to be the course of the American Government under such circumstances?

Self-preservation is the first law of nature with States as well as with individuals. All nations have, at different periods, acted upon this maxim. Although it has been made the pretext for committing flagrant injustice, as in the partition of Poland and other similar cases which history records, yet the principle itself, though often abused, has always been recognized.

The United States has never acquired a foot of territory except by fair purchase, or, as in the case of Texas, upon the free and voluntary application of the people of that independent State, who desired to blend their destinies with our own.

Even our acquisitions from Mexico are no exception to this rule because, although we might have claimed them by the right of conquest in a just war, yet we purchased them for what was then considered by both parties a full and ample equivalent.

Our past history forbids that we should acquire the island of Cuba without the consent of Spain, unless justified by the great law of self-preservation. We must, in any event, preserve our conscious rectitude and our own self-respect.

Whilst pursuing this course we can afford to disregard the censures of the world, to which we have been so often and so unjustly exposed.

After we have offered Spain a price for Cuba far beyond its present value, and this shall have been refused, it will then be time to consider the questions, Does Cuba, in the possession of Spain, seriously endanger our internal peace and the existence of our cherished Union?

Should this question be answered in the affirmative, then, by every law, human and divine, we shall be justified in wresting it from Spain, if we possess the power; and this upon the very same principle that would justify an individual in tearing down the burning house of his neighbor if there were no other means of preventing the flames from destroying his own home.

Under such circumstances we ought neither to count the cost nor regard the odds which Spain might enlist against us. We forbear to enter into the

question, whether the present condition of the island would justify such a measure. We should, however, be recreant to our duty, be unworthy of our gallant forefathers, and commit base treason against our posterity, should we permit Cuba to be Africanized and become a second San Domingo, with all its attendant horrors to the white race, and suffer the flames to extend to our own neighboring shores, seriously to endanger, or actually to consume, the fair fabric of our Union.

We fear that the course and current of events are rapidly tending toward such a catastrophe. We, however, hope for the best, though we ought certainly to be prepared for the worst.

We also forbear to investigate the present condition of the questions at issue between the United States and Spain. A long series of injuries to our people have been committed in Cuba by Spanish officials, and are unredressed. But recently a most flagrant outrage on the rights of American citizens, and on the flag of the United States, was perpetrated in the harbor of Havana under circumstances which, without immediate redress, would have justified a resort to measures of war in vindication of national honor. That outrage is not only unatoned, but the Spanish Government had deliberately sanctioned the acts of its subordinates, and assumed the responsibility attaching to them.

Nothing could more impressively teach us the danger to which those peaceful relations it has ever been the policy of the United States to cherish with foreign nations, are constantly exposed, than the circumstances of that case. Situated as Spain and the United States are, the latter have forborne to resort to extreme measures.

But this course can not, with due regard to their own dignity as an independent nation, continue; and our recommendations, now submitted, are dictated by the firm belief that the cession of Cuba to the United States, with stipulations as beneficial to Spain as those suggested, is the only effective mode of settling all past differences, and of securing the two countries against future collisions.

We have already witnessed the happy results for both countries which followed a similar arrangement in regard to Florida.

Yours, very respectfully,

JAMES BUCHANAN,
J. Y. MASON,
PIERRE SOULE.

Hon. WM. L. MARCY, *Secretary of State.*

It was contended by many that the hostile tone of this document was owing to the feeling of Soulé toward Spain. It was also con-

tended that the move was in the interest of the slave-holding States, and, although not acted upon by the American Government, did much towards shaping the results of the next election which found Buchanan, one of its signers, the successful candidate for the Presidency. Soulé, who had become obnoxious to the Spanish Government, sent in his resignation as soon as he found that the Manifesto was repudiated by the administration; no redress was obtained for the outrages complained of, and thus the diplomacy of Spain was again triumphant. This was not long after the Lopez expedition; and the execution of Crittenden and his companions had caused intense feeling throughout this country and came near producing war with Spain.

President Buchanan in his annual message to Congress at the opening of the Thirty-sixth Congress, December 6, 1858, says:

The island of Cuba, from its geographical position, commands the mouth of the Mississippi and the immense and annually increasing trade, foreign and coastwise, from the valley of that noble river, now embracing half the sovereign States of the Union. With that island under the dominion of a distant foreign power, this trade, of vital importance to these States, is exposed to the danger of being destroyed in time of war, and it has hitherto been subjected to perpetual injury and annoyance in time of peace. Our relations with Spain, which ought to be of the most friendly character, must always be placed in jeopardy while the existing colonial government over the island shall remain in its present condition.

Whilst the possession of the island would be of vast importance to the United States, its value to Spain is comparatively unimportant. Such was the relative situation of the parties when the great Napoleon transferred Louisiana to the United States. Jealous as he ever was of the national honor and interests of France, no person throughout the world has imputed blame to him for accepting a pecuniary equivalent for this cession.

The publicity which has been given to our former negotiations upon this subject and the large appropriation which may be required to effect the purpose render it expedient before making another attempt to renew the negotiation that I should lay the whole subject before Congress. This is especially necessary, as it may become indispensable to success that I should be entrusted with the means of making an advance to the Spanish Government immediately after the signing of the treaty, without awaiting the ratification of it by the Senate. I am encouraged to make this suggestion by the example of Mr. Jefferson previous to the purchase of Louisiana from France and by that

of Mr. Polk in view of the acquisition of territory from Mexico. I refer the whole subject to Congress and commend it to their careful consideration.—

Messages and Papers of the Presidents; James Buchanan (page 511).

The following extracts refer to an offer of \$100,000,000 which was indignantly refused by Spain:

WASHINGTON CITY, *January 22, 1854.*

To the Senate of the United States:

I transmit herewith a report from the Secretary of State in answer to the resolution of the Senate of the 18th instant, requesting the President, if not incompatible with the public interest, "to communicate to the Senate any and all correspondence between the Government of the United States and the Government of Her Catholic Majesty relating to any proposition for the purchase of the island of Cuba, which correspondence has not been furnished to either house of Congress." From this it appears that no such correspondence has taken place which has not already been communicated to Congress. In my late annual message I stated in reference to the purchase of Cuba that "the publicity which has been given to our former negotiations on this subject and the large appropriation which may be required to effect the purpose render it expedient, before making another attempt to renew the negotiations, that I shall lay the whole subject before Congress." I still entertain the same opinion, deeming it highly important, if not indispensable to the success of any negotiation which I might institute for this purpose, that the measure should receive the previous sanction of Congress.—Messages and Papers of the Presidents; James Buchanan (pages 535-537).

In his annual Message of December 19, 1859, the President again refers to the matter of purchase of Cuba. He says:

I need not repeat the arguments which I urged in my last annual message in favor of the acquisition of Cuba by fair purchase. My opinions on that measure remain unchanged. I, therefore, again invite the serious attention of Congress to this important subject. Without a recognition of this policy on their part it will be almost impossible to institute negotiations with any reasonable prospect of success.—Messages and Papers of the Presidents; James Buchanan (page 561).

And in his message of December 3, 1860, he says:

I reiterate the recommendation contained in my annual message of December, 1858, and repeated in that of December, 1859, in favor of the acquisition

of Cuba from Spain by fair purchase. I firmly believe that such an acquisition would contribute essentially to the well-being and prosperity of both countries in all future time, as well as prove the certain means of immediately abolishing the African slave trade throughout the world. I would not repeat this recommendation upon the present occasion if I believed that the transfer of Cuba to the United States upon conditions highly favorable to Spain could justly tarnish the national honor of the proud and ancient Spanish monarchy. Surely no person ever attributed to the first Napoleon a disregard of the national honor of France for transferring Louisiana to the United States for a fair equivalent, both in money and commercial advantages.—Messages and Papers of the Presidents; James Buchanan (page 642).

During the Ten Years' War, the United States offered to guarantee the debt of the island, if Spain would grant its independence. At this time General Grant was President of the United States and Spain was a Republic, but she was not an iota less tyrannical and grasping in one form than another. The proposition was promptly declined by General Prim who was temporarily in power; and General Grant, throughout his administration, scrupulously adhered to the policy of non-intervention. During the stormy days following the terrible affair of the "Virginius," General Sickles was our Minister to Spain. His efforts to obtain an honorable settlement of the difficulty not having been successful, he resigned. Copies of some of the letters exchanged at this time will doubtless be of interest in this connection. It will be seen there was a conflict between the expressions made to our Minister at Madrid, and those made to the State Department by Spanish diplomats in Washington.

UNITED STATES LEGATION IN SPAIN.

MADRID, *November 14, 1873.*

SIR.—I have the honor to forward herewith a copy of a note this day passed to the minister of State, in which, in obedience to your instruction of the 12th inst., by cable, I have protested against the summary execution of the captain and thirty-six of the crew of the "Virginius" and sixteen others, by order of the Spanish authorities at Santiago de Cuba. You were advised in my telegram of last evening that Mr. Carvajal, in our interview of yesterday, confirmed the report published in the Havana papers.

I am, etc.,

SICKLES.

(Received December 11th.)

MADRID, *November 15, 1873.*

Received an ill-tempered note to-day from the minister of State, rejecting protest, and saying Spain would, nevertheless, consider and decide questions according to law and her dignity.

SICKLES.

MADRID, *November 18, 1873.*

Minister of State informs me, in note of this date, that the reports mentioned in your cable of 15th are not confirmed, and that, on the contrary, as soon as the captain-general could submit to Santiago the orders sent by this Government on the 6th, the executions were suspended.

SICKLES.

MADRID, *November 19, 1873.*

Popular feeling runs high here against United States and this legation. Press violent and abusive, advising Government to order me out of Spain. Last night a mob was collected to attack and sack the legation. The authorities interfered and preserved the peace.

SICKLES.

WASHINGTON, *November 20, 1873.*

Instructions sent yesterday by cable authorize you to defer closing legation in order to allow a reasonable time to Spanish Government to ascertain facts in response to their request through minister here, presented on the 18th inst. No other postponement has been agreed to, and minister was informed that a satisfactory settlement would be expected by the 26th.

FISH.


MADRID, *November 20, 1873.*

Have received rejoinder of minister to my reply to his note in answer to our protest. Neither this nor either of the three communications in writing so far received, contains any expression of regret or disapproval of the capture or the slaughter at Santiago. The press approves the whole business, and denies that any censure or regret has been expressed by this Government. The ministerial journals acquiesce.

SICKLES.

MADRID, *November 21, 1873.*

Constant efforts are made by this Cabinet to conciliate England. Castelar is every day at British legation. The press has received an official hint to



From Harper's Weekly.

PAYING THE PENALTY OF REBELLION AGAINST SPANISH MISRULE.

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INSURGENTS IN CAVE REGION IN CAIGUANABO COUNTY.

contrast the moderation of England with our impatience. I suspect overtures have also been made to Germany for her good offices.

SICKLES.

WASHINGTON, *November 23, 1873.*

Have telegraphed to Rome for authority to Italian minister to take custody of library and property. Spanish Government, through minister here, proposed arbitration, which has been declined, on the ground that the question is not one for arbitration, the subject being one of national honor, of which the nation must be the judge and custodian.

FISH.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

WASHINGTON, *November 25, 1873.*

If upon the close of to-morrow no accommodation shall have been reached in the case of the "Virginius," you will address to the foreign office a note expressing regret at the delay of the reparation asked for, and stating that, in conformity with instructions from your Government, you were under the necessity of withdrawing from Madrid, for which purpose you request the usual passport for yourself, your family and suite. If, however, the accommodation desired should be brought about in the course of to-morrow, either here or in Madrid, you will, until otherwise directed, abstain from addressing the note adverted to. Should a proposition be submitted to you to-morrow, you will refer it here, and defer action until it be decided upon. A telegram has just now been read to me by Admiral Polo, which gives reason to hope for a satisfactory accommodation. You will, therefore, allow the whole of to-morrow to pass before addressing your note.

FISH.

MADRID, *November 25, 1873.*

Layard says Granville has expressed his sense of the justice and moderation of the reparation we have demanded, and this has been communicated to Castelar. England reserves her reclamation for the present, and endeavors to promote a settlement of the question pending between the United States and Spain.

SICKLES.

MADRID, *November 26, 1873.*

At half-past two this afternoon, half an hour after I had asked for my passports, I received a note, dated to-day, from minister of State, in which he says:

First. If it appear, on or before the 25th of December next, that the "Virginius" rightfully carried the American flag, and that her documents

were regular, Spain will declare the seizure illegal, salute the flag as requested, and return the ship with the surviving passengers and crew.

Second. If it be proved that the authorities of Santiago de Cuba, in their proceedings and sentences pronounced against foreigners, have essentially infringed Spanish legislation or treaties, this Government will arraign those authorities before competent tribunals.

Third. Any other reclamations growing out of the affair, which either of the respective governments may have to present, will be considered diplomatically, and, if no agreement be reached, they will be submitted to the arbitration of a third power, named by mutual consent.

Fourth. If the 25th day of December shall have expired without the Spanish Government having resolved, in so far as comes within its province, the questions arising out of the demand for reparation, it will hold itself bound to accord such reparation the same as if the right of the United States to receive it were recognized, and such reparation will be given in the form specified in the first and second paragraphs.

SICKLES.

MADRID, *November 28, 1873.*

Last night it was agreed here informally that, accepting my declaration of the nationality of the "Virginus," reparation would be made in accordance with our demand of the 15th inst. This was ratified by the council of ministers at 3 this morning, and I was promised an official communication in that sense to-day. I am now informed in a note from minister of State that yesterday you authorized the Spanish minister at Washington to convey to this Government a different proposition on the part of the United States, and that it has been accepted, of which you have been notified through Admiral Polo. Please let me know whether this statement is true. The only instruction I have had from you since my four telegrams of the 26th, is a copy of the Senate resolutions passed in fifty-six.

SICKLES.

WASHINGTON, *November 29, 1873.*

Remain at post. Further instructions soon. Settlement being effected here.

FISH.

MADRID, *December 15, 1873, 4:30 P. M.*

President Castelar called at the legation this afternoon and informed me that the "Virginus" and survivors had been surrendered to those authorized to receive them on the part of the United States.

SICKLES.

(Received 3:20 P. M.)

MADRID, *December 20, 1873, 12:30 A. M.*

It is stated here by authority that in consequence of a communication this Government has received from that of the United States, in which it appears the "Virginus" is not an American ship, a reclamation will be made by Spain for the restoration of the vessel and passengers.

SICKLES.

(Received December 20, 10:20 A. M.)

WASHINGTON, *December 20, 1873, 11:20 A. M.*

Official advices received of surrender of survivors from "Virginus."

FISH.

MADRID, *December 26, 1873.*

My resignation having been accepted, I now respectfully renew my request for the publication of the correspondence relating thereto, comprising my telegrams of the 6th, 16th and 20th inst., and your replies of the 6th, 17th and 20th. I beg that this request may be submitted to the President.

SICKLES.

(Received December 26th, P. M.)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

WASHINGTON, *December 31, 1873.*

SIR.—On the 26th ult., General Sickles' No. 893 arrived at this Department during my absence for the holidays. In it he states that it was informally agreed, on the night of the 27th of November last, that on a declaration made by him of the American nationality of the "Virginus," the vessel and surviving passengers and crew would be delivered up, the flag saluted, and the other measures of reparation accorded in conformity with our demands of the 15th inst. It is greatly to be regretted that General Sickles did not state with whom this informal agreement was made.

The note of Mr. Carvajal, minister of foreign affairs, which accompanies General Sickles' dispatch, does not convey the idea that he had been a party to that agreement, but does intimate that he would have discussed some of the points raised in General Sickles' note but for the arrangement which was made here.

General Sickles further says, that at noon on the 28th of November, Mr. Carvajal sent him a copy of a telegram from Admiral Polo, containing what purported to be a fresh proposal from me respecting the "Virginus," which

General Sickles appears to have supposed was in conflict with the informal arrangement of the previous evening.

Without more accurate information concerning the person with whom the informal arrangement was made, I can not permit myself to think that the Spanish Government receded from any undertaking which it had once assumed.

So far, however, as General Sickles' statement may be supposed to affect this Government, it is proper to say that the changes from the original demands of the United States, which were agreed to in the protocol of the 29th of November, were adopted on the suggestion of the Spanish Government, under the belief that they did not affect the principles upon which our demands were founded, and were calculated to promote a peaceful settlement of the unfortunate differences which had arisen between the two powers.

Spain having admitted (as could not be seriously questioned), that a regularly documented vessel of the United States is subject on the high seas, in time of peace, only to the police jurisdiction of the power from which it receives its papers, it seemed to the President that the United States should not refuse to concede to her the right to adduce proof to show that the "Virginius" was not rightfully carrying our flag. When the question of national honor was adjusted, it also seemed that there was a peculiar propriety in our consenting to an arbitration on a question of pecuniary damages.

This happy adjustment of the difference between two sister Republics on a basis honorable to both, fortunately makes the matters referred to by General Sickles of little importance. I have thought it right, however, to correct the misapprehensions under which his dispatch seems to have been written.

I am, sir, etc.,

HAMILTON FISH.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

WASHINGTON, *November 14, 1877.*

The Secretary of State, to whom was referred the resolution of the House of Representatives of the 12th inst., requesting him to "inform the House, if not incompatible with public interests, what amount of indemnity has been paid to this Government by the Government of Spain on account of the execution of General Ryan and others, at Santiago de Cuba, November 4, 1873, and what disposition has been made of such funds as may have been received," has the honor to report to the President that the amount of indemnity paid by the Government of Spain on that account was 80,000 Spanish dollars, yielding, less exchange, the sum of \$77,794.44 in coin; that claims thereon have been settled and paid to the amount of \$38,102; that a claim for \$2,500 has been settled, but is not yet paid; and that the unexpended balance of the "Virginius" in-

demnity is invested at 5 per cent. registered bonds of the United States. The Secretary of State has also to state that, as the heirs of General Ryan failed to prove that he was a citizen of the United States, nothing has been paid to them from said indemnity funds.

Respectfully submitted,

WM. M. EVARTS.

To the President.

It will be seen that in the report of Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State in 1877, in regard to the matter, he states that the indemnity paid by Spain on account of the execution of General Ryan and others at Santiago, November 4, 1873, was \$77,794.44; that claims thereon amounting to \$38,102 had been settled and paid, and that the unexpended balance was invested in 5 per cent. registered United States bonds. The vessel and the surviving passengers were given up to the authorities of the United States. Spanish diplomacy had the better chance in this disastrous matter from the fact that the President was fully conscious of the illegality of the proceedings of the "Virginus," and this knowledge formed an element of weakness in the negotiations.

In the general instructions to General Sickles' successor, Mr. Cushing, before his departure to Madrid, he was informed by the Secretary of State that "The President can not but regard independence and emancipation, of course, as the only certain and even necessary solution of the question of Cuba."

In 1875 the American Government addressed strong protests to the Spanish Government and to the European powers asking intervention in the interest of terminating the war in Cuba. The foreign powers refused to interfere, but Spain promised reforms and the immediate suppression of the rebellion. It required more than two years longer to accomplish this, but General Grant adhered strictly to the established policy of nonintervention.

Those who wonder that Spain should have stubbornly and indignantly refused to entertain the idea of parting with Cuba, little appreciate the tie connecting the countries. To the great bulk of the Spanish people, Cuba was as much a part of Spain as any one of the provinces of the Peninsula itself. Its separation from Spain was looked upon as a national dismemberment. It was as impossible for Spain to make of Cuba a matter of bargaining, as it would be for the United States to entertain the idea of selling one of the States

whose star shines in the constellation gracing our national banner. In addition to this, Spain felt very bitterly the loss of her other American possessions. The South American colonies were lost to her one after another, owing in a great measure to her own bad management and complications with foreign powers. Louisiana, ceded to France with the understanding it was not to be alienated, almost immediately passed to the United States. Florida was sold by Ferdinand VII, and this action on his part produced a revolution in Spain. In addition to this, the unconcealed sympathy of the American people for the insurgents in every Cuban rebellion greatly increased the obstinate attachment of Spain to the fairest and last of her American possessions.

In President Cleveland's message to Congress in December, 1895, he thus refers to the war in Cuba:

Cuba is again gravely disturbed. An insurrection, in some respects more active than the last preceding revolt, which continued from 1868 to 1878, now exists in a large part of the eastern interior of the island, menacing even some populations on the coast. Besides deranging the commercial exchanges of the island, of which our country takes the predominant share, this flagrant condition of hostilities, by arousing sentimental sympathy and inciting adventurous support among our people, has entailed earnest effort on the part of this Government to enforce obedience to our neutrality laws and to prevent the territory of the United States from being abused as a vantage ground from which to aid those in arms against Spanish sovereignty.

Whatever may be the traditional sympathy of our countrymen as individuals with a people who seem to be struggling for larger autonomy and greater freedom, deepened as such sympathy naturally must be in behalf of our neighbors, yet the plain duty of their Government is to observe in good faith the recognized obligations of international relationship. The performance of this duty should not be made more difficult by a disregard on the part of our citizens of the obligations growing out of their allegiance to their country, which should restrain them from violating as individuals the neutrality which the nation of which they are members is bound to observe in its relations to friendly sovereign States. Though neither the warmth of our people's sympathy with the Cuban insurgents, nor our loss and material damage consequent upon the futile endeavors thus far made to restore peace and order, nor any shock our humane sensibilities may have received from the cruelties which appear to especially characterize this sanguinary and fiercely conducted war, have in the least shaken the determination of the Government to honestly

fulfill every international obligation, yet it is to be earnestly hoped, on every ground, that the devastation of armed conflict may speedily be stayed and order and quiet restored to the distracted island, bringing in their train the activity and thrift of peaceful pursuits.

It will be seen that President Cleveland counseled good faith, neutrality and non-intervention. In the following February, resolutions recognizing the belligerency of the Cubans were introduced into the Senate and they were adopted February 28th, by a vote of 64 to 6. These resolutions, favored by Senators Sherman, Morgan, Davis, Lodge and others, were opposed by Senators Hale and Hoar. Different resolutions on the same subject were passed by the House, the matter went to conference, was discussed again to a considerable extent in the House and Senate, and finally the Conference Committee adopted the original Senate resolutions and they were finally passed by the House by a vote of 245 to 27, April 6th.

WAR IN CUBA.

54th Congress,
1st Session.

SENATE.

Con. Res. 19,
Part 5.

CONCURRENT RESOLUTION:

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring therein), That, in the opinion of Congress, a condition of public war exists between the Government of Spain and the government proclaimed and for some time maintained by force of arms by the people of Cuba; and that the United States of America should maintain a strict neutrality between the contending powers, according to each all the rights of belligerents in the ports and territory of the United States.

Resolved further, That the friendly offices of the United States should be offered by the President to the Spanish Government for the recognition of the independence of Cuba.

Passed the Senate, February 28, 1896.

Passed the House of Representatives, April 6, 1896.

These resolutions were not in a form which made action by the President necessary, and they amounted to nothing further than to show the drift of public sentiment. The long and violent discussion of the matter aroused a very bitter feeling in Spain, and riotous demonstrations took place in Valencia, Madrid, Barcelona, Cadiz and

Bilboa. These outbreaks were disavowed by the Spanish Government and some of the colleges whose students had been engaged in them were closed on that account. Spain endeavored in every way to avoid diplomatic entanglements.

Meanwhile, the international obligations of the United States were strictly complied with, and much money was expended in guarding the coast to intercept the departure of filibustering expeditions. One of these was captured about to leave New York, February 25th, and General Garcia and others were detained in this country. But in spite of these precautions, Cuban sympathizers were constantly eluding the authorities, and Garcia himself reached Cuba safely in the spring. April 8th, Senator Turpie boldly urged intervention by the United States. There had been some dissatisfaction with the course of Consul-General Williams in Cuba, owing to his alleged inactivity in behalf of Americans arrested or ill-treated in Havana, and on April 13th, he was replaced by General Fitzhugh Lee. April 16th, the Diaz Brothers, American citizens, were arrested and imprisoned. April 24th, Dygert, an American prisoner in Havana, was released upon the intervention of the Consul-General. April 27th, the "Bermuda," with arms and ammunition for the Cubans, sailed from Jacksonville, Fla., and safely accomplished her mission; but the schooner "Competitor," on the same business, was captured by a Spanish gunboat. American citizens on board were tried by court-martial and sentenced to be shot, and a repetition of the "Virginus" affair was feared; but at the solicitation of the United States, Spain agreed to postpone the execution, and after a delay of more than a year, they were finally released from prison, November 18, 1897. On July 4, 1896, a filibustering expedition under Captain Colby, an American, was safely landed in Cuba and contributed greatly to the Cuban cause.

President Cleveland's last annual message to Congress, December, 1896, was conservative and not aggressive; still it hinted that intervention might soon become necessary, and the idea of purchasing Cuba was again suggested. The following extracts contain the gist of his remarks on the subject:

The insurrection in Cuba still continues with all its perplexities. It is difficult to perceive that any progress has thus far been made toward the pacification of the island or that the situation of affairs, as depicted in my last annual message, has in the least improved. If Spain still holds Havana and the seaports and all the considerable towns, the insurgents still roam at will over at least



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COLONEL JOAQUIN RUIZ (IN FIREMAN'S UNIFORM).
Killed by Insurgent Chief Aranguren.



COMMITTEE APPOINTED TO INVESTIGATE THE RUIZ MURDER.

two-thirds of the inland country. If the determination of Spain to put down the insurrection seems but to strengthen with the lapse of time, and is evinced by her unhesitating devotion of largely increased military and naval forces to the task, there is much reason to believe that the insurgents have gained in point of numbers, and character, and resources, and are none the less inflexible in their resolve not to succumb, without practically securing the great objects for which they took up arms. If Spain has not yet re-established her authority, neither have the insurgents yet made good their title to be regarded as an independent State. Indeed, as the contest has gone on, the pretense that civil government exists on the island, except so far as Spain is able to maintain it, has been practically abandoned. Spain does keep on foot such a government, more or less imperfectly, in the large towns and their immediate suburbs. But, that exception being made, the entire country is either given over to anarchy or is subject to the military occupation of one or the other party. It is reported, indeed, on reliable authority that, at the demand of the commander-in-chief of the insurgent army, the putative Cuban Government has now given up all attempt to exercise its functions, leaving that Government confessedly (what there is the best reason for supposing it always to have been in fact), a government merely on paper.

* * * * *

The spectacle of the utter ruin of an adjoining country, by nature one of the most fertile and charming on the globe, would engage the serious attention of the Government and people of the United States in any circumstances. In point of fact, they have a concern with it which is by no means of a wholly sentimental or philanthropic character. It lies so near to us as to be hardly separated from our territory. Our actual pecuniary interest in it is second only to that of the people and Government of Spain. It is reasonably estimated that at least from \$30,000,000 to \$50,000,000 of American capital are invested in plantations and in railroad, mining, and other business enterprises on the island.

* * * * *

The insurgents are undoubtedly encouraged and supported by the widespread sympathy the people of this country always and instinctively feel for every struggle for better and freer government, and which, in the case of the more adventurous and restless elements of our population, leads in only too many instances to active and personal participation in the contest. The result is that this Government is constantly called upon to protect American citizens, to claim damages for injuries to persons and property, now estimated at many millions of dollars, and to ask explanations and apologies for the acts

of Spanish officials, whose zeal for the repression of rebellion sometimes blinds them to the immunities belonging to the unoffending citizens of a friendly power. It follows from the same causes that the United States is compelled to actively police a long line of seacoast against unlawful expeditions, the escape of which the utmost vigilance will not always suffice to prevent.

* * * * *

It is now also suggested that the United States should buy the island—a suggestion possibly worthy of consideration if there were any evidence of a desire or willingness on the part of Spain to entertain such a proposal. It is urged, finally, that, all other methods failing, the existing internecine strife in Cuba should be terminated by our intervention, even at the cost of a war between the United States and Spain—a war which its advocates confidently prophesy could be neither large in its proportions nor doubtful in its issue.

The correctness of this forecast need be neither affirmed nor denied. The United States has, nevertheless, a character to maintain as a nation, which plainly dictates that right and not might should be the rule of its conduct.

Referring to the conduct of the United States toward Spain during the existing rebellion and during the Ten Years' War, President Cleveland continues:

No other great power, it may safely be said, under circumstances of similar perplexity, would have manifested the same restraint and the same patient endurance. It may also be said that this persistent attitude of the United States toward Spain in connection with Cuba, unquestionably evinces no slight respect and regard for Spain on the part of the American people. They in truth do not forget her connection with the discovery of the Western Hemisphere, nor do they underestimate the great qualities of the Spanish people, nor fail to fully recognize their splendid patriotism and their chivalrous devotion to the national honor.

* * * * *

And yet neither the Government nor the people of the United States have shut their eyes to the course of events in Cuba, or have failed to realize the existence of conceded grievances, which have led to the present revolt from the authority of Spain—grievances recognized by the Queen Regent and by the Cortes, voiced by the most patriotic and enlightened of Spanish statesmen, without regard to party, and demonstrated by reforms proposed by the executive and approved by the legislative branch of the Spanish Government. It is in the assumed temper and disposition of the Spanish Government to remedy

these grievances, fortified by indications of influential public opinion in Spain, that this Government has hoped to discover the most promising and effective means of composing the present strife, with honor and advantage to Spain and with the achievement of all the reasonable objects of the insurrection.

* * * * *

It was intimated by this Government to the Government of Spain some months ago that, if a satisfactory measure of home rule were tendered the Cuban insurgents, and would be accepted by them upon a guaranty of its execution, the United States would endeavor to find a way not objectionable to Spain to furnishing such guaranty. While no definite response to this intimation has yet been received from the Spanish Government, it is believed to be not altogether unwelcome, while, as already suggested, no reason is perceived why it should not be approved by the insurgents. Neither party can fail to see the importance of early action, and both must realize that to prolong the present state of things for even a short period will add enormously to the time and labor and expenditure necessary to bring about the industrial recuperation of the island. It is, therefore, fervently hoped on all grounds that earnest efforts for healing the breach between Spain and the insurgent Cubans, upon the lines above indicated, may be at once inaugurated and pushed to an immediate and successful issue. The friendly offices of the United States, either in the manner above outlined or in any other way consistent with our Constitution and laws, will always be at the disposal of either party.

Whatever circumstances may arise, our policy and our interests would constrain us to object to the acquisition of the island or an interference with its control by any other power.

It should be added that it can not be reasonably assumed that the hitherto expectant attitude of the United States will be indefinitely maintained.

* * * * *

When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has become manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its re-establishment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge.

* * * * *

Until we face the contingencies suggested, or the situation is by other incidents imperatively changed, we should continue in the line of conduct heretofore pursued, thus in all circumstances exhibiting our obedience to the

requirements of public law and our regard for the duty enjoined upon us by the position we occupy in the family of nations.

A contemplation of emergencies that may arise should plainly lead us to avoid their creation, either through a careless disregard of present duty or even an undue stimulation and ill-timed expression of feeling. But I have deemed it not amiss to remind the Congress that a time may arrive when a correct policy and care for our interests, as well as a regard for the interests of other nations and their citizens, joined by considerations of humanity and a desire to see a rich and fertile country, intimately related to us, saved from complete devastation, will constrain our Government to such action as will subserve the interests thus involved and at the same time promise to Cuba and its inhabitants an opportunity to enjoy the blessings of peace.

The message was adversely criticised in Spain where it aroused great bitterness. From the beginning of the session of Congress the debates on Cuban matters were the all-absorbing topic. Early in December, the country was greatly agitated by the accounts received of the assassination of Maceo by the Spanish troops. He was succeeded in command by General Juan Ruis Rivera.

In February, 1897, the Queen Regent signed a decree granting reforms to the Cubans. In the same month, two American prisoners, Scott and Sanguily were released. A list of American citizens, either native or naturalized, who had been arrested in Cuba, was presented to Congress by President Cleveland and comprised seventy-four persons, seven of whom were newspaper correspondents. One of the most affecting cases, which created widespread indignation, was that of Dr. Ricardo Ruiz who was imprisoned and died before his release could be secured, presumably from the effects of ill-treatment. In February, Secretary Olney demanded a full investigation. Later on, in April, President McKinley appointed William J. Calhoun as special commissioner to investigate the case. While there was strong presumption that death was due to ill-treatment, there was no direct evidence to prove this, and the report gave the cause of death as congestion of the brain.

The agitation of the Cuban question was continued all during the winter and it was confidently expected by many that President McKinley's first move would be a strong war measure; but this hope was quickly dissipated by the conservative tone of his inaugural message which reiterated the policy of nonintervention adhered to by his predecessor.

The selection of Senator Sherman, as Secretary of State, again raised the hopes of the Cuban sympathizers for he had been a strong advocate of Cuban interests when in the Senate; but as soon as he entered the cabinet, he announced his policy to be the preservation of peace in every direction.

March 28th, General Rivera was captured by the Spanish troops and would have been summarily dealt with had it not been for the interference of the United States. On April 1st, Senator Allen introduced a resolution protesting against the purpose of the Spanish Government to court-martial him. Secretary Sherman accordingly made a protest, and the Spanish Government replied that General Rivera would be treated as a prisoner of war.

During the month of May, 1897, while Congress was in extra session, Cuban matters were extensively discussed, and as there was no further possibility of concealing the suffering existing in Cuba, at the suggestion of the President \$50,000 was appropriated for the relief of the Americans who were starving in that island.

Among the many speeches made at this time in Congress in regard to affairs in Cuba, I copy the following from the Congressional Record of May 20, 1897, Vol. 30, part II, pp. 1196 and 1197:

Mr. WHEELER of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, the highest parliamentary body of the greatest government on earth is called upon to determine from the evidence before it whether war does or does not exist on the island of Cuba.

That is the only question, Mr. Speaker.

Only on yesterday, at the very time prominent Republican statesmen were asserting that war did not exist on that island, the distinguished Spanish senator and ex-premier, Senor Sagasta, was making a speech in Madrid, in which he asserted in the most positive terms that war did exist; that Spain had 200,000 troops in Cuba, but he painfully admitted that Spain was not master even of the territory trodden by her soldiers. I read his exact words as they appear in the cablegram from Madrid in the Post of this morning:

"MADRID, May 19.

"At a meeting of Liberal senators and deputies to-day Señor Sagasta, former premier, made an important speech, in the course of which he said:

" 'We have 200,000 troops in Cuba, but we are not even masters of the territory trodden by our soldiers. At the same moment Carlism is organizing itself in the peninsula and menaces us with a new war, thanks to the impunity it enjoys, while the seeds of separatism are germinating in some of the provinces.

"The picture could not be gloomier. We have war in Cuba and in the Philippines, and we have attempts at civil war at home."

Two hundred thousand Spanish soldiers in arms and in line of battle in the island of Cuba, and an official report before us stating that 800 American citizens are driven from their homes, deprived of their property, despoiled of their estates, impounded and corralled and starving in the towns and villages of Cuba, and yet men who have forgotten that honor and chivalry are the priceless heritage of the American people would make us believe that the island of Cuba is blessed with profound peace.

For three years the Spanish bulletins have been reporting frequent engagements with superior bodies of insurgents. They have told us of the slaughter of the insurgents in battle, and the sound of musketry shooting down helpless prisoners, including combatants and noncombatants, including Cubans and Americans, has been heard every day of the reign of the Nero of the nineteenth century: "King Weyler the First;" and yet, after all this slaughter, the distinguished Spanish senator and ex-premier proclaims in Madrid, the Spanish capital:

"We have 200,000 troops in Cuba, but we are not even masters of the territory trodden by our soldiers."

This is an important statement from a Spanish senator and ex-premier, and the gentleman from Illinois [Mr. Hitt] who has just taken his seat informs us that Señor Sagasta will in a few days again become the premier of that Government, and this fact gives even more significance to his words. He tells the people of Spain that because of an insurgent army of superior numbers the 200,000 Spanish troops are not even masters of the territory they stand upon, and the gentleman from Pennsylvania who spoke half an hour ago told us that the warfare carried on by these 200,000 soldiers was brutal, cruel, and atrocious.

The statement by Señor Sagasta that "Spain is not even master of the territory trodden by her 200,000 soldiers," is an admission that the Cubans have practically the control of the entire island. This alone entitles the struggling patriots to the rights of belligerents.

All works on international law assert that actual possession of the territory is sufficient.

Wildman, quoted approvingly by Halleck, page 68, says:

"When, in the result of a civil war, a state changes its government, or a province, or colony, that before had no separate existence, is in the possession of the rights of sovereignty, the possession of sovereignty *de facto* is taken to be possession *de jure*; and any foreign power is at liberty to recognize such sovereignty by treating with the possessor of it as an independent State. In international transactions possession is sufficient."

Davis in international law, page 200, says:

"The parties to a war are called belligerents. The recognition of such rights by foreign governments in no way involves the recognition of the rebellious government as a separate political recognition. It only implies that the laws of war are to prevail in the military operations."

Lorimer, Vol. I, page 142, says:

"By recognizing belligerent rights neutral powers pronounce no judgment whatever, either on the merits of the claim or the probability of its ultimate vindication. Belligerent recognition is a mere declaration of impartiality. To withhold from the claimant for recognition the rights of belligerency, whilst we extend them to the parent State, would plainly be to take part against it in the war."

Notwithstanding all this, the money changers and owners of Spanish bonds tell the people that there is no war in Cuba, and that we must not recognize Cubans as entitled to belligerent rights.

From 1776 to 1781 the average enrolled force of our continental soldiers was 38,263, while the average force of British troops in America during that time, which I take from eleven different official reports, was 32,208, to which force should be added their American adherents, which at one time numbered 8,954 men, making the average British force somewhat in excess of 40,000 soldiers; yet all historical works, including our school histories, tell us that the period from Lexington and Concord, April 19, 1775, to Yorktown, October 19, 1781, was a condition of bloody, cruel, and desolating war.

Our losses during that seven-years conflict was but 2,200 killed and 6,500 wounded, a less number than the Spaniards claim are killed each month, either killed in battle or shot down in Weyler's slaughter pens. In the war of 1812 we had 1,877 killed and died of wounds, and 3,737 were wounded and recovered; and in the war with Mexico 1,049 were killed and died from wounds, and 3,928 were wounded and recovered.

The greatest force commanded by General Taylor, with which he won the victories of Palo Alto, Resaca de la Palma, and Monterey, was 6,650, and his great victory at Buena Vista was accomplished with a force of 4,733 men, and Santa Anna's entire army at that battle was reported on paper as 19,993 men.

General Scott carried the Stars and Stripes from Vera Cruz to the halls of Montezuma with an army whose maximum strength was 12,776 men, and the entire force brought against him by Santa Anna was estimated to be 30,000 strong [applause]; and yet American history has dignified these occurrences as real, actual, bloody warfare. Mr. Speaker, we have to either stop Fourth of July celebrations and undo the elections of Old Hickory in 1848 and Pierce in 1852, whom the people elected because they were told that old Zach Taylor

and Franklin Pierce were both heroes in actual war, or else we have got to admit that the array of hostile armies five times as formidable as those which fought the campaign in Mexico or the battles of the Revolution have created a condition of actual war in Cuba.

Stonewall Jackson in his campaign in the Valley had less than 17,000 men, and even less than that number in his engagements at Kernstown with General Shields, at McDowell with General Milroy, at Front Royal and Winchester with General Banks, and at Cross Keys and Port Republic with Generals Frémont and Shields, and yet all these gallant soldiers, driven from these fields by the sagacity, skill, and courage of the superb Jackson, hastened forward couriers, dispatches, and telegrams assuring the Government that the once peaceful valley of the Shenandoah had become a theater of actual war.

If we are to vote that war does not exist in Cuba, we must also vote that there was no war in the Shenandoah Valley.

Again, Mr. Speaker, the War Record Reports tell us that in 1863 the total effective of all the Confederate force east of the Mississippi river was only 153,780 men. If we now decide that there are not a sufficient number of Spanish troops in Cuba to create a condition of war, we must also decide that war did not exist in this country from 1861 to 1865, and we must follow up that by repealing all the pension laws, bringing the dead to life, making the lame to walk, revising history, and teaching the children that there are no such persons as Lincoln, McClellan, Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, Hancock, Schofield, or Lee, Jackson, and Jefferson Davis. We must do one of these things, Mr. Speaker, or else admit that the same facts which created a condition of war in one country did not create it in another.

The SPEAKER. The time of the gentleman from Alabama has expired.

Mr. WHEELER of Alabama. I ask two minutes more.

Mr. BAILEY. I have yielded all the time under my control.

Mr. WHEELER of Alabama. I ask unanimous consent for an extension of two minutes.

There was no objection.

Mr. WHEELER of Alabama. I thank the House for this courtesy.

The trouble is, Mr. Speaker, that the country has changed. From 1776 to 1865 the dominant spirit which controlled in this Republic was one of honor, glory, chivalry, and patriotism. The dominant spirit of to-day is the pride of gold, of palaces, of marriage alliances with dukes, and princes, and counts.

I do not know what others may say or how others may vote, but I for one proclaim on this floor that war, cruel, brutal, murderous war, does exist in that "gem of the ocean"—that beautiful "Queen of the Antilles"—and I



CUBAN SCENE.



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A SPANISH VICTIM RESCUED TOO LATE.

here assert that it is our duty as the greatest people upon earth to so declare in the highest councils that exist under the canopy of heaven.

If this declaration will aid our brethren struggling for liberty, we are only doing what we promised to do when God vouchsafed victory and liberty to us. If we fail to do this, we are recreant to our pledges, to Christianity, to civilization, to humanity, and to God. [Loud applause.]

It was not until later that the Spanish Government allowed American charity to be applied to the few surviving reconcentrados who could be saved.

Early in June, 1897, there was a crisis in the Spanish Cabinet and Canovas resigned, but was persuaded to withdraw his resignation. He was assassinated August 8th, and his place as Premier was filled by General Azcarraga, who in turn gave way to Sagasta. Hon. Hannis Taylor of Alabama was replaced as Minister to Spain by General Stewart L. Woodford, who was appointed June 16th, and presented his credentials to the Queen Regent September 13, 1897. He was authorized to attempt to adjust matters, but it was impossible to make any arrangement satisfactory to either side. The feeling of hostility between Spain and the United States was every day increasing in intensity and the inevitable outbreak was only a question of time.

On December 6th, President McKinley sent to Congress a message in which he ably reviewed the condition of affairs in Cuba in the following words:

The most important problem with which this Government is now called upon to deal pertaining to its foreign relations concerns its duty toward Spain and the Cuban insurrection. Problems and conditions more or less in common with those now existing have confronted this Government at various times in the past. The story of Cuba for many years has been one of unrest; growing discontent; an effort toward a larger enjoyment of liberty and self-control; of organized resistance to the mother country; of depression after distress and warfare and of ineffectual settlement to be followed by renewed revolt. For no enduring period since the enfranchisement of the continental possessions of Spain in the Western continent has the condition of Cuba or the policy of Spain toward Cuba not caused concern to the United States.

The prospect from time to time that the weakness of Spain's hold upon the island and the political vicissitudes and embarrassments of the home government might lead to the transfer of Cuba to a continental power called forth,

between 1823 and 1860, various emphatic declarations of the policy of the United States to permit no disturbance of Cuba's connection with Spain unless in the direction of independence or acquisition by us through purchase; nor has there been any change of this declared policy since upon the part of the Government.

The revolution which began in 1868 lasted for ten years despite the strenuous efforts of the successive peninsular governments to suppress it. Then as now the Government of the United States testified its grave concern and offered its aid to put an end to bloodshed in Cuba. The overtures made by General Grant were refused and the war dragged on, entailing great loss of life and treasure and increased injury to American interests, besides throwing enhanced burdens of neutrality upon this Government. In 1878 peace was brought about by the Truce of Zanjón, obtained by negotiations between the Spanish commander, Martínez de Campos, and the insurgent leaders.

The present insurrection broke out in February, 1895. It is not my purpose at this time to recall its remarkable increase or to characterize its tenacious resistance against the enormous forces massed against it by Spain. The revolt and the efforts to subdue it carried destruction to every quarter of the island, developing wide proportions and defying the efforts of Spain for its suppression. The civilized code of war has been disregarded, no less so by the Spaniards than by the Cubans.

The existing conditions can not but fill this Government and the American people with the gravest apprehension. There is no desire on the part of our people to profit by the misfortunes of Spain. We have only the desire to see the Cubans prosperous and contented, enjoying that measure of self-control which is the inalienable right of man, protected in their right to reap the benefit of the exhaustless treasures of their country.

The offer made by my predecessor in April, 1896, tendering the friendly offices of this Government failed. Any mediation on our part was not accepted. In brief the answer read: "There is no effectual way to pacify Cuba unless it begins with the actual submission of the rebels to the mother country." Then only could Spain act in the promised direction, of her own motion and after her own plans.

The cruel policy of concentration was initiated February 16, 1896. The productive districts controlled by the Spanish armies were depopulated. The agricultural inhabitants were herded in and about the garrison towns, their lands laid waste and their dwellings destroyed. This policy the late Cabinet of Spain justified as a necessary measure of war and as a means of cutting off supplies from the insurgents. It has utterly failed as a war measure. It was not civilized warfare. It was extermination.

Against this abuse of the rights of war I have felt constrained on repeated occasions to enter the firm and earnest protest of this Government. There was much of public condemnation of the treatment of American citizens by alleged illegal arrests and long imprisonment awaiting trial or pending protracted judicial proceedings. I felt it my first duty to make instant demand for the release or speedy trial of all American citizens under arrest. Before the change of the Spanish Cabinet in October last twenty-two prisoners, citizens of the United States, had been given their freedom.

For the relief of our own citizens suffering because of the conflict the aid of Congress was sought in a special message, and under the appropriation of April 4, 1897, effective aid has been given to American citizens in Cuba, many of them at their own request having been returned to the United States.

The instructions given to our new minister to Spain before his departure for his post directed him to impress upon that Government the sincere wish of the United States to lend its aid toward the ending of the war in Cuba by reaching a peaceful and lasting result, just and honorable alike to Spain and to the Cuban people. These instructions recited the character and duration of the contest, the widespread losses it entails, the burdens and restraints it imposes upon us, with constant disturbance of national interests, and the injury resulting from an indefinite continuance of this state of things. It was stated that at this juncture our Government was constrained to seriously inquire if the time was not ripe when Spain of her own volition, moved by her own interests and every sentiment of humanity, should put a stop to this destructive war and make proposals of settlement honorable to herself and just to her Cuban colony. It was urged that as a neighboring nation, with large interests in Cuba, we could be required to wait only a reasonable time for the mother country to establish its authority and restore peace and order within the borders of the island; that we could not contemplate an indefinite period for the accomplishment of this result.

No solution was proposed to which the slightest idea of humiliation to Spain could attach, and indeed precise proposals were withheld to avoid embarrassment to that Government. All that was asked or expected was that some safe way might be speedily provided and permanent peace restored. It so chanced that the consideration of this offer, addressed to the same Spanish Administration which had declined the tenders of my predecessor and which for more than two years had poured men and treasure into Cuba in the fruitless effort to suppress the revolt, fell to others. Between the departure of General Woodford, the new envoy, and his arrival in Spain the statesman who had shaped the policy of his country fell by the hand of an assassin, and although the Cabinet of the late Premier still held office and received from our

envoy the proposals he bore, that Cabinet gave place within a few days thereafter to a new Administration, under the leadership of Sagasta.

The reply to our note was received on the 23d day of October. It is in the direction of a better understanding. It appreciates the friendly purposes of this Government. It admits that our country is deeply affected by the war in Cuba and that its desires for peace are just. It declares that the present Spanish Government is bound by every consideration to a change of policy that should satisfy the United States and pacify Cuba within a reasonable time. To this end Spain has decided to put into effect the political reforms heretofore advocated by the present Premier, without halting for any consideration in the path which in its judgment leads to peace. The military operations, it is said, will continue but will be humane and conducted with all regard for private rights, being accompanied by political action leading to the autonomy of Cuba while guarding Spanish sovereignty. This, it is claimed, will result in investing Cuba with a distinct personality; the island to be governed by an executive and by a local council or chambers, reserving to Spain the control of the foreign relations, the Army and Navy and the judicial administration. To accomplish this the present Government proposes to modify existing legislation by decree, leaving the Spanish Cortes, with the aid of Cuban senators and deputies, to solve the economic problem and properly distribute the existing debt.

In the absence of a declaration of the measures that this Government proposes to take in carrying out its proffer of good offices it suggests that Spain be left free to conduct military operations and grant political reforms, while the United States for its part shall enforce its neutral obligations and cut off the assistance which it is asserted the insurgents receive from this country. The supposition of an indefinite prolongation of the war is denied. It is asserted that the western provinces are already well nigh reclaimed; that the planting of cane and tobacco therein has been resumed, and that by force of arms and new and ample reforms very early and complete pacification is hoped for.

The immediate amelioration of existing conditions under the new administration of Cuban affairs is predicted, and therewithal the disturbance and all occasion for any change of attitude on the part of the United States. Discussion of the question of the international duties and responsibilities of the United States as Spain understands them is presented, with an apparent disposition to charge us with failure in this regard. This charge is without any basis in fact. It could not have been made if Spain had been cognizant of the constant efforts this Government has made at the cost of millions and by the employment of the administrative machinery of the nation at command to perform

its full duty according to the law of nations. That it has successfully prevented the departure of a single military expedition or armed vessel from our shores in violation of our laws would seem to be a sufficient answer. But of this aspect of the Spanish note it is not necessary to speak further now. Firm in the conviction of a wholly performed obligation, due response to this charge has been made in diplomatic course.

Throughout all these horrors and dangers to our own peace this Government has never in any way abrogated its sovereign prerogative of reserving to itself the determination of its policy and course according to its own high sense of right and in consonance with the dearest interests and convictions of our own people should the prolongation of the strife so demand.

Of the untried measures there remain only: Recognition of the insurgents as belligerents; recognition of the independence of Cuba; neutral intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, and intervention in favor of one or the other party. I speak not of forcible annexation, for that can not be thought of. That by our code of morality would be criminal aggression.

Recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents has often been canvassed as a possible if not inevitable step both in regard to the previous ten years' struggle and during the present war. I am not unmindful that the two Houses of Congress in the spring of 1896 expressed the opinion by concurrent resolution that a condition of public war existed requiring or justifying the recognition of a state of belligerency in Cuba, and during the extra session the Senate voted a joint resolution of like import, which, however, was not brought to a vote in the House of Representatives. In the presence of these significant expressions of the sentiment of the legislative branch it behooves the Executive to soberly consider the conditions under which so important a measure must needs rest for justification. It is to be seriously considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of Statehood which alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor. Possession, in short, of the essential qualifications of sovereignty by the insurgents and the conduct of the war by them according to the received code of war are no less important factors toward the determination of the problem of belligerency than are the influences and consequences of the struggle upon the internal polity of the recognizing State.

The wise utterances of President Grant in his memorable message of December 7, 1875, are signally relevant to the present situation in Cuba, and it may be wholesome now to recall them. At that time a ruinous conflict had for seven years wasted the neighboring island. During all those years an utter disregard of the laws of civilized warfare and of the just demands of humanity,

which called forth expressions of condemnation from the nations of Christendom, continued unabated. Desolation and ruin pervaded that productive region, enormously affecting the commerce of all commercial nations, but that of the United States more than any other by reason of proximity and larger trade and intercourse. At that juncture General Grant uttered these words, which now as then sum up the elements of the problem:

"A recognition of the independence of Cuba being, in my opinion, impracticable, and indefensible, the question which next presents itself is that of the recognition of belligerent rights in the parties to the contest. In a former message to Congress I had occasion to consider this question, and reached the conclusion that the conflict in Cuba, dreadful and devastating as were its incidents, did not rise to the fearful dignity of war. * * * It is possible that the acts of foreign powers, and even acts of Spain herself, of this very nature, might be pointed to in defense of such recognition. But now, as in its past history, the United States should carefully avoid the false lights which might lead it into the mazes of doubtful law and of questionable propriety, and adhere rigidly and sternly to the rule, which has been its guide, of doing only that which is right and honest and of good report. The question of according or of withholding rights of belligerency must be judged in every case, in view of the particular attending facts. Unless justified by necessity, it is always, and justly, regarded as an unfriendly act and a gratuitous demonstration of moral support to the rebellion. It is necessary, and it is required, when the interests and rights of another government or of its people are so far affected by a pending civil conflict as to require a definition of its relations to the parties thereto. But this conflict must be one which will be recognized in the sense of international law as war.

"Belligerence, too, is a fact. The mere existence of contending armed bodies, and their occasional conflicts, do not constitute war in the sense referred to. Applying to the existing condition of affairs in Cuba the tests recognized by publicists and writers on international law, and which have been observed by nations of dignity, honesty and power, when free from sensitive or selfish and unworthy motives, I fail to find in the insurrection the existence of such a substantial political organization, real, palpable and manifest to the world, having the forms and capable of the ordinary functions of government toward its own people and to other states, with courts for the administration of justice, with a local habitation, possessing such organization of force, such material, such occupation of territory as to take the contest out of the category of a mere rebellious insurrection, or occasional skirmishes, and place it on the terrible footing of war, to which a recognition of belligerency would aim to elevate it.

"The contest, moreover, is solely on land; the insurrection has not possessed itself of a single seaport whence it may send forth its flag, nor has it any means of communication with foreign powers except through the military lines of its adversaries. No apprehension of any of those sudden and difficult complications which a war upon the ocean is apt to precipitate upon the vessels, both commercial and national, and upon the consular officers of other powers, calls for the definition of their relations to the parties to the contest. Considered as a question of expediency, I regard the accordance of belligerent rights still to be as unwise and premature, as I regard it to be, at present, indefensible as a measure of right.

"Such recognition entails upon the country according the rights which flow from it difficult and complicated duties, and requires the exaction from the contending parties of the strict observance of their rights and obligations. It confers the right of search upon the high seas by vessels of both parties; it would subject the carrying of arms and munitions of war, which now may be transported freely and without interruption, in vessels of the United States, to detention and to possible seizure; it would give rise to countless vexatious questions, would release the parent government from responsibility for acts done by the insurgents, and would invest Spain with the right to exercise the supervision recognized by our treaty of 1795 over our commerce on the high seas, a very large part of which, in its traffic between the Atlantic and the Gulf States, and between all of them and the States on the Pacific, passes through the waters which wash the shores of Cuba. The exercise of this supervision could scarce fail to lead, if not to abuses, certainly to collisions perilous to the peaceful relations of the two States. There can be little doubt as to what result such supervision would before long draw this nation. It would be unworthy of the United States to inaugurate the possibilities of such result, by measures of questionable right or expediency, or by any indirection."

Turning to the practical aspects of a recognition of belligerency and reviewing its inconveniences and positive dangers, still further pertinent considerations appear. In the code of nations there is no such thing as a naked recognition of belligerency unaccompanied by the assumption of international neutrality. Such recognition without more will not confer upon either party to a domestic conflict a status not theretofore actually possessed or affect the relation of either party to other States. The act of recognition usually takes the form of a solemn proclamation of neutrality which recites the *de facto* condition of belligerency as its motive. It announces a domestic law of neutrality in the declaring State. It assumes the international obligations of a neutral in the presence of a public state of war. It warns all citizens and others within the jurisdiction of the proclamaunt that they violate those rigor-

ous obligations at their own peril and can not expect to be shielded from the consequences. The right of visit and search on the seas and seizure of vessels and cargoes and contraband of war and good prize under admiralty law must under international law be admitted as a legitimate consequence of a proclamation of belligerency. While according the equal belligerent rights defined by public law to each party in our ports disfavours would be imposed on both, which while nominally equal would weigh heavily in behalf of Spain herself. Possessing a navy and controlling the ports of Cuba her maritime rights could be asserted not only for the military investment of the island, but up to the margin of our own territorial waters, and a condition of things would exist for which the Cubans within their own domain could not hope to create a parallel; while its creation through aid or sympathy from within our domain would be even more impossible than now, with the additional obligations of international neutrality we would perforce assume.

The enforcement of this enlarged and onerous code of neutrality would only be influential within our own jurisdiction by land and sea and applicable by our own instrumentalities. It could impart to the United States no jurisdiction between Spain and the insurgents. It would give the United States no right of intervention to enforce the conduct of the strife within the paramount authority of Spain according to the international code of war.

For these reasons I regard the recognition of the belligerency of the Cuban insurgents as now unwise and therefore inadmissible. Should that step hereafter be deemed wise as a measure of right and duty the Executive will take it.

Intervention upon humanitarian grounds has been frequently suggested and has not failed to receive my most anxious and earnest consideration. But should such a step be now taken when it is apparent that a hopeful change has supervened in the policy of Spain toward Cuba? A new government has taken office in the mother country. It is pledged in advance to the declaration that all the effort in the world can not suffice to maintain peace in Cuba by the bayonet; that vague promises of reform after subjugation afford no solution of the insular problem; that with a substitution of commanders must come a change of the past system of warfare for one in harmony with a new policy which shall no longer aim to drive the Cubans to the "horrible alternative of taking to the thicket or succumbing in misery;" that reforms must be instituted in accordance with the needs and circumstances of the time, and that these reforms, while designed to give full autonomy to the colony and to create a virtual entity and self-controlled administration, shall yet conserve and affirm the sovereignty of Spain by a just distribution of powers and burdens upon a basis of mutual interest untainted by methods of selfish expediency.



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CUBAN INSURGENTS FIGHTING THE SPANIARDS IN THE OPEN.



SPANISH GUERRILLAS.

The first acts of the new government lie in these honorable paths. The policy of cruel rapine and extermination that so long shocked the universal sentiment of humanity has been reversed. Under the new military commander a broad clemency is proffered. Measures have already been set on foot to relieve the horrors of starvation. The power of the Spanish armies it is asserted is to be used not to spread ruin and desolation but to protect the resumption of peaceful agricultural pursuits and productive industries. That past methods are futile to force a peace by subjugation is freely admitted, and that ruin without conciliation must inevitably fail to win for Spain the fidelity of a contented dependency.

Decrees in application of the foreshadowed reforms have already been promulgated. The full text of these decrees has not been received, but as furnished in a telegraphic summary from our minister are: All civil and electoral rights of Peninsular Spaniards are, in virtue of existing constitutional authority, forthwith extended to Colonial Spaniards. A scheme of autonomy has been proclaimed by decree, to become effective upon ratification by the Cortes. It creates a Cuban parliament which, with the insular executive, can consider and vote upon all subjects affecting local order and interests, possessing unlimited powers save as to matters of State, war and the navy as to which the governor-general acts by his own authority as the delegate of the central government. This parliament receives the oath of the governor-general to preserve faithfully the liberties and privileges of the colony, and to it the colonial secretaries are responsible. It has the right to propose to the central government, through the governor-general, modifications of the national charter and to invite new projects of law or executive measures in the interest of the colony.

Besides its local powers it is competent, first, to regulate electoral registration and procedure and prescribe the qualifications of electors and the manner of exercising suffrage; second, to organize courts of justice with native judges from members of the local bar; third, to frame the insular budget both as to expenditures and revenues, without limitation of any kind, and to set apart the revenues to meet the Cuban share of the national budget, which latter will be voted by the national Cortes with the assistance of Cuban senators and deputies; fourth, to initiate or take part in the negotiations of the national government for commercial treaties which may affect Cuban interests; fifth, to accept or reject commercial treaties which the national government may have concluded without the participation of the Cuban government; sixth, to frame the colonial tariff, acting in accord with the peninsular government in scheduling articles of mutual commerce between the mother country and the colonies. Before introducing or voting upon a bill, the Cuban government or

the chambers will lay the project before the central government and hear its opinion thereon, all the correspondence in such regard being made public. Finally, all conflicts of jurisdiction arising between the different municipal, provincial and insular assemblies, or between the latter and the insular executive power, and which from their nature may not be referable to the central government for decision, shall be submitted to the courts.

That the Government of Sagasta has entered upon a course from which recession with honor is impossible can hardly be questioned; that in the few weeks it has existed it has made earnest of the sincerity of its professions is undeniable. I shall not impugn its sincerity, nor should impatience be suffered to embarrass it in the task it has undertaken. It is honestly due to Spain and to our friendly relations with Spain that she should be given a reasonable chance to realize her expectations and to prove the asserted efficacy of the new order of things to which she stands irrevocably committed. She has recalled the commander whose brutal orders inflamed the American mind and shocked the civilized world. She has modified the horrible order of concentration and has undertaken to care for the helpless and permit those who desire to resume the cultivation of their fields to do so and assures them of the protection of the Spanish Government in their lawful occupations. She has just released the "Competitor" prisoners heretofore sentenced to death and who have been the subject of repeated diplomatic correspondence during both this and the preceding Administration.

Not a single American citizen is now in arrest or confinement in Cuba of whom this Government has any knowledge. The near future will demonstrate whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace, just alike to the Cubans and to Spain as well as equitable to all our interests so intimately involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained. If not, the exigency of further and other action by the United States will remain to be taken. When that time comes that action will be determined in the line of indisputable right and duty. It will be faced, without misgiving or hesitancy in the light of the obligation this Government owes to itself, to the people who have confided to it the protection of their interests and honor, and to humanity.

Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense ourselves, actuated only by upright and patriotic considerations, moved neither by passion nor selfishness, the Government will continue its watchful care over the rights and property of American citizens and will abate none of its efforts to bring about by peaceful agencies a peace which shall be honorable and enduring. If it shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization and humanity to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part and only because the necessity for such action will be so clear as to command the support and approval of the civilized world.

JANUARY 1 TO MAY 1, 1898.

CHAPTER VIII.

With the beginning of the year 1898, a provisional government, in accord with the reforms promised by the Sagasta cabinet, was inaugurated in Havana. Although there was very little chance of any measure of autonomy proving satisfactory to the Cubans, the American people were advised to give the Spanish Government a chance of testing the value of the attempted reforms. Thoughtful persons feared that the policy of Spain was simply to keep the United States in a condition of inaction until so late in the season that a campaign would have to be made in the rainy season or deferred until the following year. Meanwhile the country was fully awakened to the necessity of increasing the navy and strengthening the coast defenses.

The White Squadron, under the command of Admiral Sicard, was ordered to rendezvous at Key West. Riotous demonstrations against the Americans in Cuba being reported by the consul-general, it was deemed best to send a war vessel to the port of Havana, and on January 25th, the "Maine," under command of Captain Sigsbee, was ordered to that place. This was ostensibly a visit of courtesy, but was also a precautionary measure in behalf of Americans and American property in Cuba. The hostility of the Spaniards was scarcely veiled, but in time of peace they dared not object to the presence of an American war vessel before Havana, and they immediately prepared to return the courtesy by sending the "Vizcaya" to the port of New York. The vessel was in fact present in New York harbor during the days of excitement following the destruction of the "Maine;" and the fact that it was protected from violence at the hands of irresponsible and excited persons argued well for the self-control of the American people and the administrative ability of those in authority at the port. Meanwhile both Consul-General Lee and Captain Sigsbee were aware of the anti-American spirit existing in Havana, not on account of any lack of courtesy on the part of the Spanish officials, but from the indifference and apathy with which they were received by the Spanish soldiers and the trades-people in the city. Several threatening placards were printed and distributed and rumors of ill-feeling were rife;

consequently the officers of the "Maine," were constantly on the alert for a popular outbreak; and the crew of the vessel were not allowed to go ashore.

February 8th, it was learned that De Lome, the Spanish Minister at Washington, had sent to a friend in Havana, Senor Coneljas, a Spanish politician of high rank, a letter containing abusive and insulting language about President McKinley. The publication of this letter caused great indignation throughout the United States; and as De Lome was unable to deny the authorship of the objectionable expressions, Spain was immediately requested to recall him, but he promptly resigned and received his passports before action could be taken at Madrid.

De Lome had not left New York when the country was horrified by the news of the blowing up of the "Maine." The telegram from Captain Sigsbee announcing the disaster, requested that judgment be suspended until an investigation could be made; and everything possible was done by the American authorities to allay the excitement naturally aroused. A naval court of inquiry to investigate the matter was appointed by Admiral Sicard. The members of the court were Captain Sampson of the "Iowa," Captain Chadwick of the "New York," Lieutenant-Commander William P. Potter, United States Navy, and Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix also of the "New York," The last-named was appointed judge-advocate; he had at one time been executive officer of the "Maine" and was thoroughly familiar with the construction of the vessel and the disposition of her stores and ammunition. The order appointing the court of inquiry reads as follows:

U. S. FLAGSHIP "NEW YORK" (first rate).

KEY WEST, FLA., *February 19, 1898.*

Capt. WILLIAM T. SAMPSON, U. S. N., *Commanding U. S. S. Iowa, Key West, Fla.:*

SIR.—A court of inquiry, consisting of yourself as president, and of Capt. French E. Chadwick, and Lieut.-Commander William P. Potter, United States Navy, as additional members, and of Lieut.-Commander Adolph Marix, United States Navy, as judge-advocate, is hereby ordered to convene at noon on Monday, February 21, 1898, or as soon thereafter as practicable, for the purpose of inquiring into the circumstances connected with the loss, by explosion, of the United States battle ship "Maine," in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, on the night of Tuesday, February 15, 1898.

The court is authorized to hold its sessions on board any ship of the North Atlantic Squadron, or in the city of Key West, Florida, or in the harbor of the city of Havana, Cuba.

The attention of the court is invited to the instructions, concerning the particulars to be investigated in the case of the loss or grounding of a ship of the Navy, contained in the United States Navy Regulations.

The following-described papers relating to the loss of the United States ship "Maine" on the occasion referred to are attached to and made part of this precept:

1. The copy of a telegram sent by Capt. C. D. Sigsbee, United States Navy, at Havana, Cuba, to Commander James M. Forsyth, United States Navy, at Key West, Florida, without date, but, probably, sent on the night of February 15th, as it was received at Key West, Florida, by Lieut.-Commander William S. Cowles, United States Navy, at 1 A. M. of February 16, 1898, and by the commander-in-chief at 5:30 A. M. of February 16, at Dry Tortugas, Florida.

2. A telegram sent by Capt. C. D. Sigsbee, United States Navy, to the commander-in-chief at Key West, Florida, dated Havana, Cuba, February 16, 1898.

The court will diligently and thoroughly inquire into all the circumstances attending the loss of said vessel on the date named, and upon the conclusion of the investigation will report to the commander-in-chief its proceedings, all the testimony taken, and the facts which it may deem established by the evidence adduced, together with its opinion as to what further proceedings, if any, should be had in the matter.

The court will also report whether or not the loss of said vessel was, on the occasion named, in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers or members of the crew of said vessel, and if so, the names of such officers or members of the crew, and in what respect and to what extent any or either of them were so at fault or negligent.

If the court shall be of opinion that further proceedings should be had in the matter, it will include in its report a succinct statement as to the person or persons against whom, and the specific matter upon which, such proceedings should be had.

The court will also report its opinion as to the cause or causes of the explosion, or other incidents that bore directly or indirectly upon the loss of the "Maine."

It will also record any information that it may be able to obtain by testimony and evidence, as to any person or persons not connected with the Navy of the

United States, who are, in its opinion, responsible, in part or wholly, directly or indirectly, for the explosion and loss of the "Maine," and will include their names, in its opinion, together with the degree of responsibility in each case.

M. SICARD,

Rear-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief,

United States Naval Force on North Atlantic Station.

I certify the above to be a true copy.

A. MARIX,

Lieut.-Com., U. S. N., Judge-Advocate.

The court commenced its sittings at Havana, February 21st, and continued some time at that place, later moving to Key West where many of the witnesses were located and it continued in session for a month. The inquiry was thorough and exhaustive, and was made with great fairness and deliberation; and the further it progressed, the less doubt there seemed to be that the "Maine" was destroyed by some external agency.

February 19th, the United States had declined the request of Spain for a joint investigation of the disaster. The officials in Havana held a short court of inquiry and transmitted the findings to Madrid; but it was regarded in this country as a mere perfunctory affair, and not of serious weight as to the investigation or the result announced.

The following resolution was passed by Congress to defray the expenses of the submarine work necessary on the wreck of the "Maine."

Joint Resolution To provide for recovering the remains of officers and men and property from the wrecked United States ship "Maine," and making an appropriation therefor.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Navy be, and he is hereby, authorized to engage the services of a wrecking company or companies, having proper facilities for the prompt and efficient performance of submarine work, for the purpose of recovering the remains of the officers and men lost on the United States ship "Maine," and of saving the vessel or such parts thereof, and so much of her stores, guns, material, equipment, fittings, and appurtenances as may be practicable; and for this purpose the sum of two hundred thousand dollars, or as much thereof as may be necessary, is hereby appropriated and made immediately available.

Approved, February 23, 1898.

Meanwhile the Red Cross had begun effective work among the starving Cubans. Spain having objected to the transporting of charitable supplies by Government cruisers, it was agreed to have them carried on light-house tenders. Feeling having been aroused in Cuba against Consul-General Lee, it was intimated by Spain that his withdrawal was desirable, but the United States refused to recall him. Senor Polo y Bernabe was appointed Spanish Minister to succeed De Lome, and he arrived in Washington and presented his credentials to the President, March 12th, being received with the utmost courtesy and consideration.

On March 8th, a bill appropriating \$50,000,000 to be expended by the President for national defense, was reported to the House by Hon. Joseph G. Cannon, Chairman of the Committee on Appropriations. From among the short speeches delivered on this occasion, I reproduce the following from the Congressional Record of that date. (Con. Record, Vol. 31, part 3, page 2607.)

The SPEAKER. The gentleman from Alabama is recognized. [Loud and prolonged applause.]

The Chair must inform the House that the time taken up with applause comes out of the gentleman's time.

Mr. WHEELER of Alabama. Mr. Speaker, 20,000,000 brave and true hearts that dwell in that beautiful land south of yon river join me in most earnest support of this resolution. [Loud and prolonged applause.]

To those who insist that the diplomats of this Government should regard the maintenance of peace as the paramount purpose, I beg to say that the history of all nations shows that the best way to preserve peace is to be always thoroughly prepared for war. Certainly it is the only way for a nation to preserve peace and at the same time uphold its honor and retain the respect of other nations.

I respectfully submit that it is time for the American people to halt for a moment and stop the worship of Mammon and Mammon's kings, to cast a glance backward and reflect upon that which formed the foundation of this Great Republic. It, Mr. Speaker, was the teachings of the mothers who fled from the oppressions of caste and class, braved an unfathomed ocean, and landed upon these shores, confronted by wild beasts and savage Indians. They taught their sons that the highest possible honor and greatest possible privilege was to fight for country, its safety, and its honor. It was this spirit which enabled our forefathers to successfully cope with the brave and wild Indians. It was this that crowned our arms with glory and victory in the

war of the Revolution, the war of 1812, and the war with Mexico. It was this that caused a million brave men to fly to arms in 1861.

For a century American mothers had taught their sons that an ounce of glory earned in battle was worth more than a million pounds of gold. [Loud applause.] This is the teaching which we must continue to impress upon our children, and it is the best heritage we can give to those who are to follow after us. This and this alone will cause the flag of our country to continue to soar higher and higher and the prestige of this Great Republic to extend its power for good in the farthest corners of the earth. [Applause.]

After twenty years of war and turmoil in Europe, which terminated in 1815, Napier, in his closing words of the history of those events, showed how thoroughly the English people appreciated that their greatness and power were due to the glory achieved by the arms of Britain's chivalrous sons. This great writer said:

"Wellington was victorious; the great conqueror (Napoleon) was overthrown; England stood the most triumphant nation of the world, but with an enormous debt, a dissatisfied people, gaining peace without tranquillity, greatness without intrinsic strength, the present time uneasy, the future dark and threatening. Yet she rejoices in the glory of her arms, and it is a stirring sound." [Applause.]

And in illustration of the virtue developed and exercised in the pursuit of martial glory, General Napier said:

"War is the condition of this world. From men to the smallest insect all are at strife, and the glory of arms, which can not be obtained without the exercise of honor, fortitude, courage, obedience, modesty, and temperance, excites the brave man's patriotism and is a chastening corrective for the rich man's pride."

And with striking truth this great historian continues:

"It is yet no security for power. Napoleon, the greatest man of whom history makes mention — Napoleon, the most wonderful commander, the most sagacious politician, the most profound statesman, lost by arms, Poland, Germany, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and France. Fortune, that name for the unknown combination of infinite power, was wanting to him; and without her aid the designs of man are as bubbles on a troubled ocean."

Change one word, and we in America will indorse this expression. For "fortune" write "patriotism;" interpret that word to mean the exercise of this great virtue in the spirit inspired by the teaching and example of Washington, Lincoln, Lee, and Stonewall Jackson — a patriotism which holds love of country as dearer and sweeter than life, and as far above personal ambition as the heavens are above the earth — I repeat, substitute that dearest of words



THE MARINE GUARDS OF THE "MAINE" AT DRILL.



REVOLVER PRACTICE ON THE "MAINE."

and give it this interpretation, and then this sentiment which Napier applied to monarchy and imperialism would express the emotion uppermost in the hearts of the patriots of this the greatest country of the world. [Loud applause.]

[Here the hammer fell.]

The bill passed the Senate without debate, and was signed by the President March 9th. All the southern members of Congress were warm in their advocacy of the measure, and the unanimity of the action and the implicit confidence placed in the President had a good moral effect, not only in the United States, but especially abroad where it was hoped that a spirit of disunion might become manifest in case of the declaration of war.

The administration took immediate measures to put the country into a good state of defense; vessels were bought and transformed into armored cruisers, monitors were refitted, and steps were taken to get the army into a thoroughly good condition. The military departments were rearranged and the troops in the west were on marching orders in a short time.

Spain remonstrated against the presence of the American fleet at Key West, but took immediate steps to increase her own navy and prepare a hostile fleet for American waters. The "Massachusetts" and the "Texas" were ordered to Hampton Roads, and the sea-coast was thoroughly patrolled by armed vessels. At this time the papers were filled with descriptions of the preparation of two formidable Spanish fleets, and their probable destination could only be conjectured. Every city on the Atlantic coast was more or less apprehensive of possible attack; the Engineer's Department devoted much of its energy to strengthening the defenses of the sea-board, and our navy-yards were kept busy day and night with the unusual demands upon them.

March 17th, Senator Proctor spoke in the Senate on the Cuban question, giving full descriptions of the condition of the people there, as learned from his own personal observation. Senator Proctor had been Secretary of War during President Harrison's administration, and was highly respected for intelligence, integrity and good judgment. He had just returned from Cuba whither he had gone during the last week of February on a tour of investigation to satisfy himself as to the actual condition of affairs in the island. He presented the facts in a cool, deliberate, unimpassioned manner, showing that the

estimated mortality among the noncombatants from starvation and ill-treatment was about 200,000, and that thousands more were at that moment in the throes of starvation and disease. He declared that the issue was between 1,400,000 Cubans and 200,000 Spanish soldiers.

Senator Thurston had also visited Cuba with a party in a private yacht, reaching there a few days after Senator Proctor. He was accompanied by Senator Money, Representatives Cummings and W. A. Smith, Mrs. Thurston and several other ladies. Mrs. Thurston was deeply impressed with the sad scenes witnessed in the course of their visit and her sympathy was strongly aroused in favor of these suffering people. She died suddenly on board the yacht in Matanzas harbor and the circumstances under which she died gave additional weight to Senator Thurston's advocacy of the Cuban cause. Public indignation was inflamed by his recital of the terrible state of affairs in Cuba as given in his speech in the Senate about a week after Senator Proctor had spoken on the same subject.

March 21st, the House of Representatives passed a bill for the relief of the survivors of the "Maine" disaster, and this bill was passed by the Senate two days later. The Spanish report of the destruction of the "Maine" was received at Madrid, March 25th, and the American report was transmitted to Madrid on the following day and was sent to Congress, March 28th, the summing up of the case being as follows:

U. S. S. "IOWA" (1st rate),

KEY WEST, FLA., *Monday, March 21, 1898* — 10 A. M.

The court met pursuant to the adjournment of yesterday.

Present — All the members and the judge-advocate.

The record of last day's proceedings was read over and approved.

The court was then cleared for deliberation.

After full and mature consideration of all the testimony before it, the court finds as follows:

1. That the United States battle ship "Maine" arrived in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, on the 25th day of January, 1898, and was taken to buoy No. 4, in from five and one-half to six fathoms of water by the regular Government pilot.

The United States consul-general at Havana had notified the authorities at that place, the previous evening, of the intended arrival of the "Maine."

2. The state of discipline on board the "Maine" was excellent, and all orders and regulations in regard to the care and safety of the ship were strictly carried out.

All ammunition was stowed in accordance with prescribed instructions, and proper care was taken whenever ammunition was handled.

Nothing was stowed in any one of the magazines or shellrooms which was not permitted to be stowed there.

The magazines and shellrooms were always locked after having been opened, and after the destruction of the "Maine" the keys were found in their proper place in the captain's cabin, everything having been reported secure that evening at 8 P. M.

The temperatures of the magazines and shellrooms were taken daily and reported. The only magazine which had an undue amount of heat was the after ten-inch magazine, and that did not explode at the time the "Maine" was destroyed.

The torpedo war-heads were all stowed in the after part of the ship, under the wardroom, and neither caused nor participated in the destruction of the "Maine."

The dry gun-cotton primers and detonators were stowed in the cabin aft, and remote from the scene of the explosion.

Waste was carefully looked after on board the "Maine" to obviate danger. Special orders in regard to this had been given by the commanding officer.

Varnishes, driers, alcohol, and other combustibles of this nature were stowed on or above the main deck and could not have had anything to do with the destruction of the "Maine."

The medical stores were stowed aft, under the wardroom, and remote from the scene of the explosion.

No dangerous stores of any kind were stowed below in any of the other storerooms.

The coal bunkers were inspected daily. Of those bunkers adjacent to the forward magazines and shellrooms four were empty, namely: B3, B4, B5, B6. A15 had been in use that day, and A16 was full of New River coal. This coal had been carefully inspected before receiving it on board. The bunker in which it was stowed was accessible on three sides at all times, and the fourth side at this time on account of bunkers B4 and B6 being empty. This bunker, A16, had been inspected that day by the engineer officer on duty.

The fire alarms in the bunkers were in working order, and there had never been a case of spontaneous combustion of coal on board the "Maine."

The two after boilers of the ship were in use at the time of the disaster, but for auxiliary purposes only, with a comparatively low pressure of steam, and being tended by a reliable watch.

These boilers could not have caused the explosion of the ship. The four forward boilers have since been found by the divers, and are in a fair condition.

On the night of the destruction of the "Maine," everything had been reported secure for the night at 8 P. M. by reliable persons, through the proper authorities, to the commanding officer. At the time the "Maine" was destroyed the ship was quiet, and, therefore, least liable to accident caused by movements from those on board.

EXPLOSIONS.

3. The destruction of the "Maine" occurred at 9:40 P. M. on the 15th day of February, 1898, in the harbor of Havana, Cuba, she being at the time moored to the same buoy to which she had been taken upon her arrival. There were two explosions of a distinctly different character, with a very short but distinct interval between them, and the forward part of the ship was lifted to a marked degree at the time of the first explosion. The first explosion was more in the nature of a report like that of a gun, while the second explosion was more open, prolonged, and of greater volume. This second explosion was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines of the "Maine."

CONDITION OF THE WRECK.

4. The evidence bearing upon this, being principally obtained from divers, did not enable the court to form a definite conclusion as to the condition of the wreck, although it was established that the after part of the ship was practically intact, and sank in that condition a very few minutes after the destruction of the forward part.

The following facts in regard to the forward part of the ship are, however, established by the testimony:

A portion of the port side of the protective deck, which extends from about frame 30 to about frame 41, was blown up, aft, and over to port. The main deck, from about frame 30 to about frame 41, was blown up, aft, and slightly over to starboard, folding the forward part of the middle superstructure over and on top of the after part.

This was, in the opinion of the court, caused by the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines of the "Maine."

5. At frame 17 the outer shell of the ship, from a point eleven and one-half feet from the middle line of the ship, and six feet above the keel when in its normal position, has been forced up so as to be now about four feet above the surface of the water, therefore about thirty-four feet above where it would be had the ship sunk uninjured.

The outside bottom plating is bent into a reversed V-shape (Δ), the after wing of which, about fifteen feet broad and thirty-two feet in length (from

frame 17 to frame 25), is doubled back upon itself against the continuation of the same plating, extending forward.

At frame 18 the vertical keel is broken in two, and the flat keel bent into an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom plating. This break is now about six feet below the surface of the water, and about thirty feet above its normal position.

In the opinion of the court this effect could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame 18 and somewhat on the port side of the ship.

6. The court finds that the loss of the "Maine" on the occasion named was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers or members of the crew of said vessel.

7. In the opinion of the court the "Maine" was destroyed by the explosion of a submarine mine, which caused the partial explosion of two or more of the forward magazines.

8. The court has been unable to obtain evidence fixing the responsibility for the destruction of the "Maine" upon any person or persons.

W. T. SAMPSON,
Captain, U. S. N., President.

A. MARIX,
Lieut.-Com., U. S. N., Judge-Advocate.

The court having finished the inquiry it was ordered to make, adjourned at 11 A. M., to await the action of the convening authority.

W. T. SAMPSON,
Captain, U. S. N., President.

A. MARIX,
Lieut.-Com., U. S. N., Judge-Advocate.

U. S. FLAGSHIP "NEW YORK,"

Off Key West, Fla., March 22, 1898.

The proceedings and findings of the court of inquiry in the above case are approved.

M. SICARD,
*Rear-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief of the
United States Naval Force on the North Atlantic Station.*

Minister Woodford, at Madrid, held a special conference with Sagasta and used every possible measure to obtain a peaceful settlement of the Cuban question, but the time for diplomacy had passed. Spain had no intention of yielding any of her claims over the Cubans, and the only possible result of diplomatic measures at this time was

to defer the outbreak of hostilities until the rainy and unhealthy season. It was incredible to any European power, especially to a people so slow and procrastinating as the Spaniards habitually are, that the United States in her unprepared condition could muster, arm and mobilize a formidable army in the course of a few weeks. Meanwhile the Blanco administration endeavored to soften the condition of affairs in Cuba. Money was donated to relieve the suffering, and the reconcentrado edicts were abrogated; while the Red Cross agents in co-operation with the American consuls were allowed to carry on their humane work in the island. But it was impossible for the Spanish authorities to give the relief they were evidently sincere in attempting to give. Most of the reconcentrados had lost everything. Their homes were destroyed, their live-stock scattered or killed; weak with starvation, and penniless, it was impossible for them to return to the places they once called home. Those who sought employment on the plantations near the city, were not secure; for the Government was unable to prevent the burning of the fields and machinery by the insurgents, who were driven to desperation and refused to accept or even to listen to any other terms save absolute independence.

The following letter from Consul-General Lee, partly describes the situation and gives little hope of relief for the unfortunate condition of affairs:

UNITED STATES CONSULATE-GENERAL,

HAVANA, *January 8, 1898.*

SECRETARY OF STATE:

SIR.—I have the honor to state, as a matter of public interest, that the "reconcentrado order" of General Weyler, formerly Governor-General of this island, transferred about 400,000 self-supporting people, principally women and children, into a multitude, to be sustained by the contributions of others or die of starvation or of fevers, resulting from a low physical condition, and being massed in large bodies, without change of clothing and without food.

Their houses were burned, their fields and plant beds destroyed, and their live stock driven away or killed.

I estimate that probably 200,000 of the rural population in the provinces of Pinar del Rio, Havana, Matanzas, and Santa Clara, have died of starvation or from resultant causes, and the deaths of whole families almost simultaneously or within a few days of each other, and of mothers praying for their children to be relieved of their horrible sufferings by death, are not the least of the many pitiable scenes which were ever present. In the provinces of Puerto

Principe and Santiago de Cuba, where the "reconcentrado order" could not be enforced, the great mass of the people are self-sustaining.

* * * * *

A daily average of ten cents' worth of food to 200,000 people would be an expenditure of \$20,000 per day, and, of course, the most humane efforts upon the part of our citizens can not hope to accomplish such a gigantic relief, and a great portion of these people will have to be abandoned to their fate.

* * * * *

I am, etc.,

FITZHUGH LEE.

Similar letters from consuls in the various provinces were being daily received; and mention was made in some of the letters of organized bodies of charitable women who went from door to door carrying relief, some families contributing hundreds of dollars each month to feed the poor. Some of the letters and reports gave harrowing details of the suffering witnessed, and the following letters describe the crowds coming to the consulates to receive the rations and medicines sent by the United States for distribution:

CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES,

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *February 26, 1898.*

SECRETARY OF STATE:

SIR.—I have the honor to herewith inclose for your information a copy of a letter sent yesterday by me to the New York Central Cuban Relief Committee, showing the results of four days' work in distributing rations to the starving poor.

Rations are issued in a court attached to the consulate, the people being admitted by the police through a carriage driveway.

As I write the street is blocked by the hungry throng for nearly a square above and below the entrance.

I have requested the police to admit the most delicate and feeble subjects first, as many of them are unable to stand very long in such a crowd.

I shall, if possible, get a photographic view of the scene and forward it to the President through your honorable Department.

I am, etc.,

PULASKI F. HYATT,

United States Consul.

Since writing this dispatch (No. 437), I have been informed that the ladies' relief committee have estimated that in this city alone the number who need help is at least 18,000.

HYATT,

Consul.

CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
SAGUA LA GRANDE, *March 12, 1898.*

SECRETARY OF STATE:

SIR.—With reference to the distribution to and requirement for the concentrados in my consular district, I beg to submit the following for the information of the Department:

From the 15th of last month, through cash donations made to this consulate, direct, through personal appeal, I cared for 1,200 persons. By the 1st instant these contributions increased so as to enable the committee to increase the relief list to 2,000. This has been maintained until now; but as the "Fern," with thirty-five tons, should arrive to-morrow, the Sagua relief can be continued.

About a week since I received the first shipment of supplies, about twenty tons being sent from Havana under direction of the Red Cross branch in that city. All this I distributed among ten of the twenty-two towns I had managed to investigate, using none for Sagua; there being five others not yet looked into out of the twenty-seven cities and towns in my zone. I believe that with the assistance of a very able local committee, that I have this relief reduced to a kind of system so as to avoid as little abuse as possible, and at the same time care for the most deserving.

For instance; about sixty days ago, the mayors of these towns furnished, by request, this office with the number they claimed as actually destitute in their several municipal districts, which footed up over 50,000 persons. Estimating a decrease from death of 10,000, would leave, say, 40,000.

From the investigation so far made, I estimate if provision can be made to care for 25,000, whatever may be left will manage to survive.

Upon this estimate I beg to say that to keep this number alive will require eighty tons per month.

With the supplies reported in transit we can carry them through until the 12th of the coming month (April).

While, as stated in a very recent dispatch to the Department, the military have thrown every conceivable obstacle in the way of carrying out this humane work, I have, when convinced of their sincerity, acted in conjunction with the civil authorities.

Of the 5,000 utterly destitute in this city, the mayor, by popular subscription, has made an effort to issue a scant ration of rice and beans to about one-third of this number. Yesterday he called to say that he had a telegram from the acting Spanish minister in Washington, suggesting that he offer to aid me in the distribution of the supplies being sent from the United States; that he had no funds with which to do anything.



GROUP PHOTOGRAPHED AFTER THE BREAKFAST TO OFFICERS
OF THE "MAINE," HAVANA YACHT CLUB, JAN. 30, 1898.



THE CREW OF THE "MAINE," MOST OF WHOM WERE LOST.

Being a good, active man, I gladly accepted the offer of his services.

It is with pleasure that I say to the Department that Senor Leonardo Chia, "administrador" of the Sagua, as also the "administradores" of the Santa Clara and Cienfuegos railroads, have not only transported free the supplies for the reconcentrados, but have used extra effort to have them reach destination in due time.

I am, etc.,

WALTER B. BARKER,

Consul.

[Telegram.]

SAGUA LA GRANDE, March 24, 1898.

DAY, Washington:

Closer investigation disclose larger number destitute than estimates sent. Fifty tons needful now. Distress far greater than my reports show.

BARKER,

Consul.

On February 14th, the Senate had passed a resolution calling for the diplomatic correspondence on this subject, and it was transmitted to the Senate in April. The paper from which above extracts are made was consolidated with the message of President McKinley, Senate Document No. 405, Fifty-fifth Congress.

On April 1st the House passed an appropriation of \$39,000,000 for the building of three war ships, six torpedo boats, six torpedo-boat destroyers and a smokeless powder factory. On the 4th speeches were made in both Houses of Congress favoring intervention in Cuba. On the same day messages were received from Pope Leo XIII offering to mediate between the two countries, and he did in fact send conciliatory messages to Spain in an effort to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, but his efforts were fruitless. On the 5th, five Senators declared themselves in favor of war, and on the same day Consul-General Lee was recalled. April 7th, representatives of six great powers presented a joint note to the President in favor of peace. They were courteously and kindly received, but the President declared firmly that war in Cuba must cease.

At last, after great and trying delay in futile schemes of diplomacy, the President sent a message to Congress April 11th in favor of immediate intervention.

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE ON THE CONDITION OF AFFAIRS IN CUBA.

To the Congress of the United States:

Obedient to that precept of the Constitution which commands the President to give, from time to time, to the Congress information of the state of the Union and to recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient, it becomes my duty now to address your body with regard to the grave crisis that has arisen in the relations of the United States to Spain by reason of the warfare that for more than three years has raged in the neighboring island of Cuba.

I do so because of the intimate connection of the Cuban question with the state of our own Union and the grave relation the course which it is now incumbent upon the Nation to adopt must needs bear to the traditional policy of our Government if it is to accord with the precepts laid down by the founders of the Republic and religiously observed by succeeding Administrations to the present day.

The present revolution is but the successor of other similar insurrections which have occurred in Cuba against the dominion of Spain, extending over a period of nearly half a century, each of which, during its progress, has subjected the United States to great effort and expense in enforcing its neutrality laws, caused enormous losses to American trade and commerce, caused irritation, annoyance, and disturbance among our citizens, and, by the exercise of cruel, barbarous, and uncivilized practices of warfare, shocked the sensibilities and offended the humane sympathies of our people.

Since the present revolution began, in February, 1895, this country has seen the fertile domain at our threshold ravaged by fire and sword in the course of a struggle unequaled in the history of the island and rarely paralleled as to the numbers of the combatants and the bitterness of the contest by any revolution of modern times where a dependent people striving to be free have been opposed by the power of the sovereign State.

Our people have beheld a once prosperous community reduced to comparative want, its lucrative commerce virtually paralyzed, its exceptional productiveness diminished, its fields laid waste, its mills in ruins, and its people perishing by tens of thousands from hunger and destitution. We have found ourselves constrained, in the observance of that strict neutrality which our laws enjoin, and which the law of Nations commands, to police our own waters and watch our own seaports in prevention of any unlawful act in aid of the Cubans.

Our trade has suffered; the capital invested by our citizens in Cuba has been largely lost, and the temper and forbearance of our people have been so sorely

tried as to beget a perilous unrest among our own citizens which has inevitably found its expression from time to time in the National legislature, so that issues wholly external to our own body politic engross attention and stand in the way of that close devotion to domestic advancement that becomes a self-contained commonwealth whose primal maxim has been the avoidance of all foreign entanglements. All this must needs awaken, and has, indeed, aroused the utmost concern on the part of this Government, as well during my predecessor's term as in my own.

In April, 1896, the evils from which our country suffered through the Cuban war became so onerous that my predecessor made an effort to bring about a peace through the mediation of this Government in any way that might tend to an honorable adjustment of the contest between Spain and her revolted colony, on the basis of some effective scheme of self-government for Cuba under the flag and sovereignty of Spain. It failed through the refusal of the Spanish Government then in power to consider any form of mediation or, indeed, any plan of settlement which did not begin with the actual submission of the insurgents to the mother country, and then only on such terms as Spain herself might see fit to grant. The war continued unabated. The resistance of the insurgents was in nowise diminished.

The efforts of Spain were increased, both by the dispatch of fresh levies to Cuba and by the addition to the horrors of the strife of a new and inhuman phase happily unprecedented in the modern history of civilized Christian peoples. The policy of devastation and concentration, inaugurated by the captain-general's bando of October 21, 1896, in the Province of Pinar del Rio was thence extended to embrace all of the island to which the power of the Spanish arms was able to reach by occupation or by military operations. The peasantry, including all dwelling in the open agricultural interior, were driven into the garrison towns or isolated places held by the troops.

The raising and movement of provisions of all kinds were interdicted. The fields were laid waste, dwellings unroofed and fired, mills destroyed, and, in short, everything that could desolate the land and render it unfit for human habitation or support was commanded by one or the other of the contending parties and executed by all the powers at their disposal.

By the time the present Administration took office a year ago, reconcentration—so called—had been made effective over the better part of the four central and western provinces, Santa Clara, Matanzas, Havana, and Pinar del Rio.

The agricultural population to the estimated number of 300,000 or more was herded within the towns and their immediate vicinage, deprived of the means of support, rendered destitute of shelter, left poorly clad, and exposed to the

most unsanitary conditions. As the scarcity of food increased with the devastation of the depopulated areas of production, destitution and want became misery and starvation. Month by month the death rate increased in an alarming ratio. By March, 1897, according to conservative estimates from official Spanish sources, the mortality among the reconcentrados, from starvation and the diseases thereto incident, exceeded 50 per centum of their total number.

No practical relief was accorded to the destitute. The overburdened towns, already suffering from the general dearth, could give no aid. So-called "zones of cultivation" established within the immediate areas of effective military control about the cities and fortified camps proved illusory as a remedy for the suffering. The unfortunates, being for the most part women and children, with aged and helpless men, enfeebled by disease and hunger, could not have tilled the soil without tools, seed, or shelter for their own support or for the supply of the cities. Reconcentration, adopted avowedly as a war measure in order to cut off the resources of the insurgents, worked its predestined result. As I said in my message of last December, it was not civilized warfare; it was extermination. The only peace it could beget was that of the wilderness and the grave.

Meanwhile the military situation in the island had undergone a noticeable change. The extraordinary activity that characterized the second year of the war, when the insurgents invaded even the hitherto unharmed fields of Pinar del Rio and carried havoc and destruction up to the walls of the city of Havana itself, had relapsed into a dogged struggle in the central and eastern provinces. The Spanish arms regained a measure of control in Pinar del Rio and parts of Havana, but, under the existing conditions of the rural country, without immediate improvement of their productive situation. Even thus partially restricted, the revolutionists held their own, and their conquest and submission, put forward by Spain as the essential and sole basis of peace, seemed as far distant as at the outset.

In this state of affairs my Administration found itself confronted with the grave problem of its duty. My message of last December reviewed the situation and narrated the steps taken with a view to relieving its acuteness and opening the way to some form of honorable settlement. The assassination of the prime minister, Canovas, led to a change of government in Spain. The former Administration, pledged to subjugation without concession, gave place to that of a more liberal party, committed long in advance to a policy of reform involving the wider principle of home rule for Cuba and Puerto Rico.

The overtures of this Government, made through its new envoy General Woodford, and looking to an immediate and effective amelioration of the condition of the island, although not accepted to the extent of admitted mediation

in any shape, were met by assurances that home rule, in an advanced phase, would be forthwith offered to Cuba, without waiting for the war to end, and that more humane methods should thenceforth prevail in the conduct of hostilities. Coincidentally with these declarations, the new Government of Spain continued and completed the policy already begun by its predecessor, of testifying friendly regard for this Nation by releasing American citizens held under one charge or another connected with the insurrection, so that, by the end of November, not a single person entitled in any way to our National protection, remained in a Spanish prison.

While these negotiations were in progress the increasing destitution of the unfortunate reconcentrados and the alarming mortality among them claimed earnest attention. The success which had attended the limited measure of relief extended to the suffering American citizens among them by the judicious expenditure through the consular agencies of the money appropriated expressly for their succor by the joint resolution approved May 24, 1897, prompted the humane extension of a similar scheme of aid to the great body of sufferers. A suggestion to this end was acquiesced in by the Spanish authorities. On the 24th of December last, I caused to be issued an appeal to the American people, inviting contributions in money or in kind for the succor of the starving sufferers in Cuba, following this on the 8th of January by a similar public announcement of the formation of a central Cuban relief committee, with headquarters in New York city, composed of three members representing the American National Red Cross and the religious and business elements of the community.

The efforts of that committee have been untiring and have accomplished much. Arrangements for free transportation to Cuba have greatly aided the charitable work. The president of the American Red Cross and representatives of other contributory organizations have generously visited Cuba and co-operated with the consul-general and the local authorities to make effective distribution of the relief collected through the efforts of the central committee. Nearly \$200,000 in money and supplies has already reached the sufferers and more is forthcoming. The supplies are admitted duty free, and transportation to the interior has been arranged, so that the relief, at first necessarily confined to Havana and the larger cities, is now extended through most, if not all, of the towns where suffering exists.

Thousands of lives have already been saved. The necessity for a change in the condition of the reconcentrados is recognized by the Spanish Government. Within a few days past the orders of General Weyler have been revoked; the reconcentrados, it is said, are to be permitted to return to their homes, and aided to resume the self-supporting pursuits of peace. Public works have been

ordered to give them employment, and a sum of \$600,000 has been appropriated for their relief.

The war in Cuba is of such a nature that short of subjugation or extermination a final military victory for either side seems impracticable. The alternative lies in the physical exhaustion of the one or the other party, or perhaps of both—a condition which in effect ended the ten years' war by the truce of Zanjón. The prospect of such a protraction and conclusion of the present strife is a contingency hardly to be contemplated with equanimity by the civilized world, and least of all by the United States, affected and injured as we are, deeply and intimately, by its very existence.

Realizing this, it appeared to be my duty, in a spirit of true friendliness, no less to Spain than to the Cubans who have so much to lose by the prolongation of the struggle, to seek to bring about an immediate termination of the war. To this end I submitted, on the 27th ultimo, as a result of much representation and correspondence, through the United States minister at Madrid, propositions to the Spanish Government looking to an armistice until October 1st for the negotiation of peace with the good offices of the President.

In addition, I asked the immediate revocation of the order of reconcentration, so as to permit the people to return to their farms and the needy to be relieved with provisions and supplies from the United States, co-operating with the Spanish authorities, so as to afford full relief.

The reply of the Spanish Cabinet was received on the night of the 31st ultimo. It offered, as the means to bring about peace in Cuba, to confide the preparation thereof to the Insular Parliament, inasmuch as the concurrence of that body would be necessary to reach a final result, it being, however, understood that the powers reserved by the Constitution to the Central Government are not lessened or diminished. As the Cuban Parliament does not meet until the 4th of May next, the Spanish Government would not object, for its part, to accept at once a suspension of hostilities if asked for by the insurgents from the general-in-chief, to whom it would pertain, in such case, to determine the duration and conditions of the armistice.

The propositions submitted by General Woodford and the reply of the Spanish Government were both in the form of brief memoranda, the texts of which are before me, and are substantially in the language above given. The function of the Cuban Parliament in the matter of "preparing" peace and the manner of its doing so are not expressed in the Spanish memorandum; but from General Woodford's explanatory reports of preliminary discussions preceding the final conference it is understood that the Spanish Government stands ready to give the Insular Congress full powers to settle the terms of peace with the insurgents—whether by direct negotiation or indirectly by means of legislation does not appear.

With this last overture in the direction of immediate peace, and its disappointing reception by Spain, the Executive is brought to the end of his effort.

In my annual message of December last I said:

"Of the untried measures there remain only: Recognition of the insurgents as belligerents; recognition of the independence of Cuba; neutral intervention to end the war by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, and intervention in favor of one or the other party. I speak not of forcible annexation, for that can not be thought of. That, by our code of morality, would be criminal aggression."

Thereupon I reviewed these alternatives, in the light of President Grant's measured words, uttered in 1875, when after seven years of sanguinary, destructive, and cruel hostilities in Cuba he reached the conclusion that the recognition of the independence of Cuba was impracticable and indefensible; and that the recognition of belligerence was not warranted by the facts according to the tests of public law. I commented especially upon the latter aspect of the question, pointing out the inconveniences and positive dangers of a recognition of belligerence which, while adding to the already onerous burdens of neutrality within our own jurisdiction, could not in any way extend our influence or effective offices in the territory of hostilities.

Nothing has since occurred to change my view in this regard; and I recognize as fully now as then that the issuance of a proclamation of neutrality, by which process the so-called recognition of belligerents is published, could, of itself and unattended by other action, accomplish nothing toward the one end for which we labor — the instant pacification of Cuba and the cessation of the misery that afflicts the island.

Turning to the question of recognizing at this time the independence of the present insurgent government in Cuba, we find safe precedents in our history from an early day. They are well summed up in President Jackson's message to Congress, December 21, 1836, on the subject of the recognition of the independence of Texas. He said:

"In all the contests that have arisen out of the revolutions of France, out of the disputes relating to the Crowns of Portugal and Spain, out of the separation of the American possessions of both from the European Governments, and out of the numerous and constantly occurring struggles for dominion in Spanish America, so wisely consistent with our just principles has been the action of our Government, that we have, under the most critical circumstances, avoided all censure, and encountered no other evil than that produced by a transient estrangement of good-will in those against whom we have been by force of evidence compelled to decide.

"It has thus made known to the world that the uniform policy and practice of the United States is to avoid all interference in disputes which merely relate to the internal government of other Nations, and eventually to recognize the authority of the prevailing party without reference to our particular interests and views or to the merits of the original controversy.

* * * "But on this, as on every other trying occasion, safety is to be found in a rigid adherence to principle.

"In the contest between Spain and the revolted colonies we stood aloof, and waited not only until the ability of the new States to protect themselves was fully established, but until the danger of their being again subjugated had entirely passed away. Then, and not until then, were they recognized.

"Such was our course in regard to Mexico herself." * * * "It is true that with regard to Texas the civil authority of Mexico has been expelled, its invading army defeated, the chief of the Republic himself captured, and all present power to control the newly-organized government of Texas annihilated within its confines; but, on the other hand, there is, in appearance at least, an immense disparity of physical force on the side of Texas. The Mexican Republic, under another Executive, is rallying its forces under a new leader and menacing a fresh invasion to recover its lost dominion.

"Upon the issue of this threatened invasion the independence of Texas may be considered as suspended; and were there nothing peculiar in the relative situation of the United States and Texas, our acknowledgment of its independence at such a crisis could scarcely be regarded as consistent with that prudent reserve with which we have hitherto held ourselves bound to treat all similar questions."

Thereupon Andrew Jackson proceeded to consider the risk that there might be imputed to the United States motives of selfish interest in view of the former claim on our part to the territory of Texas, and of the avowed purpose of the Texans in seeking recognition of independence as an incident to the incorporation of Texas in the Union, concluding thus:

"Prudence, therefore, seems to dictate that we should still stand aloof and maintain our present attitude, if not until Mexico itself, or one of the great foreign powers shall recognize the independence of the new government, at least until the lapse of time or the course of events shall have proved beyond cavil or dispute the ability of the people of that country to maintain their separate sovereignty and to uphold the government constituted by them. Neither of the contending parties can justly complain of this course. By pursuing it we are but carrying out the long-established policy of our Government, a policy which has secured to us respect and influence abroad and inspired confidence at home."



CUBAN WOUNDED EN ROUTE TO THE HOSPITAL.



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DESMAYS, THE CUBAN BALAKLAVA.

These are the words of the resolute and patriotic Jackson. They are evidence that the United States, in addition to the test imposed by public law as the condition of the recognition of independence by a neutral State (to-wit, that the revolted State shall "constitute in fact a body politic, having a government in substance as well as in name, possessed of the elements of stability," and forming de facto, "if left to itself, a State among the Nations, reasonably capable of discharging the duties of a State"), has imposed for its own governance in dealing with cases like these the further condition that recognition of independent statehood is not due to a revolted dependency until the danger of its being again subjugated by the parent State has entirely passed away.

This extreme test was, in fact, applied in the case of Texas. The Congress to whom President Jackson referred the question as one "probably leading to war," and, therefore, a proper subject for "a previous understanding with that body by whom war can alone be declared and by whom all the provisions for sustaining its perils must be furnished," left the matter of the recognition of Texas to the discretion of the Executive, providing merely for the sending of a diplomatic agent when the President should be satisfied that the Republic of Texas had become "an independent State." It was so recognized by President Van Buren, who commissioned a chargé d'affaires March 7, 1837, after Mexico had abandoned an attempt to reconquer the Texan territory, and when there was at the time no bona fide contest going on between the insurgent province and its former sovereign.

I said in my message of December last, "It is to be seriously considered whether the Cuban insurrection possesses beyond dispute the attributes of statehood which alone can demand the recognition of belligerency in its favor." The same requirement must certainly be no less seriously considered when the graver issue of recognizing independence is in question, for no less positive test can be applied to the greater act than to the lesser; while, on the other hand, the influences and consequences of the struggle upon the internal policy of the recognizing State, which form important factors when the recognition of belligerency is concerned, are secondary, if not rightly eliminable, factors when the real question is whether the community claiming recognition is or is not independent beyond peradventure.

Nor from the standpoint of expediency do I think it would be wise or prudent for this Government to recognize at the present time the independence of the so-called Cuban Republic. Such recognition is not necessary in order to enable the United States to intervene and pacify the island. To commit this country now to the recognition of any particular government in Cuba might subject us to embarrassing conditions of international obligation toward

the organization so recognized. In case of intervention our conduct would be subject to the approval or disapproval of such government. We would be required to submit to its direction and to assume to it the mere relation of a friendly ally.

When it shall appear hereafter that there is within the island a government capable of performing the duties and discharging the functions of a separate nation, and having, as a matter of fact, the proper forms and attributes of nationality, such government can be promptly and readily recognized and the relations and interests of the United States with such nation adjusted.

There remain the alternative forms of intervention to end the war, either as an impartial neutral by imposing a rational compromise between the contestants, or as the active ally of the one party or the other.

As to the first, it is not to be forgotten that during the last few months the relation of the United States has virtually been one of friendly intervention in many ways, each not of itself conclusive, but all tending to the exertion of a potential influence toward an ultimate pacific result, just and honorable to all interests concerned. The spirit of all our acts hitherto has been an earnest, unselfish desire for peace and prosperity in Cuba, untarnished by differences between us and Spain, and unstained by the blood of American citizens.

The forcible intervention of the United States as a neutral to stop the war, according to the large dictates of humanity and following many historical precedents where neighboring States have interfered to check the hopeless sacrifices of life by internecine conflicts beyond their borders, is justifiable on rational grounds. It involves, however, hostile constraint upon both the parties to the contest as well to enforce a truce as to guide the eventual settlement.

The grounds for such intervention may be briefly summarized as follows:

First. In the cause of humanity and to put an end to the barbarities, bloodshed, starvation, and horrible miseries now existing there, and which the parties to the conflict are either unable or unwilling to stop or mitigate. It is no answer to say this is all in another country, belonging to another nation, and is, therefore, none of our business. It is specially our duty, for it is right at our door.

Second. We owe it to our citizens in Cuba to afford them that protection and indemnity for life and property which no government there can or will afford, and to that end to terminate the conditions that deprive them of legal protection.

Third. The right to intervene may be justified by the very serious injury to the commerce, trade, and business of our people, and by the wanton destruction of property and devastation of the island.

Fourth, and which is of the utmost importance. The present condition of affairs in Cuba is a constant menace to our peace, and entails upon this Government an enormous expense. With such a conflict waged for years in an island so near us and with which our people have such trade and business relations—when the lives and liberty of our citizens are in constant danger and their property destroyed and themselves ruined—where our trading vessels are liable to seizure and are seized at our very door by war ships of a foreign nation, the expeditions of filibustering that we are powerless to prevent altogether, and the irritating questions and entanglements thus arising—all these and others that I need not mention, with the resulting strained relations, are a constant menace to our peace, and compel us to keep on a semi-war footing with a nation with which we are at peace.

These elements of danger and disorder already pointed out have been strikingly illustrated by a tragic event which has deeply and justly moved the American people. I have already transmitted to Congress the report of the naval court of inquiry on the destruction of the battle ship "Maine" in the harbor of Havana during the night of the 15th of February. The destruction of that noble vessel has filled the national heart with inexpressible horror. Two hundred and fifty-eight brave sailors and marines and two officers of our Navy, reposing in the fancied security of a friendly harbor, have been hurled to death, grief and want brought to their homes and sorrow to the nation.

The naval court of inquiry, which, it is needless to say, commands the unqualified confidence of the Government, was unanimous in its conclusion that the destruction of the "Maine" was caused by an exterior explosion, that of a submarine mine. It did not assume to place the responsibility. That remains to be fixed.

In any event the destruction of the "Maine," by whatever exterior cause, is a patent and impressive proof of a state of things in Cuba that is intolerable. That condition is thus shown to be such that the Spanish Government can not assure safety and security to a vessel of the American Navy in the harbor of Havana on a mission of peace, and rightfully there.

Further referring in this connection to recent diplomatic correspondence, a dispatch from our minister to Spain, of the 26th ultimo, contained the statement that the Spanish minister for foreign affairs assured him positively that Spain will do all that the highest honor and justice require in the matter of the "Maine." The reply above referred to of the 31st ultimo also contained an expression of the readiness of Spain to submit to an arbitration all the differences which can arise in this matter, which is subsequently explained by the note of the Spanish minister at Washington of the 10th instant, as follows:

"As to the question of fact which springs from the diversity of views be-

tween the reports of the American and Spanish boards, Spain proposes that the facts be ascertained by an impartial investigation by experts, whose decision Spain accepts in advance."

To this I have made no reply.

President Grant, in 1875, after discussing the phases of the contest as it then appeared, and its hopeless and apparent indefinite prolongation, said:

"In such event, I am of opinion that other nations will be compelled to assume the responsibility which devolves upon them, and to seriously consider the only remaining measures possible—mediation and intervention. Owing, perhaps, to the large expanse of water separating the island from the peninsula, * * * the contending parties appear to have within themselves no depository of common confidence, to suggest wisdom when passion and excitement have their sway, and to assume the part of peacemaker.

"In this view in the earlier days of the contest the good offices of the United States as a mediator were tendered in good faith, without any selfish purpose, in the interest of humanity and in sincere friendship for both parties, but were at the time declined by Spain, with the declaration, nevertheless, that at a future time they would be indispensable. No intimation has been received that in the opinion of Spain that time has been reached. And yet the strife continues with all its dread horrors and all its injuries to the interests of the United States and of other nations.

"Each party seems quite capable of working great injury and damage to the other, as well as to all the relations and interests dependent on the existence of peace in the island; but they seem incapable of reaching any adjustment, and both have thus far failed of achieving any success whereby one party shall possess and control the island to the exclusion of the other. Under these circumstances, the agency of others, either by medium or by intervention, seems to be the only alternative which must sooner or later be invoked for the termination of the strife."

In the last annual message of my immediate predecessor during the pending struggle, it was said:

"When the inability of Spain to deal successfully with the insurrection has become manifest, and it is demonstrated that her sovereignty is extinct in Cuba for all purposes of its rightful existence, and when a hopeless struggle for its re-establishment has degenerated into a strife which means nothing more than the useless sacrifice of human life and the utter destruction of the very subject-matter of the conflict, a situation will be presented in which our obligations to the sovereignty of Spain will be superseded by higher obligations, which we can hardly hesitate to recognize and discharge."

In my annual message to Congress, December last, speaking to this question, I said:

"The near future will demonstrate whether the indispensable condition of a righteous peace, just alike to the Cubans and to Spain, as well as equitable to all our interests so intimately involved in the welfare of Cuba, is likely to be attained. If not, the exigency of further and other action by the United States will remain to be taken. When that time comes that action will be determined in the line of indisputable right and duty. It will be faced, without misgiving or hesitancy, in the light of the obligation this Government owes to itself, to the people who have confided to it the protection of their interests and honor, and to humanity.

"Sure of the right, keeping free from all offense ourselves, actuated only by upright and patriotic considerations, moved neither by passion nor selfishness, the Government will continue its watchful care over the rights and property of American citizens and will abate none of its efforts to bring about by peaceful agencies a peace which shall be honorable and enduring. If it shall hereafter appear to be a duty imposed by our obligations to ourselves, to civilization and humanity to intervene with force, it shall be without fault on our part and only because the necessity for such action will be so clear as to command the support and approval of the civilized world."

The long trial has proved that the object for which Spain has waged the war can not be attained. The fire of insurrection may flame or may smolder with varying seasons, but it has not been and it is plain that it can not be extinguished by present methods. The only hope of relief and repose from a condition which can no longer be endured is the enforced pacification of Cuba. In the name of humanity, in the name of civilization, in behalf of endangered American interests which give us the right and the duty to speak and to act, the war in Cuba must stop.

In view of these facts and of these considerations, I ask the Congress to authorize and empower the President to take measures to secure a full and final termination of hostilities between the Government of Spain and the people of Cuba, and to secure in the island the establishment of a stable government, capable of maintaining order and observing its international obligations, insuring peace and tranquillity and the security of its citizens as well as our own, and to use the military and naval forces of the United States as may be necessary for these purposes.

And in the interest of humanity and to aid in preserving the lives of the starving people of the island I recommend that the distribution of food and supplies be continued, and that an appropriation be made out of the public Treasury to supplement the charity of our citizens.

The issue is now with the Congress. It is a solemn responsibility. I have exhausted every effort to relieve the intolerable condition of affairs which is at our doors. Prepared to execute every obligation imposed upon me by the Constitution and the law, I await your action.

Yesterday, and since the preparation of the foregoing message, official information was received by me that the latest decree of the Queen Regent of Spain directs General Blanco, in order to prepare and facilitate peace, to proclaim a suspension of hostilities, the duration and details of which have not yet been communicated to me.

This fact with every other pertinent consideration will, I am sure, have your just and careful attention in the solemn deliberations upon which you are about to enter. If this measure attains a successful result, then our aspirations as a Christian, peace-loving people will be realized. If it fails, it will be only another justification for our contemplated action.

WILLIAM McKINLEY.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, *April 11, 1898.*

Consul-General Lee and other Americans arrived about this time from Havana. General Lee expressed himself as positive that the secret of the "Maine" disaster was known to some of the Spanish officials at Cuba. His disclosures added somewhat to the excitement already aroused. On the 13th, amid a scene of wild disorder, the House passed a resolution recognizing the independence of Cuba and directing the President to intervene. It was debated for two days by the Senate and passed with amendments; went to a conference committee, where the amendment recognizing the existing Republican government of Cuba was stricken out, was thus accepted by the Senate, passed on April 19th and was signed by the President on the 20th. The bill, as it finally became law, reads as follows:

[PUBLIC RESOLUTION — No. 21.]

Joint Resolution For the recognition of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of the United States to carry these resolutions into effect.

Whereas the abhorrent conditions which have existed for more than three years in the island of Cuba, so near our own borders, have shocked the moral sense of the people of the United States, have been a disgrace to Christian

civilization, culminating, as they have, in the destruction of a United States battle ship, with two hundred and sixty-six of its officers and crew, while on a friendly visit in the harbor of Havana, and can not longer be endured, as has been set forth by the President of the United States in his message to Congress of April eleventh, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, upon which the action of Congress was invited: Therefore,

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, First. That the people of the island of Cuba are, and of right ought to be, free and independent.

Second. That it is the duty of the United States to demand, and the Government of the United States does hereby demand, that the Government of Spain at once relinquish its authority and government in the island of Cuba and withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban waters.

Third. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval force of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry these resolutions into effect.

Fourth. That the United States hereby disclaims any disposition or intention to exercise sovereignty, jurisdiction, or control over said island except for the pacification thereof, and asserts its determination, when that is accomplished, to leave the government and control of the island to its people.

Approved, *April 20, 1898.*

On the same day the Spanish Minister at Washington received his passports. In Madrid at a meeting of the Cortes, the Queen Regent from the throne, read a speech appealing to the loyalty and devotion of the people of Spain, and speaking of the injustice of the American Government. She was received with the wildest enthusiasm. On the following day, before Minister Woodford could deliver the ultimatum of the United States, he was informed by the Spanish Government that diplomatic relations with the United States were at an end. He left Madrid for Paris, being followed to the frontiers of Spain by crowds of rioters from whom he was protected by a strong Spanish guard; American affairs in Madrid were entrusted to the British embassy.

The fleet at Key West, under command of Admiral Sampson, was ordered to blockade Havana. The Asiatic squadron, under Commodore Dewey, was ordered to blockade the Philippine Islands. Admiral Sicard was detained at Washington as adviser to the Secretary of the Navy. Captain Sigsbee, late in command of the "Maine," was

given command of the "St. Paul," an auxiliary cruiser. Commodore Schley was in command of the fleet at Hampton Roads; and a squadron for the protection of the American coast was placed under the command of Admiral Howard. Meanwhile the Army was rapidly mobilizing. Chickamauga Park was made a general rendezvous for troops, which were also being hurried to New Orleans, Key West, Tampa and other points. The Twenty-fifth United States Infantry reached Chickamauga and camped there April 15th.

At this time, Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Hon. Theodore Roosevelt, resigned to accept active service in the Army and enlisted as an officer of the First Volunteer Cavalry, generally known of as "Roosevelt's Rough Riders" under the command of Colonel Leonard Wood.

April 22d, a bill was passed by both Houses, authorizing the call for volunteers, and on the following day, the President issued a call for 125,000 men from the different States. The call was promptly responded to and recruits came pouring in from the different States.

The act authorizing this call is as follows:

[PUBLIC — No. 67.]

An Act To provide for temporarily increasing the military establishment of the United States in time of war, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That all able-bodied male citizens of the United States, and persons of foreign birth who shall have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States under and in pursuance of the laws thereof, between the ages of eighteen and forty-five years, are hereby declared to constitute the national forces, and, with such exceptions and under such conditions as may be prescribed by law, shall be liable to perform military duty in the service of the United States.

§ 2. That the organized and active land forces of the United States shall consist of the Army of the United States and of the militia of the several States when called into the service of the United States: *Provided*, That in time of war the Army shall consist of two branches which shall be designated, respectively, as the Regular Army and the Volunteer Army of the United States.

§ 3. That the Regular Army is the permanent military establishment, which is maintained both in peace and war according to law.

§ 4. That the Volunteer Army shall be maintained only during the existence of war, or while war is imminent, and shall be raised and organized, as in this



—DIVA OF LEBES WEALE.

"MAINE" COAL PASSERS, WHOSE QUARTERS WERE BLOWN UP.



SINGLE-STICK EXERCISE ON THE "MAINE."

act provided, only after Congress has or shall have authorized the President to raise such a force or to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States: *Provided*, That all enlistments for the Volunteer Army shall be for a term of two years, unless sooner terminated, and that all officers and men composing said army shall be discharged from the service of the United States when the purposes for which they were called into service shall have been accomplished, or on the conclusion of hostilities.

§ 5. That when it becomes necessary to raise a volunteer army the President shall issue his proclamation stating the number of men desired, within such limits as may be fixed by law, and the Secretary of War shall prescribe such rules and regulations, not inconsistent with the terms of this act, as may in his judgment be necessary for the purpose of examining, organizing, and receiving into service the men called for: *Provided*, That all men received into service in the Volunteer Army shall, as far as practicable, be taken from the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia and the Indian Territory in proportion to their population. And any company, troop, battalion or regiment from the Indian Territory shall be formed and organized under such rules and regulations as shall be prescribed by the Secretary of War.

§ 6. That the Volunteer Army and the militia of the States when called into the service of the United States shall be organized under, and shall be subject to, the laws, orders, and regulations governing the Regular Army: *Provided*, That each regiment of the Volunteer Army shall have one surgeon, two assistant surgeons, and one chaplain, and that all the regimental and company officers shall be appointed by the governors of the States in which their respective organizations are raised: *Provided further*, That when the members of any company, troop, battery, battalion or regiment of the organized militia of any State shall enlist in the Volunteer Army in a body, as such company, troop, battery, battalion or regiment, the regimental, company, troop, battery and battalion officers in service with the militia organization thus enlisting may be appointed by the governors of the States and Territories, and shall, when so appointed, be officers of corresponding grades in the same organization when it shall have been received into the service of the United States as a part of the Volunteer Army: *Provided further*, That the President may authorize the Secretary of War to organize companies, troops, battalions, or regiments, possessing special qualifications, from the nation at large not to exceed three thousand men, under such rules and regulations, including the appointment of the officers thereof, as may be prescribed by the Secretary of War.

§ 7. That all organizations of the Volunteer Army shall be so recruited from time to time as to maintain them as near to their maximum strength as the

President may deem necessary, and no new organization shall be accepted into service from any State unless the organizations already in service from such State are as near to their maximum strength of officers and enlisted men as the President may deem necessary.

§ 8. That all returns and muster-rolls of organizations of the Volunteer Army and of militia organizations while in the service of the United States shall be rendered to the adjutant-general of the Army, and upon the disbandment of such organizations the records pertaining to them shall be transferred to and filed in the record and pension office of the War Department. And regimental and other medical officers serving with volunteer troops in the field or elsewhere shall keep a daily record of all soldiers reported sick, or wounded as shown by the morning calls or reports, and shall deposit such reports with other reports provided for in this section with the record and pension office as provided herein, for other reports, returns and muster-rolls.

§ 9. That in time of war, or when war is imminent, the troops in the service of the United States, whether belonging to the Regular or Volunteer Army or to the militia, shall be organized, as far as practicable, into divisions of three brigades, each brigade to be composed of three or more regiments; and whenever three or more divisions are assembled in the same army the President is authorized to organize them into army corps, each corps to consist of not more than three divisions.

§ 10. That the staff of the commander of an army corps shall consist of one assistant adjutant-general, one chief engineer, one inspector-general, one chief quartermaster, one chief commissary of subsistence, one judge-advocate, and one chief surgeon, who shall have, respectively, the rank of lieutenant-colonel; one assistant adjutant-general, who shall have the rank of captain, and the aids-de-camp authorized by law. The staff of the commander of a division shall consist of one assistant adjutant-general, one engineer officer, one inspector-general, one chief quartermaster, one chief commissary of subsistence, and one chief surgeon, who shall have, respectively, the rank of major, and the aids-de-camp authorized by law. The staff of the commander of a brigade shall consist of one assistant adjutant-general, one assistant quartermaster, and one commissary of subsistence, each with the rank of captain, one surgeon, and the aids-de-camp authorized by law. The staff officers herein authorized for the corps, division, and brigade commanders may be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, as officers of the Volunteer Army, or may be assigned by him, in his discretion, from officers of the Regular Army or the Volunteer Army, or of the militia in the service of the United States: *Provided*, That when relieved from such staff service said appointments or assignments shall terminate.

§ 11. That the President is hereby authorized to appoint in the Volunteer Army, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, not exceeding one major-general for each organized army corps and division, and one brigadier-general for each brigade, and any officer so selected and appointed from the Regular Army shall be entitled to retain his rank therein: *Provided*, That each general officer of the Volunteer Army shall be entitled to the number of aids-de-camp authorized for an officer of like grade in the Regular Army.

§ 12. That all officers and enlisted men of the Volunteer Army, and of the militia of the States when in the service of the United States, shall be in all respects on the same footing as to pay, allowances, and pensions as that of officers and enlisted men of corresponding grades in the Regular Army.

§ 13. That the governor of any State or Territory may, with the consent of the President, appoint officers of the Regular Army in the grades of field officers in organizations of the Volunteer Army, and officers thus appointed shall be entitled to retain their rank in the Regular Army: *Provided*, That not more than one officer of the Regular Army shall hold a commission in any one regiment of the Volunteer Army at the same time.

§ 14. That the general commanding a separate department or a detached army is authorized to appoint from time to time military boards of not less than three nor more than five volunteer officers of the Volunteer Army to examine into the capacity, qualifications, conduct, and efficiency of any commissioned officer of said army within his command: *Provided*, That each member of the board shall be superior in rank to the officer whose qualifications are to be inquired into: *And provided further*, That if the report of such a board is adverse to the continuance of any officer, and the report be approved by the President, such officer shall be discharged from service in the Volunteer Army, at the discretion of the President, with one month's pay and allowances.

§ 15. That all acts and parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions hereof be, and the same are hereby, repealed.

Approved, *April 22*, 1898.

On the same day Congress passed a

Joint Resolution To prohibit the export of coal or other material used in war from any seaport of the United States.

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the President is hereby authorized, in his discretion, and with such limitations and exceptions as shall seem to him expedient, to prohibit the export of coal or other material used in war from any seaport of the United States until otherwise ordered by the President or by Congress.

Approved, *April 22*, 1898.

This was followed by action upon the part of Great Britain declaring coal contraband of war.

The following is the important paragraph in the Proclamation of Neutrality published by Great Britain, on April 26, 1898, making coal contraband of war:

Rule 3.—No ship of war of either belligerent shall hereafter be permitted, while in any such port, roadstead, or waters subject to the territorial jurisdiction of Her Majesty, to take in any supplies, except provisions and such other things as may be requisite for the subsistence of her crew, and except so much coal only as may be sufficient to carry such vessel to the nearest port of her own country, or to some nearer destination, and no coal shall again be supplied to any such ship of war in the same or any other port, roadstead, or waters subject to the territorial jurisdiction of Her Majesty, without special permission, until after the expiration of three months from the time when such coal may have been last supplied to her within British waters as aforesaid.

War was declared by Spain April 24th,

PROCLAMATION OF WAR BY SPAIN.

FOREIGN OFFICE, *May 3, 1898.*

The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has received, through Her Majesty's embassy at Madrid, the following translation of a decree issued by the Spanish Government on the 23d of April, 1898:

ROYAL DECREE.

In accordance with the advice of my Council of Ministers; in the name of my son, King Alfonso XIII, and as Queen-Regent of the Kingdom, I decree as follows:

ARTICLE I. The state of war existing between Spain and the United States terminates the treaty of peace and friendship of the 27th October, 1795, the protocol of the 12th January, 1877, and all other agreements, compacts, and conventions that have been in force up to the present between the two countries.

ART. II. A term of five days from the date of the publication of the present royal decree in the Madrid Gazette is allowed to all United States ships anchored in Spanish ports, during which they are at liberty to depart.

ART. III. Notwithstanding that Spain is not bound by the declaration signed in Paris on the 16th April, 1856, as she expressly stated her wish not to adhere to it, my Government, guided by the principles of international law, intends

to observe and hereby orders that the following regulations for maritime law be observed:

(a) A neutral flag covers the enemy's goods, except contraband of war.

(b) Neutral goods, except contraband of war, are not liable to confiscation under the enemy's flag.

(c) A blockade to be binding must be effective; that is to say, maintained with a sufficient force to actually prevent access to the enemy's coast.

ART. IV. The Spanish Government, while maintaining their right to issue letters of marque, which they expressly reserved in their note of the 16th May, 1857, in reply to the request of France for the adhesion of Spain to the declaration of Paris relative to maritime law, will organize for the present a service of "auxiliary cruisers of the navy," composed of ships of the Spanish mercantile navy, which will co-operate with the latter for the purposes of cruising, and which will be subject to the statutes and jurisdiction of the navy.

ART. V. In order to capture the enemy's ships, to confiscate the enemy's merchandise under their own flag, and contraband of war under any flag, the royal navy, auxiliary cruisers, and privateers, if and when the latter are authorized, will exercise the right of visit on the high seas and in the territorial waters of the enemy, in accordance with international law and any regulations which may be published for the purpose.

ART. VI. Under the denomination contraband of war, the following articles are included:

Cannons, machine guns, mortars, guns, all kinds of arms and firearms, bullets, bombs, grenades, fuses, cartridges, matches, powder, sulphur, saltpeter, dynamite and every kind of explosive, articles of equipment like uniforms, straps, saddles and artillery and cavalry harness, engines for ships and their accessories, shafts, screws, boilers and other articles used in the construction, repair, and arming of war ships, and in general all warlike instruments, utensils, tools, and other articles, and whatever may hereafter be determined to be contraband.

ART. VII. Captains, commanders, and officers of non-American vessels or of vessels manned as to one-third by other than American citizens, captured while committing acts of war against Spain, will be treated as pirates, with all the rigor of the law, although provided with a license issued by the Republic of the United States.

ART. VIII. The Minister of State and the Minister of Marine are charged to see the fulfillment of the present royal decree and to give the orders necessary for its execution.

MARIA CRISTINA.

MADRID, *April 23*, 1898.

The United States declared war on the 25th, in the following words:

An Act Declaring that war exists between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, First. That war be, and the same is hereby, declared to exist, and that war has existed since the twenty-first day of April, anno Domini eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, including said day, between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Spain.

Second. That the President of the United States be, and he hereby is, directed and empowered to use the entire land and naval forces of the United States, and to call into the actual service of the United States the militia of the several States, to such extent as may be necessary to carry this act into effect.

Approved, *April 25, 1898.*

The European and South American powers proclaimed neutrality. The Spanish squadron sailed from Cape Verde Islands; its destination was unknown, and caused much anxiety, but it was finally conjectured that it had sailed directly west to the Caribbean Sea.

April 25th, the same day that war was declared, Secretary Sherman resigned and was succeeded by William R. Day, as Secretary of State. The following day, the President declared that he would adhere to the anti-privateering agreement of the Declaration of Paris. The Postmaster-General ordered no more mails sent to Spain.

The following act of Congress approved April 26th, authorized an increase in the enlisted strength of the army to 62,597, more than doubling its strength upon the peace basis:

[PUBLIC — No. 70.]

An Act For the better organization of the line of the Army of the United States.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That hereafter the peace organization of each regiment of infantry now in service shall embrace one colonel, one lieutenant-colonel, two majors, ten captains, twelve first lieutenants, ten second lieutenants, one sergeant-major, one quartermaster-sergeant, one chief musician, two principal musicians, two battalions of four companies each, and two skeleton or unmanned companies; the organized companies to be constituted as now authorized by law: *Provided,* That nothing herein contained shall be

construed as abolishing the office of chaplain in each regiment of colored troops: *And provided further*, That the vacancies in the grade of major created by this section shall be filled by promotion according to seniority in the infantry arm.

§ 2. That upon a declaration of war by Congress, or a declaration by Congress that war exists, the President, in his discretion, may establish a third battalion for each infantry regiment, consisting of four companies, to be supplied by manning the two skeleton companies and by organizing two additional companies. The vacancies of commissioned officers in the additional companies shall be filled by promotions by seniority in the infantry arm, and by appointments in accordance with existing law; and hereafter all vacancies occurring in the cavalry, artillery, and infantry above the grade of second lieutenant shall, subject to the examination now required by law, be filled by promotion according to seniority from the next lower grade in each arm.

§ 3. That upon a declaration of war by Congress, or a declaration of Congress that war exists, the enlisted strength of a company, troop, and battery, respectively, may, in the discretion of the President, be increased to comprise not exceeding:

For each company of infantry: One first sergeant, one quartermaster-sergeant, four sergeants, twelve corporals, two musicians, one artificer, one wagoner, and eighty-four privates; total enlisted, one hundred and six: *Provided*, That in the event of a call by the President for either volunteers or the militia of the country the President is authorized to accept the quotas of troops of the various States and Territories, including the District of Columbia and Indian Territory, as organized under the laws of the States and Territories, including the District of Columbia, in companies, troops, and batteries, each to contain so far as practicable the number of enlisted men authorized in this act for each arm of the service, and battalions of not less than three such companies and regiments of not less than ten nor more than twelve such companies. But this proviso shall apply to companies, troops, batteries, battalions, and regimental organizations and none other: *Provided further*, That in volunteer organizations received into the service under this act and existing laws, one hospital steward shall be authorized for each battalion.

For each troop of cavalry: One first sergeant, one quartermaster-sergeant, six sergeants, eight corporals, two farriers and blacksmiths, two trumpeters, one saddler, one wagoner, seventy-eight privates; total enlisted, one hundred.

For each battery of heavy artillery: One first sergeant, twenty-two sergeants, ten corporals, two musicians, two artificers, one wagoner, one hundred and sixty-two privates; total enlisted, two hundred.

For each battery of field artillery: One first sergeant, one quartermaster-

sergeant, one veterinary sergeant, six sergeants, fifteen corporals, two farriers, two artificers, one saddler, two musicians, one wagoner, one hundred and forty-one privates; total enlisted, one hundred and seventy-three.

For each company of engineers: One first sergeant, ten sergeants, ten corporals, two musicians, sixty-four first-class privates, sixty-three second-class privates; total enlisted, one hundred and fifty. In time of war there shall be added to the Signal Corps of the Army ten corporals, one hundred first-class privates, and forty second-class privates, who shall have the pay and allowances of engineer troops of the same grade.

The quartermaster and veterinary sergeants provided for in this section shall have the pay and allowances of sergeants of their respective arms.

§ 4. That when recruited to their war strength the President may add one second lieutenant to each battery of artillery; such offices to be filled by appointments, as prescribed by existing law.


§ 5. That in time of war the President shall cause the batteries of artillery authorized by law to be organized as heavy or field artillery, as in his judgment the exigencies of the service may require.

§ 6. That in time of war the pay proper of enlisted men shall be increased twenty per centum over and above the rates of pay as fixed by law: *Provided*, That in war time no additional increased compensation shall be allowed to soldiers performing what is known as extra or special duty: *Provided further*, That any soldier who deserts shall, besides incurring the penalties now attaching to the crime of desertion, forfeit all right to pension which he might otherwise have acquired.

§ 7. That in time of war every officer serving with troops operating against an enemy who shall exercise, under assignment in orders issued by competent authority, a command above that pertaining to his grade, shall be entitled to receive the pay and allowances of the grade appropriate to the command so exercised: *Provided*, That a rate of pay exceeding that of a brigadier-general shall not be paid in any case by reason of such assignment: *Provided further*, That at the end of any war in which the United States may become involved the Army shall be reduced to a peace basis by the transfer in the same arm of the service or absorption by promotion or honorable discharge under such regulations as the Secretary of War may establish of supernumerary commissioned officers and the honorable discharge or transfer of supernumerary enlisted men; and nothing contained in this act shall be construed as authorizing a permanent increase of the commissioned or enlisted force of the Regular Army beyond that now provided by the law in force prior to the passage of this act, except as to the increase of twenty-five majors provided for in section one hereof.

Approved, *April 26, 1898.*

On the 27th, Admiral Sampson's blockading squadron silenced the works at Matanzas, Cuba; and Commodore Dewey's squadron sailed from Mirs' Bay to Manila. The steamer "Paris," to be employed as an auxiliary cruiser, reached New York safely, and the United States battle ship "Oregon," which had been hastily recalled from the Pacific coast, was reported at Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on the 30th of April.



THE GALLANT PART TAKEN BY OUR NAVY.

CHAPTER IX.

On the 1st day of May, the whole country was electrified by the glorious news of Dewey's victory at Manila. The "Asiatic" squadron, under the command of Admiral, then Commodore, Dewey, consisted of the cruisers "Olympia," "Raleigh," "Boston," "Charleston," and "Baltimore;" gunboats "Concord," "Monocacy," and "Petrel;" the supply vessel "Zafiro;" colliers "Brutus," "Nashan," and "Nero;" monitors "Monadnock" and "Monterey;" transports "City of Pekin" and "Sydney," and the revenue cutter "McCullough." With these vessels he entered Manila Bay and engaged a Spanish fleet stationed there, destroying or capturing the entire squadron under Admiral Montojo, consisting of the cruisers "Reina Christina," "Castillo," "Don Antonio," "Ulloa," "Isla de Cuba," "Isla de Luzon," the gunboats "General Lezo," "Duero," "Correo," "Velasco," "Mindano," and one transport, with a loss to the American fleet of seven wounded. The loss on the side of the Spaniards was 300 killed and more than twice that number wounded.

Commodore Dewey was at Hong Kong when war was declared. Forced to leave British waters, with no coaling station nearer than Honolulu, there was but one course for him to pursue, that is to say, to make himself master of Manila by the defeat of the Spanish squadron. Having a good insight into Spanish character, and a thorough knowledge of the disposition of the enemy's forces, he left Mirs Bay with his program fully prepared, and he carried it through successfully.

The bay of Manila is one of the largest and deepest harbors in the world, having an area of 125 miles, with an entrance twelve miles wide, defended by the fortified islands Corregidor and Caballos. Passing these fortifications during the night of Saturday, April 30th, Dewey's fleet coolly sailed into the bay and at 5 o'clock Sunday morning, the flagship "Olympia" was five miles from Manila, and as soon as she was discovered, the shore batteries and the long-range guns of the ships opened on the Americans and continued to bombard the fleet for two hours, but without effect. The flagship, followed by

the "Baltimore," the "Raleigh," the "Petrel," the "Concord," and the "Boston," steamed directly for Cavité, and when about three miles from that fortress, opened fire on the "Reina Christina," the flagship of the Spanish Admiral Montojo. Filing past the enemy five times and countermarching in a circle with gradually decreasing range, Dewey practically annihilated the Spanish fleet and fortifications in about two hours. Retiring to give his men a little needed rest and food, he promptly returned to the attack and finished his work.

The Spaniards fought with desperate bravery. When his flagship was destroyed, the Spanish admiral, taking his flag in an open boat, was transferred to the "Isla de Cuba." Cadarso, captain of the vessel, was mortally wounded and, refusing to leave, remained with his men and went down with his ship. Their desperate valor availed nothing, for their tactics and marksmanship were bad, while those of the Americans were superb.

The temporary withdrawal of the American fleet was construed by the Spaniards as a retreat. They could not imagine that a battle could be waged with such enormous loss on one side and so few casualties on the other. The news first cabled to Spain was that the American fleet had been successfully repulsed.

Before a definite account of the action was received in this country, Commodore Dewey had cut the cable to prevent communication with Spain; but a few days later, full reports were received from the despatch boat "McCulloch," by way of Hong Kong.

The two brief messages sent by Dewey form the most concise and comprehensive report that could well be made of an achievement which has never been equalled in daring conception and magnificent execution.

The first message, dated Manila, May 1st, but sent only when the second was forwarded, was as follows:

Squadron arrived at Manila at daybreak this morning. Immediately engaged the enemy and destroyed the following Spanish vessels: "Reina Christina," "Castilla," "Don Antonio," "Isla de Ulloa," "Isla de Luzon," "Isla de Cuba," "General Lezo," "Marquis del Duero," "Correo," "Velasco," "Isla de Mindanao," a transport and a water battery at Cavité. The squadron is uninjured; and only a few men are slightly wounded. Only means of telegraphing is the American consul at Hong Kong. I shall communicate with him.

The second, dated at Cavité, May 4th, completed his record of the action:

I have taken possession of the naval station at Cavité and destroyed its fortifications. Have destroyed fortifications at the bay entrance, paroling the garrison. I control the bay completely, and can take the city at any time. The squadron is in excellent health and spirits. The Spanish loss not fully known, but very heavy; 150 killed, including the captain of the "Reina Christina." I am assisting in protecting the Spanish sick and wounded; 250 sick and wounded in hospital within our lines. Much excitement at Manila. Will protect foreign residents.

Lieutenant L. J. Stickney, a former naval officer who was on the bridge of the "Olympia," as a volunteer aide to Commodore Dewey, in writing of the battle, thus describes the combat after the first fire of the Americans:

The Spaniards seemed encouraged to fire faster, knowing exactly our distance, while we had to guess theirs. Their ships and shore guns were making things hot for us. The piercing scream of shot was varied often by the bursting of time fuse shells, fragments of which would lash the water like shrapnel or cut our hull and rigging. One large shell that was coming straight at the "Olympia's" forward bridge fortunately fell within less than 100 feet. One fragment cut the rigging; another struck the bridge gratings in line with it; a third passed under Commodore Dewey and gouged a hole in the deck. Incidents like these were plentiful.

Our men naturally chafed at being exposed without returning fire from all our guns, but laughed at danger and chatted good-humoredly. A few nervous fellows could not help dodging, mechanically, when shells would burst right over them, or close aboard, or would strike the water, or pass overhead with the peculiar spluttering roar made by a tumbling rifled projectile.

Still the flagship steered for the center of the Spanish line, and, as our other ships were astern, the "Olympia" received most of the Spaniards' attention.

Owing to our deep draught, Commodore Dewey felt constrained to change his course at a distance of 4,000 yards and run parallel to the Spanish column.

'Open with all guns,' he ordered, and the ship brought her port broadside bearing. The roar of all the flagship's five-inch rapid-firers was followed by the deep diapason of her turret eight-inchers. Soon our other vessels were equally hard at work, and we could see that our shells were making Cavité harbor hotter for the Spaniards than they had made the approach for us.

Protected by their shore batteries and made safe from close attack by shallow water, the Spaniards were in a strong position. They put up a gallant fight.

One shot struck the "Baltimore" and passed clean through her, fortunately hitting no one. Another ripped the upper main deck, disabled a six-inch gun, and exploded a box of three-pounder ammunition, wounding eight men. The "Olympia" was struck abreast the gun in the wardroom by a shell, which burst outside, doing little damage. The signal halyards were cut from the officer's hand on the after bridge. A sailor climbed up in the rain of shot and mended the line.

A shell entered the "Boston's" port quarter and burst in Ensign Dodridge's stateroom, starting a hot fire, and fire was also caused by a shell which burst in the port hammock netting. Both these fires were quickly put out. Another shell passed through the "Boston's" foremast just in front of Captain Wildes, on the bridge.

After having made four runs along the Spanish line, finding the chart incorrect, Lieutenant Calkins, the "Olympia's" navigator, told the commodore he believed he could take the ship nearer the enemy, with lead going to watch the depth of water. The flagship started over the course for the fifth time, running within 2,000 yards of the enemy, followed by all the American vessels, and, as even the six-pounder guns were effective at such short range, the storm of shot and shell launched against the Spaniard was destructive beyond description.

Following are the official reports of the captains of the various American warships which took part in the battle of Manila bay, and also an English translation of the report of Admiral Montojo, the Spanish commander-in-chief of the station and squadron of the Philippines:

U. S. FLAGSHIP "OLYMPIA,"

Off MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, *May 3, 1898.*

SIR.—I have the honor to make the following report of this ship's engagement with the enemy on May 1st:

On April 30th we stood down for the entrance to Manila bay. At 9:42 P. M. the crew were called to general quarters (the ship having been previously cleared for action) and remained by their guns, ready to return the fire of the batteries if called upon.

At about 11:30 P. M. we passed through Boca Grande entrance of Manila bay. The lights on Corregidor and Caballo islands and on San Nicolas banks were extinguished.

After this ship had passed in, the battery on the southern shore of entrance opened fire at the ships astern, and the "McCulloch" and the "Boston" returned the fire.

At 4 A. M. of May 1st coffee was served out to officers and men. At day-break sighted shipping at Manila. Shifted course to southward and stood for Cavité. At 5:06 two submarine mines were exploded near, Cavité bearing south-southeast, distant four miles. At 5:15 battery on Shangly Point opened fire, but the shell fell short. Other shells passed over us, ranging seven miles. At 5:41 A. M. we opened fire on Spanish ships with forward eight-inch guns, which were soon followed by the five-inch battery. A rapid fire was kept up until the close of the action.

The range varied from 5,600 to 2,000 yards.

A torpedo boat ran out and headed for this ship, but was finally driven back by our secondary battery. She came out a second time and was again repulsed. This time she had to be beached, as several shots had hit her.

Batteries from Manila fired occasional shots at the ships during the action, but did no damage.

At 6:20 turned to starboard and headed back in front of the Spanish line. The "Olympia" led the column three times to the westward and twice to the eastward in front of the Spanish ships and shore batteries. On one occasion the Spanish flagship "Reina Cristina" was hit by an eight-inch shell from our forward turret and raked fore and aft. At 7:35 ceased firing and stood out into Manila bay.

The men went to breakfast.

Many of the Spanish ships were seen to be on fire, and when we returned at 11:16 to complete the destruction of the Spanish fleet only one, the "Don Antonio de Ulloa," and the shore batteries, returned our fire. The former was sunk and the latter were silenced.

At 12:40 P. M. stood back to Manila bay and anchored.

Besides making the ordinary preparations of clearing ship for action, the heavy sheet chains were faked up and down over a buffer of awnings against the sides in wake of the five-inch ammunition hoists and afforded a staunch protection, while iron and canvas barricades were placed in various places to cover gun's crews and strengthen moderate defenses.

The vessel was struck or slightly hulled as follows:

(1) Plate indented one and one-half inches starboard side of superstructure just forward of second five-inch sponson.

(2) Three planks torn up slightly in wake of forward turret on starboard side of forecastle.

(3) Port after shrouds of fore and main rigging.

(4) Strongback of gig's davits hit and slightly damaged.

(5) Hole in frame of ship between frames 65 and 66 on starboard side below maindeck rail; made by a six-pounder.

(6) Lashing of port whaleboat davit carried away by shot.

(7) One of the rail stanchions carried away outside of port gangway.

(8) Hull of ship indented on starboard side one foot below main-deck rail and three feet abaft No. 4 coal port.

The forward eight-inch guns fired twenty-three shells. The ammunition hoist was temporarily out of commission on account of the blowing of the fuse. The right gun worked well with the electrical batteries. Battery of left gun failed to explode the primer after the first shot; also resistance lamp in dynamo circuit broken. Used percussion primers in this gun with good results after the first shot.

The after turret fired thirteen shells. Had three misfires, with battery of right gun and two with dynamo circuit, as fuses blew out. In renewing fuses they were immediately blown out; so shifted to percussion primers with good results. In left gun one shell jammed, after which used half-full and half-reduced charge, which fired it. Battery of this gun gave good results. One primer failed to check gas.

The smoke from the five-inch battery and from the forward eight-inch guns gave considerable trouble, and in both turrets the object glass of the telescopic sights became covered with a deposit from the powder and had to be wiped off frequently. These are, nevertheless, considered good sights for heavy guns; but it is recommended that bar sights be installed in case of emergency, as there is no provision for sighting other than with the telescopes.

The batteries for the five-inch guns found to be unreliable. Used dynamo circuit on three guns with good results. Ammunition poor. Many shell became detached from the cases on loading and had to be rammed out from the muzzle. Several cases jammed in loading and in extracting. Guns and gun mounts worked well. Fired about 281 five-inch shell.

The six-pounder battery worked to perfection, firing 1,000 rounds. Fired 360 rounds of one-pounder and 1,000 rounds of small-arm ammunition.

From 9:42 P. M. of April 30th till 12:40 P. M., May 1st, two divisions of the engineer's force worked the boilers and engines, keeping up steam and working well, notwithstanding the heat of the fire and engine rooms. The third division worked at their stations in the powder division.

The ship needs no immediate repairs and is in excellent condition to engage the enemy at any time.

There were no casualties nor wounded on this ship.

Where every officer and man did his whole duty there is only room for general praise. Pay Inspector D. A. Smith, Fleet Pay Clerk Wm. J. Rightmire, and Pay Clerk W. M. Long, all volunteered for and performed active

service not required by their stations. Ensign H. H. Caldwell, secretary to the commander-in-chief, volunteered for fighting duty and was assigned to the command of a subdivision of the five-inch battery. Mr. J. L. Stickney, correspondent of the New York Herald (and formerly a naval officer of exceptional ability), served as a volunteer aid to the commander-in-chief and rendered invaluable assistance in carrying messages and in keeping an accurate account of the battle. One six-pounder was manned by a crew of marines, and two relief crews for the five-inch guns and two for the six-pounders acted as sharpshooters under Capt. W. Biddle, U. S. M. C.

The range was obtained by cross bearings from the standard compass and the distance taken from the chart.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

CH. V. GRIDLEY,

Captain U. S. N., Commanding U. S. Flagship "Olympia."

The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, *Asiatic Station.*

U. S. "RALEIGH,"

Off MANILA, LUZON, *May 4, 1898.*

SIR.—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of this vessel of your squadron during the engagement with the Spanish squadron and shore batteries at Cavité, near Manila, on the morning of May 1, 1898:

At about 12:10 A. M. of May 1st, when passing in column, natural order, abreast of El Fraile island, at the entrance to the bay, I observed a flash, as of a signal thereon, and at about 12:15 A. M. a shot was fired from El Fraile, passing, as I think, diagonally between the "Petrel" and this vessel. A shot was fired in return, but without effect, by the starboard after five-inch gun of this vessel.

At 5 A. M., when the squadron was nearly abreast the city of Manila and the flagship was turning to pass down toward Cavité, the Lunetta battery, of apparently heavy guns, at Manila, opened fire and continued so long as the squadron was in action. This vessel shifted position from starboard to port (inside) quarter of the "Baltimore," and held that position until retired at 7:35 A. M. At a few minutes after 5 A. M. this vessel, so soon as the Spanish vessels at Cavité bore on the port bow, opened fire with the six-inch gun, and then with the five-inch guns in succession, as fast as they would bear. The secondary battery guns did not seem to reach the enemy, and their fire was soon stopped and not again used until the distance was considerably lessened. At 11:20 A. M., when signal was made to re-engage, this vessel started ahead full speed (using reserve speed) to keep up with the flagship, but it was found



ADMIRAL DEWEY.



BATTLE OF MANILLA,

to be impossible, and falling behind all the time, I cut across to gain line abreast of Cavité battery just as the flagship passed the "Baltimore" at that port, at which time we opened fire with all guns. At 12, in obedience to signal, this vessel attempted to get into the inner harbor to destroy enemy's vessels, but getting into shoal water—twenty feet—was obliged to withdraw, and so reported. While attempting to get inside, the battery was used, on an enemy's vessel at anchor (supposed to be the "Don Antonio de Ulloa") until she sank. Not being able to find a channel farther inside, and everything in sight having been destroyed, this vessel, at 1:30 P. M., withdrew and later anchored near the flagship. I inclose a statement of the ammunition expended during the engagement.

I am very pleased to report that the officers and crew behaved splendidly. Each and every one seemed anxious to do his whole duty, and, so far as I can learn, did it. Their whole conduct was beyond praise.

This vessel was struck but once, and then by a six-pounder shell, which passed through both sides of the whaleboat (above her water line), and then glanced along the chase of the starboard six-pounder on our poop. The gun was not injured, and the whaleboat but slightly, and she is again ready for service.

I am happy to report that there were no casualties of any kind.

This vessel at the close of the engagement was in as good condition as when it began, and without any preparation could have fought it over again.

In conclusion, permit me to congratulate you upon the very brilliant victory you achieved over a naval force nearly equal to your own and backed by extensive shore batteries of very heavy guns, and this without the loss of a single life. History points to no greater achievement.

Very respectfully,

J. B. COGHLAN,

Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.

Commodore GEORGE DEWEY, U. S. N., *Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, Asiatic Station.*

U. S. S. "CONCORD,"

MANILA, May 2, 1898.

SIR.—In compliance with article 275, United States Navy Regulations, I have to submit the following report of the late action so far as this vessel was concerned:

In obedience to your orders I took position in line. In passing the city a big gun opened on the fleet, to which I replied with two shots. The "Concord" held her position in the line until your order to withdraw from action.

Later in the day I was ordered by you to burn a transport. To arrive at the position of the transport my course lay so as to open the dockyard and vessels therein, at which I took a few shots with the six-inch battery. I succeeded in firing the transport, which is still in flames.

Each and every one of my subordinates did his whole duty with an enthusiasm and zeal beyond all praise. I am particularly indebted to the executive officer, Lieut.-Commander George P. Colvocoresses, for the cool, deliberate, and efficient manner with which he met each phase of the action, and for his hearty co-operation in my plans. Lieut. T. B. Howard, the navigator, proved that, like his father, he was ready to offer his life to his country and flag. The officers of divisions—Lieut. P. W. Hourigan, powder; Lieut. (j. g.) C. M. McCormick, third gun; Ensign L. A. Kaiser, second gun; and Ensign W. C. Davidson, first gun—performed every duty with zeal and alacrity. Ensign O. S. Knepper, in charge of signals, performed the duty as though he were in the daily habit of being under fire. P. A. Paymaster E. D. Ryan volunteered to take charge of the after powder division, and was most useful therein. The steam department, under Chief Engineer G. B. Ransom and P. A. Engineer H. W. Jones, was in a perfect condition, working as though on parade. Pay Clerk F. K. Hunt volunteered to assist the surgeon. The crew, one and all, worked with enthusiasm. I have nothing but praise for each and every man.

I am happy to report that there were no casualties. The "Concord" was not hit.

The following is a list of the ammunition expended: One hundred and fifteen six-inch full charges, 67 six-inch reduced charges, 6 shrapnel, 176 six-inch common shell, 220 six-pounder cartridges, 120 three-pounder cartridges, and 60 one-pounder cartridges.

I inclose a list of the ammunition remaining on board; also the report of the executive officer and of the chief engineer.

Very respectfully,

ASA WALKER,

Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.

The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE, *Asiatic Station.*

U. S. S. "BALTIMORE,"

MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, *May 4, 1898.*

SIR.—I have the honor to make the following report, as required by article 437, Navy Regulations, of the engagement of this ship with the Spanish fleet and shore batteries at Sangley Point, Cavité bay, on the 1st instant.

At early daylight the fleet had reached a point close up to the shipping off the city of Manila, when the signal was made, "Prepare for general action." Spanish batteries near Old Manila opened fire at long range at about the same time. Flagship leading, with port helm, bore down on the right of Spanish line of vessels, formed in a somewhat irregular crescent at anchor, extending from off Sangley Point to the northeast, and in readiness to receive us, their left supported by the batteries on Sangley Point.

Following your lead in close order, our fire commenced with the port battery at about 5:40 A. M., at a distance of about 6,000 yards.

Our column passed down the enemy's line, turning with port helm as their left was reached, engaging them with starboard battery on the return. This maneuver was performed three times at distances from the enemy's ships varying from 2,600 to 5,000 yards, when you signaled to "withdraw from action" at 7:35.

Upon reaching a convenient distance in the bay, you signaled, "Let the people go to breakfast;" and at 8:40, "Commanding officers repair on board the flagship."

While on board the flagship I received an order to intercept a steamer coming up the bay, reported to be flying Spanish colors.

Soon after starting on this duty I discovered the colors of the stranger to be British, and so reported by signal, you having in the meantime made general signal to get under way and follow your motions, this ship being at the time some two miles to the south-southwest of the flagship on her way to intercept the supposed Spanish steamer.

At 10:55 you made general signal, "Designated vessel will lead," with "Baltimore's" distinguishing pennant, and in a few minutes signal to "attack the enemy's batteries or earthworks" and for fleet to "close up;" in obedience to which order this ship led in, with starboard helm, to a position off the Cañaoa and Sangley Point batteries and opened fire with starboard battery at a distance of about 2,800 yards, closing in to 2,200, between which and 2,700 yards our best work was done, slowing the ship dead slow, stopping the engines as range was obtained, delivering a rapid and accurate fire upon the shore batteries and a gunboat just inside of Sangley Point, since proven to have been the "Don Antonio de Ulloa," practically silencing the batteries in

question before the fire of another ship became effective, owing to the lead we had obtained in our start for the supposed Spanish steamer.

The fire of ships and batteries having been silenced and the white flag displayed on the arsenal buildings at Cavité, you signaled, at 1:20, to "prepare to anchor," and at 1:30, "Anchor at discretion."

The victory was complete.

The wind was light and variable during the first engagement and from the northeast; force, 2 to 3 during the second.

The firing devices gave considerable trouble, extractors, sear springs, and firing pins bending and breaking, and wedge blocks jamming. Electric firing attachments gave trouble by the grease and dirt incident to firing insulating the connections, so much so that shortly after the engagement commenced they were abandoned for percussion, but coolness and steadiness replaced defective parts in the shortest possible time.

The ammunition supply was ample, and the test was conclusive so long as electric hoists are uninjured.

The behavior of officers and men was beyond all praise. The accuracy and rapidity of their fire you were an eye-witness of. The steadiness and cool bearing of all on board who came under my observation was that of veterans.

The fact that the ship was so rarely hit gave few opportunities for conspicuous acts of heroism or daring, but the enthusiasm and cool steadiness of the men gave promise that they would have been equal to any emergency.

I shall report later such detail of individual merit as has been mentioned by officers of divisions or that came under my own observation.

I inclose (a) report of executive officer; (b) surgeon's report of casualties; (c) carpenter's report of damages; (d) report of ammunition expended.

Very respectfully,

N. M. DYER,

Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.

The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE, *Asiatic Station.*

U. S. S. "PETREL,"

MANILA BAY, *May 4, 1898.*

SIR.—I respectfully report as follows concerning my share in the action fought by the fleet under your command in Manila bay, off Cavité, on the morning of May 1, 1898:

The ship had been partly cleared for action at Hong Kong and on the run to Manila. Went to quarters for action at 9:45 P. M. of April 30th, and all

preparations were completed. Hammocks were not piped down, but men were allowed to sleep at their guns.

The position of "Petrel" was fourth from head of column, astern of "Raleigh" and ahead of "Concord." We passed in through Boco Grande, about one mile from El Fraile. All lights were masked and only stern lights showing. At 11:10 a rocket and light were shown from Corregidor Island and just as the "Raleigh" and "Petrel" came abreast El Fraile three shots were fired from a shore battery on the rock, these being promptly replied to by the "Raleigh," "Concord" and "Boston." We steamed slowly up the bay, and just as day was breaking, about 5 o'clock, the shore batteries below Manila began firing. It was scarcely light enough to distinguish vessels from this vessel when flagship made signal to "prepare for action," so signal was repeated from the "Baltimore." During time column was forming and closing up, the batteries from below Manila were firing. As flagship stood to southward the ships and batteries at Cavité began their firing, and gradually, as we approached, we could make out ships under way in harbor and three guns on shore firing. The battery of this vessel began firing at 5:22 by the deck clock at a range of 5,000 yards.

The column circled three times from east to west in front of shore, standing in a little nearer each time, the first time being 3,000 yards and the third time 1,800 yards. During these three rounds this vessel expended 92 six-inch common shells, 82 six-inch full charges, 10 reduced charges, and 253 three-pounders. Several times during rounds had to cease firing on account of smoke and in order to economize ammunition. The greater part of our great-gun fire was at the "Reina Cristina" and "Castilla," the former steaming around the harbor and the latter anchored about 500 yards off Sangley Point; but the other and smaller vessels were fired at when opportunity offered. Especially was the fire of the rapid-fire guns aimed at a yellow launch, which was apparently a torpedo boat trying to turn our flank. The navigator, Lieutenant B. A. Fiske, was stationed in the top with a stadiometer to determine the distance and report upon the efficiency of the fire.

At 7:30 we ceased firing and withdrew from action in obedience to a signal from flagship to fleet to that effect. The men were given their breakfast. While withdrawing, the enemy continued firing until we were well out of range, and the batteries below Manila were firing at intervals during breakfast. At 11, when the signal was made to get under way, the "Petrel" followed the "Olympia" and stood well in. While steaming across the fire the signal was hoisted for the "Petrel" to pass inside.

This vessel left her station, passed outside of "Baltimore," and rounded Sangley Point about 500 yards outside of where "Castilla" was burning.

The fire was then directed at the "Don Antonio de Ulloa," and when it was found that she was sinking and deserted, the ship passed farther inside and opened fire upon the ships behind inner breakwater and whose masts were seen above government buildings. During the firing on the "Ulloa" a white flag with a Geneva cross was discovered in range with her, and I stood in further so as to get it out of range. After the first two or three shots fired through the public building at ships behind the mole, the Spanish flag was, at 12:30 P. M., hauled down and a white flag run up. The surrender was immediately signaled to fleet and firing ceased.

In obedience to a signal from flagship to destroy all shipping in the harbor, Lieutenant Hughes was sent with a whaleboat's crew of seven men, this whaleboat being the only one on the ship which would float, and set fire to the "Don Juan de Austria," "Isla de Cuba," "Isla de Luzon," "General Lezo" and "Marques del Duero." Afterward Ensign Fermier was sent to set fire to the "Velasco" and "El Correo." The "Isla de Cuba," "Isla de Luzon" and "Don Juan de Austria" were aground and full of water when they were fired. Their outboard valves were opened and the ships allowed to fill. The breech plugs of four-inch guns had been taken off and could not be found. During the night the magazines of the "Don Juan de Austria" blew up. The "Manila" was not burned because the Spanish officers begged that she be not destroyed because she was unarmed and a coast-survey vessel. Lieutenant Fiske and Passed Assistant Engineer Hall raised steam on the ship this morning, the 4th instant, and brought her out. At the time she was aground. The "Don Antonio de Ulloa" was sunk and the "Reina Cristina" and "Castilla" were burning in outer harbor.

Lieutenant Fiske was sent ashore and brought off two tugboats, the "Rapido" and "Hercules," and three steam launches.

I was anchored in Cavité harbor from 12:50 to 5:20 P. M., when I got under way and returned to the fleet.

There were no casualties or accidents of any kind, the ship having been struck only once just beneath hawse pipe by a piece of shell which burst just as it sank, and threw a column of water over the forecastle.

After the white flag was displayed, there was apparently the greatest confusion in the arsenal. Parts of the crews of the various ships were there, and all were armed and were constantly falling in and moving about; yet there was no evidence of any desire to continue the fighting, and instead of any resistance being offered to the destruction of the ships, they were rather inclined to assist with their advice and evinced a desire to surrender to the first officer they met.

The action of ammunition was exceedingly good. There was expended

during action, 113 six-inch common shells, 3 six inch armor-piercing shells, 82 six-inch full charges, 34 six-inch reduced charges, and 313 three-pounder ammunition. Owing to the heat due to firing, the pads swelled and made it very difficult to lock the breech plug. Nothing would remedy this save shifting plugs, replacing hot plug by the one from the other gun which was cool. The wedge of firing lock jammed frequently, due to hot parts. This was remedied by shifting locks.

The percussion primers worked very unsatisfactorily; sometimes four primers would be expended before one would act. Primers leaked badly, causing excessive deposit in primer seat, hard extraction, and delay in priming of gun and requiring frequent boring of vent.

The action of no one can be censured, the conduct of each and every officer and man being excellent. There was no confusion; I should say less than at ordinary target practice.

The loading was rapidly done and the firing was deliberate. Due to your caution to commanding officers that no ammunition should be wasted, Lieutenant Plunkett fired the forward six-inch guns and Ensign Fermier the after ones, and the work was thoroughly done. Lieutenant Hughes stationed himself on the poop, as it was deemed essential that he should not be with the commanding officer on the bridge. He materially assisted Ensign Fermier by observing fall of shot and tendering advice regarding pointing. I wish particularly to call to your attention Lieutenant Hughes, his gallantry in taking a boat's crew of seven men and in the face of a large armed force on shore setting fire to the five ships before mentioned. He was aware that he had the only boat in the ship which would float, until the steam whaleboat could be prepared.

Lieutenant Fiske stationed himself on the fore cross trees with stadimeter to measure the range and report on the fall of shots. He also took charge of the steam whaleboat to cover Lieutenant Hughes in his operations in burning the ships.

Lieutenant Wood had charge of the powder division, assisted in the after part by Assistant Paymaster Siebels. There was at no time a halt in the firing due to failure of the powder division.

Ensign Montgomery was in charge of the signals, and materially assisted me on the bridge. He also directed the fire of the forward three-pounder when it was allowed to be fired. He also afforded assistance to Lieutenant Plunkett by observing the fall of shots from the forward six-inch guns.

I desire also to mention the efficient service of the engines. In order to maintain our position and to take advantage of every opportunity, the engine telegraph was in constant use from full speed to stop, and the engine never

failed to respond in the quickest time possible. This I consider to be due to the high state of efficiency of that department, and the whole credit is due to Passed Assistant Engineer Hall.

I can make no statement regarding the services of Passed Assistant Surgeon Brownell, as the "Petrel" was most fortunate in having no casualties.

I inclose the report of the executive officer.

Very respectfully,

E. P. WOOD,

Commander, U. S. N., Commanding.

The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE, *Asiatic Station.*

U. S. S. "BOSTON," 2D RATE,

PORT CAVITE, MANILA BAY, *May 3, 1898.*

SIR.—I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by this vessel in the late action with the Spanish fleet on the morning of May 1st.

At daylight the merchant ships off Manila were seen, and soon after the Spanish fleet, close into Cavité. This vessel was the sixth in the column and brought up the rear. Several shots were fired by the batteries in Manila, and two shots were given in reply. At 5:35 A. M. action with the enemy commenced and was continued at varying distances, steaming in a circle until 7:35 A. M., firing with a fair degree of deliberation and accuracy. At times the smoke was dense, interfering very materially with maneuvering and firing.

The Spanish fleet and shore batteries replied vigorously, and an attempt was made with an improvised torpedo boat, but our fire was overpowering and the enemy received heavy damage and loss.

In obedience to signal I withdrew from action at 7:35 and gave the crew breakfast and rest.

At 11:10 the action was renewed and continued until the enemy ceased firing and his ships were all burned, sunk or withdrawn behind the arsenal of Cavité.

This vessel was struck four times by enemy's shot, doing no material damage. Our own fire destroyed three of our own boats and badly damaged three others.

No casualties occurred.

The conduct of officers and men on this trying occasion was of the very highest quality, and they bore themselves with courage and spirit and entirely

to my satisfaction. It also gives me pleasure to bear witness to the courage and resolution of the Spanish fleet and to say that they defended themselves creditably.

Very respectfully,

FRANK WILDES,
Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.

The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF COMMANDING U. S. NAVAL FORCE, *Asiatic Station.*

CONSULATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
BAY OF MANILA, PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, *May 4, 1898.*

SIR.—I have the honor to briefly report to you concerning the battle of Manila Bay, fought on May 1, 1898.

Heeding your mandate, and by repeated request of Commodore George Dewey, of the United States Asiatic Squadron, I left Manila on Saturday, April 23d, and on Wednesday, April 27th, at about 1 o'clock, P. M., boarded the flagship "Olympia," in Mirs Bay, in Hong Kong. After meeting the Commodore and his captains and commanders in council, the Commodore at once ordered his fleet to start at 2 P. M. for Manila Bay.

On Saturday, April 30th, Subig Bay was reconnoitered because of reported hiding of Spanish fleet in its inner harbor, but no fleet being there found, the Commodore proceeded at once to the south channel entrance to Manila Bay, and while by many reports mines, torpedoes and land defenses obstructed entrance, yet the flagship led the van, and between 10 P. M., April 30th, and 2 A. M., May 1st, our fleet of six war ships, one dispatch boat and two coal-laden transports passed all channel dangers unharmed, despite shots from forts, and at 2 A. M. were all safe on the broad expanse of Manila Bay.

After my departure, April 23d, and by drawing fire, to save Manila if possible, all Spanish war ships went to their strongly fortified naval station at Cavité, where the inner harbor gave refuge, and where potential support could be had from several forts and well-equipped batteries, which extended several miles right and left from Port Cavité.

At about 5:30 A. M., Sunday, May 1st, the Spanish guns opened fire at both the Manila breakwater battery and at Cavité, from fleet and forts.

With magnificent coolness and order, but with the greatest promptness, our fleet, in battle array, headed by the flagship, answered the Spanish attack, and for about two and a half hours a most terrific fire ensued.

The method of our operations could not have shown greater system, our guns greater effectiveness, or our officers and crews greater bravery; and while Spanish resistance was stubborn and the bravery of Spanish forces such as to challenge admiration, yet they were outclassed, weighed in the balance of war against the methods, training, aim and bravery shown on our decks, and after less than three hours' perilous and intense combat one of Spain's war ships was sinking, two others were burning, and all others, with land defenses, had severely suffered, when our squadron, with no harm done its ships, retired for breakfast.

At about 10 o'clock, A. M., Commodore Dewey renewed the battle, and with effects most fatal with each evolution.

No better evidence of Spanish bravery need be sought than that, after the castigation of our first engagement, her ships and forts should again answer our fire. But Spanish efforts were futile. Ship after ship and battery after battery went to destruction before the onslaught of American energy and training, and an hour and a half of our second engagement wrought the annihilation of the Spanish fleet and forts, with several hundred Spaniards killed and wounded and millions in value of their Government's property destroyed. While amazing, almost unbelievable, as it seems, not a ship or gun of our fleet had been disabled, and, except on the "Baltimore," not a man had been hurt.

One of the crew of the "Baltimore" had a leg fractured by slipping and another hurt in the ankle in a similar manner, while four received slight flesh wounds from splinters thrown by a six-inch projectile, which pierced the starboard side of the cruiser.

But in the battle of Manila Bay the United States squadron of six war ships totally destroyed the Spanish fleet of eight war ships, many forts and batteries, and accomplished this work without the loss of a man!

History has only contrasts. There is no couplet to form a comparison. The only finish fight between the modern war ships of civilized nations has proven the prowess of American naval men and methods, and the glory is a legacy for the whole people. Our crews are all hoarse from cheering, and while we suffer for cough drops and throat doctors, we have no use for liniment or surgeons.

To every ship, officer and crew, all praise be given. As Victoria was answered years ago, "Your Majesty, there is no second," so may I report to your department as to our war ships conquering the Spanish fleet in the battle of Manila Bay — there is no first — "there is no second." The cool bravery and efficiency of the Commodore was echoed by every captain and commander and down through the lines by every officer and man, and naval history of the

dawning century will be rich if it furnishes to the world so glorious a display of intelligent command and successful service as must be placed to the credit of the United States Asiatic Squadron under date of May 1, 1898.

It was my lot to stand on the bridge of the "Baltimore" by the side of Captain Dyer during the first engagement, and to be called to the flagship "Olympia" by the Commodore, at whose side, on the bridge, I stood during the second engagement, and when the clouds roll by and I have again a settled habitation, it will be my honor and pleasure to transmit a report showing service somewhat in detail and for which commanders promise data.

Meanwhile our Commodore will officially inform you of events which will rival in American history the exploits of Paul Jones.

I have the honor to be, sir, your most obedient servant,

OSCAR F. WILLIAMS,

U. S. Consul, Manila, Philippine Islands.

(Not acting.)

Hon. JUDGE DAY, *Assistant Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.*

SPANISH OFFICIAL REPORT.

DEPARTURE FOR SUBIC.

On the 25th of April, at 11 P. M., says Señor Montojo, I left the bay of Manila for Subic with a squadron composed of the cruisers "Reina Cristina," "Don Juan de Austria," "Isla de Cuba," "Isla de Luzon," dispatch boat "Marques del Duero," and the wooden cruiser "Castilla." This last could merely be considered as a floating battery, incapable of maneuvering, on account of the bad condition of her hull. The following morning, being at Subic, I had a conference with Captain Del Rio, who, though he did not relieve my anxiety respecting the completion of the defensive works, assured me that they would soon be finished.

In the meanwhile the cruiser "Castilla," even on this short cruise, was making much water through the bearings of the propeller and the opening astern. They worked day and night to stop these leaks with cement, finally making the vessel nearly water-tight, but absolutely impossible to use her engines.

On the morning of the 27th I sailed with the vessels to cover the entrance to the port of Subic. The "Castilla" was taken to the northeast point of

the island of Grande to defend the western entrance, since the eastern entrance had already been closed with the hulls of the "San Quintin" and two old merchant vessels which were sunk there.

With much disgust, I found that the guns which should have been mounted on that island were delayed a month and a half. This surprised me, as the shore batteries that the navy had installed (with very little difficulty) at the entrance of the bay of Manila, under the intelligent direction of colonel of naval artillery, Señor Garces, and Lieutenant Beneavente, were ready to fight twenty-four days after the commencement of the work.

I was also no less disgusted that they confided in the efficacy of the few torpedoes which they had found feasible to put there.

The entrance was not defended by torpedoes nor by the batteries of the island, so that the squadron would have had to bear the attack of the Americans with its own resources, in forty meters of water and with little security. Our vessels could not only be destroyed, but they could not save their crews. I still held a hope that the Americans would not go to Subic, and give us time for more preparations, but the following day I received from the Spanish consul at Hong Kong a telegram which said: "Enemy's squadron sailed at 2 P. M. for the bay of Mirs, and according to reliable accounts they sailed for Subic to destroy our squadron, and then will go to Manila."

This telegram demonstrated that the enemy knew where they could find my squadron and that the port of Subic had no defenses.

The same day, the 28th of April, I convened a council of the captains, and all, with the exception of Del Rio, chief of the new arsenal, thought that the situation was insupportable and that we should go to the bay of Manila in order to accept there the battle under less unfavorable conditions.

THE RETURN TO MANILA.

I refused to have our ships near the city of Manila, because, far from defending it, this would provoke the enemy to bombard the plaza, which doubtless would have been demolished on account of its few defenses. It was unanimously decided that we should take position in the bay of Canacao, in the least water possible, in order to combine our fire with that of the batteries of Point Sangley and Ulloa.

I immediately ordered Del Rio to concentrate his forces in the most strategic point of the arsenal, taking every disposition to burn the coal and stores before allowing them to fall into the power of the enemy. I sent the "Don Juan de Austria" to Manila to get a large number of lighters filled with sand to defend the water line of the "Castilla" (which could not move) against the

enemy's shells and torpedoes. At 10 A. M. on the 29th I left Subic with the vessels of my squadron, towing the "Castilla" by the transport "Manila."

In the afternoon of the same day we anchored in the Gulf of Canacao in eight meters of water. On the following morning we anchored in line of battle, the "Cristina," "Castilla," "Don Juan de Austria," "Don Juan de Ullo," "Luzon," "Cuba" and "Marques del Duero," while the transport "Manila" was sent to the Roads of Bacoor, where the "Velasco" and "Lezo" were undergoing repairs.

At 7 P. M. I received a telegram from Subic announcing that the enemy's squadron had entered the port at 3, reconnoitering, doubtless seeking our ships, and from there they sailed with course for Manila.

The mail steamer "Isla Mindanao" arrived in the bay. I advised her captain to save his vessel by going to Singapore, as the enemy could not get into the entrance probably before midnight, as he was not authorized from the trans-Atlantic he did not do so, and then I told him that he could anchor in shallow water as near as possible to Bacoor.

At midnight gun fire was heard off Corregidor, and at 2 on the morning of the 1st of May I received telegraphic advices that the American vessels were throwing their search lights at the batteries of the entrance, with which they had exchanged several shots. I notified the commanding general of the arsenal, Señor Sostoa, and the general-governor of the plaza, Capt. Señor Garcia Pana, that they should prepare themselves. I directed all the artillery to be loaded, and all the sailors and soldiers to go to their stations for battle, soon to receive the enemy.

This is all that occurred since I sailed to Subic until the entrance of the American squadron in the bay of Manila.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE ENEMY.

The squadron being disposed for action, adds Señor Montojo, fires spread, and everything in proper place, we waited for the enemy's arrival.

All the vessels, having been painted dark-grey color, had taken down their masts and yards and boats to avoid the effects of projectiles and the splinters, had their anchors buoyed and cables ready to slip instantly.

At 4 A. M. I made signal to prepare for action, and at 4:45 the "Austria" signaled the enemy's squadron, a few minutes after which they were recognized, with some confusion, in a column parallel with ours, at about 6,000 meters distant; the flagship "Olympia" ahead, followed by the "Baltimore," "Raleigh," "Boston," "Concord," "Helena," "Petrel" and "McCulloch," and the two transports "Zafiro" and "Nanshan."

The force of these vessels, excepting transports that were noncombatant, amounted to 21,410 tons, 49,290 horse-power, 163 guns (many of which were rapid-fire), 1,750 men in their crews, and of an average velocity of about seventeen miles. The power of our only five effective ships for battle was represented by 10,111 tons, 11,200 horse-power, seventy-six guns (very short of rapid-fire), 1,875 crew, and a maximum speed of twelve miles.

THE FIRE FROM SHORE.

At 5 the batteries on Point Sangley opened fire. The two first shots fell short and to the left of the leading vessel. These shots were not answered by the enemy, whose principal object was the squadron.

This battery only had two Ordonez guns of fifteen centimeters mounted, and but one of these could fire in the direction of the opposing fleet.

In a few minutes one of the batteries of Manila opened fire, and at 5:15 I made signal that our squadron open fire. The enemy answered immediately. The battle became general. We slipped the springs and the cables and started ahead with the engines, so as not to be involved by the enemy.

THE BATTLE.

The Americans fired most rapidly. There came upon us numberless projectiles, as the three cruisers at the head of the line devoted themselves almost entirely to fight the "Cristina," my flagship. A short time after the action commenced one shell exploded in the forecastle and put out of action all those who served the four rapid-fire cannon, making splinters of the forward mast, which wounded the helmsman on the bridge, when Lieutenant Jose Nunez took the wheel with a coolness worthy of the greatest commendation, steering until the end of the fight. In the meanwhile another shell exploded in the orlop, setting fire to the crews' bags, which they were fortunately able to control.

The enemy shortened the distance between us, and, rectifying his aim, covered us with a rain of rapid-fire projectiles. At 7:30 one shell destroyed completely the steering gear. I ordered to steer by hand while the rudder was out of action. In the meanwhile another shell exploded on the poop and put out of action nine men. Another destroyed the mizzen masthead, bringing down the flag and my ensign, which was replaced immediately. A fresh shell exploded in the officers' cabin, covering the hospital with blood, destroying the wounded who were being treated there. Another exploded in the ammunition room astern, filling the quarters with smoke and preventing the working of the hand steering gear. As it was impossible to control the

fire, I had to flood the magazine when the cartridges were beginning to explode.

Amidships several shells of smaller calibre went through the smokestack and one of the large ones penetrated the fire room, putting out of action one master gunner and twelve men serving the guns. Another rendered useless the starboard bow gun; while the fire astern increased, fire was started forward by another shell, which went through the hull and exploded on the deck.

The broadside guns, being undamaged, continued firing until there were only one gunner and one seaman remaining unhurt for firing them, as the guns' crews had been frequently called upon to substitute those charged with steering, all of whom were out of action.

THE DESTRUCTION OF OUR SHIPS.

The ship being out of control, the hull, smoke pipe and mast riddled with shot or confused with the cries of the wounded; half of her crew out of action, among whom were seven officers, I gave the order to sink and abandon the ship before the magazines should explode, making signal at the same time to the "Cuba" and "Luzon" to assist in saving the rest of the crew, which they did, aided by others from the "Duero" and the arsenal.

I abandoned the "Cristina," directing beforehand to secure her flag, and accompanied by my staff, and with great sorrow, I hoisted my flag on the cruiser "Isla de Cuba."

After having saved many men from the unfortunate vessel, one shell destroyed her heroic commander, Don Luis Cadarso, who was directing the rescue.

The "Ulloa," which also defended herself firmly, using the only two guns which were available, was sunk by a shell which entered the water line, putting out of action her commander and half of her remaining crew, those which were left only remaining for the service of the two guns stated.

The "Castilla," which fought heroically, remained with her artillery useless, except one stern gun, with which they fought spiritedly, was riddled with shot and set on fire by the enemy's shells, then sunk, and was abandoned by her crew in good order, which was directed by her commander, Don Alonzo Algado. The casualties on this ship were 23 killed and 80 wounded.

The "Austria," very much damaged and on fire, went to the aid of the "Castilla." The "Luzon" had three guns dismounted, and was slightly damaged in the hull. The "Duero" remained with one of her engines useless, the bow gun of twelve centimeters and one of the redoubts.

At 8 o'clock in the morning, the enemy's squadron having suspended its

fire, I ordered the ships that remained to us to take positions in the bottom of the Roads at Bacoor, and there to resist to the last moment, and that they should be sunk before they surrendered.

THE SINKING.

At 10:30 the enemy returned, forming a circle to destroy the arsenal and the ships which remained to me, opening upon them a horrible fire, which we answered as far as we could with the few cannon which we still had mounted.

There remained the last recourse to sink our vessels, and we accomplished this operation, taking care to save the flag, the distinguishing pennant, the money in the safe, the portable arms, the breech plugs of the guns and the signal codes.

After which I went with my staff to the Convent of Santo Domingo de Cavité, to be cured of a wound received in the left leg, and to telegraph a brief report of the action, with preliminaries and results.

THE JUDGMENT OF THE ADMIRAL.

It remains only to say that all the chiefs, officers, engineers, quartermasters, gunners, sailors and soldiers rivaled one another in sustaining with honor the good name of the navy on this sad day.

The inefficiency of the vessels which composed my little squadron, the lack of all classes of the personnel, especially master gunners and seamen gunners; the inaptitude of some of the provisional machinists, the scarcity of rapid-fire cannon, the strong crews of the enemy, and the unprotected character of the greater part of our vessels all contributed to make more decided the sacrifice which we made for our country, and to prevent the possibility of the horrors of the bombardment of the city of Manila, with the conviction that with the scarcity of our force against the superior enemy we were going to certain death and could expect a loss of all our ships.


Our casualties, including those of the arsenal, amounted to 381 men killed and wounded.

OFFICE OF THE STAFF OF THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE
STATION AND SQUADRON OF THE PHILIPPINES,

MANILA, *April 24, 1898.*

It having been resolved to go out with the squadron for the port of Subic, not only for the defense of that important port but also as a strategic harbor

AFTER
THE
ACTION



DEWEY GRIDLEY LAMBERTON



BIRDSEYE VIEW OF MANILA AND ENVIRONS.

L.A. SHARER

for operations which may occur, the staff is placed in charge of the necessary orders from these headquarters.

As commandant of the Cavité arsenal I have nothing to say to your excellency concerning its defense, as the chief commander and officers will know how to defend the interests of the nation, trusting the valor, zeal and intelligence of all those who, with the slight and feeble resources upon which we can count, will do everthing possible to guard the honor of the flag and the navy.

Go on, sir, in the ordering and equipping as much as you think necessary for the common purposes which concern our interests.

You will use the telegraph to report to me all that you think important for your affairs in all departments, as well as the cable to communicate with the Government.

As long as possible communicate by way of Paranaque and Malate, and also with the batteries of the coast by signals as well as by boats.

If you need merchant vessels to equip with torpedo tubes, which may be effective in such vessels, you will also equip them, etc.

MONTOJO.

The COMMANDANT OF THE CAVITE ARSENAL.

April 25. — Copy.

SIGUILLY,

Secretary.

Commodore Dewey had already reported that it would be useless for him to capture Manila without sufficient land forces to occupy the place, and preparations were being made to send troops to the Philippines to co-operate with the squadron; but three weeks elapsed after his victory, before the first troops were embarked. Major-General Wesley Merritt, United States Army, was appointed military governor of the Philippines. A force of 158 officers and 3,428 men sailed to Dewey's assistance, May 25th. Others followed soon after, and General Merritt went out himself on June 27th. It was a strange and unlooked-for circumstance that the war declared for the purpose of assisting the starving Cubans should have commenced in the far East. The continuation of the Manila campaign, and its far-reaching results, belong to the historians of the future. The immediate results of Dewey's victory were to cripple the Spanish Navy so seriously as to make our Pacific coast reasonably secure against attacks from that source; while it established, or rather maintained, the prestige of the American Navy and showed the superb training of our officers and

seamen. Meanwhile the naval officers on this side of the world had their hands full.

At the opening of hostilities, the Atlantic fleet, then cruising at Key West, under the command of Admiral Sampson, was ordered to blockade Havana, and to keep the coast of Cuba, as near as possible, in a state of blockade. Admiral Sampson's squadron at first consisted of three battle ships, two armored cruisers, four double-turreted monitors, ten torpedo boats and more than eighty cruisers, tugs, colliers, gunboats, auxiliary transports, scouts, supply, hospital, refrigerator, repair, and other boats. It was later reinforced by the Flying Squadron under Schley.

After the Flying Squadron was merged into Sampson's, another squadron called the Eastern was organized under Commodore J. C. Watson, with a view to a possible European cruise. It consisted of the cruiser "Newark," auxiliaries "Yankee," "Yosemite," and "Dixie," collier "Abaranda," and after July 5th, the "Oregon" and "Iowa;" these vessels did good service in assisting the transportation of troops, and the naval operations in the West Indies.

The enterprise intrusted to Sampson was of vast importance, his squadron being required to blockade nearly 2,000 miles of coast. Communication between the principal cities of Havana depended in the main upon transportation by sea, on account of the limited railroad facilities in the island.

April 29th, Admiral Cervera sailed from the Cape Verde islands with the warships "Maria Teresa," "Almirante Oquendo," "Vizcaya," "Cristobal Colon," and the torpedo-boat destroyers "Terror," "Furore," and "Pluton." The course taken by this fleet was very uncertain, and there were various suggestions as to the intentions of Admiral Cervera. There was great reason to suppose that he would stop at Porto Rico and coal his vessels before sailing to Cuba. It was also supposed that he might go to Martinique, as at that time there was a suspicion of friendship for Spain among the French, and it was feared that the Spanish fleet might be permitted to coal at that island. There was also great fear that Cervera's squadron might attempt to intercept the "Oregon," which was on the way from the Pacific coast to the West Indies.

The sailing of this gallant vessel from San Francisco to Key West, was one of the most extraordinary feats recorded during the war. Leaving San Francisco on hurried orders, she steamed down the Chilean coast, around the Horn, and proceeded up the Atlantic coast

into the harbor of Buenos Ayres, which was reported to be mined against her entrance. Without any encounter, she sailed out again and reached Key West safely, a voyage of over 14,000 miles in less than six weeks, through waters in which the enemy's cruisers were supposed to be swarming.

Four converted Atlantic liners, the "Harvard," "Yale," "St. Louis," and "St. Paul," besides the fast commerce destroyers "Columbia" and "Minneapolis," did magnificent service as scouts; these vessels were constantly on the lookout to catch a glimpse of the Spanish fleet, but it was very difficult for them to obtain any reliable information. As the indications seemed to point out that Cervera would stop at San Juan, Porto Rico, Admiral Sampson determined to attack that port.

On the 4th of May, having provided for the blockade of Havana, he left Nicholas Channel with the battle ships "New York," "Iowa," and "Indiana;" the monitors "Amphitrite" and "Terror;" the lighter vessels "Detroit" and "Montgomery," and the torpedo boat "Porter," and steamed for San Juan, being much delayed on the way by the slowness of the monitors. He reached San Juan on the 12th of May and bombarded that place to reduce the means of defense should the Spanish ships arrive. His loss was one man killed and four wounded on board the "New York," three wounded on the "Iowa," and one death from heat on the "Amphitrite," the other ships escaping without casualties.

U. S. FLAGSHIP "NEW YORK," 1ST RATE.

KEY WEST, FLA., May 18, 1898,

SIR.—Supplementary to my telegram No. 73, of the 12th instant, I have the honor to submit the following report, more in detail, of the attack on the defenses of Porto Rico, made by a portion of this squadron on the 12th instant

Upon approaching San Juan it was seen that none of the Spanish vessels were in the harbor. I was, therefore, considerably in doubt whether they had reached San Juan and again departed for some unknown destination, or whether they had not arrived. As their capture was the object of the expedition, and as it was essential that they should not pass to the westward, I determined to attack the batteries defending the port, in order to develop their positions and strength, and then, without waiting to reduce the city or subject it to a regular bombardment—which would require due notice—turn to the westward.

Our progress had been so much slower than I had reason to anticipate, from Key West to Porto Rico, owing to the frequent breakdowns of the two monitors, which made it necessary to tow them both the whole distance, and also to the disabled condition of the "Indiana," that eight days had been consumed instead of five, as I had estimated.

I commenced the attack as soon as it was good daylight. This lasted about three hours, when the signal was made to discontinue the firing, and the squadron stood to the northeast until out of sight of San Juan, when the course was laid for the westward, with the view of communicating with the Department at Port Plata and learn if the Department had obtained information as to the movements of the Spanish vessels.

At Cape Haytien I received word from the Department that the Spanish vessels had been sighted off Curaçao on the 14th instant and directed me to return with all dispatch to Key West.

As stated in my telegram, no serious injury was done any of the ships, and only one man was killed and seven wounded slightly.

The following notes were taken during the attack:

Weather, fair; very light breeze; long swell from northward and westward.
3:30.— Breakfast.

4.— Call "All hands" complete clearing for action. Squadron standing in for San Juan, the lights of the town being plainly visible, "Detroit" leading; "Wompatuck" on starboard bow to anchor boat for turning stake as provided in my "Order of battle"—second plan of action; the other ships in column as follows: "Iowa," "Indiana," "New York," "Amphitrite," "Terror," and "Montgomery." Speed, four knots.

4:58.— "Detroit" inshore, standing across harbor entrance. In this passage across the front of the harbor, and very close to the town, the "Detroit" received no fire at all. No Spanish flag was flying on the Morro or elsewhere. No Spanish vessels could be seen in the harbor. There was one merchant steamer in the inner harbor.

5.— Sounded "General quarters."

5:16.— "Iowa" began firing on the Morro with forward six-pounder, and then with all starboard battery. Smoke hanging over the ship made firing slow.

5:24.— First return shot from the shore batteries.

5:30.— "Iowa" turned from the batteries, circling to the westward.

5:59.— Made signal, "Form column."

6:09.— Made telegraphic signal, "Use only large guns." The smoke from the smaller guns had been interfering with the fire of the heavier guns. The column was headed in for the batteries in the same line of attack as in the first round.

6:15.—“Detroit” seen standing away from Morro, with the “Montgomery” not far off her port beam. From the time when the shore batteries began firing (5:24) until this time (6:15) the “Detroit” had been lying close inshore, between the line followed by the squadron and the Morro, and she had been subjected to what seemed a concentrated fire of all the shore batteries for all this time, she in the meanwhile pouring in broadsides from her own rapid-fire battery.

6:30.—Made signal to “Detroit” and “Montgomery” not to follow battle ships. By this time all the shore batteries had been developed, and they were more numerous than the information received had led me to suspect.

6:35.—“Iowa” began firing at Morro on the second round; range, 1,500 yards.

6:40.—“Iowa” ceased firing. Almost calm; smoke hanging over the shore fortifications, pretty effectually screening them.

7:12.—“Amphitrite” signaled, “After turret disabled for to-day.”

7:16.—“Iowa” began firing on the third round.

7:38.—Signaled to “Detroit” and “Montgomery,” “Report casualties.” Received replies as follows: “Detroit,” “o;” “Montgomery,” “o.”

7:45.—“Iowa” sounded, “Secure.”

7:45.—Made signal, “Form column, course northwest,” and hauled down the signal at 8:01.

8:12.—Made signal, “Report casualties.”

8:15.—The “Terror,” which had been lying close inshore engaged with the fortifications, ceased firing.

8:47.—“New York” reports “1 killed, 4 wounded.” All other ships reported no casualties, except the “Amphitrite,” which reported the death of one gunner’s mate from the effects of heat.

I inclose copies of the reports of the commanding officers on the incidents of the bombardment, including ammunition expended, and behavior of the guns and ordnance material. etc.

Very respectfully,

W. T. SAMPSON,

Rear Admiral, U. S. Navy,

Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

The SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, *Navy Department, Washington, D. C.*

Meanwhile, other vessels of Sampson’s squadron were busily engaged cutting the cable around the coast of Cuba. On May 11th, the “Marblehead” and “Nashville” cut two cables at Cienfuegos

under a galling fire, which resulted in a loss to the Americans of one killed and eleven wounded. Several hundred of the Spanish soldiers defending the coast at this place, were reported killed. On the same day a fatal encounter took place at Cardenas where the "Winslow" was disabled and almost destroyed by fire from the forts, with a loss of five killed and three wounded. Among the lost was Ensign Worth Bagley, the first officer killed during the war.

CONVENT HOSPITAL,

KEY WEST, FLA., May 16, 1898.

SIR.—I respectfully submit the following report of the action off Cardenas, Cuba, as participated in by the U. S. torpedo boat "Winslow," to supplement the summarized statement submitted by me on the 11th instant, the day of the fight.

The "Winslow" arrived off Cardenas from Matanzas at 9 A. M. on the 11th, having left her station on the blockade to obtain an additional supply of coal, the amount of fuel in her bunkers being reduced to five tons. The U. S. S. "Machias" and "Wilmington" were found at Piedras Cay. Upon making application to Captain Merry, the senior officer present, I was directed to apply to Captain Todd, commanding U. S. S. "Wilmington," for necessary supplies.

On boarding the U. S. S. "Wilmington" I was informed by her commanding officer of his intention to enter Cardenas harbor on the afternoon of that day. Of the three channels leading through the cays two were believed to be mined. There remained unexplored a third channel, between Romero and Blanco cays, over which the minimum depth of water, as shown by the chart, was one and three-fourths fathoms. As the rise of tide at this place was about one and one-half feet, and the "Wilmington" drew scant ten feet, I was directed to receive on board a Cuban pilot, Santos, to take with me the revenue cutter "Hudson" to sound this channel, and, in company with the "Hudson," to sweep the channel for torpedoes. This work I completed by noon, except the sweeping of the channel, which could not be done on account of the grounding of the "Hudson." That vessel touched lightly, but managed to work off without injury. The "Winslow," therefore, dragged the channel with grapnels and returned to the "Wilmington," reporting to Captain Todd upon the practicability of the entrance.

The entrance was begun at 12:30, high tide, the "Hudson" on the starboard side and the "Winslow" on the port side of the "Wilmington" assisting in marking out shoal water. No vessels were in sight on entering Cardenas bay

save two square-rigged merchantmen with sails unbent, anchored directly off the town. As it was thought possible that gunboats might attempt to escape, the "Hudson" was sent along the western side and the "Winslow" along the eastern side of the bay to intercept them in event of such movement; not finding them the three vessels met off the town at a distance of about 3,500 yards. When in this position the "Winslow" was signaled to approach the "Wilmington" within hail and I was directed by Captain Todd to go in and investigate a small gunboat then observed for the first time, painted gray with black smokestack, apparently not under steam and moored to a wharf, to the left of which arose a compact mass of buildings close to the water front. Torpedoes were set for surface runs, the fans upon the war-noses were run up so as to provide for explosion at short range for use alongside of the gunboat, and all preparations were made for immediate action.

At a distance of about 1,500 yards, at which time the "Winslow" was advancing at about twelve knots, which seems her maximum speed in quite shoal water, the first gun of the engagement was fired from the bow of the Spanish gunboat, marked by a clear puff of white smoke. This shot, which passed over the "Winslow," was at once replied to by that ship and was the signal for the commencement from the beach of a rapidly sustained fire, characterized, primarily, by a total absence of smoke. At the commencement of this firing I received a flesh wound in the left thigh. As the action advanced a cloud of haze collected on shore at the location of this battery and when closed I detected one or two gun flashes from among the buildings, but at no time could I detect the exact position of the guns. My uncertainty as to the position of the enemy was attested to by the commanding officer of the "Hudson" and by officers commanding gun divisions on the "Wilmington," who inquired of me shortly after the action what I made out to be the enemy's exact position.

At this time the wind was blowing from the ships toward the shore. The first shot that pierced the "Winslow" rendered her steam and hand-steering gear inoperative and damaged them beyond repair. Efforts to work the hand-steering gear from aft were frustrated by the wrecking of that mechanism and the rupture of both wheel ropes; relieving tackles failed to operate the rudder. For a short time the vessel was held in her bows on position by use of her propellers. She then swung broadside to the enemy. A shot now pierced her engine-room rendering one engine inoperative. I directed my attention to maintaining fire from her one-pounder guns, to keeping the vessel constantly in movement, so as to reduce the chances of her being hit, to endeavoring to withdraw from close range, and to keeping clear of the line of fire of the "Wilmington" and "Hudson." The use of the remaining engine, however, had the effect of throwing her stern toward the enemy upon backing, while

going ahead threw her bow in the same direction. Under the heavy fire of the "Wilmington" the fire of the enemy slackened. The Spanish gunboat was silenced and put out of action early in the engagement.

The "Winslow" now being practically disabled, I signaled to the "Hudson" to tow us out of action. She very gallantly approached us, and we succeeded in getting a line to her. Previous to this, the alternate rapid backing and steaming ahead of the "Winslow" had had the effect of working her out from under the enemy's batteries, and in this way a distance of about 300 yards was gained. Finding that we were working out in this manner, I directed Ensign Bagley to concentrate his attention upon the movement of the ship, watching the vessel so as to keep her out of the "Wilmington's" way, and to direct the movements of the man at the reversing gear, mechanical communication from deck to engine-room being impracticable. This necessitated Mr. Bagley making repeated short trips from the deck to the foot of the engine-room ladder while directing the vessel's course, and at the moment of being on deck he stood abreast the starboard gun close to a group of men who had been stationed below, but who had been sent on deck from the disabled machinery. A shell hitting, I believe, a hose-reel, exploded instantly, killing Ensign Bagley and two others and mortally wounding two. This accident, which occurred at the close of the action, was virtually its end; the enemy fired a few more shots, but was soon completely silenced by the heavy fire of the "Wilmington." The conduct of Ensign Bagley and the men with him, as well as that of the crew who survived the fight, is beyond commendation. After seeing the dead and wounded removed from the "Winslow" and conveyed on board the "Wilmington," I turned over the command of the ship to Gunner's Mate G. P. Brady, my own injury preventing me from performing active duty for the time being.

I have the honor to remain, sir, your obedient servant,

JOHN B. BERNADOU,

Lieutenant, U. S. Navy.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

On May 18th, the "St. Louis" and "Wompatuck" cut a cable near Santiago, and on the following day made an unsuccessful attempt to cut the cable at Guantanamo. A more successful attempt was made at the latter place on June 7th, by the "St. Louis" and the "Marblehead."

On the 15th of May, news was brought to Admiral Sampson that the Spanish destroyer "Terror" had reached Martinique, and that

Cervera's fleet had been seen off Curaçao on the day before. It was evident that his destination was either Santiago or San Juan, and the admiral hastened back to Key West to coal, so as to be able to intercept the Spanish squadron before it could reach the Windward passage.

A Cuban pilot informed the Americans that there was probably not more than 1,000 tons of coal at Santiago. About this time, May 25th, the "St. Paul" captured the Spanish collier "Restormal," having on board 2,400 tons of coal; this must have been a severe blow to the Spanish squadron.

Meanwhile, Commodore Schley had been ordered to the West Indies with the Flying Squadron and arrived at Key West on the morning of the 18th; he was dispatched in haste next day by way of the Yucatan passage, to Cienfuegos, as it was the very natural surmise that Cervera was bringing munitions of war to that port, the most important place on the coast having direct communication by rail with Havana. Schley's squadron consisted of the "Brooklyn," "Massachusetts," "Texas," and "Scorpion," to which were added the "Iowa," "Castine," "Dupont," the collier "Merrimac," and later the "Marblehead," "Eagle," and "Vixen." Commodore Schley immediately proceeded to blockade Cienfuegos to prevent the entrance of Cervera's squadron. It was not until sometime later he learned that the Spanish admiral had reached Santiago on the day the Flying Squadron left Key West. The American fleet arrived within blockading distance of Santiago on the evening of the 28th, and on the next day Schley reported in the following dispatch that four of Cervera's vessels had been sighted inside the harbor.

MOLE ST. NICHOLAS, *via* HAYTI.

SECRETARY OF NAVY, *Washington*:

Off Santiago de Cuba, May 29th, 10 A. M. Enemy in port. Recognized "Cristobal Colon," "Infanta Maria Teresa," and two torpedo-boat destroyers moored inside Morro, behind point. Doubtless the others are here. I have not sufficient coal. Making every effort to get coal in. "Vixen" has blown out manhole gasket. I have sent boiler makers on board to repair. Collier repaired, machinery being put together. Have about 3,000 tons of coal in collier, but not easy to get aboard here. If there is no engagement in next two or three days, Sampson's squadron could relieve this one to coal at Gonaives or Port au Prince. Hasten me dispatch vessels for picket work.

The "Brooklyn," "Iowa," "Texas," "Massachusetts," "Marblehead," "Vixen," and collier compose squadron here. I am sending "St. Paul" to communicate with Sampson.

SCHLEY.

Early during the blockade it was determined to obstruct the channel to prevent any attempt at the escape of Cervera's squadron, and it was suggested that the collier "Merrimac" would answer the purpose. Lieutenant Hobson, assistant naval constructor, who had been on duty on the flagship, was intrusted by Admiral Sampson, May 29th, with the formation of a plan for obstructing the channel. This plan he submitted to the admiral on May 30th, every point, even to the smallest detail, having been thoroughly studied in regard to the navigation and manoeuvring of the vessel as well as the method of sinking her. It was decided to sink the collier by exploding a series of torpedoes advantageously placed on the outside, these torpedoes to be fired simultaneously from the bridge of the vessel by means of electric cables. It was arranged with a view to additional ease in sinking that all the ports and apertures should be opened at the same time, and that the lashings holding the anchors should be instantly cut so as to catch and hold the vessel in the desired position. The crew was to be composed of picked men, strong, alert, experienced, and positively reliable, for the slightest deviation from the program would be fatal to success. Arrangements were to be made for the crew to escape in a boat prepared for the purpose.

The preparation of the torpedoes was instantly begun under the direction of Gunner Morgan of the "New York." The flagship, accompanied by the "Oregon," the "Mayflower," and the "Porter," reached Santiago early on June 1st with the preparations — torpedoes, fuses, etc. — completed, except as to the plan for adapting them to the collier, which they then saw for the first time. The "Merrimac" was immediately stripped, the torpedoes attached and all arrangements made to have her taken into the entrance of the channel. Lieutenant Hobson, having prepared the plan, and being thoroughly familiar with every detail, was intrusted with its performance, Captain Miller of the "Merrimac" having most reluctantly given way to the younger man in the command of his vessel which was selected for the perilous enterprise. When volunteers were called for, practically the whole fleet responded, every man seeming to consider it a priceless privilege to take part. The crew finally selected was as follows: Naval Con-

structor R. P. Hobson; D. Montague, chief master at arms, "New York;" George Charette, gunner's mate, third class, "New York;" R. Clausen, coxswain, "New York;" G. F. Phillips, machinist, first class, "Merrimac;" F. Kelly, water tender, "Merrimac;" O. Deignan, coxswain, "Merrimac;" and J. E. Murphy, coxswain, "Iowa."

In order to secure sufficient light to enter the harbor, it was determined to go in just before the setting of the moon, which would occur a short time before daylight.

On the morning of June 2d, the first attempt to approach the harbor was made, but to the great disappointment of Lieutenant Hobson and his gallant crew, the vessel was recalled, as the morning was too far advanced, and they were obliged to wait until the next day. The final start was made shortly before daybreak on June 3d, the pilot remaining on board to take her as far as possible, and the former assistant engineer, Mr. Crank, volunteered to look after the engines and leave them in a condition to complete the trip without further care. He and the pilot were taken off by a steam launch sent in near the entrance of the channel, under the command of Naval Cadet Powell, who was also directed to wait near the entrance of the harbor to pick up any of the crew who might escape. The roar of the guns soon gave the signal that she had been attacked by the enemy, and those outside waited with great anxiety to learn the fate of the crew and the ship.

Meanwhile a small boat by which the men expected to escape became disabled, and when the vessel was abandoned, they were obliged to keep themselves afloat by clinging to a raft. They remained in this condition in the water until overtaken by the steam launch of the Spanish admiral, when they surrendered as prisoners and were taken aboard. The same day a tugboat from Santiago, bearing a flag of truce, brought out a letter from Admiral Cervera to Admiral Sampson assuring him of the safety of Hobson and his men, and returned to Santiago with clothing and necessities for the heroes who had escaped from the sinking "Merrimac." Efforts to exchange these men proved unsuccessful, as the "Merrimac" prisoners had been delivered to the custody of the army, and the matter was referred to Captain-General Blanco. The Spanish officials were afraid the prisoners had acquired too much valuable information in regard to the defenses of the harbor of Santiago, and they were not exchanged until July 6th, after negotiations with General Shafter.

On Monday, June 6th, Santiago was bombarded by the American

fleet, orders being given to avoid Morro Castle where the "Merrimac" prisoners were confined; but several shots struck there, severely wounding a number of the garrison. Lieutenant Hobson and his men were uninjured. They were removed to quarters in the city the next day.

June 10th, the American vessels took possession of the landing at Guantanamo, making it possible for the marines to establish a camp there.

The first United States forces to land upon Cuban soil were 650 men of the First Marine Battalion Volunteers of New York, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Robert W. Huntington. These men had been aboard the transport "Panther" since May 22d, and hailed with delight the prospect of stretching themselves on shore. On the afternoon of Friday, June 10th, they landed and marched up a steep hillside east of Fisherman's Point, Guantanamo Bay, and hoisted the Stars and Stripes on a plateau at the summit of the hill. The camp was laid out, tents set up, and the marines, proud of having the honor of making the first landing, and with a sense of security in having been able to establish themselves without opposition, christened their camp after the commander of the gunboat "Marblehead," Captain McCalla, and gave themselves up to the enjoyment of a night's rest. Before the landing, the coast and the neighborhood had been bombarded by the American vessels outside, and the Spaniards had been dispersed for a short time. About 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the next day, while some of the men were resting, and about 150 were bathing in the surf, they were suddenly surprised by an attack from the jungles beyond the camp, where a large body of Spaniards had collected and were pouring a deadly rain of Mauser bullets upon the startled marines.

Then ensued the first land fight of the war, in which four of our men were killed and a number wounded. The first to fall was Dr. John Blair Gibbs, surgeon of the battalion. The attack continued at intervals all night long, the smokeless powder used by the Spaniards giving them great advantage, and making it almost impossible for the marines to pick off their skulking foes. Twenty-four hours longer the fight was maintained, but the arrival of sixty Cuban scouts, familiar with the tactics of the enemy and able to serve as guides, assisted the marines, who formed themselves into scouting parties, and in three or four days succeeded in driving the Spaniards back to Caimanera and holding their camp unmolested. This heroic en-

counter proved the great superiority of the United States forces, their courage, endurance and determination to conquer, while it developed the fact that the Cubans, although brave and enthusiastic, were of little value as disciplined fighters, and were utterly unskilled as marksmen. The landing, thus severely contested, remained in the possession of the Navy and was used by Admiral Sampson as a coaling and repair station.

On June 22d, Captain Sigsbee of the "St. Paul," disabled the Spanish destroyer "Terror," which had been left at Martinique for repairs, and which, coming up with the cruiser near San Juan, foolishly attempted to torpedo her.

On the 20th of June, word was brought to the admiral's flagship of the approach of the transports bringing the Army of Santiago under the command of General Shafter. After a consultation between the two commanders, naval and military, a conference was held with the Cuban chieftains at the headquarters of General Rabi at Aserraderos, about eighteen miles west of Santiago, and the final plans for landing the troops were decided upon. On the 22d, the steam launches and other boats of the blockading fleet which could be spared, were collected at the flagship, each in charge of a young naval officer, and all under command of Captain Goodrich of the "St. Louis," ready to assist in landing the troops. The ships began to shell the coast as soon as the troops were ready to land at Daiquiri, while a feint was made on a large scale at Canabas on a little bay west of the harbor. During this action a shell hit and seriously damaged the "Texas," killing one and wounding nine men. A few days later some of the troops were landed at Siboney, 3,000 Cubans under Garcia were brought there from Aserraderos, and on the 17th, 1,300 of General Duffield's brigade arrived on the "Yale," making about 21,000 men in all who had been landed at that time.

One of the most important features of the blockade was the search-light thrown into the harbor at night, making it impossible for the enemy to attempt to send out even the smallest vessel. The search-light service was maintained by the "Iowa," "Oregon," and "Massachusetts," whose crews took up the watch for two hours at a time, while the guns of the adjacent vessel were trained on the entrance. The ships of the blockading squadron were arranged in a semi-circle, drawing up at night closer to the shore and at daylight moving out to a line about six and a half miles from the land batteries.

By June 30th, the preparations for attacking the city were com-

pleted, and arrangements were made for a joint attack by the land and sea forces. Early on the morning of July 1st, an assault was commenced on Aguadores by General Duffield's brigade, supported by the "New York," the "Suwanee," and the "Gloucester." The attack was a feint to draw off the Spanish forces from the land side of the city. While the firing was in progress the "Yale," "Newark," and "Vulcan" arrived crowded with soldiers who cheered wildly at every shot and begged permission to land, but the day was too far advanced for them to be put on shore. The shelling, which lasted all the forenoon, ruined the fortifications of Aguadores.

Next day a bombardment commenced on the forts and batteries defending the harbor and on the ships within. The line of warships was formed as follows: "Gloucester," "New York," "Newark," "Indiana," "Oregon," "Iowa," "Massachusetts," "Texas," "Brooklyn," and "Vixen," and the firing commenced at 6 o'clock continuing two hours, when signals were received that the shells thrown toward the Spanish position might endanger our own troops. The firing ceased after having done much damage to the fortifications, and incidentally to the buildings in the city. The marksmanship displayed by the American gunners was again shown to be unsurpassed.

Meanwhile, Admiral Cervera, who had found it impossible to elevate his guns sufficiently to assist in the defenses of the city, received orders from the Spanish government and from Captain-General Blanco to leave the harbor, and, if possible, sail to the rescue of Havana. It was hoped that with his swift cruisers, Cervera would be able to make a dash and get past the American ships before they could recover from their surprise. The admiral did not share this belief, but while he protested the impossibility of executing the manoeuver with success, he obeyed orders and prepared with his magnificent ships to rush into certain and awful destruction.

Sunday morning, the 3d of July, dawned clear and beautiful over Santiago bay. The American ships of war, swinging in the semi-circle outside the entrance of the harbor, gave little token of the terrible work in which they were so soon to take part. The men were in their "Sunday clothes," and the ordinary routine of the holy day was in progress. Admiral Sampson on the flagship "New York," was steaming seven miles off to Siboney to hold a consultation with General Shafter and form plans for a simultaneous attack of the land and sea forces upon the beleaguered city of Santiago.

About half past 9 o'clock, at an opening in the cliffs surrounding

the harbor, appeared the fighting masts of a warship, her funnels throwing out dense clouds of smoke, indicating that she was coming out with great speed. Suddenly the signal "Enemy's ships are coming out," appeared on the masthead of the "Iowa," and almost at the same moment from the other vessels; while the "Brooklyn," Commodore Schley's flagship, instantly displayed the signal, "Close in and engage the enemy." The "Maria Teresa," Admiral Cervera's flagship, was followed by the "Vizcaya," the "Cristobal Colon," and the "Almirante Oquendo," only a few minutes elapsing between the appearance of the different vessels.

It was evidently the intention of the "Vizcaya" to immediately ram the "Brooklyn," but the splendid manoeuvring of the American vessels, which instantly responded to the commodore's orders, compelled the Spaniards to change their tactics, and they immediately commenced a running fight, while firing wildly and ineffectively, their only hope being to disable some of the American vessels and escape to the open sea.

In a few moments the Spanish flagship was undone; the first shell that struck her shattered her main water-supply pipe; the second went into the admiral's cabin, exploding and set the stern afire, while another tore through a gunroom and killed sixty men. In twenty minutes the "Teresa" was beached six miles from the harbor entrance, her captain and many of her crew killed, and the survivors, among them Admiral Cervera and his son, were compelled to leap into the water and swim ashore. The "Almirante Oquendo," the last of the cruisers to leave the bay, was wrecked and beached half a mile beyond the "Maria Teresa." The "Vizcaya" and "Colon" were speeding to the west, pursued by the "Brooklyn," "Oregon," "Iowa," and "Indiana."

Meanwhile the little torpedo-boat destroyers "Pluton" and "Furor," came rushing out of the harbor entrance and were met by the "Gloucester," under the command of Lieutenant Richard Wainwright. Shots from the "New York," which had now reached the scene, and the "Texas," assisted the "Gloucester" in destroying these two vessels. The "Furor" was sunk and the "Pluton" ran ashore hauling down her colors. The "Vizcaya" went ashore at Aserraderos, fifteen miles west of Santiago. On flew the "Cristobal Colon," followed by the "Brooklyn," the "Oregon," the plucky little "Vixen," the "Texas," and the "New York." The Americans had ceased firing, intent only on winning the race; the "Oregon," "Brooklyn,"

and "Texas" were making great speed and closing in upon the doomed vessels. In answer to a signal from Captain Clark of the "Oregon," Commodore Schley gave the orders to try one of the thirteen-inch projectiles. The first struck the water close astern the "Colon," the second reached the mark. The magnificent "Colon," the pride and glory of the Spanish Navy, and considered one of the fleetest vessels in the world, hauled down her colors and ran aground at Rio Darquino, seventy-five miles west of Santiago, at 1:15 P. M., after a chase of three hours and a quarter. Captain Cook of the "Brooklyn" went on board to receive the surrender of the "Colon," conveying from Commodore Schley most considerate orders as to the terms to be granted the prisoners. The crew of 525 men were transferred to the "Resolute," while Commodore Paredes and his aide and Captain Moreu were taken on board the "New York." The sea-valves of the vessel were opened by the Spaniards, and she sank so rapidly that it was impossible to save her.

The survivors of the "Vizcaya," consisting of Captain Eulate and twenty-five officers, together with 250 petty officers and men, thirty-two of whom were wounded, were rescued by the "Iowa," while the "Indiana," the "Gloucester," and other vessels were busy with the work of rescuing the crews of the "Maria Teresa," the "Oquendo" and the torpedo boats. Four hundred and eighty prisoners were taken from the "Maria Teresa," and about forty from the "Oquendo," twenty-two from the "Pluton" and seventeen from the "Furor."

Admiral Cervera and his son were taken aboard the "Gloucester," and afterward transferred to the "Iowa."

In the noble work of rescue the kindness, tenderness and chivalry of the American seaman were not less conspicuous than his matchless courage and devotion in the hour of conflict.

The American officers and seamen bore testimony to the bravery displayed by the Spaniards, as well as to the patience and fortitude of the wounded prisoners, and their appreciation of the kindness with which they were treated by their captors. The Spaniards had fought against overwhelming odds, but they could have done immense damage to the blockading fleet had it not been for their incompetency with machinery, and their poor marksmanship. Another thing against the Spaniards was the fact that the seamen at the outset of this desperate enterprise was stimulated by liquor, while the American seamen were all sober. The Spaniards expected no quarter from the Americans, and so astonished were they at the treatment received



CAPTAIN-GENERAL BLANCO.



NEW YORK

CINCINNATI

INDIANAS

DETROIT

IOWA

NEWPORT

INDIANA
HAGLEHEAR

PORTER
BRANDING IN PRIZE

HERALD
DISPATCH BOAT
DEWEY

TERROR

WILMINGTON

FLEET CLOSING IN ON HAVANA.

that Admiral Cervera cabled to General Blanco: "The crews are very grateful for the noble generosity with which they were treated." The prisoners were taken to healthy quarters in the United States, supplied with good clothing and food, while the officers were conveyed to Annapolis and released on parole; and these men, so kindly treated by the Americans, had been rescued by them at the risk of their own lives.

In this action the Americans lost one killed and two wounded. The man killed was George H. Ellis, yeoman of the "Brooklyn," who was instantly killed by a shell from the "Vizcaya," as he was stepping forward to find the range of that ship. None of the American vessels were disabled, although the "Iowa" was struck five times, two shells piercing her, one starting a fire that was quickly extinguished.

The following dispatch in regard to the action was sent by Commodore Watson:

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *July 3.*

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, *Washington:*

July 3d, at 9:30 A. M. To-day Spanish squadron, seven in all, including one gunboat, came out of Santiago in column and was totally destroyed within an hour, excepting "Cristobal Colon," which was chased forty-five miles to westward by the commander-in-chief, "Brooklyn," "Oregon," and "Texas," surrendering to "Brooklyn," but was beached to prevent sinking. None of our officers or men were injured, except on board "Brooklyn," the chief yeoman, Ellis, was killed and one man wounded. Admiral Cervera, all commanding officers excepting of "Oquendo," about seventy other officers, and 1,600 men are prisoners. About 350 killed or drowned and 160 wounded; latter cared for on "Solace" and "Olivette." Have just arrived off Santiago in "Marblehead" to take charge while commander-in-chief is looking out for "Cristobal Colon."

WATSON.

On the afternoon of the 3d, Admiral Sampson sent the following cable dispatch to Washington:

SIBONEY, *July 3d, via HAYTI, July 4th.*

The fleet under my command offers the nation, as a Fourth of July present, the whole of Cervera's fleet. It attempted to escape at 9:30 this morning. At 2 the last ship, the "Cristobal Colon," had run ashore seventy-five miles west of Santiago and had let down her colors. The "Infanta Maria Teresa,"

"Oquendo," and "Vizcaya," were forced ashore, burned and blown up within twenty miles of Santiago. The "Furor" and "Pluton" were destroyed within four miles of the port.

SAMPSON

This message, which reached the President at noon on Monday the 4th, filled the country with joy and exultation, arousing the national spirit from the depression caused by the heavy losses at San Juan and El Caney on July 1st.

Immediately on the receipt of Admiral Sampson's message, the President sent the following:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 4th.

ADMIRAL SAMPSON, *Playa del Este*:

You have the gratitude and congratulations of the whole American people. Convey to your noble officers and crews, through whose valor new honors have been added to the American Navy, the grateful thanks and appreciation of the nation.

WILLIAM McKINLEY.

Secretary Long sent the following:

TO ADMIRAL SAMPSON, *Playa del Este*:

The Secretary of the Navy sends you and every officer and man of your fleet, remembering affectionately your dead comrade, grateful acknowledgment of your heroism and skill. All honor to the brave. You have maintained the glory of the American Navy.

JOHN D. LONG.

The following is a translation of Admiral Cervera's telegram describing the battle:

CERVERA'S TELEGRAM.

PLAYA DEL ESTE (SANTIAGO).

I went out with the ships at 9:30 and sustained a very hot battle with the enemy. The defense was brilliant, but it was impossible to fight against the hostile forces, which were three times as large as ours. The "Maria Teresa," "Oquendo," and "Vizcaya," all with fire on board, ran ashore, and were then blown up. The destroyers "Pluton" and "Furor" were sunk by shots from

the hostile guns. The "Colon," the Americans say, surrendered after running aground. I estimate our losses at 600 killed and wounded. The rest of the crews have been taken prisoners. Villaamil was killed in battle; I believe also Lazaga. Among the wounded are Concas and Eulate. The Americans have allowed the latter to retain his sword because of his brilliant conduct. I must state that the American sailors are treating us with all possible consideration.

CERVERA.

Six days later, the admiral wrote as follows to the captain of the U. S. S. "St. Louis," the vessel in which the officers of the Spanish ships were transported to the United States:

Captain CASPER F. GOODRICH, U. S. M. S. "*St. Louis*:"

MY DEAR SIR.—I have the greatest pleasure in acknowledging by the present, in my own name and also in that of all captains and officers actually on board this ship, that we consider ourselves under the greatest obligation to you for the many kindness and excellent treatment which you and all the officers under your command have shown to us during this passage. I must also mention the careful and most valuable medical assistance which has been given to our wounded and sick men; your kind feelings are gone as far in this respect as to order them to be put in one of the saloons of the ship, in order to provide more effectually to their comfort.

I know nothing which does not agree with what I have just written. * * *

I thank you again for the delicate and manifold acts of kindness through which you have endeavored to alleviate the sore burden of our great misfortune. I assure you that I shall never forget them, and I am, sir,

Your most obedient servant,

PASCUAL CERVERA.

AT SEA, *July 9, 1898.*

The battles of Santiago and Manila, though reversed in circumstances and movements, were perfect parallels as to results. The losses to the Spaniards in these two engagements amounted to twenty ships in all, valued at about \$25,000,000. The Spanish loss in men in both engagements was about 1,100 killed, 2,400 captured, and several hundred wounded and missing. The American loss in the two battles was one killed and sixteen wounded, while the injuries sustained by our vessels were comparatively of the most trivial character. The

commanders engaged on the American side in the battle of Santiago were Sampson, Schley, Clark, Philip, Cook, Evans, Taylor, and Wainwright, all of whom were eminent and conspicuous for bravery and good conduct, and all of whom were advanced in the order of their rank in recognition of their good service in this engagement.

On July 4th, the Spaniards made an attempt to imitate Hobson's exploit by towing the dismantled cruiser "Reina Mercedes" into the entrance to sink her across that part of the channel not closed by the wreck of the "Merrimac." The movement was observed by the battle ship "Texas," which opened fire with such good effect that the "Mercedes" was driven out of her course to the north side of the channel, where a thirteen-inch shell struck her in the hull, exploded and sank her in shoal water, far out of the channel. The Spanish cruiser "Alphonso XII" left Havana harbor and endeavored to reach "Mariel," but was pursued and destroyed; the crew and part of her cargo were rescued by detachments of Spanish infantry and artillery which reached the shore where she was stranded.

On July 10th, Santiago was bombarded by the "Brooklyn," "Texas," and "Indiana," and on the following day by the "New York," "Brooklyn," and "Indiana," this demonstration being intended to support the attack of the army on the land side of the city. On the 17th, Santiago having capitulated and the mines in the harbor being removed under the terms of capitulation, the blockading fleet entered the bay, and the gunners were able to observe for the first time the effect of the projectiles fired by them during the various bombardments.

On July 18th, all the Spanish ships in Manzanillo harbor were destroyed by the "Wilmington," "Helena," "Scorpion," "Hist," "Hornet," "Wompatuck," and "Osceola," without any casualties to our own vessels. On the 12th of August the city was bombarded, but on the next day news was brought of the agreement for a treaty of peace, and hostilities ceased.

The most important facts demonstrated by the naval battles during the war were the advantage of the use of smokeless powder, and the great superiority of land fortifications over armed vessels; also the great importance of thorough drilling in the care and use of machinery and in marksmanship. So great have been the improvements in the manufacture of artillery, that success in modern warfare depends in a great measure upon the efficiency of the men handling the machinery.

Another fact demonstrated to the satisfaction of the members of the

"Maine" board of inquiry, as well as to the country at large, was that the destruction of the "Maine" could not possibly have been due to an internal cause, the wrecked vessels of Cervera's fleet having been injured in such a manner as to cause their magazines to explode leaving the wrecks in a condition totally different from that of the "Maine."

The following are the official reports of officers engaged in the battle with Cervera's squadron:

SAMPSON'S REPORT OF BATTLE WITH SPANISH FLEET.

U. S. FLAGSHIP "NEW YORK," 1ST RATE,

Off SANTIAGO DE CUBA, CUBA, *July 15, 1898.*

SIR.—I have the honor to make the following report upon the battle with and the destruction of the Spanish squadron commanded by Admiral Cervera, off Santiago de Cuba, on Sunday, July 3, 1898:

The enemy's vessels came out of the harbor between 9:35 and 10 A. M., the head of the column appearing around Cay Smith at 9:31 and emerging from the channel five or six minutes later.

The positions of the vessels of my command off Santiago at that moment were as follows: The flagship "New York" was four miles east of her blockading station and about seven miles from the harbor entrance. She had started for Siboney, where I intended to land, accompanied by several of my staff, and go to the front to consult with General Shafter. A discussion of the situation and a more definite understanding between us of the operations proposed had been rendered necessary by the unexpectedly strong resistance of the Spanish garrison of Santiago. I had sent my chief of staff on shore the day before to arrange an interview with General Shafter, who had been suffering from heat prostration. I made arrangements to go to his headquarters, and my flagship was in the position mentioned above when the Spanish squadron appeared in the channel. The remaining vessels were in or near their usual blockading positions, distributed in a semi-circle about the harbor entrance, counting from the eastward to the westward, in the following order: The "Indiana" about a mile and a half from shore, the "Oregon"—the "New York's" place being between these two—the "Iowa," "Texas," and "Brooklyn," the latter two miles from the shore west of Santiago. The distance of the vessels from the harbor entrance was from two and one-half to

four miles, the latter being the limit of day blockading distance. The length of the arc formed by the ships was about eight miles. The "Massachusetts" had left at 4 A. M. for Guantanamo for coal. Her station was between the "Iowa" and "Texas." The auxiliaries "Gloucester" and "Vixen" lay close to the land and nearer the harbor entrance than the large vessels, the "Gloucester" to the eastward and the "Vixen" to the westward. The torpedo boat "Ericsson" was in company with the flagship and remained with her during the chase until ordered to discontinue, when she rendered very efficient service in rescuing prisoners from the burning "Vizcaya." I inclose a diagram showing approximately the positions of the vessels as described above.

The Spanish vessels came rapidly out of the harbor, at a speed estimated at from eight to ten knots, and in the following order: "Infanta Maria Teresa" (flagship), "Vizcaya," "Cristobal Colon," and the "Almirante Oquendo." The distance between these ships was about 800 yards, which means that from the time the first one became visible in the upper reach of the channel until the last one was out of the harbor, an interval of only about twelve minutes elapsed. Following the "Oquendo," at a distance of about 1,200 yards, came the torpedo-boat destroyer "Pluton," and after her the "Furor." The armored cruisers, as rapidly as they could bring their guns to bear, opened a vigorous fire upon the blockading vessels, and emerged from the channel shrouded in the smoke from their guns.

The men of our ships in front of the port were at Sunday "quarters for inspection." The signal was made simultaneously from several vessels, "Enemy ships escaping," and general quarters were sounded. The men cheered as they sprang to their guns, and fire was opened probably within eight minutes by the vessels whose guns commanded the entrance. The "New York" turned about and steamed for the escaping fleet, flying the signal, "Close in towards harbor entrance and attack vessels," and gradually increasing speed, until toward the end of the chase she was making sixteen and one-half knots, and was rapidly closing on the "Cristobal Colon." She was not, at any time, within the range of the heavy Spanish ships, and her only part in the firing was to receive the undivided fire from the forts in passing the harbor entrance, and to fire a few shots at one of the destroyers, thought at the moment to be attempting to escape from the "Gloucester."

The Spanish vessels, upon clearing the harbor, turned to the westward in column, increasing their speed to the full power of their engines. The heavy blockading vessels, which had closed in toward the Morro at the instant of the enemy's appearance, and at their best speed, delivered a rapid fire, well sustained and destructive, which speedily overwhelmed and silenced the Spanish

fire. The initial speed of the Spaniards carried them rapidly past the blockading vessels, and the battle developed into a chase in which the "Brooklyn" and "Texas" had, at the start, the advantage of position. The "Brooklyn" maintained this lead. The "Oregon," steaming with amazing speed from the commencement of the action, took first place. The "Iowa" and the "Indiana" having done good work, and not having the speed of the other ships, were directed by me, in succession, at about the time the "Vizcaya" was beached, to drop out of the chase and resume blockading stations. These vessels rescued many prisoners. The "Vixen," finding that the rush of the Spanish ships would put her between two fires, ran outside of our own column and remained there during the battle and chase.

The skillful handling and gallant fighting of the "Gloucester" excited the admiration of everyone who witnessed it, and merits the commendation of the Navy Department. She is a fast and entirely unprotected auxiliary vessel—the yacht "Corsair"—and has a good battery of light rapid-fire guns. She was lying about two miles from the harbor entrance, to the southward and eastward, and immediately steamed in, opening fire upon the large ships. Anticipating the appearance of the "Pluton" and "Furor," the "Gloucester" was slowed, thereby gaining more rapidly a high pressure of steam, and when the destroyers came out she steamed for them at full speed, and was able to close to short range, while her fire was accurate, deadly, and of great volume. During this fight the "Gloucester" was under the fire of the Socapa battery. Within twenty minutes from the time they emerged from Santiago harbor the careers of the "Furor" and the "Pluton" were ended, and two-thirds of their people killed. The "Furor" was beached and sunk in the surf; the "Pluton" sank in deep water a few minutes later. The destroyers probably suffered much injury from the fire of the secondary batteries of the battle ships "Iowa," "Indiana," and the "Texas," yet I think a very considerable factor in their speedy destruction was the fire, at close range, of the "Gloucester's" battery. After rescuing the survivors of the destroyers, the "Gloucester" did excellent service in landing and securing the crew of the "Infanta Maria Teresa."

The method of escape attempted by the Spaniards, all steering in the same direction, and in formation, removed all tactical doubts or difficulties, and made plain the duty of every United States vessel to close in, immediately engage, and pursue. This was promptly and effectively done. As already stated, the first rush of the Spanish squadron carried it past a number of the blockading ships which could not immediately work up to their best speed; but they suffered heavily in passing, and the "Infanta Maria Teresa" and the "Oquendo" were probably set on fire by shells fired during the first fifteen minutes of the engagement. It was afterward learned that the "Infanta Maria

Teresa's" fire main had been cut by one of our first shots, and that she was unable to extinguish fire. With large volumes of smoke rising from their lower decks aft, these vessels gave up both fight and flight, and ran in on the beach—the "Infanta Maria Teresa" at about 10:15 A. M. at Nima Nima, six and a half miles from Santiago harbor entrance, and the "Almirante Oquendo" at about 10:30 A. M. at Juan Gonzales, seven miles from the port.

The "Vizcaya" was still under the fire of the leading vessels; the "Cristobal Colon" had drawn ahead, leading the chase, and soon passed beyond the range of the guns of the leading American ships. The "Vizcaya" was soon set on fire, and, at 11:15, she turned inshore and was beached at Aserraderos, fifteen miles from Santiago, burning fiercely and with her reserves of ammunition on deck already beginning to explode. When about ten miles west of Santiago the "Indiana" had been signaled to go back to the harbor entrance, and at Aserraderos the "Iowa" was signaled to "Resume blockading station." The "Iowa," assisted by the "Ericsson" and the "Hist," took off the crew of the "Vizcaya," while the "Harvard" and the "Gloucester" rescued those of the "Infanta Maria Teresa" and the "Almirante Oquendo." This rescue of prisoners, including the wounded, from the burning Spanish vessels was the occasion of some of the most daring and gallant conduct of the day. The ships were burning fore and aft, their guns and reserve ammunition were exploding and it was not known at what moment the fire would reach the main magazines. In addition to this a heavy surf was running just inside the Spanish ships. But no risk deterred our officers and men until their work of humanity was complete.

There remained now of the Spanish ships only the "Cristobal Colon"—but she was their best and fastest vessel. Forced by the situation to hug the Cuban coast, her only chance of escape was by superior and sustained speed. When the "Vizcaya" went ashore, the "Colon" was about six miles ahead of the "Brooklyn" and the "Oregon;" but her spurt was finished and the American ships were now gaining upon her. Behind the "Brooklyn" and the "Oregon" came the "Texas," "Vixen" and "New York." It was evident from the bridge of the "New York" that all the American ships were gradually overhauling the chase, and that she had no chance of escape. At 12:50 the "Brooklyn" and the "Oregon" opened fire and got her range—the "Oregon's" heavy shell striking beyond her—and at 1:20 she gave up without firing another shot, hauled down her colors and ran ashore at Rio Torquino, forty-eight miles from Santiago. Captain Cook, of the "Brooklyn," went on board to receive the surrender. While his boat was alongside I came up in the "New York," received his report and placed the "Oregon" in charge of the wreck to save her, if possible, and directed the prisoners to be transferred

to the "Resolute," which had followed the chase. Commodore Schley, whose chief of staff had gone on board to receive the surrender, had directed that all her personal effects should be retained by the officers. This order I did not modify. The "Cristobal Colon" was not injured by our firing, and probably is not much injured by beaching, though she ran ashore at high speed. The beach was so steep that she came off by the working of the sea. But her sea valves were opened and broken, treacherously, I am sure, after her surrender, and despite all efforts she sank. When it became evident that she could not be kept afloat, she was pushed by the "New York" bodily upon the beach, the "New York's" stem being placed against her for this purpose — the ship being handled by Captain Chadwick with admirable judgment — and sank in shoal water and may be saved. Had this not been done she would have gone down in deep water and would have been, to a certainty, a total loss.

I regard this complete and important victory over the Spanish forces as the successful finish of several weeks of arduous and close blockade, so stringent and effective during the night that the enemy was deterred from making the attempt to escape at night, and deliberately elected to make the attempt in daylight. That this was the case I was informed by the commanding officer of the "Cristobal Colon."

It seems proper to briefly describe here the manner in which this was accomplished. The harbor of Santiago is naturally easy to blockade, there being but one entrance and that a narrow one, and the deep water extending close up to the shore line presenting no difficulties of navigation outside of the entrance. At the time of my arrival before the port — June 1st — the moon was at its full, and there was sufficient light during the night to enable any movement outside of the entrance to be detected; but with the waning of the moon and the coming of dark nights there was opportunity for the enemy to escape, or for his torpedo boats to make an attack upon the blockading vessels. It was ascertained with fair conclusiveness that the "Merrimac," so gallantly taken into the channel on June 3d, did not obstruct it. I, therefore, maintained the blockade as follows: To the battle ships was assigned the duty, in turn, of lighting the channel. Moving up to the port, at a distance of from one to two miles from the Morro — dependent upon the condition of the atmosphere — they threw a search-light beam directly up the channel, and held it steadily there. This lighted up the entire breadth of the channel for a half a mile inside of the entrance so brilliantly that the movement of small boats could be detected. Why the batteries never opened fire upon the search-light ship was always a matter of surprise to me; but they never did. Stationed close to the entrance of the port were three picket launches and a little distance farther out

three small picket vessels—usually converted yachts—and, when they were available, one or two of our torpedo boats. With this arrangement there was at least a certainty that nothing could get out of the harbor undetected. After the arrival of the army, when the situation forced upon the Spanish admiral a decision, our vigilance increased. The night blockading distance was reduced to two miles for all vessels, and a battle ship was placed alongside the search-light ship, with her broadside trained upon the channel in readiness to fire the instant a Spanish ship should appear. The commanding officers merit the greatest praise for the perfect manner in which they entered into this plan and put it into execution. The "Massachusetts," which, according to routine, was sent that morning to coal at Guantanamo, like the others had spent weary nights upon this work, and deserved a better fate than to be absent that morning.

I inclose for the information of the Department, copies of orders and memorandums issued from time to time, relating to the manner of maintaining the blockade.

When all the work was done so well it is difficult to discriminate in praise. The object of the blockade of Cervera's squadron was fully accomplished, and each individual bore well his part in it—the commodore in command on the second division, the captains of ships, their officers and men. The fire of the battle ships was powerful and destructive, and the resistance of the Spanish squadron was, in great part, broken almost before they had got beyond the range of their own forts. The fine speed of the "Oregon" enabled her to take a front position in the chase, and the "Cristobal Colon" did not give up until the "Oregon" had thrown a thirteen-inch shell beyond her. This performance adds to the already brilliant record of this fine battle ship, and speaks highly of the skill and care with which her admirable efficiency has been maintained during a service unprecedented in the history of vessels of her class. The "Brooklyn's" westerly blockading position gave her an advantage in the chase which she maintained to the end, and she employed her fine battery with telling effect. The "Texas" and the "New York" were gaining on the chase during the last hour, and had any accident befallen the "Brooklyn" or the "Oregon," would have speedily overhauled the "Cristobal Colon." From the moment the Spanish vessel exhausted her first burst of speed the result was never in doubt. She fell, in fact, far below what might reasonably have been expected of her. Careful measurements of time and distance give her an average speed, from the time she cleared the harbor mouth until the time she was run on shore at Rio Tarquino, of thirteen and seven-tenths knots. Neither the "New York" nor the "Brooklyn" stopped to couple up their forward engines, but ran out the chase with one pair, getting steam, of course, as

rapidly as possible on all boilers. To stop to couple up the forward engines would have meant a delay of fifteen minutes, or four miles in the chase.

Several of the ships were struck—the “Brooklyn” more often than the others—but very slight material injury was done, the greatest being aboard the “Iowa.” Our loss was one man killed and one wounded, both on the “Brooklyn.” It is difficult to explain this immunity from loss of life or injury to ships in a combat with modern vessels of the best type, but Spanish gunnery is poor at the best, and the superior weight and accuracy of our fire speedily drove the men from their guns and silenced their fire. This is borne out by the statements of prisoners and by observation. The Spanish vessels, as they dashed out of the harbor, were covered with the smoke from their own guns, but this speedily diminished in volume and soon almost disappeared. The fire from the rapid-fire batteries of the battle ships appears to have been remarkably destructive. An examination of the stranded vessels shows that the “Almirante Oquendo” especially had suffered terribly from this fire. Her sides are everywhere pierced and her decks were strewn with the charred remains of those who had fallen.

The reports of Commodore W. S. Schley and of the commanding officers are inclosed.

A board, appointed by me several days ago, has made a critical examination of the stranded vessels, both with a view of reporting upon the result of our fire and the military features involved and of reporting upon the chance of saving any of them and of wrecking the remainder. The report of the board will be speedily forwarded.

Very respectfully,

W. T. SAMPSON,

Rear Admiral United States Navy.

Commander-in-Chief U. S. Naval Force, North Atlantic Station.

THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY, *Navy Department, Washington, D. C.*

SCHLEY'S REPORT OF ENGAGEMENT WITH SPANISH SQUADRON.

NORTH ATLANTIC FLEET, SECOND SQUADRON, U. S. FLAGSHIP “BROOKLYN,”

GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, *July 6, 1898.*

SIR.—I have the honor to make the following report of that part of the squadron under your command which came under my observation during the engagement with the Spanish fleet on July 3, 1898.

At 9:35 A. M. Admiral Cervera, with the "Infanta Maria Teresa," "Vizcaya," "Oquendo," "Cristobal Colon" and two torpedo boat destroyers, came out of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba in column at distance and attempted to escape to the westward. Signal was made from the "Iowa" that the enemy was coming out, but his movements had been discovered from this ship at the same moment. This vessel was the farthest west, except the "Vixen," in the blockading line. Signal was made to the western division, as prescribed in your general orders, and there was immediate and rapid movements inward by your squadron and a general engagement at ranges beginning at 1,100 yards and varying to 3,000 yards, until the "Vizcaya" was destroyed, about 10:50 A. M. The concentration of the fire of the squadron upon the ships coming out was most furious and terrific, and great damage was done them.

About twenty or twenty-five minutes after the engagement began two vessels, thought to be the "Teresa" and "Oquendo," and since verified as such, took fire from the effective shell fire of the squadron and were forced to run on the beach some six or seven miles west of the harbor entrance, where they burned and blew up later. The torpedo boat destroyers were destroyed early in the action, but the smoke was so dense in their direction that I cannot say to which vessel or vessels the credit belongs. This, doubtless, was better seen from your flagship.

The "Vizcaya" and "Colon," perceiving the disaster to their consorts, continued at full speed to the westward to escape and were followed and engaged in a running fight with the "Brooklyn," "Texas," "Iowa" and "Oregon" until 10:50, when the "Vizcaya" took fire from our shells. She put her helm to port and, with a heavy list to port, stood in shore and ran aground at Aserraderos, about twenty-one miles west of Santiago, on fire fore and aft, and where she blew up during the night. Observing that she had struck her colors, and that several vessels were nearing her to capture and save her crew, signal was made to cease firing. The "Oregon" having proved vastly faster than the other battleships, she and the "Brooklyn," together with the "Texas" and another vessel which proved to be your flagship, continued westward in pursuit of the "Colon," which had run close in shore, evidently seeking some good spot to beach if she should fail to elude her pursuers.

This pursuit continued with increasing speed in the "Brooklyn," "Oregon" and other ships, and soon the "Brooklyn" and "Oregon" were within long range of the "Colon," when the "Oregon" opened fire with her thirteen-inch guns, landing a shell close to the "Colon." A moment afterwards the "Brooklyn" opened fire with her eight-inch guns, landing a shell just ahead of her. Several other shells were fired at the "Colon," now in range of the

"Brooklyn's" and "Oregon's" guns. Her commander, seeing all chances of escape cut off, and destruction awaiting his ship, fired a lee gun and struck her flag at 1:15 P. M., and ran ashore at a point some fifty miles west of Santiago harbor. Your flagship was coming up rapidly at the time, as was also the "Texas" and "Vixen." A little later, after your arrival, the "Cristobal Colon," which had struck to the "Brooklyn" and the "Oregon," was turned over to you as one of the trophies of this great victory of the squadron under your command.

During my official visit, a little later, Commander Eaton, of the "Resolute," appeared and reported to you the presence of a Spanish battleship near Altares. Your orders to me were to take the "Oregon" and go eastward to meet her, and this was done by the "Brooklyn," with the result that the vessel reported as an enemy was discovered to be the Austrian cruiser "Infanta Maria Teresa," seeking the commander-in-chief.

I would mention, for your consideration, that the "Brooklyn" occupied the most westward blockading position, with the "Vixen," and, being more directly in the route taken by the Spanish squadron, was exposed for some minutes, possibly ten, to the gun fire of three of the Spanish ships and the west battery, at a range of 1,500 yards from the ships and about 3,000 yards from the batteries, but the vessels of the entire squadron, closing in rapidly, soon diverted this fire and did magnificent work at close range. I have never before witnessed such deadly and fatally accurate shooting as was done by the ships of your command as they closed in on the Spanish squadron, and I deem it a high privilege to commend to you, for such action as you may deem proper, the gallantry and dashing courage, the prompt decision and the skillful handling of their respective vessels of Captain Philip, Captain Evans, Captain Clark, and especially my chief of staff, Captain Cook, who was directly under my personal observation and whose coolness, promptness and courage were of the highest order. The dense smoke of the combat shut out from my view the "Indiana" and the "Gloucester," but, as these vessels were closer to your flagship, no doubt their part in the conflict was under your immediate observation.

Lieutenant Sharp, commanding the "Vixen," acted with conspicuous courage; although unable to engage the heavier ships of the enemy with his light guns, nevertheless was close in to the battle line under heavy fire, and many of the enemy's shot passed beyond his vessel.

I beg to invite special attention to the conduct of my flag lieutenant, James H. Sears, and Ensign Edward McCauley, Jr., aid, who were constantly at my side during the engagement and who exposed themselves fearlessly in discharging their duties; and also the splendid behavior of my secretary, Lieu-

tenant B. W. Wells, Jr., who commanded and directed the fighting of the fourth division with splendid effect.

I would commend the highly meritorious conduct and courage in the engagement of Lieutenant Commander N. E. Mason, the executive officer, whose presence everywhere over the ship during its continuance did much to secure the good result of this ship's part in the victory.

The navigator, Lieutenant A. C. Hodgson, and the division officers, Lieutenant T. D. Griffin, Lieutenant W. R. Rush, Lieutenant Edward Simpson, Lieutenant J. G. Doyle, Ensign Charles Webster and the junior divisional officers were most steady and conspicuous in every detail of duty contributing to the accurate firing of this ship in her part of the great victory of your forces.

The officers of the Medical, Pay, Engineer and Marine Corps responded to every demand of the occasion, and were fearless in exposing themselves. The warrant officers, Boatswain William L. Hill, Carpenter G. H. Warford and Gunner F. T. Applegate, were everywhere exposed, in watching for damage, reports of which were promptly conveyed to me.

I have never in my life served with a braver, better, or worthier crew than that of the "Brooklyn." During the combat, lasting from 9:35 until 1:15 P. M., much of the time under fire, they never flagged for a moment, and were apparently undisturbed by the storm of projectiles passing ahead, astern and over the ship.

The result of the engagement was the destruction of the Spanish squadron and the capture of the Admiral and some thirteen to fifteen hundred prisoners, with the loss of several hundred killed, estimated by Admiral Cervera at 600 men.

The casualties on board this ship were: G. H. Ellis, chief yeoman, killed; J. Burns, fireman, first class, severely wounded. The marks and scars show that the ship was struck about twenty-five times, and she bears in all forty-one scars as the result of her participation in the great victory of your force on July 3, 1898. The speed-cone halyards were shot away and nearly all the signal halyards. The ensign at the main was so shattered that in hauling it down at the close of action it fell in pieces.

I congratulate you most sincerely upon this great victory to the squadron under your command, and I am glad that I had an opportunity to contribute in the least to a victory that seems big enough for all of us.

I have the honor to transmit herewith the report of the commanding officer and a drawing, in profile, of the ship, showing the location of hits and scars, also a memorandum of the ammunition expended and the amount to fill her allowance.

Since reaching this place and holding conversation with several of the cap-

tains, viz., Captain Eulate, of the Vizcaya, and the second in command of the "Colon," Commander Contreras, I have learned that the Spanish admiral's scheme was to concentrate all fire for awhile on the "Brooklyn," and the "Vizcaya" to ram her, in the hopes that if they could destroy her the chance of escape would be increased, as it was supposed she was the swiftest ship of your squadron. This explains the heavy fire mentioned and the "Vizcaya's" action in the earlier moments of the engagement. The execution of this purpose was promptly defeated by the fact that all the ships of the squadron advanced into close range and opened an irresistibly furious and terrific fire upon the enemy's squadron as it was coming out of the harbor.

I am glad to say that the injury supposed to be below the water line was due to a water valve being opened from some unknown cause and flooding the compartment. The injury to the belt is found to be only slight and the leak small.

I beg to inclose a list of the officers and crew who participated in the combat of July 3, 1898.

I cannot close this report without mentioning in high terms of praise the splendid conduct and support of Captain C. E. Clark of the "Oregon." Her speed was wonderful and her accurate fire splendidly destructive.

Very respectfully,

W. S. SCHLEY,

Commodore United States Navy.

Commanding Second Squadron North Atlantic Fleet.

The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE, *North Atlantic Station.*

U. S. FLAGSHIP "NEW YORK," 1ST RATE,

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *July 4, 1898.*

SIR.—I have the honor to make the following report of the part taken by this ship in the action of yesterday during and following sortie of Admiral Cervera's squadron.

The ship had started at 8:50 for the army landing at Siboney, the commander-in-chief having an appointment with the general commander of the army. A few minutes after the crew had been called to quarters for Sunday inspection, firing was heard and a ship was seen leaving the harbor entrance; the helm was

at once put over, the crew called to general quarters, signal "Close in toward harbor entrance and attack vessels" made, orders given to spread all fires and the ship headed back for the enemy, whose ships were seen successively coming out at a high speed. The flagship "Infanta Maria Teresa" was first, then another armored cruiser of the same class (which turned out to be the "Vizcaya"), followed by the "Cristobal Colon," and armored cruiser ("Oquendo"), and the torpedo-boat destroyers "Furor" and "Pluton."

The nearer ships had immediately engaged and by the time we were off the entrance, one, the flagship, was already afire and was soon ashore. The "Indiana" and "Gloucester" were actively engaged with the torpedo boats. This ship fired some four-inch shell at the one nearer the port toward which she was headed and seemed attempting to return, but she was already practically out of the fight. The boiler of the more advanced one had blown up, showing a vast column of condensed steam. During this time the batteries, whose line of fire we had crossed close to, repeatedly fired upon us, without effect. No return was made to this fire. A shell from the west battery fell within 200 yards of the ship when we were over four miles to the westward and we had thought ourselves entirely out of range. This ship stood on, leaving the "Gloucester," which had shown herself so capable, to look after the survivors in the torpedo boats. By this time a second cruiser was ashore and burning (the "Almirante Oquendo"), while the third, the "Vizcaya," and the "Cristobal Colon" were still steaming rapidly westward. The "Indiana" was now signaled (11:26 A. M.) to return to the blockading position to look after anything which might be there. Very shortly the "Vizcaya" turned shoreward, smoke began to issue from her afterpart, and by the time that she was ashore on the reef at Aserraderos (fifteen miles west of Santiago) she was ablaze. The "Iowa" had signaled a little before that she had surrendered, and stopped off this place, where she gave much assistance in the rescue of the "Vizcaya's" people.

This ship stood on in the chase of the "Cristobal Colon," with ahead of us the "Brooklyn," "Oregon," "Texas" and "Vixen," the "Oregon" being much nearer inshore of the two headmost ships, but not in gunshot. We were rapidly increasing our speed.

It was evident, however, that the "Colon" would give us a lengthy chase, and at noon the crew left quarters and went to dinner.

About 12:50 the "Oregon" opened fire, and some of her shells were observed to strike beyond the "Colon." This made her capture a foregone conclusion, and shortly after 1 o'clock she turned in toward shore and soon struck her colors. She had been beached at a small inlet known as Rio Tarquino. By the time we arrived a boat was alongside her from the "Brook-



ADMIRAL SAMPSON.



L.A. SHAFER.

THE SPANISH FLEET.

lyn," and Captain Cook, the boarding officer, came alongside this and reported. This ship then sent a boat to take possession, the commanding officer going in the boat. I was received by the commodore of the squadron, the captain, Captain de Navio Don Emilio Moreu and Captain de Navio, of the first class, Don José de Paredes y Chacon (which latter had been civil governor of Santiago and had only just been attached to the squadron). I arranged for the transfer of the crew and officers, a division to each ship present and the engineer force to be left aboard. While aboard, however, the "Resolute" arrived and it was arranged to transfer the whole number to her.

I had taken with me the fleet surgeon, an engineer officer and the carpenter to examine and make secure everything necessary. The engineer officer reported to me that she was making water aft. I had previously had soundings taken and found eight feet at the bow and seventy at the stern, so that but a small portion of the ship was ashore. I returned as quickly as possible to the flagship to report the situation. The "Oregon" was signaled to take charge and the men were hastened on board, a number being sent also from this ship. Our work of closing water-tight doors, etc., was of no avail. A large number of sea valves had been treacherously opened and the valves so broken as to make it impossible to close them. The ship thus slowly settled. At 7:30 she came afloat and came out into deeper water. The officer in charge (Lieutenant-Commander Cogswell) had let go an anchor, but as it was clear that if she went down in water of the depth in which she was she could never be recovered, this ship's stem was placed against her quarter, and later, a line being taken from our own bow to hers, the "Colon" was forced inshore. It was by this time dark, but using a searchlight we were enabled gradually to force the ship in on the beach, the chain being paid out at the same time. She thus sank in a very moderate depth of water, and it is very probable she may be saved.

At 11 P. M. the flagship returned to Santiago, leaving the "Texas" and "Oregon" in charge of the prize.

Though the ship was not able to come to action with any of the larger ships on account of her distance to the eastward, every nerve was strained to do so, and all was done that could be done. Our speed had rapidly increased so that we were going sixteen knots at the end. We were immediately astern while all others were considerably to seaward. We were thus in a position to prevent a possible doubling to the rear and escape to the south-east.

The officers and crew, as they always have done, acted in the most enthusiastic and commendable manner. They have worked into so complete a

system that the ship is practically instantaneously ready for action, and while all are deserving of commendation and credit, I think it no derogation from the deserts of others to particularly name Lieutenant-Commander Potter, to whom, as executive officer, so much of the ship's efficiency is due, and Chief Engineer McConnell, who has kept the machinery in the admirable order which has enabled us at all times to develop the ship's full speed.

Very respectfully,

F. E. CHADWICK,

Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.

The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE, *North Atlantic Station.*

U. S. FLAGSHIP "NEW YORK," 1ST RATE,

GUANTANAMO BAY, *July 29, 1898.*

SIR.—As supplementary to my report, dated July 4th, of the action of the 3d, I beg to state that at the close of the chase of the "Colon" our speed had increased to not less than seventeen knots, instead of sixteen, as mentioned in my ninth paragraph.

We were making at the close from 104 to 108 turns. One hundred and four turns with a clean bottom would give seventeen and a third knots. One hundred and eight turns with a clean bottom would give eighteen knots. An allowance of one knot off for foul bottom is more than ample, as the ship was flying light, having in but a moderate amount of coal and very few stores. Under such circumstances there can be no question that this ship would have quickly overhauled the "Colon" had she continued her flight, and would have insured her capture had there been an accident of any sort to the other ships in pursuit.

Very respectfully,

F. E. CHADWICK,

Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.

The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

CAPTAIN CLARK'S REPORT OF BATTLE AT SANTIAGO, JULY 3,
1898.

U. S. S. "OREGON," 1ST RATE,

Off SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 4, 1898.*

SIR.—I have the honor to report that at 9:30 A. M., yesterday, the Spanish fleet was discovered standing out of the harbor of Santiago de Cuba. They turned to the westward and opened fire, to which our ships replied vigorously. For a short time there was an almost continuous flight of projectiles over this ship, but when our line was fairly engaged, and the "Iowa" had made a swift advance as if to ram or close, the enemy's fire became defective in train as well as range. The ship was only struck three times, and at least two of them were by fragments of shells. We had no casualties.

As soon as it was evident that the enemy's ships were trying to break through and escape to the westward we went ahead at full speed, with the determination of carrying out to the utmost your order: "If the enemy tries to escape, the ships must close and engage as soon as possible and endeavor to sink his vessels or force them to run ashore." We soon passed all of our ships except the "Brooklyn," bearing the broad pennant of Commodore Schley. At first we only used our main battery, but when it was discovered that the enemy's torpedo boats were following their ships we used our rapid-fire guns, as well as the six-inch, upon them with telling effect. As we ranged up near the sternmost of their ships she headed for the beach, evidently on fire. We raked her as we passed, pushing on for the next ahead, using our starboard guns as they were brought to bear, and before we had her fairly abeam she too was making for the beach. The two remaining vessels were now some distance ahead, but our speed had increased to sixteen knots and our fire, added to that of the "Brooklyn," soon sent another, the "Vizcaya," to the shore in flames. The "Brooklyn" signaled "Oregon, well done." Only the "Cristobal Colon" was left, and for a time it seemed as if she might escape; but when we opened with our forward turret guns and the "Brooklyn" followed, she began to edge in toward the coast and her capture or destruction was assured. As she struck the beach her flag came down and the "Brooklyn" signaled, "Cease firing," following it with "Congratulations for the grand victory, thanks for your splendid assistance."

The "Brooklyn" sent a boat to her, and when the admiral came up with the "New York," "Texas," and "Vixen," she was taken possession of. A prize crew was put on board from this ship under Lieutenant-Commander Cogswell, the executive officer, but before 11 P. M. the ship, which had been

filling in spite of all efforts to stop leaks, was abandoned, and just as the crew left she went over on her side.

I can not speak in too high terms of the bearing and conduct of all on board this ship. When they found the "Oregon" had pushed to the front, and was hurrying to a succession of conflicts with the enemy's vessels if they could be overtaken, and would engage, the enthusiasm was intense.

As these vessels were so much more heavily armored than the "Brooklyn" they might have concentrated upon and overpowered her, and consequently I am persuaded that, but for the way the officers and men of the "Oregon" steamed and steered the ship and fought and supplied her batteries, the "Colon" and perhaps the "Vizcaya" would have escaped. Therefore, I feel that they rendered meritorious service to the country; and while I can not mention the name of each officer and man individually, I am going to append a list of the officers, with the stations that they occupied, hoping that it may be of service to them should the claims of others for advancement above them ever be considered.

J. K. Cogswell, lieutenant-commander; had general charge of the batteries.

R. F. Nicholson, lieutenant; handled the ship, placing her as I directed

W. H. Allen, lieutenant; in charge of ammunition supply.

A. A. Ackerman, lieutenant; in charge of after thirteen-inch turret.

E. W. Eberle, lieutenant, junior grade; in charge of forward thirteen-inch turret.

C. M. Stone, lieutenant, junior grade; in charge of six-inch battery.

L. A. Bostwick, ensign; aloft giving ranges till we closed, then in charge of torpedoes.

C. L. Hussey, ensign; in charge of ten six-pounder H. R. F. guns.

R. Z. Johnston, ensign; in charge of signals and aid to captain.

R. Dickins, captain, U. S. M. C.; in charge of marines and four six-pounder H. R. F.

A. R. Davis, second lieutenant, U. S. M. C.; in charge of four six-pounder H. R. F. and two one-pounder.

H. E. Yarnell, naval cadet; in charge port after eight-inch turret.

L. M. Overstreet, naval cadet; in charge of starboard forward eight-inch turret.

C. R. Miller, naval cadet; in charge of port forward eight-inch turret.

S. G. Magill, naval cadet; in charge of six-inch gun.

C. S. Kempff, naval cadet; in charge of starboard eight-inch turret aft.

P. B. Dungan, naval cadet; in forward thirteen-inch turret.

E. J. Sadler, naval cadet; in forward chain of supplies.

E. C. Kalbfus, naval cadet; in after thirteen-inch turret.

H. L. Brinser, naval cadet; in after chain of supplies.
 C. B. Hatch, naval cadet; at secondary battery.
 C. Shackford, naval cadet; in torpedo division.
 R. W. Milligan, chief engineer; in charge of machinery.
 C. N. Offley, passed assistant engineer; in starboard engine-room.
 J. M. Reeves, assistant engineer; in port engine-room.
 F. Lyon, assistant engineer; in charge of firerooms.
 H. N. Jenson, naval cadet; in after hydraulic pumproom.
 W. D. Leahy, naval cadet; in forward hydraulic pumproom.
 T. C. Dunlap, (acting) assistant engineer; in starboard engine-room.
 P. A. Lovering, surgeon; in charge of hospital.
 W. B. Grove, assistant surgeon; transportation of wounded.
 S. R. Colhoun, paymaster; with surgeon, aid to wounded.
 J. P. McIntyre, chaplain; with surgeon, aid to wounded.
 J. A. Murphy, pay clerk; aid to wounded in six-inch compartment.
 John Costello, boatswain; in central station.
 A. S. Williams, gunner; in powder division.
 M. F. Roberts, carpenter; in powder division.

Very respectfully,

C. E. CLARK,

Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.

The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE, *North Atlantic Station.*

CAPTAIN PHILIP'S REPORT OF THE BATTLE JULY 3, 1898.

U. S. S. "TEXAS,"

Off SANTIAGO, *July 4, 1898.*

SIR.—In accordance with the requirements of article 437, Navy Regulations, I respectfully submit the following statement in regard to the part the "Texas" took in the engagement with the enemy yesterday.

At daylight on the morning of the 3d the "Texas" stood out from entrance to harbor, taking day blockading position, about three miles from the Morro (the Morro bearing north-northeast).

At 9:35, the Morro bearing N. by E. $\frac{1}{2}$ E., distant 5,100 yards, the enemy's ships were sighted standing out of the harbor. Immediately general signal 250 was made; this signal was followed by the "Iowa's" almost at the same time.

The ship, as per order, was heading in toward the entrance; went ahead full speed, putting helm hard astarboard, and ordering forced draft on all boilers. The officer of the deck, Lieut. M. L. Bristol, having given the general alarm and beat to quarters for action at the same time.

As the leader, bearing the admiral's flag, appeared in the entrance she opened fire, which was, at 9:40, returned by the "Texas" at range of 4,200 yards while closing in. The ship leading was of the "Vizcaya" class and the flagship.

Four ships came out, evidently the "Vizcaya," the "Oquendo," "Maria Teresa," and "Colon," followed by two torpedo-boat destroyers. Upon seeing these two we immediately opened fire upon them with our secondary battery, the main battery at the time being engaged with the second and third ships in line. Owing to our secondary battery, together with the "Iowa" and "Gloucester," these two destroyers were forced to beach and sink.

Whilst warmly engaged with the third in line, which was abreast and engaging the "Texas," our fire was blanketed for a short time by the "Oregon" forging ahead and engaging the second ship. This third ship, after a spirited fire, sheered inshore, and in 10:35 ran up a white flag. We then ceased fire on the third and opened fire with our forward guns at long range (6,600 yards) on the second ship (which was then engaged with the "Oregon") until 11:05, when she (enemy's second ship) sheered in to the beach, on fire.

At 11:10 she struck her colors. We ceased fire and gave chase, with "Brooklyn" and "Oregon," for the leading ship until 1:20, when the "Colon" sheered in to beach and hauled down her colors, leaving them on deck at foot of her flagstaff. We shut off forced draft and proceeded at moderate speed to close up.

I would state that during this chase the "Texas" was holding her own with the "Colon," she leading us about four miles at the start.

The reports of the executive order and the surgeon are transmitted.

I have the pleasure of stating that the entire battery of the "Texas" is in a most excellent condition and ready for any service required by the commander-in-chief, especially calling attention to the efficiency of the two turret guns, due to the alterations recently made by Lieut. F. J. Haeseler, of this ship.

The bearing and performance of duty of all officers met with my entire approval.

Very respectfully submitted,

J. W. PHILIP,

Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.

The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF, *North Atlantic Station.*

CAPTAIN TAYLOR'S REPORT OF ENGAGEMENT WITH SPANISH FLEET.

U. S. S. "INDIANA," 1ST RATE,

Off SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 4, 1898.*

SIR.—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of the "Indiana" in the action of July 3d with the Spanish squadron off Santiago de Cuba:

At 9:37 A. M., while the crew were at quarters preliminary to general muster, noted two guns fired from the "Iowa" and general signal "Enemy's ships escaping" flying. At once cleared ship for action and the crew were at the guns in a remarkably short time, all officers and men showing an alacrity that indicated clearly their pleasure at the opportunity offered them.

The Spanish squadron was seen emerging from the harbor, and in a few moments a general action ensued. The leading ship, which proved to be the "Infanta Maria Teresa," flying the flag of Vice-Admiral Cervera, was followed by the other vessels of the squadron, as follows: "Vizcaya," "Cristobal Colon," "Oquendo," and the torpedo-boat destroyers "Furor" and "Pluton." The enemy's vessels headed to the westward and our ships headed in the same direction, keeping as nearly abreast of them as possible.

This ship fired on all of them as they came out one by one, and continued the action later by firing principally on the "Maria Teresa," "Oquendo," "Furor," and "Pluton." Several of our shells were seen to take effect on these vessels. Our secondary-battery guns were directed principally on the destroyers, as were the six-inch guns. The destroyers were sunk through the agency of our guns and those of the "Gloucester," which vessel had come up and engaged them close aboard.

The initial fire of the last two ships was directed at this vessel, and, although falling very close, only striking the ship twice, without any injury to ship or crew.

Our ranges were obtained by stadimeter angles on Morro as the ships emerged, and then by angles on the tops of the rear ships. The ranges were from 4,500 to 2,000 yards, observed from the top. From the bridge I could see that our shooting was excellent and showed its effect. One of our thirteen-inch shells was seen to enter the "Maria Teresa" under the quarter-deck and explode, and that ship was observed on fire very shortly afterward.

About 10:15 A. M. observed the "Maria Teresa" and "Oquendo" on fire and heading for the beach, the fire from their guns having ceased. We then

devoted our special attention to prevent the escape of the destroyers, which appeared more than a match for the "Gloucester," she being the only small vessel near to engage them. They were soon seen to blow up, apparently struck by our six-inch and six-pounders. We now fired our large guns at the "Vizcaya," which was at long range. She made for the shore soon after, on fire and battery silenced. These ships hauled down their colors as they made for the beach. The Spanish flagship hoisted the white flag as she grounded.

We now ceased firing. The "Colon" was observed well over the western horizon, closely pursued by the "Brooklyn," "Oregon," and "Texas," offshore of her. The flagship "New York," steaming full speed to the westward, as soon as the "Vizcaya" surrendered signaled us, "Go back and guard entrance of harbor." Several explosions were observed on board the burning ships. At noon turned and stood to the eastward for our station, in obedience to the above signal. Observed the "Harvard" and several transports standing to the westward.

About 12:30 the "Resolute" came within hail and informed us by megaphone that a Spanish battle ship was sighted to the eastward, standing toward us. Later the "Harvard" passed, confirming the information, and adding that the ship was painted white. We made out the vessel ahead and stood for her with our guns bearing. She proved to be the Austrian armored cruiser "Kaiserin Maria Teresa." She sent an officer on board and requested permission to enter the harbor. I referred him to the commander-in-chief. She then stood on to the westward and we resumed our station.

During this action we used no armor-piercing shell except the smokeless powder six-pounders, and the good effect of the common shell is shown by the fires on the enemy's ships and the short time taken to disable them without piercing their armor, and with almost no injury to our ships.

The guns and mounts worked well; only two failures of electric primers noted.

During the afternoon sent boats with surgeon on shore to the burning vessels to assist in caring for the wounded. The boats returned, bringing one wounded officer and seventeen men as prisoners.

Received also during the afternoon and night prisoners from the "Gloucester" and "Hist," in all 7 officers and 217 men, which were to-day transferred to the "St. Louis."

The conduct of the officers and crew was in every respect commendable; coolness and good discipline prevailed, coupled with a marked enthusiasm. This desirable condition of affairs is largely due to the efforts of the officers,

and I desire to commend to the commander-in-chief the executive officer, Lieut.-Commander John A. Rodgers, and all the officers of the ship, for the part taken by the "Indiana" in bringing about this great victory and the complete destruction of the enemy's squadron.

Very respectfully,

H. C. TAYLOR,

Captain, Commanding.

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE, *North Atlantic Station.*

U. S. S. "INDIANA," 1ST RATE,

Off SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 14, 1898.*

SIR.—Fearing that some mistake might occur as to the position of the "Indiana" when the Spanish squadron came out, owing to my having omitted it in my report, I have the honor to inclose a sketch showing our correct position at the time.

There are circumstances that identify clearly this position of the "Indiana" on the sketch. One of these is that by my order the officer of the deck steamed out when the flagship turned to the eastward and took a position upon the line parallel to shore formed by the other ships and closed in the interval on that line. The bearing of Morro at that time was between NNW. $\frac{1}{2}$ W. and NW. by N. The distance is fixed by the fact that the first range given by the officer in the top, as obtained by vertical angle of Morro, measured by sextant and stadimeter, was 4,200 yards, and at this time we had only begun to close in on the entrance, according to your instructions, and had barely gathered way.

Our distance was, therefore, about 4,300 yards, with Morro bearing between NNW. $\frac{1}{2}$ W. and NW. by N., the ship at the time heading west-northwest and stationary.

Very respectfully,

H. C. TAYLOR,

Captain, Commanding.

THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE, *North Atlantic Station.*

CAPTAIN EVANS' REPORT OF ENGAGEMENT WITH SPANISH SQUADRON, JULY 3, 1898.

U. S. S. "IOWA," 1ST RATE,

Off SANTIAGO DE CUBA, CUBA, *July 4, 1898.*

SIR.—I have the honor to make the following report of the engagement with the Spanish squadron off Santiago de Cuba on the 3d of July:

On the morning of the 3d, while the crew was at quarters for Sunday inspection, the leading vessel of the Spanish squadron was sighted at 9:31 coming out of the harbor at Santiago de Cuba. Signal, "Enemy's ships coming out," was immediately hoisted and a gun fired to attract attention. The call to general quarters was sounded immediately, the battery made ready for firing, and the engines rung full speed ahead.

The position of the vessel at the time of sighting the squadron was the usual blockading station off the entrance of the harbor, Morro Castle bearing about north and distant about three to four miles. The steam at this time in the boilers was sufficient for a speed of five knots.

After sighting the leading vessel, the "Infanta Maria Teresa" (Admiral Cervera's flagship), it was observed that she was followed in succession by the remaining three vessels of the Spanish squadron, the "Vizcaya," "Cristobal Colon," and "Almirante Oquendo." The Spanish ships moved at a speed of about eight to ten knots, which was speedily increased as they cleared the harbor entrance and stood to the westward. They maintained a distance of about 800 yards between vessels. The squadron moved with precision and stations were well kept.

Immediately upon sighting the leading vessel fires were spread, and the "Iowa" headed toward the leading Spanish ship. About 9:40 the first shot was fired from this ship, at a distance of about 6,000 yards.

The course of this vessel was so laid that the range speedily diminished. A number of shots were fired at ranges varying between 6,000 and 4,000 yards. The range was rapidly reduced to 2,500 yards, and subsequently to 2,000 and to 1,200 yards.

When it was certain that the "Maria Teresa" would pass ahead of us, the helm was put to starboard, and the starboard broadside delivered at a range of 2,500 yards. The helm was then put to port and the ship headed across the bow of the second ship, and as she drew ahead the helm was again put to starboard and she received in turn the full weight of our starboard broadside at a range of about 1,800 yards. The "Iowa" was again headed off with port helm for the third ship, and as she approached the helm was put to starboard

until our course was approximately that of the Spanish ship. In this position at a range of 1,400 yards the fire of the entire battery, including rapid-fire guns, was poured into the enemy's ships.

About 10 o'clock the enemy's torpedo-boat destroyers "Furor" and "Pluton" were observed to have left the harbor and to be following the Spanish squadron. At the time that they were observed, and in fact most of the time that they were under fire, they were at a distance varying from 4,500 to 4,000 yards. As soon as they were discovered the secondary battery of this ship was turned upon them, while the main battery continued to engage the "Vizcaya," "Oquendo," and "Maria Teresa."

The fire of the main battery of this ship, when the range was below 2,500 yards, was most effective and destructive, and after a continuance of this fire for perhaps twenty minutes it was noticed that the "Maria Teresa" and "Oquendo" were in flames and were being headed for the beach. Their colors were struck about 10:20, and they were beached about eight miles west of Santiago.

About the same time (about 10:25) the fire of this vessel, together with that of the "Gloucester" and another smaller vessel, proved so destructive that one of the torpedo-boat destroyers ("Pluton") was sunk and the "Furor" was so much damaged that she was run upon the rocks.

After having passed, at 10:35, the "Oquendo" and Maria Teresa," on fire and ashore, this vessel continued to chase and fire upon the "Vizcaya" until 10:36, when signal to cease firing was sounded on board, it having been discovered that the "Vizcaya" had struck her colors.

At 11 the "Iowa" arrived in the vicinity of the "Vizcaya," which had been run ashore, and, as it was evident that she could not catch the "Cristobal Colon," and that the "Oregon," "Brooklyn," and "New York" would, two steam cutters and three cutters were immediately hoisted out and sent to the "Vizcaya" to rescue her crew. Our boats succeeded in bringing off a large number of officers and men of that ship's company, and in placing many of them on board the torpedo boat "Ericsson" and the auxiliary dispatch vessel "Hist."

About 11:30 the "New York" passed in chase of the "Cristobal Colon," which was endeavoring to escape from the "Oregon," "Brooklyn," and "Texas."

We received on board this vessel from the "Vizcaya," Captain Eulate, the commanding officer, and twenty-two officers, together with about 248 petty officers and men, of whom thirty-two were wounded. There were also received on board five dead bodies, which were immediately buried with the honors due to their grade.

The battery behaved well in all respects.

The dashpot of the forward twelve-inch gun, damaged in the engagement of the 2d, had been replaced the same day by one of the old dashpots, which gave no trouble during this engagement.

The following is an approximate statement of the ammunition expended during the engagement. A more exact statement cannot be given at this time:

| | |
|---|-------|
| Twelve-inch semi-armor-piercing shell, with full charges..... | 31 |
| Eight-inch common shell, with full charges..... | 35 |
| Four-inch cartridges, common shell | 251 |
| Six-pounder cartridges, common shell | 1,056 |
| One-pounder cartridges, common shell | 100 |

This ship was struck in the hull, on the starboard side, during the early part of the engagement by two projectiles of about six-inch caliber, one striking the hull two or three feet above the actual water line and almost directly on the line of the berth deck, piercing the ship's side between frames 9 and 10, and the other piercing the side and the cofferdam between frames 18 and 19.

The first projectile did not pass beyond the inner bulkhead of the cofferdam A 41-43. The hole made by it was large and ragged, being about sixteen inches in a longitudinal direction and about seven inches in a vertical direction. It struck with a slight inclination aft, and perforated the cofferdam partition bulkhead (A 41-43 to 45-47). It did not explode, and remained in the cofferdam.

The second projectile pierced the side of the ship and the cofferdam A 105, the upper edge of the hole being immediately below the top of the cofferdam on the berth deck in compartment A 104. The projectile broke off the hatch plate and the coaming of the water-tank compartment, exploded, and perforated the walls of the chain locker. The explosion created a small fire, which was promptly extinguished. The hole in the side made by this projectile was about five feet above the water line, and about two or three feet above the berth deck. One fragment of this shell struck a link of the sheet chain wound around the six-pounder ammunition hoist, cutting the link in two. Another perforated the cofferdam on the port side and slightly dished the outside plating.

These two wounds, fortunately, were not of serious importance.

Two or three other projectiles of small caliber struck about the upper bridge and smokestacks, inflicting trifling damage, and four other small projectiles struck the hammock nettings and the side aft.

There are no casualties among the ship's company to report. No officer nor man was injured during the engagement.

After having received on board the rescued crew of the "Vizcaya," this vessel proceeded to the eastward and resumed the blockading station in obedience to the signal made by the commander-in-chief about 11:30.

Upon arriving on the blockading station, the "Gloucester" transferred to this vessel Rear Admiral Cervera, his flag lieutenant, and the commanding officers of the torpedo-boat destroyers "Furor" and "Pluton," and also one man of the "Oquendo's" crew, rescued by the "Gloucester."

Naval Cadets Frank Taylor Evans and John E. Lewis, and five men belonging to the "Massachusetts," were on board the "Iowa" when the enemy's ships came out. They were stationed at different points and rendered efficient service.

The officers and men of this ship behaved admirably. No set of men could have done more gallant service.

I take pleasure in stating to you, sir, that the coolness and judgment of the executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander Raymond P. Rodgers, deserves, and will, I hope, receive a proper reward at the hands of the Government. The test of the executive officer's work is the conduct of the ship and crew in battle. In this case it was simply superb.

The coolness of the navigator, Lieutenant W. H. Schuetze, and of Lieutenant F. K. Hill, in charge of the rapid-fire guns on the upper deck, are worthy of the greatest commendation.

Other officers of the ship did not come under my personal observation, but the result of the action shows how well they did their duty.

I cannot express my admiration for my magnificent crew. So long as the enemy showed his flag they fought like American seamen; but when the flag came down they were as gentle and tender as American women.

In conclusion, sir, allow me to congratulate you on the complete victory achieved by your fleet.

Very respectfully,

R. D. EVANS,

Captain, U. S. N., Commanding.

The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCE, *North Atlantic Station.*

COMMANDER WAINWRIGHT'S REPORT OF BATTLE AT SANTIAGO.

U. S. S. "GLOUCESTER,"

Off SANTIAGO DE CUBA, Cuba, July 6, 1898.

SIR.—I have the honor to report that at the battle of Santiago on July 3d, the officers and crew of the "Gloucester" were uninjured and the vessel was

not injured in hull or machinery, the battery only requiring some slight overhauling. It is now in excellent condition.

I inclose herewith a copy of the report of the executive officer made in compliance with paragraph 525, page 110, Naval Regulations, which report, I believe, to be correct in all particulars. I also inclose copies of the reports of the several officers, which may prove valuable for future reference.

It was the plain duty of the "Gloucester" to look after the destroyers, and she was held back, gaining steam, until they appeared at the entrance. The "Indiana" poured in a hot fire from all her secondary battery upon the destroyers; but Captain Taylor's signal, "Gunboats close in," gave security that we would not be fired upon by our own ships. Until the leading destroyer was injured our course was converging, necessarily; but as soon as she slackened her speed, we headed directly for both vessels, firing both port and starboard batteries as the occasion offered.

All the officers and nearly all the men deserve my highest praise during the action. The escape of the "Gloucester" was due mainly to the accuracy and rapidity of the fire. The efficiency of this fire, as well as that of the ship generally, was largely due to the intelligent and unremitting efforts of the executive officer, Lieutenant Harry P. Huse. The result is more to his credit when it is remembered that a large proportion of the officers and men were untrained when the "Gloucester" was commissioned. Throughout the action he was on the bridge and carried out my orders with great coolness. That we were able to close in with the destroyers—and until we did so they were not seriously injured—was largely due to the skill and constant attention of P. A. Engineer George W. McElroy. The blowers were put on and the speed increased to seventeen knots without causing a tube to leak or a brass to heat. Lieutenant Thomas C. Wood, Lieutenant George H. Norman, Jr., and Ensign John T. Edson not only controlled the fire of the guns in their divisions and prevented waste of ammunition, but they also did some excellent shooting themselves. Acting Assistant Surgeon J. F. Bransford took charge of one of the guns and fired it himself occasionally. Acting Assistant Paymaster Alexander Brown had charge of the two Colt guns, firing one himself, and they did excellent work. Assistant Engineer A. M. Proctor carried my orders from the bridge and occasionally fired a gun when I found it was not being served quite satisfactorily. All were cool and active at a time when they could have had but little hope of escaping uninjured.

Lieutenants Wood and Norman, Ensign Edson, and Assistant Engineer Proctor were in charge of the boats engaged in saving life. They all risked their lives repeatedly in boarding and remaining near the two destroyers and the two armed cruisers when their guns were being discharged by the heat and

their magazines and boilers were exploding. They also showed great skill in landing and taking off the prisoners through the surf.

Of the men mentioned in the several reports, I would call special attention to John Bond, chief boatswain's mate. He would have been recommended to the Department for promotion prior to his gallant conduct during the action of July 3d. I would also recommend to your attention Robert P. Jennings, chief machinist, mentioned in the report of Mr. McElroy. I believe it would have a good effect to recognize the skill of the men and the danger incurred by the engineer's force. I would also recommend that the acting appointments of those men mentioned by the officers in their reports be made permanent.

The wounded and exhausted prisoners were well and skillfully tended by Assistant Surgeon Bransford, assisted by Ensign Edson, who is also a surgeon.

The admiral, his officers and men were treated with all consideration and care possible. They were fed and clothed as far as our limited means would permit.

Very respectfully,

RICHARD WAINWRIGHT,

Lieutenant-Commander, U. S. N., Commanding.

The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCES, *North Atlantic Station.*

LIEUTENANT SHARP'S REPORT OF ENGAGEMENT OF "VIXEN"
WITH SPANISH FLEET JULY 3, 1898.

U. S. S. "VIXEN,"

GUANTANAMO, Cuba, *July 7, 1898.*

SIR.—I have the honor to make the following report as to the part taken by the U. S. S. "Vixen" in the engagement with the Spanish fleet under the command of Admiral Cervera during the morning and afternoon of Sunday, July 3, 1898.

Between 9:35 and 9:45 A. M. the "Vixen" was at a point about four miles to the westward of Morro, and at a distance of about one and one-half miles south of the shore line. At about 9:40 it was reported to me that an explosion had taken place in the entrance of Santiago Harbor. I went on deck and almost immediately sighted the leading vessel of the Spanish fleet standing out of the entrance. Some of the vessels of our fleet were closing in toward Morro and firing.

The "Vixen" was heading toward the Morro. The engines were ordered ahead at full speed and the helm put hard aport, the object being to cross ahead of the leading Spanish vessel, and thus not obstruct the gun fire of our own fleet, the shells from which soon began to fall about the position we had just left.

The leading Spanish vessel opened fire on this vessel with her starboard bow guns the projectiles from which passed over us, all being aimed too high. I estimate the number of shots fired at us at this time to have been between five and ten

As the "Vixen" gathered headway her head came to about south by east, opening the "Brooklyn" up about two points on our port bow; steadied her and steamed on about this course until we had reached a position about a mile to the southward and westward of the "Brooklyn," which was now turning with port helm and firing her guns as they bore on the enemy's vessels. At 9:50 hoisted signal No. 252. The course was then ordered changed to west-southwest, the intention being to steer a parallel course to that of the Spanish fleet. By some mistake the quartermaster steadied the helm on southwest by south, which was soon discovered, but not until the "Vixen" had increased her distance off-shore by perhaps another half mile. The course west-southwest was again ordered, and when steadied on it we were an estimated distance of about five miles from the shore. From about 10:15 the courses and times of changing were as follows: At 10:15 changed course to W. $\frac{1}{2}$ S., at 10:56 to NW. by N., at 11:00 WNW., at 11:05 W. by N., at 11:10 NW. by W., at 11:15 W. by N., at 11:30 W. by S., at 1:50 W. by N. All these courses were by the steering compass, and the speed was estimated from twelve to thirteen and one-half knots per hour. Times noted are by deck clock, which was five minutes fast of watch time used in the notes inclosed.

Seeing that the Spanish vessels were out of range of our guns while we were well within range of theirs, we reserved our fire.

About 11:06, having approached within range of the "Vizcaya, we opened fire with our starboard battery at an elevation of 5,000 yards for the six-pounder guns and extreme elevation for the one-pounders; continued the fire for six minutes, when, seeing that the ensign of the "Vizcaya" was not flying, at 11:12 ordered cease firing. Expended 27 six-pounder armor-piercing shells and 18 one-pounder common shells.

After passing Aserraderos the course was held at from west by north to west by south, heading for the point on the western horizon. Average speed, about twelve to thirteen and one-half knots; average number of revolutions, 105 per minute; average steam pressure, 122 $\frac{1}{2}$ pounds.

The "Brooklyn" and "Oregon" bore on the port and starboard bows, re-



CAPT. "BOB" EVANS.



By Courtesy of General Lawton

VIEW OF MORRO CASTLE, SANTIAGO DE CUBA, AS SEEN ON ENTERING THE HARBOR.

spectively, and were gradually dropping the "Vixen" astern, as was the "Cristobal Colon," which was running closer inshore. About 12:25 the "Oregon" opened fire on the "Colon," as did also the "Brooklyn," feeling their way up to the range, which was apparently obtained after the fourth or fifth shot. About 1:20 the "Oregon" and "Brooklyn" headed inshore about four points. About 1:28 the "Texas" hoisted signal, "Enemy has surrendered." This signal was repeated to the "New York" by the "Vixen." At 2:30 "Vixen" stopped off Rio Tarquino, in the vicinity of the "Oregon" and "Brooklyn." The "Cristobal Colon" was close inshore, bows on the beach, her colors down, lying on the deck at the foot of her staff.

I have the honor to inclose a copy of notes taken during the chase by my orders upon the suggestion of Lieutenant Harlow. These notes were written by Assistant Paymaster Doherty. The incidents and times were given by Lieutenant Harlow, whose watch was five minutes slow of deck-clock time. The times taken after 10:30 are accurate; those taken before that time were estimated and may be in error a few minutes.

Inclosed is a sketch showing positions of vessels at various times. It is taken from a chart taken from the "Cristobal Colon" after the surrender and is enlarged four times. All courses are true.

In conclusion, I wish to call to your attention the coolness and strict attention to duty of both officers and men.

Very respectfully,

ALEX. SHARP, JR.,
Lieutenant, Commanding.

The COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF U. S. NAVAL FORCES, *North Atlantic Station.*

In connection with the defeat of Cervera's squadron on the 3d of July, the following pages from the report of the Spanish Lieutenant Jose Muller y Tejeiro, will be found interesting.

XXVI.

SORTIE OF THE FLEET.

If I were to live a thousand years and a thousand centuries, never should I forget that 3d day of July, 1898, nor do I believe that Spain will ever forget it. The day dawned beautifully. One of those summer days when not the slightest breath of air stirs the leaves of the trees, when not the smallest cloud is visible in the skies; when not the slightest vapor fills the atmosphere, which was wonderfully transparent, so that the horizon could be observed at a great distance.

Nothing special was to be noticed among the ships of our fleet; motionless on the quiet waters of the bay, that reflected their hulls, though inverted, with wonderful accuracy, they looked as though they ought not to leave an anchoring place where they could remain in such perfect safety.

It was 8:30. Feeling sure that the ships would not go out, and taking advantage of the chance of getting a horse, for the distance was great, I went to the military hospital to see Mr. Joaquin Bustamente, whom I found a different man, as the saying is. His voice was strong, his eyes bright, and his cheeks flushed. He moved with ease and did not appear to experience any difficulty in doing so. I was agreeably surprised.

Why does one remember things that are really not of great importance? Is it perhaps because they are connected with others that are? I cannot explain it. I only know that I remember, word for word, the conversation that took place between us. It was as follows:

"Is the fleet not going out?" he asked, without giving me a chance to say anything.

"Not just now, I believe, though it is ready to go out. Is it known when the other fleet will arrive?" I said.

"What other fleet?"

"The one that is supposed to come from Spain; they probably know at about what time it may be expected at the mouth of the harbor."

"Don't be simple." (I don't remember whether he called me simple, or innocent, or a fool.) "There is no other fleet; the ships are going out and that is all there is to it. I have a letter from Don Pascual (Admiral Cervera) in which he tells me so."

I remained thunderstruck. I could doubt no longer. I know Admiral Cervera sufficiently well, as does everybody else, to know that he does not say, and still less write, what he does not intend to do.

"Do you think he will go out to-day?" I said.

"I thought he was going even now."

I could not answer. A gunshot which, judging from the direction, could only be from one of the two fleets, left me motionless.

Two or three minutes later a terrific cannonade commenced, such as I have never heard, nor will probably ever hear again, a cannonade more intense than that of June 6th, a thing which I believed impossible, shaking the building, thundering through the air. I could not think coherently. I kept looking at Mr. Bustamente like an imbecile, and he looked at me and didn't say a word. I felt something that commenced at my feet and went up to my head, and my hair must have stood on end. Then suddenly, without taking leave. I went out,

got on my horse and rode down the hill at breakneck speed, and I hardly understand how it was that I did not break my neck. I arrived at the captaincy of the port, where I found them all, from the commander of marine to the last clerk, with emotion painted on every face, and all looking in the direction of the mouth of the harbor, the mountains of which, that had been such a protection to us, and which now prevented us from seeing what was going on outside, we should have liked to grind to powder.

The noise caused by the gunshots which the mountains and valleys echoed was truly infernal and comparable to nothing. An idea may be gained of what it was when it is remembered that over 250 guns, most of them of large caliber and all breach-loading, were firing incessantly. The earth trembled, and very soon Punta Gorda, the Morro and the Socapa took part in the frightful concert, adding the thunder of their guns to the noise of those of the two fleets.

But the firing continued and that is what puzzled me. I thought, taking into account the number and class of hostile ships and of our own, that the catastrophe of the latter must necessarily take place in the very channel of the harbor, which is such a difficult one, even for ships of less length and draft than those which formed our fleet, under normal conditions; how much more, then, when sustaining a battle. A deviation, a change of course ahead of time, an injury to the rudder or the engine, even though slight and momentary, the least carelessness, in a word, might run a ship aground, and such a disaster would cause also the destruction of the other ships that were coming after and which would have collided with the first; the hostile ships might sink the first right there and then; for the same reasons, the disaster of the others becomes inevitable.

To my mind, the going out from Santiago harbor under the circumstances Admiral Cervera did, and as confirmed by the commanders of the ships of the fleet, constitutes the greatest act of valor imaginable, for it meant to go out to certain death, not only with fearlessness, but with a clear head, for a man must be completely master of himself in order to command a ship without becoming excited nor losing his head. One may form an idea of it from the horror which I experienced, who was not in any of the ships, but I knew perfectly well the dangers of the enterprise, which, in my opinion, was impossible.

The day, as I said, was most beautiful and the calm perfect. Therefore, the smoke, far from vanishing, rose up in a straight line. When the first moments of excitement were over and we had somewhat cooled down, we could see perfectly that the smoke from the firing formed four groups more or less distant from each other, but what group did our fleet form? If the one farthest to the west, then no doubt it was not surrounded and had the open sea before it, and

this was a great advantage. If, on the contrary, it formed the second or third, then it was between two fires.

Later on it was noticed that the firing was at a greater distance and decreased in intensity, and that the columns of smoke were moving farther to the west. Had they succeeded in escaping and outwitting the hostile fleet? For the present one thing was certain: Our ships had not gone down in the entrance of the harbor, nor even close to it, and that was of great importance, for the greatest danger was in the channel. Imagine our joy when the Morro advised us by telephone that our fleet was fighting in wing formation and that the enemy did not have the range. Evidently the age of miracles is not over. I will not try to describe what we felt that day — we, at Santiago, who have the honor of belonging to the navy.

I still had the horse at my disposal, and as I remembered the anxiety in which I had left Mr. Bustamente and his delicate state of health, I hastened to bring him the news, which I thought would do him a great deal of good. When I arrived, he knew it already, as everyone else did in Santiago. He had been all over the city. I found him radiant with satisfaction.

I may safely say that the 3d of July was a day of true rejoicing, for, as will be seen later when I relate the events of that day, it was believed that our ships had accomplished their object, although at the cost of the destroyers, the loss of which was already known. And although we felt very sad over the victims there must have been, the result, on the whole, was so brilliant that it surpassed all reasonable expectations.

How great were my consternation and sorrow when, at 6 o'clock in the evening, I saw the pilot Miguel López arrive, his appearance changed and his clothing and shoes wet from the drizzling rain, with the news that he had at his house at Cinco Reales five shipwrecked from the "Maria Teresa" and "Oquendo," worn out and weak; that both ships, on fire, had run aground on the coast close to each other west of Punta Cabrera and about eight miles from the harbor of Santiago, and that a great many more, some wounded and all tired, were on the road.

The "Teresa" and "Oquendo" lost, besides the "Pluton" and "Furor!" What a horrible contrast and what a sad awakening! In the morning I had believed the ships safe and was already thinking of a telegram from Havana announcing their arrival at that port. At night the news of the catastrophe, the full extent of which I did not know even then!

But as my comments and lamentations do not explain what had happened, I will give the news as it was received in the course of the day at the captaincy of the port. It will explain why, for eight hours, we believed at Santiago de Cuba that the Spanish fleet was in safety.

NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

July 3d.—The hostile fleet in sight, about five miles distant.

At 9:45 the Spanish fleet went out. Shortly after, a violent bombardment was heard.

At 10:40 the Morro said: "The Spanish fleet is fighting in wing formation at Punta Cabrera; the enemy does not have the range and it seems as though they would succeed in escaping. The American fleet is composed of the 'Brooklyn,' 'Indiana,' 'Iowa,' 'Texas,' 'Massachusetts,' 'Oregon,' and one yacht. The ships from Aguadores have come to assist in the battle."

At 11:15 no more firing was heard.

At 12:30 the Morro said: "When the fleet went out it did so slowly. After the four large ships had gone out the destroyers went, and all of the American ships fell upon them. Our fleet opposed the attack and the destroyers hurried to join them, but near Punta Cabrera one of them took fire and ran ashore. The other continued to fire and when she saw herself lost she lowered two boats filled with men; one reached the coast, the other was captured. On leaving the destroyer they set it afire and she ran aground burning."

So they are both lost. When our fleet passed Punta Cabrera one of the ships, apparently the "Teresa," went close to the shore and a great deal of smoke was seen. The "Iowa" and "New York" were pursuing her and the others followed them. By this time the hostile ships from Aguadores were already taking part in the fight.

At 2 an English warship was signaled to the south.

At 3 the Morro said that the ships which pursued our fleet were twenty-four in all; fifteen warships, armored and unarmored; the others merchant vessels equipped for war.

At 6:30 the pilot, Miguel López, said that at his house at Cinco Reales, he had five shipwrecked from the "Teresa" and "Oquendo," and they said there must be others at Cabañitas.

The tug "Esmeralda," with the second commander of marine and Ensign Nardiz, with the pilot, López, and ten armed sailors, went out to gather them up. Forces of the army also went out in the steamer "Colón" to protect those who might be returning by roads and paths along the coast.

At nightfall Colonel Escario's column arrived from Manzanillo.

My friend, Mr. Robert Mason, Chinese consul, who is interested in naval matters, and has a good understanding of everything concerning them, witnessed the battle from the Vigia del Medio, which is the highest mountain in the bay, and overlooks a great part of it. But we must take into account that,

as it is quite distant from the coast, the ships that pass close to it cannot be seen. As soon as he arrived he told me what had happened as he had seen it, and I put it down as he dictated it to me. The following is what I heard from his own lips, word for word, without changing anything in this interesting account:

"The 'Teresa' went out first, then the 'Vizcaya' and 'Colón;' after a somewhat longer interval, the 'Oquendo,' then the destroyers. The Admiral passed the Morro at 9:45. A little to windward of the Morro (west) was the 'Brooklyn.' Opposite the Morro another ship, apparently the 'Massachusetts,' and I could distinguish no other war ships from the Vigia. When the Admiral passed the Morro the hostile ships and the Morro and Socapa opened a violent fire simultaneously; the hostile ships that could not be seen and that were at Aguadores also opened fire at the same time. After passing the Morro, the Admiral went west and was lost from sight on account of the Socapa. The 'Vizcaya' followed, and then the other two. In the meantime the destroyers remained in the bay. The Spanish ships were now visible again, the 'Vizcaya' in the lead, the 'Colón,' 'Oquendo,' and 'Maria Teresa,' in line ahead at a certain distance from the American fleet. The Spanish fleet was firing slowly, the American ships lively, so that I did not lose sight again of the Spanish ships, but often of the American ships on account of the smoke. In the meantime the American warships and two yachts were gathered opposite the Socapa, and when the destroyers came out it seemed impossible that they should be able to escape. The fire was horrible from the large guns, as well as from the rapid-fire guns. Nevertheless, the destroyers were lost from sight, but they appeared again, firing from their stern guns. As long as the ships could be distinguished it could not be estimated whether they had received injuries of any kind. When they disappeared from sight, at 10:30, we could see no injuries in the masts or smokestacks, or anything special. At this time we saw all the American ships firing in a westerly direction, and at that hour the 'New York,' which had not yet entered the fight, passed the bay headed westward. When I left the battle I had not seen any ship run aground nor on fire, either Spanish or American."

Before I continue, in order to give a better understanding, I will recall the fact that the coast between Santiago and Punta Cabrera, a stretch of about six miles, forms a kind of bay on which are situated Cabañas and Guaicabón; that Punta Cabrera projects south and is very high land, consequently the ships which are west of it and close to the coast cannot be seen. It is absolutely necessary to remember this in order to understand why it was that the final result of the battle was not seen.

At 9:30 the Spanish fleet started up; first the "Maria Teresa," Admiral Cer-

vera's flagship, the "Vizcaya," then the "Cristóbal Colón," and "Oquendo." Behind these the "Plutón" and "Furor." This was the order of sortie as I learned from the pilots López and Núñez.

The "Brooklyn," "Iowa," "Indiana," "Texas," "Massachusetts," "Oregon," and one yacht were waiting at the mouth of the harbor. The others arrived soon from Aguadores, where they had been, with their engines going and under steam. One of the last ones to arrive was the "New York," which, the same as the "Brooklyn," has a twenty-mile speed.

The Spanish ships, which necessarily had to go out in line-ahead, received, as each went out, the fire of all the American ships, which they could not answer until they had passed the bank of Diamante, because they could not present the broadside, consequently their guns, to the enemy. Therefore, as long as they were inside of the harbor, they all sustained a terrible fire.

Nevertheless, they came out without serious injuries and reached the open sea. The "Vizcaya," which was the fastest ship, but had not had her bottom cleaned, was making only thirteen miles, and the other ships had to regulate their speed by hers in order to preserve the line.

I suppose, from what happened, and taking into account the order of the sortie, that Admiral Cervera intended to protect the retreat of the "Vizcaya," accompanied by the "Colón" (which did not have her turret guns mounted), with the "Oquendo" and "Maria Teresa," and then have the latter, by putting on forced draft, rejoin the former, but both were set on fire by the stern, which they presented to the hostile fire, and they were soon converted into one immense blaze and went aground on the coast, the "Teresa" about seven miles from Santiago harbor, west of Punta Cabrera, then close to her the "Oquendo." These events I learned at nightfall from the shipwrecked who had arrived. The fate of the "Vizcaya" and "Cristóbal Colón"—I will anticipate, in order to complete the account of what happened to the whole fleet as it was told me by an officer of the Austrian cruiser "Maria Teresa" (same name as ours) the next day.

When the "Oquendo" and "Teresa" had been lost, two or three American ships remained there to consummate the surrender and gather up the shipwrecked and wounded and take the others prisoners. The other ships continued to pursue the "Vizcaya" and the "Colón." The first of the two also took fire at the stern and stranded at a distance of about twenty miles (toward Aserraderos); the second did not take fire. Probably her engine was damaged and she ran up on the coast about sixty miles distant (off Tarquino).

Such was the hecatomb (for there is no other name for it) of our ill-fated fleet, and I do not believe that history records another like it. Not a single ship was saved from the catastrophe. The commanders and officers of all the

ships knew well what was going to happen, when, calm and serene in spite of everything and ready to do their duty fully, they took leave of each other and of their comrades who remained on shore, as they did not belong to the fleet.

A person who has witnessed and seen with his own eyes an event like the one which I have in vain tried to describe, must necessarily be of interest, even though of little prominence and education. For that reason I have had the pilots Miguel López and Apolonio Núñez, who took out the "Teresa" and "Oquendo," respectively, repeat to me a hundred times what they had seen. I shall not copy everything they said; that would be too much of a task, but only what relates to the battle and which gives an idea of that veritable hell, for that is what the mouth of Santiago harbor was for fifteen minutes.

Miguel López, who is cool-headed and daring on land as well as on the sea, said to me about as follows:

"I was in the forward tower by the side of Admiral Cervera, who was as calm as though he had been at anchor in his own cabin, and was observing the channel and the hostile ships and only said these words:

" 'Pilot, when can we shift the helm?' He had reference to turning to starboard, which could only be done after we had passed Diamante bank. After a few seconds he said.

" 'Pilot, advise me when we can shift the helm.'

" 'I will advise you, Admiral,' I answered.

" A few moments later I said: 'Admiral, the helm may be shifted now.'

"In a moment the Admiral, without shouting, without becoming excited, as calm as usual, said: 'To starboard,' and the next minute, 'Fire!' At the same moment, simultaneously, the two guns of the turret and those of the port battery fired on a ship which seemed to me to be the 'Indiana.' I thought the ship was sinking. I cannot tell you, Don José, all that passed. By this time there were already many dead and wounded in the battery, because they had been firing on us for some time, and I believe that in spite of the water that was in the ship she was already on fire then. The Admiral said to me:

" 'Good-by, pilot; go now; go, and be sure you let them pay you, because you have earned it well.' And he continued to give orders."

These were, more or less, the words that Miguel López spoke to me, and which he repeats to anyone who wishes to hear them.

Apolonio Núñez, who took out the "Oquendo," is very different from López, not daring, but rather easily frightened. These were his impressions:

"When we arrived at Santa Catalina battery, they were already firing. There was a hail of bullets on board which cannot be compared to anything. I was in the tower looking after the course of the ship. The commander, who

is very kind, and who knew me because I had taken the ship in on the 19th, said to me:

“‘You can go, pilot; we can get along now, and later on perhaps you will not be able to go.’ I thanked him and should have gone gladly enough, I can tell you, but I was afraid they might shift the helm before they passed *Diamante*, and you can imagine Don José, what would have happened. I remained on board, and when we had passed the bank I said to him: ‘Commander, you can shift the helm.’

“‘Go, pilot, go,’ he said, and then he commanded to put to starboard and shouted, ‘Fire!’ The noise caused by the big forward gun and the shaking of the ship made more impression on me than the fire of the Yankees. I thought the ‘*Oquendo*’ had been cut in two. I do not even want to remember it. I was lowered in a boat and then I thought I was a dead man. The bullets were falling all around me. Finally I reached *Estrella Cove*, where Miguel López had already arrived. I did not even dare look at the battle, which was now outside of the harbor.”

These two accounts, which, perhaps, do not inspire the interest which no doubt they possess, because I have not been able to remember the exact words of the men, although in substance they are the same, may give an idea of that never-to-be-forgotten sortie which had such fatal consequences.

I supposed that the American fleet would await the Spanish fleet at the mouth of the harbor and absolutely prevent it from going out, under penalty of having the ships attacked. But that requires a great deal of courage and presence of mind. Nevertheless, it would have been the safest means for accomplishing it. By not doing so they exposed themselves to being outwitted and this is proved by the fact that our ships succeeded in getting out of the harbor and as far as *Punta Cabrera* (about six miles), so that they really accomplished the most difficult part, and there is no doubt that if they had not been set on fire and if they had had a speed of even eighteen miles they would have run the blockade.

It will also have been noticed that the three ships built in Spain all had the same fate; they were burned. The one built in Italy, although not having the turret guns, and which had suffered from the hostile fire much longer, because she “died” later than the others, was not burned; she had a different fate, but not that. I believe I am not bold in affirming that if the four ships had been protected like the “*Colón*,” they would have outwitted the enemy’s pursuit. In that event they might have reached *Havana*, for as the whole, or nearly the whole, American fleet was in front of *Santiago*, they would have met no one to prevent them and the situation would have been very different.

A few of the shipwrecked arrived in the tug "Colón," and were embarked by our commander of marine in the cruiser "Reina Mercedes."

The tug "Esmeralda," with Ensign Nardiz, ten armed sailors, and the pilot López, went to Cabañitas Cove to gather up shipwrecked; but, although they made a careful search, they found none.

At night Colonel Escario's column, whose forces have already been mentioned, arrived from Manzanillo. The next day General Escario told me that when he heard the fire of the battle in the morning, he proceeded with a small vanguard to the heights of the harbor of Bayamo, and that the detachment there told him the same thing, viz., that they saw our ships run the blockade and disappear past Punta Cabrera.

To my mind there is nothing so interesting and eloquent as the account of a naval battle by persons who have taken part in it. Lieutenants Bustamante and Caballero, second in command of the destroyers "Furor" and "Plutón," respectively, who escaped by a miracle from the horrible hecatomb, in which the greater part of their crews perished, told me two days after the catastrophe, still sick and tired, of the battle which their ships sustained. Their accounts follow:

Mr. Caballero.—"The last ships were already outside of the harbor when the destroyers, which had stopped between the Socapa and Cay Smith for the purpose of getting up steam, proceeded and passed through the channel as far as Punta Morrillo, where the 'Furor,' which was in the lead, put to port as though trying to go east, but when she discovered the 'Gloucester' and other ships which were near Aguadores, she put to starboard, following the lead of our fleet, which was already at some distance, opening fire on the 'Gloucester' which we (the two destroyers) had left astern. And the 'Indiana,' 'Oregon,' 'Iowa,' and 'Texas,' which we had passed in the order named on the port hand, continued to fire very rapidly, which made it extremely difficult for us to serve the guns. After we had passed Cabañas we commenced to gain on the 'Furor,' and when we came up with her and were about fifty meters to starboard, she listed rapidly on that side, her rudder having been disabled, and passed astern of us at a distance of one meter, and sank by the stern, standing up almost vertically, and was buried in the sea a moment later, before reaching Punta Cabrera.

"As we (the 'Plutón') were making a great deal of water we continued close to the shore to reach Punta Cabrera, and when we were close to the headland which it forms, we received a thirty-two centimeter projectile, which exploded the forward group of boilers, blowing up the whole deck and cutting off communication between the two ends. She then veered to starboard and

struck on the headland, tearing off a great part of the bow. The shock threw her back some distance, then she struck again. I jumped into the water and reached the shore.

"I climbed up on the headland of Punta Cabrera and lay there for about fifteen minutes, during which the fire continued. When it was at an end I went into the mountains and gathered up such personnel of the ship as I met — about twenty or twenty-five — and with them I went around a small hill for the purpose of hiding from the coast and took the road to Santiago de Cuba, avoiding the roads and seeking the densest thickets and woods. The pilot, on pretext that the road which I was following was not a good one, left us and did not again put in an appearance. We continued walking in an easterly direction — some clothed, others naked, and the rest half clothed — for two hours, resting now and then and trying to keep close to the coast. When we reached the beach we met Lieutenant Bustamente with a group of shipwrecked from the 'Furor' (his ship) and some from the 'Maria Teresa.' We saw a yacht with the English flag close to the coast maneuvering back of Punta Cabrera, as though trying to gather up the shipwrecked there. We made signals to her with a shirt, and seeing that she paid no attention to us we walked on, avoiding the formation of large groups and hiding ourselves as much as possible.

"About 3:30 we reached the harbor of Cabañas, which we had to cross swimming, and on the opposite shore, about 9 o'clock at night, we reached the trenches of the Socapa, where at last we could rest for the night, with the assistance of some guerrillas, who supplied us with what they could."

Mr. Bustamente.—"When we (the 'Furor') reached the mouth of the harbor and saw the Spanish fleet we thought that by shaping our course westward we could seek the protection of the Spanish fleet, which was already at some distance, and we maneuvered accordingly. One of the projectiles struck one of the hatches of the boiler ventilators, thereby reducing the pressure and consequently the speed of the ship. By this time the projectiles were falling on board in large numbers. One of the shells struck Botswain Dueñas, cutting him in two; one part fell between the tiller-ropes, interrupting them momentarily, and it was necessary to take it out in pieces. Another projectile destroyed the engine and the servo-motor, so that the ship could neither proceed nor maneuver. Another had struck the after shellroom, exploding and destroying it.

Our torpedoes had their warheads on and were ready to be used, but we did not launch them because we were never at a convenient distance from the enemy. Under these circumstances, the commander of the destroyers, Captain

Fernando Villamil, gave orders to abandon the ship, and I, with part of the crew, jumped into the water, about three miles from the coast. In the water, one of the men near me, I believe the first boatswain, was struck by a bullet in the head and was buried in the water forever. The ship, in the meantime, after a horrible series of explosions, went down. When we reached the land we went in an easterly direction toward Santiago. Shortly after we met Lieutenant Caballero and with him and his men we reached Santiago, and following the same road and the same fortunes; as they are identical, I will not here relate them."

To what has been said it is useless to add another word.

CAUSES OF THE LOSS OF THE NAVAL BATTLE OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA.

Words fail me to describe the painful impression produced upon me by the disaster of the four cruisers and two destroyers under Admiral Cervera's command, and by what I may call the hecatomb of their crews, which was not complete for the only reason that the battle had taken place so near the shore, where the ships, all on fire, could run aground, rather than surrender to the enemy. In less than two hours the ships were destroyed, and yet, this is not strange. I am surprised, on the contrary, that they were not sunk in the channel.

The loss of the fleet had been foretold by all its commanders, with whom I have talked more than once, and was prophesied, so to speak, as soon as the order was received at the Cape Verde Islands to start for Cuba, and the Admiral, who was in command, advised the Government to that effect several times; these official communications are still in existence. But it seems that public opinion in the island of Cuba, especially at Havana, required the presence of the fleet in those waters, and between that and the very sensible and logical reasons advanced by the Admiral, the Government decided in favor of the former, and the fleet departed, shaping its course to the west. From that moment the loss of the fleet became inevitable, and it was only a question of time, as will be easily understood from what follows.

The fleet left the Cape Verde Islands with no more coal than was in the bunkers, the greater part of which must necessarily be used up during the voyage across the Atlantic ocean. The three destroyers, "Plutón," "Furor," and "Terror," accompanied it and had to be convoyed and supplied with coal, which involved difficulties and delays.

At Martinique (where the "Terror" was left, being no longer able to follow the fleet) the ships could not coal; and at Curaçao, in spite of the Govern-

ment's promise that they were to find a ship there with fuel, which did not put in an appearance, only two of the ships could get a small number of tons.

The order to proceed to the island of Cuba was there; what could they do under such circumstances? The only natural and logical thing: go to the harbor that was nearest and for that reason offered the least dangers, go to Santiago de Cuba, which Admiral Cervera believed well defended, as the harbor is suited for that purpose, and supplied with provisions. How great was his surprise when he found that only two guns worthy of the name defended its entrance, and that provisions were lacking in the city, as well as ammunition and everything else.

I have already stated, and will here repeat it, that during those days of May, before the hostile fleet appeared with forces superior to ours (that is, from the 20th to the 27th) the ships could not go out, not only because they did not have coal enough, but also because there was considerable swell in the sea, which prevented them from going out, as was stated by the pilots of the locality, who said that the ships were almost sure to touch bottom, especially the "Colón," which drew more water than the others.

We must take into account, for it means everything for a fleet, that they had not cleaned their bottoms for a long time and their speed was, therefore, far from what it should have been; the "Vizcaya," above all, was not able to make thirteen miles, and later, after being in Santiago harbor for forty-six days, her speed was reduced to even less.

But even if there had been no swell in the sea to the south and the ships could have gone out, where would they have gone? To Havana by the shortest route? They would have met Sampson's fleet, as Admiral Cervera knew only too well, and that was just what he wished to avoid. Perhaps, he might have succeeded by taking a course which he would have been least expected to take, through Providence channel, for instance; and this did occur to Admiral Cervera, but it was impossible, for the simple reason that he did not have fuel enough for so many days of navigation.

Moreover, when the fleet reached Santiago harbor, everybody there, as well as in the peninsula, believed it safe and congratulated its commander on his success and his clever maneuver; and when I say "everybody" I do not mean the common people only, but the official element. Could there be a better proof that Admiral Cervera complied with the wishes of the Government?

The fleet received definite order from the Captain-General of the island of Cuba to leave the harbor of Santiago, which he reiterated, in spite of Admiral Cervera's remonstrances. After that, what was to be done? Only one thing; go out, as, indeed, they did, resigned, but calm and serene, those heroes; for

all those who went out with the fleet to certain death, as every one knew, deserve that name. And I say that they went out calm and serene, and shall say it a thousand times, for only thus can ships be maneuvered in so narrow and dangerous a channel, without any of them running aground, which can happen so easily even under ordinary circumstances, when it is not necessary to oppose the fire of a hostile fleet, and with ships of less draught and length. The sortie from that harbor, under the circumstances under which those ships effected it, I do not hesitate in calling the greatest act of valor, fearlessness, skill, intelligence and practical experience in seamanship that can be conceived. This was stated repeatedly and with great admiration by the commanders and officers of the English corvette "Alert" and the Austrian cruiser "Maria Teresa," who, it may be said, witnessed the battle.

The number of ships that were awaiting ours at the mouth of the harbor, and with which the latter had to fight, as well as their nature and the kind of armament they mounted, was given in one of the first chapters, from statistics of the American Navy. This alone is more than sufficient to demonstrate that, in view of the inferiority of ours in quantity and quality, it was impossible to sustain the battle.

But there is more, much more, to be added in order to explain what happened in the naval battle of Santiago de Cuba, the greater part of which is not known by the people in Spain.

I have already stated that the "Colón," the only really protected ship of the four that composed the fleet, did not have her turret guns. Of the 14-cm. guns of the "Teresa," "Oquendo," and "Vizcaya," which are the ones that do most of the firing in a battle, six had been declared useless; and while the "Teresa" could change hers, the "Oquendo" and "Vizcaya" could not do so, and had to fight, the former with one, the latter with two, useless guns, as I have stated.

Moreover, the supply of ammunition for all of the ships was inadequate, and the "Teresa" had seventy useless charges. The greater part of the primers were no good, and consequently the guns did not go off. The breech-plugs were imperfect, so that after the second or third shot they no longer closed. The firing-pins blew out, and from many of the survivors of the "Oquendo" and "Teresa" I have learned that a number of the men serving the guns were wounded by their own pieces. Therefore, if the whole thing were not so sad and serious, it might be said that the guns of our ships were like the "carbine of Ambrosius," which went off at the breech; that is, that far from injuring the enemy, they were a danger to those who had charge of firing them.

The majority of the cartridge cases did not have the required diameter, and

on the "Maria Teresa" it happened that seven had to be discarded before one good one could be found. Under these conditions, it will be readily understood that the armament, which was intended to be converted into rapid-fire artillery, was instead converted into artillery—I do not know what to call it, but it was certainly entirely useless.

After what has been stated, can the result of the battle of Santiago be wondered at? Certainly not. The only thing that may appear strange is that, under such conditions, a fleet should have been sent to the scene of war.

It was under these circumstances that the sortie was made from the difficult harbor of Santiago by those commanders and officers who, convinced that they would all perish, contented themselves with saying farewell to the comrades who remained on shore and whom they never expected to see again.

We Spanish are very proud of the disaster of Trafalgar on account of the heroism which our navy showed on that occasion, when they placed honor above everything else, though our ships were buried in the sea. The battle of Santiago de Cuba is much more glorious even than that of 1805. In this latter battle, thirty-two allied ships of 64, 80, and 120 guns fought with twenty-eight English ships, also of 120, 80, and 64 guns; the forces, therefore, were almost equal; and if the battle was lost, while it might very well have been won, it was because our fleet was commanded by Villeneuve, and the hostile fleet by Nelson. In the battle of Santiago, six ships (if the "Plutón" and "Furor" may be called such), had to fight against twenty-four that were better protected and armed. After these figures, anything else that might be added would appear to be useless.

I have never been able to understand the reason why there was sent to the island of Cuba a fleet that was in no manner able to cope with that of the United States, and which, therefore, could in no wise prevent the ships of the latter from blockading our ports and controlling the sea; but since it was sent, without its arrival being able to prevent the loss of the island, which was lost, as experience has shown, from the very moment when war was accepted, owing to the conditions prevailing there, then it should have been prevented from being destroyed, as it was, without resulting in any advantage whatever.

The only way of gaining any advantage would have been, in my opinion, taking advantage of the fact that all the hostile ships were in Cuba, to send a few ships of great speed, more or less well armed, to the commercial ports of the United States and bombard them, even though not very effectively. It is probable that public opinion, especially of those who did not participate in the war, would have exacted the return of the ships, and then the Spanish fleet could have left Santiago in perfect safety, and a catastrophe would have been avoided which has brought us no advantage. At the same time, the ports of

the island, freed from the blockade, could have supplied themselves with provisions; and although the final result would probably have been the same, it would not have been so immediate.

The following, taken from a German report of the naval battle at Santiago, explains in some measure the defeat of the Spanish fleet:

In order to be able to realize the complete defeat of the Spanish fleet it is necessary to call clearly to mind its situation in Santiago harbor. Cervera had entered the harbor on May 19th. As early as May 27th five hostile cruisers with several gunboats and auxiliary cruisers were observed in front of the harbor, and there was no longer any doubt that the whole American battle fleet was blockading the harbor. Then followed the bombardments of Morro Castle and the Socapa, several shells falling into the bay, and the Spanish ships retreated closer to the city. On June 3d the "Merrimac" was sunk, but the entrance remained unobstructed. On June 22d occurred the landing of the American troops, who on July 1st attacked the fortifications of the city. Five hundred men of the landing corps of the Spanish ships took part in the defense and are said to have fought very valiantly.

The Government authorities at Havana were very anxious to have the fleet leave the harbor, in order to remove the main object of the attack upon Santiago; for the ships had been the cause of the blockade and of the attack on the unprepared city. Hence it was imperative that the ships should leave. It is probable that ever since the middle of June this had been suggested to Admiral Cervera by the authorities at Havana; but the Admiral appears to have declared that it was impossible to make an attempt to run the blockade at night. Whether direct orders were finally given to leave the harbor under all circumstances I have not been able to ascertain.

Admiral Cervera was in a very difficult position. He was expected to act in some manner. He did not dare make the attempt at night, and so he decided to go out with his fleet in broad daylight. The whole crew fell a victim to this fatal decision. Instructions for the order of the sortie and the taking of the western course had been previously issued by the chief of the fleet. According to the *Revista General de Marina*, Vol. XI, No. 3, August, 1898, the Admiral was entirely convinced of the impossibility of defeating the enemy or of reaching another Cuban harbor, even if he should succeed in steaming right through the hostile fleet. It is to this feeling of helplessness and impotence as against the American naval forces more than to anything else that I attribute the defeat. The Spanish ships had spent a month and a half in the harbor without even attempting to attack the blockading fleet when a favorable



ON THE FIRING LINE.



CAPTAIN CHADWICK.

opportunity presented itself, or even of harassing it. The two torpedo-boat destroyers were not used for the purpose for which they were intended. This inactivity and lack of initiative must have had a very demoralizing effect on the officers and men. If we add to this the certain knowledge that the opposing forces were much stronger, it will be readily understood that the idea of general flight after coming out of the harbor entrance was the only acceptable one, especially in view of the possibility of beaching the ships, thereby rendering them unserviceable, and eventually rescuing the crews. From the very moment that this feeling of impotence took possession of the Spanish and led to the above reflections, their fate psychologically speaking, was sealed. We do not mean to disparage their valor and tenacity in the midst of the hostile fire; but, on the other hand, it is quite natural that the Admiral, seeing that everything was happening as he had foreseen, was the one who set the example of running his ship ashore. All the other commanders followed this example.

On the American side the situation was just the reverse. Admiral Sampson's fleet was fully conscious of its power. The blockade was being conducted in accordance with carefully prepared plans, as were also the arrangements in case of the enemy's attempt to escape. Frequent engagements with the Spanish forts had given commanders and crews that calm and assurance in the handling of their weapons which guarantees success. The long blockade service, exhausting and monotonous, hardly interrupted by any action on the part of the Spanish, had strung the nerves to the highest pitch, and everybody was anxious for the end to come. Suddenly the enemy attempts to escape. All the passions that had been smoldering under the ashes break forth. The welcome opportunity for settling accounts with the enemy had come at last, and with a wild rush the American ships fell upon their victims. At the beginning the American fire, owing to the excitement of the personnel and the great distances, was probably not very effective; but when the Spanish Admiral turned to westward and the other ships followed him the moral superiority of the Americans reasserted itself. The commanders, calm and cool-headed, had their ships follow the same course, and the Americans, having every advantage on their side, recommenced the fire on the fleeing ships, which soon resulted in their total annihilation.

I have already spoken of the lack of training of the Spanish crews, the neglect of gun and torpedo target practice, the inadequate education of the commanders of the ships and torpedo-boat destroyers. It is mainly due to these deficiencies that the defeat was hastened and that the American ships sustained so few losses. Furthermore, there can be no excuse for having allowed the cruiser "Cristobal Colon" to leave Spain without her heavy armament. It has also been stated that the rapid-fire guns of this cruiser were

unserviceable, so that she was really completely defenseless. The training of the engine personnel also was totally unreliable, which is not surprising in view of the fact that the Spanish ships, as a rule, are not sent out on extensive cruises. The bottoms of the Spanish ships had not been cleaned for a long time, and as they had been lying in Santiago harbor for a month and a half they were considerably fouled. Thus the cruisers "Maria Teresa," "Oquendo," and "Vizcaya," which in all official books are credited with eighteen and a half knots speed, went into the battle with a speed of from ten to twelve knots at most, and the "Cristobal Colon," which is the latest ship and was to run twenty knots, hardly attained a speed of thirteen and a half. Under these circumstances, in every way unfavorable to the Spanish, whose crews were insufficiently trained and physically and morally enervated by long inactivity, whose ships were inferior in number, speed, and fighting efficiency, it is no wonder that the victory of the Americans was easy and paid for with insignificant sacrifices.

There was only one chance for the success of the sortie. It should have been made at night in scattered formation. After a personal investigation of the locality, it is my opinion that it is entirely practicable for a fleet to leave Santiago harbor at night. The wreck of the "Merrimac" did not constitute an obstruction. It is true that Admiral Sampson's report on the night of the blockade states that the light-ships were lying from one to two miles from Morro Castle, according to the state of the atmosphere, and that they lighted up the channel for half a mile inside. Even the best search light, however, does not reach farther than one mile. Therefore, the illumination could not have been very effective. Moreover, the shore batteries, by opening fire upon the light-ships, could have compelled them to change their positions; but, strange to say, this was never done. The dark nights at the time of the new moon, about the middle of June, would have been best suited for the enterprise. Besides, the four vessels of the fleet, two large Spanish merchant vessels lying in Santiago harbor might have been taken out in order to deceive the enemy. The six vessels, with lights darkened, should have followed each other out of the harbor entrance, in predetermined order, as fast as possible. They should then have steered different courses, previously determined, with orders not to fight except when compelled to do so by the immediate vicinity of the hostile ship or when there was no possibility of escaping the enemy in the darkness. A rendezvous should have been fixed for the next day, where the ships that succeeded in escaping were to assemble.

If the fleet did not dare attempt a night sortie and was nevertheless compelled to leave the harbor in obedience to orders, then the ships should have been headed straight at the enemy. All weapons, including the torpedo and

the ram, should have been used. A bold attack in close formation was the only chance of success against the superior hostile fighting forces, who would hardly have found time to form their lines.

I shall not attempt to discuss at length all the lessons which may be derived from the battle, because this would lead too far. I will only enumerate them, and confine myself to dwelling a little more fully on those which are of the greatest importance for practical service.

- (a) Abolition of all woodwork.
- (b) No unprotected torpedo tubes.
- (c) Protection for all gun crews against shell fire.
- (d) Protection of the fire-extinguishing apparatus against shell fire.
- (e) Smokeless powder; greatest possible simplicity in the service of the guns and the greatest possible rapidity of fire.
- (f) Good speed of the ships under normal conditions.
- (g) Thorough training of the crews in all branches of the service.

The last two are the most important. A ship may show very brilliant results at the trial trip and be credited with the greatest speed in the different books on the navies of all nations; but for the officer who is to command the ship in battle this is not a criterion from which to judge of her efficiency. Frequent trial trips under full steam, making it possible to discover and cure defects of the machinery in time of peace, and familiarizing the personnel with the functioning of the vessel in all its details, can alone give the commander an idea of what he may expect of his ship in battle. Extensive cruises at war speed should also be made, in order that the personnel may get an idea of how much more will be required in time of war. This is especially important in the tropics, where the great heat materially affects the physical endurance and efficiency of the boiler and engine personnel.

The most perfect training of the crews in all branches of the service, especially by all kinds of torpedo and gun practice, as nearly as possible under war conditions, is the foundation of success. As I said in Part IV of this work, nothing should be left undone to attain the greatest perfection possible in time of peace. No expense should be spared to enable those who bear the responsibility of the battle—the chiefs of fleets and squadrons, as well as all commanders—thoroughly to test the actual degree of efficiency of their crews by practical exercises, resembling as nearly as possible the operations of actual warfare.

Such exercises will also demonstrate whether the weapons, from a technical standpoint, are equal to all the exigencies of war.

THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

CHAPTER X.

EMBARKATION.

At the approach of hostilities, I had volunteered my services in case of war, and on May 4th, my nomination as major-general was sent to the Senate and was immediately confirmed by that body; I promptly reported for duty, and, on the 9th, I was ordered to report to General Brooke at Chickamauga.

I left Washington on the first through train, and reached General Brooke's headquarters early on the morning of May 11th. This officer had earned a very fine reputation. He is one of the three major-generals in the regular army, and as Governor-General of Cuba has become quite distinguished. He is a large, soldierly-looking man, and impresses those who meet him very favorably.

The next day at 2 o'clock I received the following telegram:

WAR DEPARTMENT, ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, D. C., May 12, 1898 — 1:38 P. M.

Major-General JOSEPH WHEELER, *Chickamauga Battlefield, Ga., care of General Brooke:*

With approval of Secretary of War, major-general commanding directs you to report at Tampa, Fla., to command the cavalry in the expedition now leaving. General Miles leaves here to-night. You should meet him at Tampa soon as possible after his arrival.

H. C. CORBIN,

Adjutant-General.

I hastened to the depot in time to take the 2:07 train, and reached Tampa on the evening of the 13th, pitched my tent with the cavalry, and devoted myself to inspection and other duties which would enable me to become thoroughly familiar with the officers and men, and I soon learned that the division was a body of men of whom any commander might be justly proud.

The concentration of these troops at Tampa was for the purpose of a movement upon Havana, it being believed that the city could be assaulted and captured before the rainy season commenced. The intention was to land the army at Mariel, a point about twenty-six miles west of Havana.

The following dispatches are interesting to show more correctly the military plans at that time:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

WASHINGTON, D. C., May 9, 1898.

The major-general commanding directs that the following orders be sent by telegraph to General Wade, at Tampa:

Direct Major-General Shafter to move his command, under protection of Navy, and seize and hold Mariel, or most important point on north coast of Cuba and where territory is ample to land and deploy army. Follow up his command with all the force sent to you. Troops will be sent you as rapidly as possible from Chickamauga and other points. Have troops fully equipped; send abundance of ammunition and ship with them food for men and animals for sixty days, to be followed by four months' supplies.

J. C. GILMORE,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, May 9, 1898—6:7 P. M.

General WADE, *Commanding Troops at Tampa, Fla.:*

With the approval of the Secretary of War, the major-general commanding directs that General Shafter move his command under protection of Navy and seize and hold Mariel, or most important point on north coast of Cuba, and where territory is ample to land and deploy army. Follow up his command with all the forces sent to you. Troops will be sent you as rapidly as possible from Chickamauga and other points. Have troops fully equipped, send abundance of ammunition, and ship with them food for men and animals for sixty days, to be followed by four months' supplies. Acknowledge receipt.

H. C. CORBIN,

Adjutant-General.

General Shafter's dispatches at this time show that he anticipated difficulty in concentrating a force at Key West on account of the fresh water at that place. These dispatches are as follows:

TAMPA BAY HOTEL, TAMPA, Fla., May 7, 1898 — 3:44 P. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY, *Washington, D. C.:*

Am crowding work of watering and coal transport and put in pen and stall for sortie (stock?). Will have it completed Wednesday sure. Many obstacles to ———.

SHAFTER,
Brigadier-General.

TAMPA BAY HOTEL, TAMPA, Fla., May 7, 1898 — 6:50 P. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY, *War Department, Washington, D. C.:*

Colonel Lawton just returned from Key West. Brings message from Commodore Watson that water is absolutely necessary; that supply on all ships is very short, and that if I can assist him in getting supply it will be a great favor to him. A barge, capacity one hundred thousand gallons, can start in morning for Key West, towed by one of ships under charter. Cost of water two cents per gallon. No tug here for hire. Shall I send it?

SHAFTER,
Brigadier-General.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, May 8, 1898.

General SHAFTER, *Tampa Bay Hotel, Tampa, Fla.:*

Your telegram concerning water supply for Commodore Watson received, and Secretary of War directs you to make every possible effort to furnish anything and everything to help him along. In this and other cases Secretary of War approves any action you take, but desires every such order of yours reported for his information.

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

WASHINGTON, D. C., May 10, 1898.

The major-general commanding directs that the following orders be tele-

graphed General Wade, Tampa, Fla.: That the movement of troops to Cuba is delayed until Monday, May 16, 1898. In the meantime he will send the infantry in the ships, with an abundant supply of water and whatever else is required with them, to Key West, there to disembark. The ships are to return to Tampa to carry more infantry to Key West until there are about 12,000 men there. These will move from Key West to Dry Tortugas and Cuba on ships coming from New York. Also, that General Brooke has been directed to send to Tampa from Chickamauga the Second, Seventh, Eighth, Twelfth, and Sixteenth Infantry. These can be forwarded to Key West by any means available.

J. C. GILMORE,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, May 10, 1898 — 6:35 P. M.

General WADE, *Commanding Troops at Tampa, Fla.:*

Movement of troops to Cuba is delayed until Monday, May 16th. In the meantime you will send infantry in the ships, with an abundant supply of water and whatever else is required with them, to Key West, there to disembark. The ships are to return to Tampa to carry more infantry to Key West until there are about 12,000 men there. These will move from Key West to Dry Tortugas and Cuba on ships coming from New York. General Brooke has been directed to send to Tampa from Chickamauga the Second, Seventh, Eighth, Twelfth, and Sixteenth Infantry. These can be forwarded to Key West by any means available.

By command General Miles.

H. C. CORBIN,

Adjutant-General.

TAMPA BAY HOTEL, TAMPA, Fla., May 11, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL UNITED STATES ARMY, FOR COMMANDING GENERAL, *War Department, Washington, D. C.:*

Water for large body of troops at Key West is serious question. Absolutely no water there. Only water barge from this port, capacity 130,000 gallons, should reach Key West to-morrow with water for Navy, and be back Friday. Transports carry considerable water, but have no way of distillation. Is imperative that water be placed in Key West before troops begin to arrive. Quartermaster-general has been asked to charter, clean, loan, and start 1,000,000 gallons tank steamer with light-draft barge for unloading. Dry

Tortugas reported to have brackish water in cisterns. Am now trying to ascertain quantity and quality. Expect information.

J. F. WADE,

Brigadier-General.

(Received, Washington, 8:12, P. M.)

TAMPA BAY HOTEL, TAMPA, Fla., May 21, 1898 — 11:21 A. M.

Gen. N. A. MILES, *Washington, D. C.:*

On account of difficulty in finding suitable camp ground, with abundant water supply, I have temporarily stopped part of the volunteer regiments at Jacksonville, and placed them under command of General Lawton. The Government will not be subjected to extra expense on account of transportation, nor for supply depots or officer. They will be brought closer to Tampa as soon as possible. The principal difficulty here is water, which must be drawn from wells; surface water can not be used.

SHAFTER,

Major-General

Measures were promptly taken to remedy the deficiency of water, but by this time it had become evident that Admiral Cervera's fleet was in the harbor of Santiago, the movement against Havana was abandoned, and it was determined to send a force of some 5,000 men to the southern coast of Cuba, but further information of the enemy made a further change necessary, and it was determined to direct the efforts of the Government against the Spanish fleet and army at Santiago, it being believed that our Army and Navy combined could capture the Spanish fleet as well as the forces in that part of Cuba.

The following letter from General Miles to the Secretary of War explains the views of the Government at that time:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

WASHINGTON, D. C., May 27, 1898.

The Honorable the SECRETARY OF WAR:

SIR.—Referring to my letter of yesterday, and to our consultation since, I desire to submit the following:

As we are now about to inaugurate active military operations in conjunction with the Navy, I think it would be advisable to load the transports at Tampa with a strong force of infantry and artillery, move them to Key West, and

thence along the northern coast of Cuba, where they would have the full protection of Admiral Sampson's fleet until they reach Admiral Schley's fleet at Santiago de Cuba, and then, by a combined effort of the Army and Navy, capture the harbor, garrison, and possibly the Spanish fleet at that point.

If before reaching Admiral Schley's fleet it shall be found that he has already accomplished the above object, or that the Spanish fleet shall have escaped, I then urge the importance of a combined attack of the Army and Navy upon Porto Rico. We will be able to land a superior force, and I believe that a combined effort will result in capturing the island, with its garrison, provided it is done before it can be re-enforced from Spain. The distance from Key West to Porto Rico is 1,040 miles, and from Cadiz, Spain, to Porto Rico is about 4,000 miles. The possession of Porto Rico would be of very great advantage to the military, as it would cripple the forces of Spain, giving us several thousand prisoners. It could be well fortified, the harbor mined, and would be a most excellent port for our Navy, which could be speedily relieved from any responsibility in the charge of that port, as we could leave a sufficient garrison to hold it against any force that might be sent against it.

Then we should commence, in my judgment, a movement toward the west by capturing the ports along the northern coast of Cuba, at the eastern end, supplying the insurgents with abundance of arms and munitions of war, and as speedily as possible land our cavalry and sufficient light artillery to enable them to move from the harbor of Pto de Nuevitas along the line of railroad to Puerto Principe. From that base our cavalry and light artillery, in conjunction with the forces of Lieutenant-General Garcia and General Gomez, should move west to near Santa Clara. These movements, in my judgment, can all be accomplished during the rainy season, through a country comparatively free from yellow fever, well stocked with cattle, and having grass sufficient for our animals. While this is being accomplished our Volunteer Army will be prepared to land in the vicinity of Mariel, Havana, or Matanzas in sufficient force to complete the capture or destruction of the Spanish forces upon the Island of Cuba. The advantage of this movement will be that the Army and Navy will act in concert and close unison; that it does not divide our Navy, and that it will utilize our most available military force in the best way during the time of the year when military operations are most difficult.

I believe that the entrance to the port of Cienfuegos can be obstructed or blockaded by one or two monitors to better advantage than to send the Army there, where it would have to meet a strong garrison, which is already there, and also of the forces that can be quickly sent there by rail directly from Havana and Matanzas.

If the above plan is approved, troops could be ordered to embark on the

transports immediately, and the purpose would be the occupation of Spanish territory, first, by moving our troops as speedily as possible to Santiago de Cuba and Porto Rico, and later to the north coast of Cuba, especially our cavalry. This military occupation to continue until hostilities cease.

Very respectfully,

NELSON A. MILES,

Major-General Commanding.

With great energy the Government had secured thirty-six transports, all of which arrived at Port Tampa about May 1st; and with great rapidity they were arranged for transportation of troops, horses and munitions of war. Major-General Shafter was selected to command the expedition. His instructions were contained in the following letter, dated May 31:

WAR DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON, *May 31, 1898* — 2:30 A. M.

Major-General WILLIAM R. SHAFTER, *Tampa, Fla.:*

With the approval of the Secretary of War, you are directed to take your command on transports, proceed under convoy of the Navy to the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, land your force at such place east or west of that point as your judgment may dictate, under the protection of the Navy, and move it onto the high ground and bluffs overlooking the harbor or into the interior, as shall best enable you to capture or destroy the garrison there, and cover the Navy as it sends its men in small boats to remove torpedoes, or, with the aid of the Navy, capture or destroy the Spanish fleet now reported to be in Santiago harbor. You will use the utmost energy to accomplish this enterprise, and the Government relies upon your good judgment as to the most judicious use of your command, but desires to impress upon you the importance of accomplishing this object with the least possible delay. You can call to your assistance any of the insurgent forces in that vicinity and make use of such of them as you think advisable to assist you, especially as scouts, guides, et cetera. You are cautioned against putting too much confidence in any persons outside of your own troops. You will take every precaution against ambuscade or surprises or positions that may have been mined or are commanded by the Spanish forces. You will co-operate most earnestly with the naval forces in every way, agreeing beforehand upon a code of signals. Communicate your instructions to Admiral Sampson and Commodore Schley. On completion of this enterprise, unless you receive other orders or deem it advisable to remain

in the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, re-embark your troops and proceed to the harbor of Pto de Banes, reporting by the most favorable means for further orders and future important service — this with the understanding that your command has not sustained serious loss and that the above harbor is safe for your transports and convoy. When will you sail?

By command of Major-General Miles:

H. C. CORBIN,

Adjutant-General.

On June 1st General Miles arrived at Tampa to assist in the prompt dispatch of this expedition. The following was sent General Shafter on June 4th:

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, June 4, 1898 — 6:15 P. M.

Major-General SHAFTER, *Tampa, Fla.:*

Admiral Sampson cables to-day: " 'Merrimac' in channel. Cervera, with four ships and two torpedo boats, in harbor safely bottled up. He urges immediate aid from your troops. He reports 7,000 men intrenched in Juraquacito and Daiquiri; 5,000 at Morron de Cuba; 4,000 at other points; in bay 500, with small Hotchkiss gun. Cervera sent flag of truce opprobriously to exchange prisoners for Naval Constructor Hobson and seven men who unharmed with him on 'Merrimac,' were taken prisoners, in recognition of their bravery. We are sure Cervera is there."

ALGER,

Secretary of War.

To this dispatch General Shafter replied as follows:

TAMPA, Fla., June 4-5, 1898 — 6:32 A. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY, *Washington, D. C.:*

Replying to your dispatch that President wishes report of the situation, I have to say that everything possible is being done to get away, but delays occur that can not be prevented or foreseen. Siege guns have only been assembled late this evening. They will be loaded on cars to-night and sent to transports early in the morning and the loading rushed. Will begin putting men on to-morrow, P. M., if possible, and be ready to start Monday night or Tuesday morning. The last of the troops from Chickamauga are expected to-night. Officers engaged in loading transports have worked night and day. The main cause for delay has been the fact that great quantities of stores have

been rushed in promiscuously, and with no facilities to handle or store them. The last ten miles before reaching the wharf is a single track and very narrow place in which to work. The capacity of this place has been greatly exceeded. Could have put the troops on and rushed them off, but not properly equipped, as I know the President wishes them. I will not delay a minute longer than is absolutely necessary to get my command in condition, and start the earliest moment possible.

SHAFTER,

Major-General.

The following telegrams are given to show the progress of events during this campaign:

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, *June 5, 1898 — 12 NOON.*

Major-General SHAFTER, *Tampa, Fla.:*

Your telegram of 6:45 this morning shown to the President, with which he expressed his satisfaction, with every confidence that you are doing everything for the best. I would like to have a telegram at 6 o'clock this evening of the situation.

H. C. CORBIN,

Adjutant-General.

TAMPA, Fla., *June 5, 1898 — 12:24 P. M.*

The SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington, D. C.:*

This expedition has been delayed through no fault of anyone connected with it. It contains the principal part of the Army, which for intelligence and efficiency is not exceeded by any body of troops on earth. It contains fourteen of the best conditioned regiments of volunteers, the last of which arrived this morning. Yet these have never been under fire. Between 30 and 40 per cent. are undrilled, and in one regiment over 300 men have never fired a gun. I request ample protection at all times for this command from the Navy. This enterprise is so important that I desire to go with this army corps or to immediately organize another and go with it to join this and capture position number 2. Now that the military is about to be used, I believe it should be continued with every energy, making the most judicious disposition of it to accomplish the desired result.

MILES,

Major-General Commanding Army.

TAMPA, Fla., June 6, 1898 — 2:37 P. M.

SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington, D. C.:*

In telegram sent to you yesterday morning please substitute words "while on sea" for "at all times" after word "protection."

MILES,

Major-General Commanding.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON, June 6, 1898.

SIR.—This Department has received from Admiral Sampson, off Santiago de Cuba, a telegram from which the following is an extract: "Very important we should know immediately whether the army expedition has sailed for Santiago and its number of vessels." You are respectfully requested to give information on the above points as soon as practicable, in order that it may be communicated to the Admiral. It is respectfully urged that the expedition should get off as soon as possible. The naval force is all ready to convoy it.

Very respectfully,

CHAS. H. ALLEN,

The Honorable the SECRETARY OF WAR,

Acting Secretary.

TAMPA, Fla., June 6, 1898 — 11:40 P. M.

Hon. R. A. ALGER, *Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.:*

Troops have been marching on board to-day and will continue all night. General Shafter hopes to sail to-morrow night or next day. There is siege artillery here and more will arrive before No. 2 can be ready. There should be a few regiments well equipped at Camp Alger.

MILES,

Major-General.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1898.

To Major-General SHAFTER or Major-General MILES, *Tampa, Fla.:*

Secretary of Navy has received this dispatch from Sampson to-day: "Bombarded forts at Santiago 7:30 to-day, June 6. Have silenced works quickly without injury of any kind, though stationed within 3,000 yards. If 10,000 men were here, city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every

consideration demands immediate army movement. If delayed, city will be defended more strongly by guns taken from the fleet."

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1898.

Major-General SHAFTER, *Port Tampa, Fla.:*

Since telegraphing you, an hour since, the President directs you to sail at once with what force you have ready.

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

TAMPA, Fla., June 7, 1898 — 9 P. M.

SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington:*

I will sail to-morrow morning. Steam can not be gotten up earlier. There is loaded to-night one division of infantry (9 regiments), 16 companies of dismounted cavalry, 4 light batteries, 2 siege batteries artillery, 2 companies of engineers, and the troops from Mobile. I will try and get on the rest of the cavalry and another division of regular infantry by morning. I will sail then with whatever I have on board.

SHAFTER,

Major-General.

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, June 7, 1898.

General SHAFTER, *Tampa, Fla.:*

About how many men will you have ready by morning?

CORBIN,

Adjutant-General.

PORT TAMPA, Fla. (direct), June 7, 1898 — 10:15 P. M.

Adjutant-General CORBIN:

I expect to have 834 officers, 16,154 men on transports by daylight and will sail at that hour. Will wire particulars before starting.

SHAFTER,

TAMPA, Fla., June 7, 1898 — 9:34 P. M.

The PRESIDENT, *Washington*:

From the Commanding General down to the drummer boys, everyone is impatient to go, and annoyed at the delay. The last of the troops from Chickamauga arrived this morning and have been equipped and hurried to the steamers. Feel confident they will all do their best to carry out the wishes and directions of the President.

MILES,

Major-General Commanding.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 8, 1898.

Major-General SHAFTER, *Tampa, Fla.*:

Wait until you get further orders before you sail. Answer quick.

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 8, 1898.

Major-General MILES, *Port Tampa, Fla.*:

I have sent the following telegram to Major-General Shafter: "Wait until you get further orders before you sail. Answer quick."

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

TAMPA, Fla., June 8, 1898 — 4:32 P. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL U. S. ARMY, *Washington*:

Your dispatch of to-day received.

MILES,

Major-General Commanding Army.

PORT TAMPA, Fla., June 8, 1898 — 4:06 P. M.

R. A. ALGER, *Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.*:

Message received. Vessels are in the stream, but will be able to stop them before reaching the Gulf.

SHAFTER,

Major-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON, *June 8, 1898.*Major-General MILES, *Tampa, Fla.:*

The reason for countermanding order you will find in the following. The order was given at the request of the Navy Department by direction of the President:

KEY WEST, *June 8.*

"Spanish armor cruiser, second class, and Spanish torpedo-boat destroyer seen by "Eagle," Nicholas Channel, Cuba. Destroy convoy. Detail follow.

"REMEY."

"KEY WEST, *June 8.*

"Last cipher just came by 'Resolute,' just arrived; was pursued by two vessels, Nicholas Channel, Cuba, last night. Shall I order 'Indiana' and all available cruisers to coast of Cuba? More detail to follow.—REMEY."

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

TAMPA, Fla., *June 8, 1898 — 11:42 P. M.*Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington, D. C.:*

If that report is true, those Spanish vessels could be within six hours of the loaded transports now, and there to-morrow. Have ample measures been taken by the Navy to insure their safety?

MILES,

Commanding.

PORT TAMPA, Fla., *June 8, 1898 — 5:03 P. M.*Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington, D. C.:*

Ships commenced moving at 4 o'clock yesterday. They have been moving out during night and morning as loaded. Your dispatch just received. Ships can be recalled and await orders.

MILES,

Commanding.



SANTIAGO REFUGEES AT EL CANEY,

Where it is estimated that twelve thousand people were fed with Red Cross supplies before the surrender of Santiago.



WHERE THE TROOPS LANDED.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

TAMPA, Fla., June 9, 1898 — 6:50 P. M.

SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington, D. C.:*

Think it would be well to announce that the Army got on board transports and started, as they did yesterday. Say nothing about its being recalled, but let our naval vessels go over the course that our transports would have gone over, with the hope of finding those Spanish ships. Does not the presence of Spanish war vessels in Cuban waters render it extremely hazardous to send troops on transports until they are captured, destroyed, or driven away? And, under the circumstances, is it expected that I shall organize expedition number 2? Arrangements had been partly made before the presence of the Spanish ships was announced.

MILES,

Major-General Commanding Army.

WAR DEPARTMENT, June 9, 1898.Major-General MILES, *Tampa, Fla.:*

The President directs me to say that no change of plan will be made; that Expedition No. 2 must be organized as rapidly as possible. We are looking for transports and are satisfied the Navy will take care of that problem. Give nothing out.

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

TAMPA, Fla., June 9, 1898 — 2:45 P. M.SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington, D. C.:*

It seems that it is a naval problem yet unsolved, and it might be advisable for the command now on board transports to have the protection of the entire Navy to convoy it to number 1, number 2, or Nuevitas, or, if this is considered too hazardous, then keep the troops in healthful camps, as they are now, and assist the Navy to destroy the Spanish fleet. There are here 25 good steamers that could be used to carry water, coal and supplies, guns, revolving cannon and mortars, etc., and they could be added to the force of the Navy. It seems strange to be suggesting that the Army assist the Navy in this way, but I am sure we would receive most loyal support when the waters are safe for crossing with the Army.

MILES,

Major-General Commanding Army.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, *June 9, 1898.*Major-General SHAFTER, *Tampa, Fla.:*

Should you not sail until Monday, Secretary War desires to know whether you will keep your troops on board or disembark them.

H. C. CORBIN,

Adjutant-General.

PORT TAMPA, Fla., *June 9, 1898 — 9:32 P. M.*ADJUTANT-GENERAL, UNITED STATES ARMY, *Washington, D. C.:*

As the ships are lying it is impracticable to disembark the men. The general officers in command are all unanimous in this opinion. They will be taken off, however, in detachments for exercise. There is no place in the vicinity where they can be camped with any degree of comfort.

SHAFTER,

Major-General U. S. Volunteers.

The following communication was received from Navy Department on date named:

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

WASHINGTON, *June 9, 1898.*

The Honorable the SECRETARY OF WAR:

SIR.— Referring to the expedition destined to Santiago de Cuba, I have the honor to inform you that it is expected that the convoy of men-of-war, reinforced by two armored ships from Admiral Sampson's fleet, will be coaled and ready to start for Santiago de Cuba by the evening of Monday, the 13th instant, or by the morning of the following day, without regard to the Spanish ships.

The board is of opinion that the army transports should not move from the vicinity of Tampa until about twenty hours before the naval convoy will be coaled and ready to start. This latter time, though estimated as above, can not be closely fixed to-day, but probably can be by to-morrow evening.

Very respectfully,

CHAS. H. ALLEN,

Acting Secretary.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, *June 9, 1898* — 9:30 P. M.Major-General MILES, *Tampa, Fla.*:

Following from the Acting Secretary Navy sent you for your information and you will transmit it to General Shafter:

"Referring to the expedition destined to Santiago de Cuba, I have the honor to inform you that it is expected that the convoy of men-of-war, re-enforced by two armored ships from Admiral Sampson's fleet, will be coaled and ready to start for Santiago by the evening of Monday, the 13th instant, or by the morning of the following day, without regard to the Spanish ships. The board is of opinion that army transports should not move from the vicinity of Tampa until about twenty hours before the naval convoy will be coaled and ready to start. This latter time, though estimated as above, can not be closely fixed to-day, but probably can be by to-morrow evening."

Any further information concerning the movement of vessels for convoy will be sent you the moment it is received.

By order Secretary of War:

H. C. CORBIN,

Adjutant-General.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, *June 12, 1898* — 11 A. M.Maj.-Gen. W. R. SHAFTER, *Port Tampa, Fla.*:

The following is sent you for your information and guidance: Commodore Remey, commandant of the naval base at Key West, has been directed to reassemble and coal as soon as possible the naval force which was recently designated to convoy the army transports in which is embarked the military expedition for Santiago de Cuba. As soon as Commodore Remey reports when the convoy will be coaled and ready, his instructions are to send it to meet the army transports in the passage or strait between Rebecca Shoal and the Dry Tortugas, and considerable time would be saved if the army transports could leave Tampa about eighteen hours before the Key West division of the convoy reaches the neighborhood of Rebecca Shoal. The date and hour at which the Key West division of the convoy will reach the vicinity of Rebecca Shoal can not be exactly fixed, but you will be informed of it as soon as practicable.

You will place yourself in communication with Commodore Remy and arrange to meet convoy as herein suggested, making close connection. Acknowledge receipt.

By order of Secretary of War.

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, *June 12, 1898.*

Major-General SHAFTER, *Port Tampa, Fla.:*

Having reference to telegram of this morning, the Secretary of War now directs me to inform you that the "Indiana" and other ships forming the convoy will meet the transports at Rebecca Shoal and proceed together to destination. You should reach the shoal not later than to-morrow afternoon. Confer freely with Commodore Remy.

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

TAMPA, Fla., *June 12, 1898 — 7:18 P. M.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL U. S. ARMY, *Washington, D. C.:*

4:30 p. m. Your dispatch in reference to starting delivered at 3 p. m. to-day. Have consulted with senior naval officer present, who says we must have daylight to get down the lower bay. Will start the transports at daylight to-morrow, and with good luck will meet convoy from Key West before Wednesday noon.

SHAFTER,
Major-General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.

PORT TAMPA, Fla., *June 13, 1898 — 1:10 P. M.*

SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington, D. C.:*

Steamers are moving out to sea and should be away at 1 o'clock.

MILES,
Major-General.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

. WASHINGTON, D. C., June 14, 1898 — 11:40 P. M.

Major-General MILES, *Tampa, Fla.*:

Secretary of War desires the names of the general officers accompanying General Shafter's expedition.

H. C. CORBIN,

Adjutant-General.

TAMPA, Fla., June 15, 1898 — 1:41 P. M.Gen. H. C. CORBIN, *Adjutant-General U. S. Army, Washington, D. C.*:

In reply to your telegram of yesterday the Major-General Commanding directs me to inform you that the following general officers accompanied General Shafter:

Maj.-Gen. Joseph Wheeler, Brig.-Gens. J. F. Kent, H. S. Hawkins, S. S. Sumner, J. C. Bates, S. B. M. Young, H. W. Lawton, and A. R. Chaffee. Also Major-General Breckinridge and Brig.-Gen. William Ludlow went as inspecting officer and engineer officer from Headquarters Army, respectively.

MICHLER,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

KEY WEST, Fla., June 15, 1898.Captain MONTGOMERY, *Executive Mansion, Washington, D. C.*:

Twenty-one transports and eight convoys off Tortugas 10 this morning, and at same place at sundown.

SAWYER,

Censor.

(Received at Washington 10:55 P. M.)

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via HAITI.*SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington, D. C.*:

Off Daiquiri, Cuba, June 22, 1898.—Landing at Daiquiri this morning successful. Very little, if any, resistance.

SHAFTER.

(Received, Washington June, 22, 1898, 6:22 P. M.)

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, *June 21, 1898.*Major-General SHAFTER, *Santiago de Cuba:*

Secretary War directs that the transports that went with you be returned to Tampa for re-enforcements under same convoy that conducted you to your present station, unless you think it unsafe to send it. Also report as to your needs. Proposed to send you auxiliary cruisers "Yale" and "Harvard" sailing from Newport News with re-enforcements.

H. C. CORBIN,

Adjutant-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,WASHINGTON, *June 21, 1898.*

The Honorable the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY:

SIR.— I have the honor to inclose herewith copy of a telegram just sent to Major-General Shafter, Santiago de Cuba.

Very respectfully,

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

By H. C. CORBIN,

Adjutant-General.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,WASHINGTON, *June 23, 1898.*Major-General SHAFTER, *Santiago de Cuba:*

Secretary of War directs such of the transports as can be spared be returned to Tampa soon as convenient under convoy of the Navy. Please cable number and names that can be returned and time of departure. Should it be deemed best to not unload all supplies not perishable on ships, the same can be left in them until next voyage.

By command Major-General Miles.

H. C. CORBIN,

Adjutant-General.

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via* HAITI.ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington*:

Siboney, I.—Cable received. Colonel Humphrey has been ordered to return as many transports as possible at once.

W. R. SHAFTER,

Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Fifth Corps.

(Received at Washington, July 2, 1898 — 1:21 A. M.)

On June 24th General Miles proposed the following for the plan of the campaign:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

WASHINGTON, D. C., *June 24, 1898.*

SIR.—I have the honor to submit the following:

With the capture of Santiago de Cuba it is expected we will have several thousand Spanish prisoners, and with the capture of the second objective position, now under consideration, it is expected we will add to the number, making, it is hoped, in the aggregate at least 30,000 prisoners.

After the capture of the position next after Santiago de Cuba it would be, in my judgment, advisable to take some deep-water harbors on the northern coast of Cuba, which would be advisable, not only for our Army, but also for the Navy, as safe ports for our transports, supply ships, and naval vessels between Key West and Porto Rico. It is also important that we should select some point at which to disembark our mounted troops and light artillery, with which our Government is well supplied. We will have, in a few weeks, upward of 15,000 cavalry. This force, with the light artillery and a small body of infantry, will make a most formidable army corps with which to conduct a campaign in the interior of Cuba.

The most available point, it appears to me, would be the harbor of Neuvas, which has twenty-eight and one-half feet of water. From there the command could move to Puerto Principe, one of the principal cities of the Island of Cuba. Using that as a base, it could move through the rolling country, which is reported to be free from yellow fever, to Moron and Taguayabon, and thence to the Villa Clara, or, by a more southern route, from Puerto Principe to Ciego de Avila, thence to Spiritus, and thence to Villa Clara. A road could be built at the rate of five miles per day as that army corps marches; also, we would find two railroad bases between Puerto Principe and Villa Clara.

To move the mounted troops over from Florida to Cuba and make this march would undoubtedly consume the time up to nearly the 30th of September.

This army corps would also have the assistance of all the available forces of Garcia and Gomez, and would by that time be occupying practically two-thirds of the Island of Cuba.

If no serious force was encountered, this army corps could continue its march to the south side of Havana. If a large force of Spanish troops, sufficient to check its march, was moved to the vicinity of Villa Clara, then the entire army with which we propose to invade Cuba could be moved between the forces at Villa Clara and Havana, dividing the Spanish forces and defeating them in detail.

I make this suggestion as having three advantages: First, we could employ at reasonable compensation such prisoners as desired occupation in road building; second, we could move into the interior of Cuba our large cavalry command without serious molestation; third, we would be operating during the rainy or sickly season in the most healthful parts of Cuba, practically free from yellow fever, and at the same time be occupying a large portion of the enemy's territory.

If this proposition does not meet with favor, then, after the capture of Santiago de Cuba and other places to the east, we could move the entire force to the west of Havana and conduct the campaign from the deep harbors on that coast. My judgment, however, is decidedly in favor of the first plan of campaign.

Before reaching Villa Clara we would undoubtedly have upward of 50,000 prisoners, and if we could, by judicious, humane treatment, use them in a way that would be advantageous to themselves as well as to our interests, I think it would be advisable. There would be one great danger in moving them to our own territory and establishing a large camp of prisoners, and that is that they would bring the germs of disease with them and spread them among our own people, as many Americans would have to be employed on the ships and railroads, together with the guards necessary to control them.

Very respectfully,

NELSON A. MILES,

Major-General Commanding.

THE SECRETARY OF WAR.

When General Miles reached my headquarters in front of Santiago on July 13th, he informed me of this proposition to organize a mounted force of 15,000 men, with full artillery equipment, and he also informed me that I was to be in command.

The plan was for me to move westerly to Havana, and capture all the positions occupied by the enemy between Santiago and Havana.

But to return from this digression and to resume the thread of our narrative, on June 7th orders were received from Washington for the immediate embarkation of our troops. That night will long be remembered at Tampa. The hotel was made bright and beautiful by the presence of fair ladies daintily attired in filmy muslins and laces; while the brilliant uniforms of our infantry, cavalry and artillery officers, with their white, yellow or red trimmings, and the additional novelty of the uniforms of the foreign attachés moving about amid the ever-changing throng added to the general interest and gayety of the scene. The band was sending inspiring strains of martial music through the foyer of the hotel and over the moonlit grounds. Many of the guests were out on the front porch and steps watching the Rough Riders who had come in from camp to be paid off for the first time, their kaki uniforms making a long brown line as they sat on the ground in the dim light waiting their turn.

About 9 o'clock there was a decided and very perceptible wave of excitement and mystery sweeping over the concourse of visitors. Orderlies were coming in saluting and giving dispatches to officers, after reading which the latter would hastily excuse themselves and calling other officers aside would disappear for a consultation. It was evident from the indications that the long waiting was over and that important orders had come.

Out in the camps great excitement reigned. Orders rang out clear and distinct in the still night air, dark figures were seen hurrying to and fro, while orderlies darted about holding candles by whose meagre light the hurried packing was done. Soon the tents were struck and huge white piles of tentage and baggage were heaped up beside the railroad, awaiting the train which was expected to leave at 11 o'clock. Groups of officers sat around discussing the situation and expressing their belief at the prospect of immediate active service. The train did not arrive until daylight when it was eagerly boarded by the weary soldiers. After reaching Port Tampa, a distance of nine miles, the troops were hurriedly embarked on the transports.

The following official table shows approximately the order of naval ships, transports and cruisers:

ORDER OF CRUISING.

International Signal, T. C. F.

| | | | | | | |
|-----------------|-------------------|------------------|-----------------|----------|-------------------|------------------|
| | <i>Vesuvius.</i> | ○ | 1600 yds. | ○ | <i>Scorpion.</i> | |
| | | 1600 yds. | | | 1600 yds. | |
| | <i>Annapolis.</i> | | <i>Castine.</i> | | <i>Helena.</i> | <i>Indiana.</i> |
| | ○ | 800 yds. | ○ | 800 yds. | ○ | 1600 yds. |
| | | | | | ○ | |
| | | 400 yds. | | | 400 yds. | |
| About 20 miles. | | ◇ 1 | ◇ 9 | ◇ 17 | <i>Alleghany.</i> | |
| | | ◇ 2 | ◇ 10 | ◇ 18 | 1st Div. | |
| | 1600 yds. | ◇ 3 | ◇ 11 | ◇ 19 | 1600 yds. | |
| | | ◇ 4 | ◇ 12 | ◇ 20 | | |
| | <i>Panther.</i> | | | | | <i>Yosemite.</i> |
| | ○ | 1600 yds. | ◇ 5 | ◇ 25 | ◇ 30 | ○ |
| | | 800 yds. | | | 800 yds. | |
| | | <i>Bancroft.</i> | | | <i>Detroit.</i> | |
| | ○ | ○ | 800 yds. | ○ | 800 yds. | ○ |
| | | | 400 yds. | | 400 yds. | |
| | | ◇ 26 | ◇ 28 | ◇ 22 | | |
| | | ◇ 7 | ◇ 15 | ◇ 23 | 2d Div. | |
| | | ◇ 8 | ◇ 16 | ◇ 24 | 1600 yds. | |
| | | ◇ 27 | ◇ 29 | ◇ | | |
| | <i>Wompatock.</i> | | | | | <i>Eagle.</i> |
| | ○ | 1600 yds. | ◇ 6 | ◇ 14 | ◇ 21 | ○ |
| | | | | | | |
| | | | 1600 yds. | | | |
| | | | <i>Wasp.</i> | ○ | | |

The cavalry division were on board the steamships "Alleghany," "Rio Grande," "Miami" and "Yucatan." It was understood that the hurried orders for immediate embarkation were due to the dispatch from Admiral Sampson to the effect that with the aid of 10,000 troops the city of Santiago and Cervera's fleet could be captured. This fired the men who knew of it with the wildest anxiety to be on the spot without a moment's delay; those who did not know of it felt there was some urgent need at the front and every man was intensely anxious to be off. Bitter disappointment was felt when the dispatch came ordering a delay. It was reported that a Spanish fleet was lying in wait in Nicholas Channel to attack the transports, which had not sufficient convoys to protect them. Finally on Monday, the 13th, orders came to sail, and on Tuesday morning, June 14th, we succeeded in pushing down Tampa Bay. The channel is a difficult one, the ships drawing eighteen feet, and the narrow channel being only twenty-three feet at its deepest part. There were only four pilots for this large number of vessels, which caused some delay.

The last glimpse the soldiers had of faces from home was when a number of ladies went down on the steamer "Margaret," which took water and mail to the fleet anchored off Egmont Keys, twenty miles from Port Tampa. When the ship sailed majestically out of Tampa Bay, cheer after cheer from the men on the decks and crowded in the rigging proved how glad they were to go forth and face the hardships and dangers in store for them; everyone exulted in the joyous consciousness that he was to have the privilege of striking a blow at one and the same time for humanity and for the honor of his country.

On Wednesday, June 15th, the transports passed Tortugas light, leaving it to the right, and at daylight on June 16th they found themselves under the escort of the warships. They moved in triple columns. My own quarters were on the "Alleghany," the leading vessel in the right-hand column of transports, some thousand yards behind the warship "Indiana."

Only a few horses and mules were carried, these being for the use of general and staff officers, and the absolute necessities of transportation, making in all about 2,000 animals. The troopers, to their great disappointment, had to go dismounted on account of the impossibility of transporting a large number of horses, which necessitated leaving in Tampa a detachment of each regiment to care for the horses there. The entire cavalry division which entered this expedition numbered 158 officers and 2,822 men, and the strength of the

entire army which sailed from Tampa to Cuba was 815 officers and 16,072 enlisted men.

Fortunately the weather was calm and the voyage was accomplished safely, with no unlooked-for incidents. Sailing around the northern coast of Cuba, we caught sight of the mainland on Friday morning, June 17th, about opposite the west end of Puerto Principe; on Sunday morning we turned southward into the Windward Channel; that night we rounded Cape Maysi, and at daylight, Monday, June 20th, were within thirty miles of Santiago. As we rounded the Cape, the waiting tugs which had been impatiently looking out for the appearance of the American armada, catching sight of the "Indiana" and the foremost of the transports, scurried back in haste to the waiting fleet; and when we came near Guantanamo, the "Detroit" shot forward in a race with the tugs to carry the news. The flagship fired a salute and sent the Admiral's launch to welcome General Shafter. The hurrahs exchanged between the soldiers and the sailors at this great distance, the salutes and cheering on both sides, were awe-inspiring to a high degree and must have reached the ears of the Spaniards in and around the city of Santiago.

After a meeting with Admiral Sampson, General Shafter with his staff went ashore and had a consultation with the Cuban generals. It was decided that the landing should be effected at Daiquiri, while feints were to be made at other points in order to confuse the Spaniards.

A general bombardment of the shore took place on the morning of the 22d, immediately after which the disembarkation commenced. The men went ashore, joyous and jubilant, generosity and good nature prevailed, and with few exceptions—for in every large body of men the chronic grumbler may be found—not a complaint or criticism was to be heard. Officers of all grades cheerfully packed their blankets and rations, and by the following day the advance troops of the corps were marching forward.

Much has been said as to the correctness of judgment which directed the landing at Daiquiri, and it has been contended by some that a landing at some point west of the bay would have been better. There would certainly have been advantages in such a course, but also, objections and difficulties. The coast was by no means favorable and the scarcity of water was also urged; but all things being considered, with the facts before General Shafter, it was certainly good judgment to land troops at Daiquiri, which could be pushed forward, drive the

enemy from Siboney and thus open that locality as an additional place of landing.

On the 22d I went ashore at the earliest possible moment to prepare for my troops and directed Colonel Wood to have his regimental flag hoisted upon the flagstaff of a Spanish blockhouse, on an eminence near the shore. The flag was instantly saluted by shrill whistles from the entire fleet. I rode forward into the country about three miles and a half, returning late at night, and was ordered next morning to proceed with such of my troops as had already disembarked, to Juragua, and to throw forward pickets to Juraguacito, commonly called "Siboney," which place, we were informed, was occupied by General Linares with a considerable force of Spainards, the defenses of the place being blockhouses and other temporary works.

LAS GUASIMAS.

Directing General Young and Colonel Wood with two squadrons of the First Volunteers, known as the "Rough Riders," and one squadron each of the First and Tenth Regulars, amounting in all to 964 men, and the commanders of three Hotchkiss guns and one dynamite gun to follow me, I rode forward accompanied by my staff officers, Major Beach and Lieutenant Steele, my interpreter, Mr. Mestre, and one orderly and a guide. Approaching Siboney I found that the Spaniards had evacuated that place and had started at daylight in the direction of Sevilla, followed by 200 Cubans.

General Lawton, with his fine division, had been given the privilege of being the first to land. He had reached Siboney with the advance of his command soon after the Spaniards had evacuated that place. Two of his brigades were encamped upon the Daiquiri and Siboney road, about half a mile from the latter place. I proceeded rapidly to the front and found that the enemy had halted in a strong position three miles from Siboney, and that the Cubans had engaged their rear with a loss of two killed and seven wounded. After examining the position and consultation with General Castillo and other Cuban officers and learning the features of the country, I returned to Siboney, reaching that place after dark, leaving the Cubans encamped on the road about one-third of the distance between Siboney and the Spanish position. This body of Cubans knew the country, and their officers seemed to be enthused to learn that the Americans were to move upon the Spaniards, and they were delighted with the idea that at daylight they were to march to battle side by side with the army which had

come for their deliverance. I expected several hundred, and these, together with my 900 men, would, I thought, be able to make a very formidable attack; and I was much impressed with the advantage it would give us for the Spaniards to be promptly and forcibly convinced that their American foes were bold, brave, aggressive and determined.

I resolved to attack as early as possible. The disposition of the troops and the plan of attack were as follows:

General Young with the Hotchkiss guns, the dynamite gun, the two squadrons of regular cavalry, and the Cubans, were to march by the main Santiago road, while Colonel Wood with his two squadrons of volunteers was to march by a road running to the left of and nearly parallel with the main road. At a designated point, where the two columns would be about seven or eight hundred yards apart, Colonel Wood was to file to the right, causing his right flank to connect with the left flank of the regulars, which, together with the Cubans, would file to the left; this would bring our troops directly in position for attack.

I was up before daylight and together with Major Beach and Mr. Mestre hastened to get the columns in march. After my own troops had been started, I sought General Castillo and the Cuban officers who had come into the town the night before, to make certain of prompt movement on their part. Being assured that the Cubans would certainly be with us if not in our advance, I rode rapidly, soon overtaking the column of regulars. I was disappointed in finding but few Cubans and could hear nothing of the main body of these troops.

On emerging from a dense wood, the Spaniards were discovered on a hill at a distance of about 800 yards. Preparations for action were promptly made. A Cuban guide was dispatched to Colonel Wood, who deployed the troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt, a squadron as a reserve being under Major Brodie. General Young put Bell's squadron of the First Regular Cavalry in line, Major Norvill being at first held in reserve and the Hotchkiss guns were put in position upon and near the road. All this was done in full view of the enemy, not more than 800 yards distant, but to our surprise not a shot was fired by them. This, together with our inability to find or hear of the main body of the Cuban force, and the further fact that the Cuban officers had stated that Spaniards would certainly retreat during the night, made me uncertain whether the troops we saw were really Spaniards or our Cuban allies, who, we

had been assured, would start for the front at the earliest dawn. I had a very powerful glass and Major Beach and I rode out on an elevation and spent some twenty-five minutes in examining the line which confronted us. They were stationed on a ridge, their breastworks were very clearly visible, and our glasses soon made it evident that they were without doubt Spaniards.

I went back to the Hotchkiss guns, told General Young and Captain Watson of my observations and directed that a well-aimed shot be fired from the Hotchkiss guns. We could see the missile strike the works, and instantly a volley from a line many hundred yards in length was showered upon us. Unfortunately the dynamite gun, on which we very much depended, had not been heard from, but the three Hotchkiss guns and Bell's squadron of regulars returned the fire with promptitude and precision. Then troops of Norvill's squadron were put in line and one troop under the gallant Captain Ayers was held in reserve. I moved forward in person with a squadron of the First Regular Cavalry under Major Bell and was particularly struck with the admirable conduct of both officers and men. The fire upon the squadron seemed to come from the breastworks a little to the left of our front and also from a portion of the Spanish line screened by a wood directly in front of us. The first man to fall in this part of the line, and I think he was the first of this regiment who was struck, was private Emil Bjork. I glanced at him as he lay partly on his side gasping, and I told the next soldier to unbuckle his belt, under which I saw a red spot showing he had been shot directly through the stomach. The Mauser bullets are so small — only twenty-seven calibre — that although I looked directly at his belt I could not see where he had been struck until his belt was removed. Major Bell, the squadron commander, Captain Knox, Lieutenant Byram and a number of noncommissioned officers and privates were badly wounded during the advance. It was very pleasing to see the perfect discipline displayed by these regular troops; as men fell, those nearest them would call in a loud voice for the hospital corps, but without for a moment turning from their duty. Most of the wounded officers and men lay in the grass where they fell, but some tried to crawl or roll back to a less exposed position.

On approaching the wood I turned off to the left so I could see that portion of the line which was advancing through the open grass-covered fields. Meanwhile Colonel Wood had deployed his regiment, his right nearly reaching the left of the regulars.

It now being evident that the Cubans were still in our rear, I went

to General Young, who was in position about fifty yards to the left of the battery, and told him I would send an officer back to find the Cubans, or get any other available troops to come up. During all this time our men were advancing and under the direction of the officers, stopping to fire when it could be done to advantage. After something over an hour's warm fighting and when our troops were within some 300 yards of the Spanish intrenchments, the enemy commenced retreating. Upon reaching the enemy's position we found it lined with empty shells of the Mauser rifles, showing their lavish use of ammunition. Our men fired a few well-directed volleys at the flying enemy, but were too exhausted to pursue.

The character of the roads over which our columns had moved was such as to render progress very difficult. The masses of undergrowth, obstructed here and there by a tangle of briars and occasional wire fencing and a succession of rocky heights and deep gullies, made the regular formation of flanking lines almost impossible, besides the extreme heat of the climate told severely on our men; but in spite of these obstacles they responded to every command with readiness of seasoned veterans and pushed steadily on with a valor so heroic and irresistible as to strike terror into the hearts of their opponents.

Our losses were 16 killed and 52 wounded, the number of killed being exactly the same in each column, but the number of wounded being much higher among the volunteers. Among the killed were Captain Allyn K. Capron, Jr., an officer in the regular army, but a captain in the First Volunteer Cavalry, Sergeant Hamilton Fish, of the distinguished family of that name, Sergeant Marvyn Russell of New York, a gentleman of education and culture. The others killed were Corporal Dougherty, Privates Leggett, Irvine, Hefner and Dawson, of the First Volunteer Cavalry, Corporal White, of the Tenth Cavalry, and Corporal Slemmer, Privates Stark, Krupp, Bjork, Kolb, Dix and Berlin, of the First Regular Cavalry. Major, afterward Colonel, Brodie, who commanded a squadron of the First Volunteer Cavalry, was badly wounded and disabled.

This battle, though not great either in point of numbers engaged or in casualties, was far-reaching in results, especially in the esprit de corps and enthusiasm with which the victory inspired our troops. Nine hundred and sixty-four dismounted cavalry in less than two days after reaching the shores of Cuba had marched fourteen miles and attacked and defeated the Spanish forces under Lieutenant-General Linares in a position which this distinguished general had selected as very favorable to defense. The Spaniards had thrown up some tem-



MACEO.



SPANISH COLUMN AT PARADE REST.

porary defenses which still further strengthened their position. The Spanish force was variously estimated at from 1,400 to more than double that number.

The following is an extract from my official report:

On June 21st, I was ordered to report to General Shafter on board the "Seguranca," and orders were given for the Army to disembark the next day, General Lawton's division to land first, Bates' Independent Brigade second, and the dismounted cavalry division, which I had the honor to command, third. In conversation with General Shafter at this and at other times, I specially dwelt upon the historic fact that the tactics of Spanish armies had been to fight in defenses around cities, and that the information we had gave strong indications that the same plan would be followed by the Spanish generals in Cuba, and I emphasized the importance of our using every effort and device to overtake and attack the enemy's detachments before they could concentrate at Santiago behind their strong breastworks, which we knew were made still stronger by wire entanglements in their front. General Shafter and all the officers to whom the suggestion was made fully concurred in this.

On the morning of the 22d a fleet of boats towed by steam or naphtha launches belonging to the Navy was placed at General Lawton's disposal, and his division was quickly landed. Appreciating the importance of getting the Army ashore as soon as possible, and knowing that it was General Shafter's desire that this should be done, I, so far as practicable, urged the landing of my troops by means of the ships' boats, and seeing these efforts on our part, some of the young naval officers, not being able to find the ships occupied by Bates' brigade, and my ships being near the shore, landed some of my troops on the afternoon of the 22d and on the morning of the 23d. I went ashore myself on the 22d, rode out to the front about four miles to reconnoiter the country, and returned that night. The next morning General Shafter sent for me and expressed great anxiety at not having heard from Lawton. He told me that there was a Spanish force in blockhouses and other fortifications at Siboney, and directed me to proceed to its immediate vicinity with the dismounted cavalry then on shore and throw out my pickets to that place, General Shafter's exact language being to "proceed to Juragua and throw forward pickets to Juraguacito." The latter place was also called Siboney, and afterwards was almost always designated by that name.

I appreciated the importance of getting Siboney into our possession, as it had a good harbor and was some nine miles nearer to Santiago than our then landing place at Daiquiri. General Shafter's anxiety for me to move rapidly was such that he gave orders for his quartermaster, Major Jacobs, to furnish me all the horses I needed for my Hotchkiss guns, dynamite gun, and for

myself and staff. The sea was so high that the captain of my transport stated that it was not safe for his boats to be lowered at that time, but I insisted upon his doing so, reached the shore, procured the horses, directed the Hotchkiss guns and the dynamite gun to move forward as soon as possible, gave the same directions to Colonel Wood and General Young, and then, accompanied by Major Beach, Lieutenant Steele, and Mr. Mestre of my staff, and one orderly, I rode rapidly to Siboney. This is a small village close to the shore, while the place which was designated Juragua was on a slight elevation overlooking Siboney and but a short distance from it.

I found General Lawton's division had been halted before reaching Siboney and was camped on the Daiquiri and Siboney road. I also found that the enemy had left Siboney that morning and was fighting with some Cubans on the Siboney and Santiago road. I rode rapidly to the front, reconnoitered the ground, and was forcibly impressed that it would be a great military advantage to attack and defeat the enemy in their position. At dark I rode back to Siboney and sent for General Young and Colonel Wood. The First Volunteer Cavalry, about 500 strong, reached Siboney between 7 and 8 o'clock that night, and the two squadrons of regular cavalry, numbering about 464 men, had been halted by General Young and put in bivouac before reaching Siboney. Many of the Cubans insisted that the enemy would leave that night. I gave directions for the command to take breakfast before daylight, and to start to the front at the first dawn of day. I explained to General Young and Colonel Wood the position and strength of the enemy.

Fully an hour before day I was up and seeking to hasten preparations for the march. The regular cavalry had arisen long before daybreak, finished their breakfast, marched quite a distance, and reached Siboney very shortly after daylight. There were two roads leading up to the point occupied by the Spaniards. The First Volunteer Cavalry, accompanied by Capt. Lloyd S. McCormick, Seventh Regular Cavalry; First Lieutenant Tyree R. Rivers, Third Regular Cavalry, and Second Lieutenant William R. Smedberg, Jr., Fourth Regular Cavalry, were, on the recommendation of General Castillo, sent by the less frequented and most difficult road, while the regular troops and the artillery were ordered upon the main Siboney and Santiago road. General Castillo had promised to take a Cuban regiment with us, and after starting the American troops I went to General Castillo and urged him to push his troops forward, which he promised to do. The Spaniards were found in the same position they occupied the previous night, about three miles from Siboney. The squadron of the First Cavalry, commanded by Major James M. Bell, was promptly put in line and the three Hotchkiss guns in position on the road, and Major Norvell's squadron of the Tenth Cavalry was at first held in reserve.

The dynamite gun, upon which we placed great dependence, failed to reach us.

A man was sent across to Colonel Wood to let him know that we were in position and that the enemy was directly in our front. What appeared to be the right of the enemy's line was in full view. The space intervening between this portion of the enemy's line and our position was quite open, but the enemy's left was hidden by heavy timber and undergrowth. As we were not fired upon, and as I had been unable to find the bulk of the Cuban force, I feared for a moment that the men we saw might be Cubans. I, therefore, together with Major Beach, rode to a little elevation in front and carefully examined them with a powerful glass, and being satisfied that they were Spaniards, I went back and ordered a shot to be fired from one of the Hotchkiss guns. This was replied to by a long line of infantry, and the fight commenced. Shortly afterward we heard shots to our left, which told us that Wood was also in action. Bell's dismounted squadron of the First Cavalry was immediately advanced, and Major Norvell, leaving Captain Ayres' troop with the battery, deployed his other three troops into line, and the seven troops advanced together. Officers and men fought with great gallantry, continuing to advance, and in an hour the fight was won. The enemy's retreat was precipitate, and our men being exhausted, and all the men and regimental officers being on foot, pursuit was impossible. Our losses were 16 killed and 52 wounded, and after giving directions in regard to the care of the wounded and the burial of the dead, I rode rapidly to Sevilla, which was in full view of Santiago, and then rode on to a point about seven miles from Santiago. Immediately after the fight was over I wrote to General Shafter and received from him complimentary replies.

That afternoon I received instructions to take command of all the troops on shore, and in the evening received the following from General Shafter's adjutant-general:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,

S. S. "SEGURANCA," June 24, 1898 — 1 P. M.

SIR.—The commanding general directs me to say that he is glad to hear such good news, and that you are occupying the enemy's ground. A battery will be sent you as soon as it can be unloaded and horses are off. Will also send you some saddle horses from the artillery. The mounted cavalry will be dispatched as fast as possible.

* * * * *

McCLERNAND,

A. A. G.

Major-General WHEELER, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding Cavalry Division.

Later I also received the following:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
ON BOARD S. S. "SEGURANCA," OFF DAIQUIRI,

CUBA, June 25, 1898 — 5:50 A. M.

SIR.—Dispatch of 5 P. M. just received. Your news is excellent. Have ordered Bates to repair road to Sevilla at once. One battery of artillery is on way to you, and will have another battery before night. Four troops Second Cavalry will be gotten to you just as early as possible.

* * * * *

Very respectfully,

WM. R. SHAFTER,

Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.

Major-General J. WHEELER, *U. S. Volunteers, Commanding Cavalry Division, near Sevilla, Cuba.*

General Shafter, in his official report dated September 13, 1898, in referring to this battle says:

The engagement had an inspiring effect upon our men and, doubtless, correspondingly depressed the enemy, as it was now plainly demonstrated to them that they had a foe to meet who would advance upon them under heavy fire delivered from intrenchments.

The day after the Las Guasimas fight General Shafter received the following telegrams from Washington:

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 25.

General SHAFTER, *Daiquiri, Cuba:*

The President directs me to send his thanks to you and your Army for the gallant action of yesterday, which I gladly do.

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

WASHINGTON, D. C., June 25.

General SHAFTER, *Daiquiri, Cuba:*

Congratulations on success attained thus far. Regret most deeply to hear of the loss of your heroic men.

MILES,

Major-General.

General Shafter replied:

Major-General MILES, *Commanding Army, Washington*:

Thanks for congratulations. Nine hundred and sixty-four men only engaged on our side. But it was very decisive in our favor, and the enemy retreated precipitately. Lack of cavalry only prevented their capture. Reports from Spanish sources from Santiago say we were beaten, but persisted in fighting, and they were obliged to fall back. Deeply regret the loss of so many brave men.

SHAFTER.

The following is General Young's report of this engagement:

HEADQUARTERS SECOND CAVALRY BRIGADE,
CAMP NEAR SANTIAGO DE CUBA, CUBA, *June 29, 1898.*

The ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Cavalry Division*:

SIR.—By direction of the major-general commanding the cavalry division, I have the honor to submit the following report of the engagement of a part of this brigade with the enemy at Guasimas, Cuba, on the 24th instant, accompanied by detailed reports from the regimental and other commanders engaged, and a list of the killed and wounded:

After debarking at Daiquiri on the afternoon of the 23d instant, I received from Major-General Wheeler, the division commander, verbal orders to move out with three days' rations in haversacks, to a good camping place between Juraguacito and Siboney, on the road leading to Santiago de Cuba.

In obedience thereto, at 4:30 P. M., I moved from my bivouac near the landing, with brigade headquarters, the First Volunteer Cavalry (Wood's), one squadron of the First United States Cavalry (Bell's), one squadron of the Tenth United States Cavalry (Norvell's), and the Hotchkiss mountain-gun battery (four guns, Captain Watson, Tenth Cavalry, temporarily commanding), all dismounted. The remainder of the brigade was ordered to follow early the following morning on receiving its rations.

I arrived at Siboney with the head of the column at about 7 P. M., where I bivouacked for the night with the First Volunteer Cavalry, the two squadrons of the First and Tenth United States Cavalry and the battery being delayed by the crowded condition of the trail and the difficulty of following through the jungle after night.

I reported to General Wheeler and from him learned of an engagement between Cubans and Spaniards in that vicinity during the day, resulting in the repulse of the former with some loss. Later I met General Castillo, the commander of the Cuban forces, who gave me a full description of the topography

of the country and much information regarding the Spanish troops, their manner of fighting, etc. General Castillo expressed the belief that although the Spaniards had successfully resisted his attack, they would fall back to Santiago during the night; but he also stated that he had received information they were being re-enforced.

Deeming it essential that positive information should be obtained as to the position and movements of the enemy in our front, I asked and obtained from General Wheeler authority to make a reconnoissance in force for this purpose, General Castillo having promised to assist and co-operate with me with a force of 800 effective Cubans.

Leading from Siboney there are two roads, or more properly trails, one to the eastward, the other to the westward of the little town, which unite about one mile before reaching Sevilla and a little in advance of the scene of the Cuban-Spanish engagement. The trails are at no point more than one and one-half miles apart.

I concluded to move by the two trails, General Castillo having informed me his outposts covered both. I consequently directed Colonel Wood to move with his regiment by the western route, cautioning him to keep a careful lookout and to attack any Spaniards he might encounter, connecting in the latter event by his right flank with the other column while trying to gain the enemy's right flank. Colonel Wood marched about 6 A. M. the 24th instant, and I sent my personal aids, First Lieutenant T. R. Rivers, Third Cavalry, and Second Lieutenant W. R. Smedberg, Fourth Cavalry, to accompany his column.

The other, the right column, marched at 5:45 A. M. I moved with it, accompanied by Captain A. L. Mills, assistant adjutant-general. I proposed to attack the enemy in front and on his left if I found him in position.

At 7:20 A. M., the right column being masked in an open glade, Captain Mills with a patrol of two men advanced and discovered the enemy located, as described by General Castillo, in a locality called Guasimas, from trees of that name in the vicinity. After having carefully examined the enemy's position I prepared to develop his strength. Canteens were ordered filled; the Hotchkiss battery was placed in position in concealment at about 900 yards, and Bell's squadron was deployed and Norvell's in support.

On discovering the enemy I had sent a Cuban guide to warn Colonel Wood, and knowing that his column had a more difficult route, and would require a longer time to reach the position, I delayed the attack some time in order that the development on both flanks should begin simultaneously. During this delay General Wheeler arrived and was informed of my dispositions, plan of attack, and intentions. After an examination of the position by him, and his approval of my action, I ordered the attack, and it was executed in a manner

winning the admiration of the division commander and all present who witnessed it.

The Spanish forces occupied a range of high hills in the form of an obtuse angle, with the salient toward Siboney and with an advance party on the trail on which I had been moving. The attack of both wings was simultaneous, and the junction of the two lines occurred near the apex of the angle on the ridge, which had been fortified with stone breastworks flanked by blockhouses.

The Spaniards were driven from their position and fled precipitately toward Santiago. The attacking force numbered 950 men, while that of the enemy, at first estimated at 2,000, has since been learned from Spanish sources to have been 2,500. The Cuban military authorities claim the Spanish strength was 4,000. It has also been reported that Lieutenant-General Linares, commanding the Spanish forces in eastern Cuba, and two other general officers were present and witnessed the action. The fire of the enemy was almost entirely by volleys, executed with the precision of parade. For an account of the operations of the left column, attention is invited to the inclosed report of Colonel Wood, marked "A."

The ground over which the right column advanced was a mass of jungle growth, with wire fences, not to be seen until encountered, and precipitous heights as the ridge was approached. It was impossible for the troops to keep touch along the front, and they could only judge of the enemy from the sound and direction of his fire. However, had it not been for this dense jungle, the attack would not have been made against an overwhelming force in such a position. Headway was so difficult that advance and support became merged and moved forward under a continuous volley firing, supplemented by that of two rapid-fire guns. Return firing by my force was only made as here and there a small clear spot gave a sight of the enemy. The fire discipline of these particular troops was almost perfect. The ammunition expended by the two squadrons engaged in an incessant advance for one hour and fifteen minutes averaged less than ten rounds per man. The fine quality of these troops is also shown by the fact that there was not a single straggler, and in not one instance was an attempt made by any soldier to fall out in the advance to assist the wounded or carry back the dead. The fighting on the left flank was equally creditable and was remarkable, and I believe unprecedented in volunteer troops so quickly raised, armed, and equipped.

Our total losses were 1 officer and 15 men killed; 6 officers and 46 men wounded. Forty-two dead Spanish soldiers were found, the bodies of nearly all of whom had been thrown into the jungle for concealment. Spanish newspapers of Santiago the day after the battle gave their loss as 77 killed. It is known that many wounded were carried to the city.

Every possible attention was given to the wounded, and the medical officers were unremitting in their efforts to alleviate their sufferings. Circumstances necessarily limited their appliances to the first aid order. The wounded were carried on improvised litters to Siboney, and the dead were carefully buried on the battlefield, a proper record of their burial being kept.

Finding, when the ridge was carried, that many of my men had become exhausted by the excessive heat and exertion, I ordered a halt and occupation of the captured position. Had I had at hand at the time of the assault a force of mounted cavalry, the fruits of our victory would have been more apparent.

General Castillo did not appear on the field, nor did any of his troops come to the front until the firing had ceased. No other troops than those mentioned were engaged in the action. Three troops of the Ninth United States Cavalry arrived on the left after the firing had stopped and were posted as pickets until relieved by General Chaffee's brigade of General Lawton's division, which then took the advance.

The action of all officers and men, so far as my personal observation extended, was superb, and I can only at this time mention the names of those whose conduct was personally observed by me as being highly conspicuous in gallantry and daring, and evidencing a firm intention to do everything within the power and endurance of humanity and the scope of duty. Captain Knox, after being shot through the abdomen, and seeing his lieutenant and first sergeant wounded, gave necessary orders to his troops and refused to allow a man in the firing line to assist him to the rear; Lieutenant Byram, after having his scalp wound dressed, and knowing his captain (Knox) to be wounded, assumed command of his troop, but fell fainting while pushing to the front; Captain Mills, the only member of my staff present with me on this part of the field, was most conspicuous for his daring and unflagging energy in his efforts to keep troops in touch on the line and in keeping me informed of the progress made in advancing through the jungle.

In connection with the conduct of the officers, attention is called to Colonel Wood's report on the conduct of Captain Capron, Major Brodie, Captain McClintock, Lieutenant Thomas, Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt, Captain McCormick (Seventh United States Cavalry), and my personal aids, Lieutenants T. R. Rivers and Smedberg. I can not speak too highly of the efficient manner in which Colonel Wood handled his regiment, and of his magnificent behavior on the field. The conduct of Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt, as reported to me by my two aids, deserves my highest commendation. Both Colonel Wood and Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt disdained to take advantage of shelter or cover from the enemy's fire while any of their men remained exposed to it — an error of judgment, but happily on the heroic side. I beg

leave to report that the behavior of all men of the regular and volunteer forces engaged in this action was simply superb, and I feel highly honored in the command of such troops.

I desire to express my admiration of the fine soldierly qualities and conduct on the march and after meeting the enemy, of Major Norvell, Tenth Cavalry, and Major Bell, First Cavalry, commanding squadrons. Their quick and rapid execution of orders and instructions were admirable and gratifying. Major Bell received a serious wound in the early part of the engagement and was succeeded in the command of his squadron by Captain Wainwright, whose management of the right wing of the advance firing line was all that I could desire or hope for, and more than I could, under such opposing conditions, confidently expect. Captains Beck and Galbraith and Lieutenants Wright and Fleming also deserve equal praise for the manner in which they maneuvered and controlled their troops in attacking the precipitous heights before them. Captain Ayres' performance of the duties assigned his troop was highly commendable, as was Captain Watson's fine work with his battery. Attention is invited to the inclosed reports of troop commanders regarding the conduct of their subordinates and their men. Assistant Surgeon Fuller and Acting Assistant Surgeon Delgado, also Assistant Surgeon J. R. Church, First Volunteer Cavalry, deserve special mention for their gallant action in personally carrying and assisting in carrying wounded men from the field under heavy fire.

The chief results following from this action with the Spaniards are a test of the valor of the opposing forces; the spirit of superiority I believe it has fixed in our own; the opening of the road to the gates of Santiago de Cuba, and the gaining of a beautiful camping ground for our Army on the heights overlooking that city, which can now easily be taken at our leisure.

Very respectfully,

S. B. M. YOUNG,

Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.

The following is a list of the officers who participated in this battle:

Major-General Joseph Wheeler, commanding.

Major William D. Beach, chief engineer.

Aurelius E. Mestre, volunteer aid.

Brigadier-General S. B. M. Young, U. S. Volunteers.

Captain A. L. Mills, A. A. G., U. S. Volunteers.

First Lieutenant T. R. Rivers, Third Cavalry, aid.

Second Lieutenant W. R. Smedberg, Jr., Fourth Cavalry, aid.

First Lieutenant L. A. Fuller, assistant surgeon.

First United States Regular Cavalry:

Major James M. Bell, commanding squadron, wounded, Las Guasimas,
June 24th.

Captain Thomas T. Knox, commanding Troop K, wounded, Las Guasimas,
June 24th.

Captain R. P. Page Wainwright, commanding Troop G.

Captain Jacob G. Galbraith, commanding Troop B.

First Lieutenant George L. Byram, squadron adjutant, wounded, Las
Guasimas, June 24th.

First Lieutenant Peter E. Traub, duty with Troop G.

First Lieutenant Edmund S. Wright, commanding Troop A.

Second Lieutenant Walter M. Whitman, duty with Troop G.

Second Lieutenant Charles McK. Saltzman, duty with Troop B.

Second Lieutenant Henry C. Smither, duty with Troop A.

Tenth United States Regular Cavalry:

Major S. T. Norvell.

Captain W. H. Beck.

Captain C. G. Ayres.

Captain J. B. Watson.

Lieutenant R. L. Livermore.

Lieutenant R. J. Fleming.

Lieutenant G. Vidmer.

Lieutenant A. M. Miller, Jr.

Lieutenant H. O. Williard.

Lieutenant F. R. McCoy.

First United States Volunteer Cavalry:

Colonel Leonard Wood.

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt.

Major Alexander O. Brodie, wounded, Las Guasimas, June 24th.

Major and Assistant Surgeon Henry La Motte.

Captain L. S. McCormick, Seventh United States Cavalry.

Captain Allyn K. Capron, killed, Las Guasimas, June 24th.

Captain Micah J. Jenkins.

Captain Frederick Muller.

Captain Maximilian Luna.

Captain R. B. Huston.

Captain W. H. H. Llewellyn.

Captain William O. O'Neill.

Captain J. C. McClintock.

First United States Volunteer Cavalry — (Continued):

First Lieutenant Woodbury Kane.
 First Lieutenant Frank Frantz.
 First Lieutenant J. A. Carr.
 First Lieutenant J. B. Wilcox.
 First Lieutenant J. R. Thomas, Jr., wounded, Las Guasimas, June 24th.
 First Lieutenant and Surgeon J. R. Church.
 Second Lieutenant R. C. Day.
 Second Lieutenant Maxwell Keyes.
 Second Lieutenant J. C. Greenway.
 Second Lieutenant J. C. Goodrich.
 Second Lieutenant Thomas Rhyning.
 Second Lieutenant J. D. Carter.
 Second Lieutenant D. J. Leahey.
 Second Lieutenant H. K. Devereux.
 U. S. Military Cadet Ernest Haskell.
 Edward Marshall, wounded, Las Guasimas, June 24th.
 Richard Harding Davis.
 Caspar Whitney.
 Robert C. Cramer.

All these officers were distinguished, but at the time I made special mention of General Young, Colonel Wood and Colonel Roosevelt, and these officers and myself made special mention of Majors Bell and Brodie, Captains McClintock, Wainwright, McCormick, Capron, Knox, Miller, Beck, Galbraith, Ayres, Watson; Surgeons Fuller, Delgado and Church, and Lieutenants Mills, Byram, Rivers, Smedberg, Wright, Fleming and Thomas. Mr. Marshall (who was badly wounded), Richard Harding Davis, Mr. Whitney and Mr. Cramer were also favorably mentioned. Major Beach and Mr. Mestre, my aid, were also highly distinguished and commended.

Colonel Leonard Wood made the following report of the part taken by the First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry (Rough Riders) in this battle:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST U. S. VOLUNTEER CAVALRY,

IN CAMP AT GUASIMAS, Cuba, June 25, 1898.

Brigadier-General YOUNG, *Commanding Second Brigade, Cavalry Division:*

SIR.—I have the honor to submit the following report of the action at Guasimas. about nine (9) miles from Santiago, on the morning of June 24, 1898:

I left camp at the sea coast at 5:40, proceeding by trail in the direction of the town of Caverita. On reaching the top of the mesa, an advance guard was thrown out, and every precaution taken against surprise, as we had positive information that the enemy was ahead of us in force. The character of the country was such that reconnoitering was extremely difficult, as the dense growth of underbrush rendered the rapid movement of flanking parties practically impossible. At 7:10 our advanced point discovered what they believed to be signs of the immediate presence of the enemy. The command was halted and the troops deployed to the right and left, in open skirmish order, and the command ordered to advance carefully. The firing began almost immediately, and the extent of firing on each flank indicated that we had encountered a very heavy force. Two additional troops were deployed on the right and left, thus leaving only three (3) troops in reserve. It was soon apparent that their lines were overlapping us on both flanks. Two (2) other troops were rapidly deployed, one on the right and one on the left, which gave our line a length about equal to their own. The firing about this time was exceedingly heavy, much of it at very short range, but on account of the heavy undergrowth comparatively few men were injured at this time. It was about this time that Captain Capron was mortally wounded. The firing on his immediate front was terrific.

The remaining troop was sent to the front, and the order given to advance very slowly. Men and officers behaved splendidly, and advanced slowly, forcing back the enemy on the right flank. We captured a small blockhouse and drove the enemy out of a very strong position in the rocks. We were now able to distinguish their line, which had taken a new position about 800 or 1,000 yards in length and about 300 yards in front of us. The firing was exceedingly heavy here again, and it was here that we had a good many men wounded and several officers. Our men continued to advance in very good order, and steadily forced the Spanish line back. We now began to get a heavy fire from a ridge on our right, which enfiladed our line (this ridge was the position which was being attacked by two squadrons of the regular cavalry), and was held in very strong force by the Spanish in small rock forts along its entire length, supported by two machine-guns.

Having cleared our right flank, we were able to pay some attention to the Spanish on the above-mentioned ridge, and centered upon it the fire of two troops. This fire, with the attacking force on the other side, soon completed the evacuation of this end of the ridge, and the regular assault completed the evacuation along the entire length of the ridge. Of the Spaniards who retreated from the ridge some few fell into line, but apparently remained there only a moment when large masses of them were seen to retreat rapidly,

and we were able to distinguish parties carrying litters of wounded men. At this time my detached troops had moved out to the left to take the right end of the Spanish line in flank. This was successfully accomplished; and as soon as this troop gained its position, "Cease firing and advance" was ordered. Our men advanced within 300 yards of the enemy, when we again opened heavy fire. The Spanish broke under this fire and retreated rapidly. We advanced to the last position held by them and halted, having established before this a connection on the right with the regular troops, who had successfully carried the ridge before mentioned. This left us in complete possession of the entire Spanish position. Our troops were too much exhausted and overcome with heat and hard work of the two preceding days to continue the pursuit. Had we had many mounted men or even fresh foot troops I think we could have captured a large portion of their forces, as they seemed completely disheartened and dispirited. About thirty minutes after the firing had ceased, three troops of the Ninth U. S. Cavalry under Captain Dimmock reported to me and I advanced them, forming a heavy line of outposts covering our entire front at a distance of about 800 yards from our line.

About two hours after the fight was over, a number of Cubans came up and made a short reconnoissance as far as Cevitas, and reported that the Spanish had apparently fled into Santiago, as they found no evidence of them. They reported a quantity of blood along the trail and a quantity of abandoned equipments, and every evidence of a complete rout from the point of their break in our front to above-named town (Cevitas).

In regard to the conduct of the officers and men, I can only say that one and all of them behaved splendidly. Captain Capron died shortly after the termination of the fight. I cannot say enough in commendation of the gallant conduct of this officer. His troop was in advance and met the enemy in very heavy force, and resisted them and drove them back, and it was in the performance of his duty that the captain was mortally wounded. The service he performed prior to his death, and the work of his troop subsequently to it, were of the very greatest value in contributing to the success of this engagement. Captain Capron's loss is an irreparable one to this regiment.

Major Brodie was shot through the arm while on the firing-line. Captain McClintock had both bones of his leg broken, also on the firing-line. Lieutenant Thomas, Captain Capron's first lieutenant, was shot shortly after the fall of Captain Capron. We found no wounded Spaniards, but all along the line we found their abandoned equipments; and there is every evidence of a large number of wounded. To the best of my knowledge we discovered in the neighborhood of 40 dead Spaniards. There may be some mistake in the figures owing to the jungle character of the country, and it is probable

that a careful search will reveal many more. Mr. Marshall, of the New York "Journal," was shot through the spine while on the firing-line witnessing the action. His conduct was extremely courageous.

The First Squadron was under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, and the Second under Major Alex. O. Brodie; both of these officers deserve great credit for the intelligence and courage with which they handled their men. In this particular it is only fair to say that this remark would apply to all officers.

I desire to express my appreciation of the gallant and effective services of Captain McCormick, Seventh Cavalry, attached to my regiment for any duty to which I might assign him; also of Captain Rivers and Lieutenant Smedberg of your staff, whose services were of the greatest value and performed under heavy fire.

Very respectfully,

Your obedient servant,

LEONARD WOOD,

Comdg. 1st U. S. Vol. Cav., of 2d Brig., Cav. Div.

The victory cleared the road for our army, and gave us possession of a beautiful and well-water camping ground, with a full view of Santiago and the surrounding country. The Spanish forces at Las Guasimas have been variously stated. The civil governor of the province told me that Linares had on the 24th of June 4,000 men. This was corrected by General Toral, who estimated the number at 2,000 or a little less, and the losses about 250. Lieutenant-General Linares told me the Spanish soldiers engaged numbered 1,400, and General Escario put the losses at 200.

I fear, however, that these statements put the Spanish force and losses rather too large. Probably the most conservative estimate is that of Colonel Roosevelt, to which I shall refer later on.

Mr. Richard Harding Davis was present on the night of June 23d while we were arranging these details for the operations for the next morning. I then laid down on my blankets near both Mr. Davis and Mr. Whitney. In the former gentleman's book, called the "Cuban and Porto Rican Campaign," he has this to say about the conference between General Young, Colonel Wood and myself. I quote from page 132 of his book:

The first accounts of the fight of the Rough Riders at Guasimas came from correspondents three miles away at Siboney, who received their information

from the wounded when they were carried to the rear, and from an officer who stampeded before the fight had fairly begun. These men declared they had been entrapped in an ambush, that Colonel Wood was dead, and that their comrades were being shot to pieces. When the newspapers reached the front, it was evident that the version these wounded men gave of the fight had been generally accepted in the States as the true account of what had occurred, and Colonel Wood and Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt, while praised for their courage, were condemned editorially for having advanced into the enemy's country without proper military precautions, for rushing blindly into an ambuscade, and through their "recklessness" and "foolhardiness" sacrificing the lives of their men.

Indeed, one Congressman, who from the marble rotunda of the Capitol was able to master a military problem in a Cuban swamp 2,000 miles away, declared that Roosevelt ought to be court-martialed.

It is quite true that the fight was a fight against an enemy in ambush; in a country with such advantages for ambush as this, the Spaniards would be fools to fight us in any other way, but there is a vast difference between blundering into an ambuscade and setting out with a full knowledge that you will find the enemy in ambush, and finding him there, and then driving him out of his ambush and before you for a mile and a half in a full retreat. This is what Major-General Joseph Wheeler planned that General Young and Colonel Wood should do; so if the conduct of these officers was reckless, it was recklessness due to their following out the carefully-prepared orders of a veteran general.

At the time of this fight General Wheeler was in command of all troops on shore, and so continued as long as General Shafter remained on board the flagship. What orders he gave then were in consequence final.

On the afternoon of June 23d, a Cuban officer informed General Wheeler that the enemy were intrenched at Guasimas, blocking the way to Santiago. Guasimas is not a village, nor even a collection of houses; it is the meeting place of two trails which join at the apex of a V, three miles from the seaport town of Siboney, and continue merged in a single trail to Santiago. General Wheeler, accompanied by Cubans, reconnoitered this trail on the afternoon of the 23d, and with the position of the enemy fully explained to him, returned to Siboney and informed General Young and Colonel Wood that he would attack the place on the following morning. The plan was discussed while I was present, so I know that so far from any one's running into an ambush unaware, every one of the officers concerned had a full knowledge of where he was to go to find the enemy and what he was to do when he got there. No one slept that night, for until 2 o'clock in the morning troops were still

being disembarked in the surf, and two ships of war had their searchlights turned on the landing-place, and made Siboney as light as a ballroom. Back of the searchlights was an ocean white with moonlight and on the shore red campfires, at which the half-drowned troops were drying their uniforms, and the Rough Riders, who had just marched in from Daiquiri, were cooking their coffee and bacon. Below the former home of the Spanish commandante, which General Wheeler had made his headquarters, lay the camp of the Rough Riders, and through it Cuban officers were riding their half-starved ponies scattering the ashes of the campfires, and galloping over the tired bodies of the men with that courtly grace and consideration for Americans which invariably marks the Cuban gentleman. Below them was the beach and the roaring surf in which a thousand or so naked men were assisting and impeding the progress shoreward of their comrades, in pontoons and shore boats, which were being hurled at the beach like sleds down a water chute.

"The Fall of Santiago," by Vivian, page 102, says:

Juragua was reached at night without the faintest opposition from the Spaniards, the Cuban scouts bringing in information that the enemy which had been in some force at Siboney had fallen back on Sevilla road and had halted and intrenched themselves at a small settlement named La Guasima, some three or four miles beyond Siboney. Many of the men had fallen from exhaustion, and the detachment of Rough Riders, which had been in charge of the dynamite gun, with which it was expected to do great things, had insisted on bringing this weapon with them, so that it was long after dusk when the last stragglers were brought in by the rear guard. General Castillo, who was in command of the Cuban scouts, made out a rough map of La Guasima for General Wheeler and it was decided to continue the march beyond Siboney at daybreak of the 24th and attack the Spanish position.

There were two roads leading to La Guasima, and it was decided to divide the American forces so as to attack the Spaniards from two quarters. Colonel Wood's regiment was sent to approach the enemy on the left-hand or mountain road, while Wheeler and Young, with the First and Tenth, and three Hotchkiss mountain guns, were to attack the enemy on the main or valley road. Young's command had somewhat the shorter road and they started by throwing out a strong scouting line in order to give Wood's men a chance to work around to the left. Troopers, as they lay at Juragua, had heard the Spaniards felling the trees before daybreak and judged that they were throwing up barricades, but on account of the echoing hills could not exactly locate the spot from which the sounds came. With the general locality of the Spaniards and



AN INSURGENT CAMP.



A FAVORITE HAVANA CAFE.

the character of their position and their strength, General Wheeler was, however, measurably well informed, as his plan of battle indicated.

Governor Roosevelt, in his book called "The Rough Riders," pages 101-104, gives a summary of the forces and losses in this fight. This is valuable because it was written after he had ample time to examine all the accounts, both Spanish and American. He says:

The Spaniards were under General Rubin, with, as second in command, Colonel Alcares. They had two guns and eleven companies of about a hundred men each; three belonging to the Porto Rico regiment, three to the San Fernandino, two to the Talavero, two being so-called mobilized companies from the mineral districts, and one a company of engineers; over 1,200 men in all, together with two guns.

General Rubin reported that he had repulsed the American attack, and Lieutenant Tejeiro states in his book that General Rubin forced the Americans to retreat, and enumerates the attacking force as consisting of three regular regiments of infantry, the Second Massachusetts and the Seventy-first New York (not one of which fired a gun or were anywhere near the battle), in addition to the sixteen dismounted troops of cavalry. In other words, as the five infantry regiments each included twelve companies, he makes the attacking force consist of just five times the actual amount. As for the "repulse" our line never went back ten yards in any place, and the advance was practically steady; while an hour and a half after the fight began, we were in complete possession of the entire Spanish position and their troops were fleeing in masses down the road, our men being too exhausted to follow them.

General Rubin also reports that he lost but seven men killed. This is certainly incorrect, for Captain O'Neill and I went over the ground very carefully and counted eleven dead Spaniards, all of whom were actually buried by our burying squads. There were probably two or three men whom we missed, but I think that our official reports are incorrect in stating that forty-two dead Spaniards were found, this being based upon reports in which I think some of the Spanish dead were counted two or three times. Indeed, I should doubt whether their loss was as heavy as ours, for they were under cover, while we advanced, often in the open, and their main lines fled long before we could get to close quarters. It was a very difficult country, and a force of good soldiers, resolutely handled, could have held the pass with ease against two or three times their number. As it was, with a force, half of regulars, and half of volunteers, we drove out a superior number of Spanish regular troops, strongly posted, without suffering a very heavy loss. Although the Spanish

fire was very heavy, it does not seem to me it was very well directed; and though they fired with great spirit while we merely stood at a distance and fired at them, they did not show much resolution, and when we advanced, always went back long before there was any chance of our coming into contact with them. Our men behaved very well indeed — white regulars, colored regulars, and Rough Riders alike. The newspaper press failed to do full justice to the white regulars, in my opinion, from the simple reason that everybody knew that they would fight, whereas, there had been a good deal of question as to how the Rough Riders, who were volunteer troops, and the Tenth Cavalry, who were colored, would behave; so there was a tendency to exalt our deeds at the expense of those of the first regulars, whose courage and good conduct were taken for granted. It was a trying fight beyond what the losses show, for it is hard upon raw soldiers to be pitted against an unseen foe and to advance steadily when their comrades are falling around them and when they can only occasionally see a chance to retaliate.

Governor Roosevelt also refers to a Spanish work entitled "*Combates y Capitulacion de Santiago de Cuba*," by Lieutenant Muller y Tejeiro. Concerning certain statements of this Spanish officer, Governor Roosevelt says:

On page 136 the lieutenant speaks as if only one echelon, of seven companies and two guns, was engaged on the 24th. The official report says distinctly, "General Rubin's column," which consisted of the companies detailed above. By turning to page 146, where Lieutenant Tejeiro enumerates the strength of the various companies, it will be seen that they averaged over 110 men apiece; this probably does not include officers and is probably an under-statement anyhow. On page 261, he makes the Spanish loss at Las Guasimas, which he calls Sevilla, nine killed and twenty-seven wounded. Very possibly he includes only the Spanish regulars; two of the Spaniards we slew, over on the left, were in brown instead of the light blue of the regulars, and were doubtless guerrillas.

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge gives an interesting account in "*Harper's Monthly*," of May, 1899, with regard to the Guasimas fight; he says, pages 835-838:

The next morning General Wheeler, commanding the division of dismounted cavalry, under direct orders from General Shafter, rode forward, followed by two squadrons of the First Volunteer Cavalry, and one each of the First and Tenth Regular Cavalry. When General Wheeler reached Juraguacito, or Siboney, he found that the Spaniards had abandoned the blockhouse at that

point, retreated some three miles toward Servilla, and there taken up a strong position, their rear having been engaged by some 200 Cubans with little effect. By 8 o'clock that night, the cavalry division had reached Siboney, and General Wheeler, after consultation with General Castillo, determined to advance and dislodge the enemy, lying between the Americans and Santiago. The next morning before daylight the movement began. The troops marched along two roads, which were really nothing more than mountain trails. The First and Tenth Regular Cavalry, under the immediate command of General Wheeler, and General Young, with Hotchkiss guns, marched by the main or easterly road to Sevilla. Along the westerly road went the First Volunteer Cavalry nearly 500 strong. This regiment, enlisted, officered, disciplined and equipped in fifty days, may well be considered for a moment as it moves forward to action only two days after its landing. It is a very typical American regiment, most of the men come from Arizona, New Mexico and Oklahoma, where the troops were chiefly raised. There are many cowboys, many men of the plains, hunters and pioneers and ranchmen, to whom the perils and exposure of frontier life are a twice-told tale. Among them can be found more than two score civilized, but full-blooded, Indians — Americans by older lineage than any of those who were fighting for the domination of the new world. Then there are boys from the farms and towns of the far western territories. Then, again, strangest mingling of all, there are a hundred or more troopers from the east — graduates of Yale and Harvard, members of the New York and Boston clubs, men of wealth and leisure, and large opportunities. They are men who have loved the chase of big game, fox-hunting, and football and all the sports which require courage and strength and are spiced with danger. Some have been idlers, many more are workers, all have the spirit of adventure strong within them, and they are there in the Cuban chaparral because they seek perils, because they are patriotic, because, as some think, every gentleman owes a debt to his country, and this is the time to pay it. And all these men, drawn from so many sources, all so American, all so nearly soldiers in their life and habit, have been roughly, quickly and effectively molded and formed into a fighting regiment by the skillful discipline of Leonard Wood, their colonel, a surgeon of the line, who wears a medal of honor, won in campaigns against the Apaches; and by the inspiration of Theodore Roosevelt, their lieutenant-colonel, who has laid down a high place in the Administration at Washington and come hither to Cuba because thus only can he live up to his ideal of conduct by offering his life to his country when war comes.

These Rough Riders, as they have been popularly called, marched along the westerly trail, so shut in by the dense undergrowth that it was almost impossible to throw out flankers or deploy the line, and quite impossible to see.

And then suddenly there were hostile volleys pouring through the brush, and a sound like the ringing of wires over head. No enemy was to be seen. The smokeless powder gave no sign. The dense chaparral screened everything. Under the intense heat men had already given way. Now they began to drop, some wounded, some dead. The Rough Riders fire and advance steadily, led onward by Colonel Wood, and Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt. A very trying place it was for perfectly new troops with the burning tropical heat, the unseen enemy, the air filled with the thin noise of the Mauser bullet. But there was no finching and the march forward went on.

Along the eastern road the regulars advanced with equal steadiness and perfect coolness. They do not draw the public attention as do the volunteers, for they act just as every one expected, and they are not new, but highly-trained troops. But their work is done with great perfection, to be noted in history later, and at the time, by all who admire men who perform their allotted task in the simple line of daily duty, bravely and efficiently. Thus the two lines moved forward constantly, along the trails and through the undergrowth, converging to the point at which they aimed, and Colonel Wood's right flank finds the anticipated support from the advancing regulars. The fire began to sweep the ridges and the strong rock forts on the ridge. Spaniards were seen at last, apparently without much desire to remain in view; the two columns pressed forward, the ridge was carried, the cross-road reached, and the fight of Las Guasimas had been won.

There was no ambush or surprise about it, as was said by some people in the first confusion, and by others later without any excuse for the mis-statement. The whole movement was arranged and carried out just as it was planned by the commanding general of the division. It had been a hot skirmish and the victory had come to the steady American advance, unchecked by the burning heat, the dense stifling undergrowth and the volleys of an unseen enemy. That night the Spanish soldiers said in Santiago:

"Instead of retreating when we fired, the Americans came on. The more we fired, the more they advanced. They tried to catch us with their hands."

The Spanish official report stated that they had repulsed the Americans and won, but as they had only 4,000 men, and the Americans 10,000, they had retreated, which was, perhaps, to the Spanish mind, dwelling these many centuries among mendacities, and thereby much confused, a satisfying explanation. The plain truth was, that the entire American force amounted to 964 officers and men. The Rough Riders suffered most severely, having eight killed and thirty-four wounded. The regulars lost eight killed and eighteen wounded. The Spanish accounts gave their own force in various figures from 4,000 down to 1,400, the last statement being made long after the battle, when the number

of Americans who had defeated them could no longer be concealed. A comparison of their varying statements and all the best evidence make the Spanish troops engaged not less than 2,800.

The firing at Las Guasimas was heard distinctly at the rear, and General Lawton hurried forward, his leading brigade under General Chaffee, but the head of the column did not reach us until some time after the engagement was over, and they were so exhausted by their rapid march that they were unable to proceed further. General Shafter sent congratulations and offers of reinforcements, directing me to take command of all the troops on shore and put them in camp in favorable positions, but not to become engaged with the enemy until we were ready to advance with the entire force. I had, therefore, several days which I devoted to reconnoitering the country, selecting the most convenient camps for the various divisions, and repairing the roads so they could be used by artillery, wagons and ambulances.

On June 30th, the strength of the American Army in Cuba was as follows:

Wheeler's cavalry division, 127 officers, 2,522 men.

Kent's infantry division, 233 officers, 4,869 men.

Lawton's infantry division, 235 officers, 5,179 men.

Bates' independent infantry brigade, 49 officers, 1,037 men.

There were also four batteries of artillery.

Duffield's brigade, with an aggregate strength of 2,486 officers and men, was in the rear, near Siboney and Aguadores.

EL CANEY.

During the week following the battle of Las Guasimas, I reconnoitered San Juan and El Caney and learned the extent and nature of the defenses, and especially that there were no cannon at El Caney. On the 25th, General Shafter had sent me one battery and written that two more batteries would soon be forwarded to me. I felt confident that by placing these batteries upon an elevation beyond the range of the small arms at El Caney, and concentrating the fire of some twelve guns at a time upon one of their forts or blockhouses, they would soon be made untenable, and that by placing troops on the road from El Caney to Santiago, we would catch the Spaniards in their attempt to retreat to that place. When General Shafter came ashore on the 28th, I visited him and urged that I be permitted to take the guns and reduce El Caney as above indicated. He came

ashore again on the 29th, and I repeated my recommendation and request, as I felt convinced of the feasibility and advisability of the project. The General fully agreed with me as to the advisability of the movement, but said he had determined to entrust it to General Lawton. I could not demur, as I knew that General Shafter had a long acquaintance with and a very high regard for General Lawton, and I was myself very favorably impressed with that officer.

El Caney was regarded by General Shafter as a place of considerable importance to the Spanish, because it commanded the Guantanamo road and could be used as an outpost from which the enemy could attack the right flank and rear of our forces that were to assail San Juan hill. He, therefore, determined to capture it before commencing the attack upon San Juan.

General Lawton's division, supported by Capron's light battery, was accordingly, on the afternoon of June 30th, ordered to proceed toward El Caney so as to be ready the following day to commence the attack. It was expected that the place would be captured within an hour and the division was then to proceed on the Caney road toward Santiago and take positions on the right of the line.

July 1st found General Lawton in position around El Caney with Chaffee's brigade on its right across the Guantanamo road, Miles's brigade in the center and Ludlow's on the left. At 6:15 that morning the sound of artillery, Capron's battery, 2,400 yards from El Caney, announced that the battle had begun, but no one imagined that it would be so hotly contested or that it would continue so long. The battle was opened by the artillery firing on a column of Spanish cavalry at about two miles' range. It was afterward learned that sixteen of the enemy were killed in this preliminary engagement. The battery fired shell and shrapnel till 11:30; recommenced at 12:30 and changed its position about 2:30 from where it was moved to about 1,000 yards from the blockhouses in the town.

During the battle General J. C. Bates was ordered by General Shafter to proceed with two regiments of his brigade, the Third and Twentieth Infantry, and relieve the Second Brigade which was holding the main road from El Caney to Santiago, to permit the latter brigade to join in the attack. Bates moved on to within about a mile and a half of El Caney where he halted for a short time and then moved down the road toward El Caney, crossing the San Juan river, and, taking a position to the right of Miles's brigade, rendered valuable assistance in the assault of the forts.

Early in the morning General Chaffee led a company of the Seventh Infantry to a point where it could seize a ridge at daylight while a company of the Twelfth Infantry was placed in a position half a mile distant, for the same purpose. This ridge was the point on which the brigade was to rest its left flank. The Twelfth Regiment was ordered to march to this ridge and attack in the direction of El Caney, the Seventh and Seventeenth Regiments, led by about fifty Cubans, marched by the El Caney road to the Guantanamo road in the direction of the town. The head of the column joined the right of the Twelfth at 7:30 A. M., about three-fourths of a mile east of Caney. At this point the enemy's skirmish line delivered a brisk fire from the town and from the ridge. The Seventh Infantry was deployed on the right of the road and the Twelfth on the left, forming a line of battle facing El Caney. The Seventeenth was placed on the right of the Seventh and the Cubans were ordered to attack the blockhouse on the right.

The artillery opened fire on the stone building before which Chaffee's line was extended. Chaffee now pressed forward; the firing was very severe and a number of our men were killed and wounded. The battle lasted until late in the afternoon. About 4:30 P. M. Captain Haskell's battalion, composed of Companies A, D, E and F, of the Twelfth Infantry, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Comba, assaulted the stone blockhouse in a gallant manner, capturing it and driving the few surviving Spaniards from the fort to the town. This fort was a rough stone structure of considerable strength, with loopholes for rifle fire and surrounded on three sides by deep trenches for rifle men. The artillery made the breach through which our men entered the fort which was taken and held, thus practically ending the battle, although the firing was continued for some time longer. Haskell's battalion was joined by other companies of the Twelfth and companies from other regiments.

Miles's brigade consisting of the Twenty-fifth and Fourth Regiments of infantry having been detached to support Capron's battery, came into action about 12:30 P. M., and was continually under fire until late in the afternoon. The attack of this brigade was begun by two companies in each regiment on the firing line, strengthened by supports and reserves from the remaining companies. As the brigade advanced across a ploughed field in front of the enemy's position, the Spanish sharpshooters in the houses in El Caney enfiladed the left of the line with a terrific fire. A battalion of the Fourth Infantry, under command of Major Baker, turned its fire upon the town, thus assisting

the brigade to advance upon the stone fort. The battalion lost heavily in rendering this important service. The tactics of the brigade were well shown by forming a line from close order at a distance of about 1,000 yards which advanced through dense underbrush and three wire fences for about 6,000 yards under a heavy fire from an enemy that could not be seen. The courage of the men is highly commended by the officers.

The First Brigade, commanded by General Ludlow, was aroused at 4 A. M., July 1st, and a half hour later took the Caney-Duquereau road toward El Caney. It was halted about 1,000 yards from that town and was greeted by the enemy with a raking fire, which swept the road, cutting the leaves from the trees. The brigade was immediately deployed, the Eighth Infantry on the left, First Battalion of Twenty-second Infantry in the center and the Second Massachusetts on the right. The brigade moved steadily forward under a deadly fire which resulted in a heavy loss, and continued until 12 o'clock. There was a lull for about an hour when the action again became violent; at 3 o'clock the brigade captured a stone fort and hoisted the American flag. The battle still continued between the brigade and the enemy in the town until 4:30 P. M.

After the battle of El Caney had terminated in our favor the division assembled at the Duquereau House, as directed by the division commander, arriving there at about 11 o'clock, P. M., the officers and men so exhausted they were hardly able to walk. After a short rest they resumed their march to San Juan via El Poso, and during the morning of the 2d, General Lawton's troops were placed in position on San Juan ridge to the right of the cavalry division. General Bates's brigade left El Caney on the evening of July 1st, after the fighting had practically ceased; the general reached my headquarters about midnight and was directed to place his force on the left of the line as soon as they came up.

The casualties at El Caney on July 1st were 4 officers and 84 enlisted men killed, 24 officers and 232 enlisted men wounded. The following reports of Generals Lawton, Bates and Chaffec give a good description of this engagement:

HEADQUARTERS INDEPENDENT BRIGADE,

In front of SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 8, 1898.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIFTH ARMY CORPS:

SIR.—I have the honor to report that my brigade left Siboney, Cuba, on the evening of June 30th, at 8:30, and marched up over the hill trail. We fol-

lowed this trail to where it joins the main road and proceeded along the main road in the dark to the place just vacated by Wheeler's cavalry division as a camp. Here we found General Wheeler's headquarter tents still standing, and went into camp in the rear of them about midnight. We struck camp at 6:30 A. M., July 1st, and marched to a point adjacent to General Shafter's headquarters, where I reported in person to General Shafter. At 10:05 A. M. I moved my brigade from this location to within about a mile and a half of El Caney, and met General Lawton upon the road at this point. After a consultation with him, lasting some minutes, I halted my brigade upon the road in order to give an opportunity for the placing of a battery that General Lawton expected to put in position between Colonel Miles's right and General Chaffee's left. I waited some time for this to be done, but the battery not putting in an appearance, I moved my brigade down the road in the direction of El Caney, crossed the San Juan river, and taking the first crossroads moved to the right to a position upon this crossroad to the right of the brigade commanded by Colonel Miles, and pushed rapidly to the front. After my brigade remained in this road for some time, under a heavy fire, we moved to the right to the assault of a small hill, occupied upon the top by a stone fort and well protected by rifle pits. General Chaffee's brigade charged them from the right and the two brigades joining upon the crest, opened fire from this point of vantage, lately occupied by the Spanish, upon the village of El Caney. From this advantageous position the Spanish were easily driven from place to place in the village proper, and as fast as they sought shelter in one building were driven out to seek shelter elsewhere; the sharpshooters of my command were enabled to do effective work at this point. The town proper was soon pretty thoroughly cleaned out of Spanish, though a couple of blockhouses upon the hill to the right of the town offered shelter to a few, and some could be seen retreating along the mountain road leading to the northwest. A part of these made a stand in a field among some bowlders. I desire to say at this point that the Third United States Infantry, under command of Colonel John H. Page, and the Twentieth United States Infantry, under command of Major William S. McCaskey, performed most efficient and meritorious services in the engagement before the village of El Caney. At about 4:30 P. M. the firing from the village had practically ceased, and as General Ludlow's brigade was then moving up the valley from the left upon the village it was deemed unwise to charge El Caney, as our troops would have been subjected to the fire from this brigade. After consultation with General Chaffee, I withdrew my brigade, hoping there was yet time to aid in the attack more to the left. My command, having had a long, hard march, the withdrawal took more time than anticipated; darkness was coming on. I, therefore, halted the command at the first water at which we arrived and proceeded in person to

report to the corps commander; was then ordered to the extreme left. I immediately moved the command and reached this position at midnight. My command had been then continuously marching or fighting for twenty-seven and one-half hours, with the exception of six and one-half hours spent near General Wheeler's headquarters. On the morning of July 2d I placed the Twentieth Infantry on the left of the Second Infantry and in continuation of their line, and held the Third Infantry in reserve near the brigade of Colonel Pearson, of General Kent's division, as that part of the line seemed to need to be strengthened. The loss in action at El Caney suffered by this brigade was three killed and ten wounded; on the 2d of July, was one killed and eighteen wounded. The wounded include Captains Rodman and Moon, of the Twentieth Infantry.

I desire to mention the following members of my staff for efficient and gallant service in the action before El Caney and in front of Santiago: Major Logan, Major Wilkins, Captain Wright, and Lieutenant Smiley. I wish also to add that Major Ives, my chief surgeon, was on the firing line and did efficient services during the progress of the fight and behaved in most gallant manner. I invite attention to the inclosed sketch, which gives the itinerary of march of this brigade during the two days.

Very respectfully,

J. C. BATES,

Brigadier-General of Volunteers, Commanding Brigade.

HEADQUARTERS SECOND DIVISION, FIFTH ARMY CORPS,

Camp near SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 3, 1898.

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIFTH ARMY CORPS, *near Santiago de Cuba:*

SIR.—I have the honor to report the following operations of the Second Division in the capture of El Caney on July 1, 1898: The town of El Caney is situated at an important point about four miles northeast of Santiago de Cuba, on the main road from Guantanamo to that city, where reinforcements for the Spanish garrison of Santiago de Cuba would probably concentrate. The town was strongly fortified with numerous blockhouses within its limits and on the roads leading thence. On a prominent hill of the town was a stone fort surrounded, as is now known, by intrenchments cut in solid rock. The reduction of El Caney being determined upon, and being on the right flank of the general advance on Santiago de Cuba, the duty devolved on the Second Division, to which was attached Light Battery E, First Artillery, commanded by Captain Allyn Capron, First Artillery. After due reconnaissance by the

division and brigade commanders, the movement began about 3 P. M. on June 30th, from the division camp about four miles east of Santiago on the main road from Siboney through Sevilla. The position of the brigades and the details of operations on July 1st are quite fully set forth in the accompanying reports of regimental and brigade commanders and in the sketch herewith submitted. The light battery first opened on a column of Spanish troops which appeared to be cavalry moving westward from El Caney and about two miles range, resulting, as was afterward learned, in killing sixteen in the column. The battery remained during the action at its first position until about 2:30 P. M., when it was moved to a new position south of and about 1,000 yards from certain blockhouses in the town where a few shots, all taking effect, were fired. This firing terminated the action, as the Spanish garrison was attempting to escape. General J. C. Bates, United States Volunteers, with two regiments of his independent brigade — the Third and Twentieth Infantry — having been sent by the major-general commanding the forces of the United States in Cuba to relieve the Second Brigade of this division, which was holding the main road from El Caney to Santiago, so as to permit it to join in the attack, also came forward, joined in the attack, taking position between the Second and Third Brigades, and rendered material assistance, especially in the assault of the stone fort.

I heartily approve the special mention of individuals and recommendations made in the reports of the regimental and brigade commanders, and regret that others who deserve mention have not received it, through circumstances. During the action I was accompanied most of the time by Major-General J. C. Breckenridge, inspector-general United States Army, as a spectator, and had the advantage of his valuable suggestions and advice during the day, for which I desire to express my sincere appreciation. His horse was shot under him on the advance upon Santiago the morning of the 2d instant.

To General Adna R. Chaffee I am indebted for a thorough and intelligent reconnaissance of the town of El Caney and vicinity prior to the battle, and the submission of a plan of attack which was adopted. I consider General Chaffee one of the best practical soldiers in the army and recommend him for special distinction for successfully charging the stone fort mentioned in this report, the capture of which practically closed the battle. I desire to invite special attention to General William Ludlow, commanding the First Brigade. General Ludlow's professional accomplishments are well known, and his assignment to command a brigade in my division I consider a high compliment to myself. In this battle General Ludlow proved himself a capable and able commander. His coolness, good judgment, and prompt action in difficult situations were remarkable. To this and his personal example on the firing line

was due the decisive success of the attack on his part of the line. I recommend General Ludlow for substantial recognition.

To Captain H. C. Carbaugh, assistant adjutant-general, adjutant-general of the division, I desire to express my thanks and appreciation for untiring energy and faithful work in dangerous positions on this occasion, and I desire particularly to mention him for gallantry in volunteering to carry and carrying to General Chaffee, while he was most hotly engaged on the firing line, instructions concerning the assault upon the stone fort mentioned in these reports, and to recommend Captain Carbaugh for promotion to the rank of major and assistant adjutant-general and for brevet of lieutenant-colonel for this act. I desire also to commend to favorable consideration Major G. Creighton Webb, inspector-general on my staff, for persistently riding his horse along the firing line of the First Brigade in search of the brigade commander to deliver important instructions when men of his escort demurred at going with him, and recommend that he receive the brevet of lieutenant-colonel of volunteers. I am particularly pleased that this battle gives me a suitable opportunity to call to the notice of my superiors Mr. R. G. Mendoza, a volunteer aid on my staff. Mr. Mendoza is a Cuban by birth, an American citizen, a young man of prepossessing appearance, of education and refinement. He joined me at Tampa, Florida, with the consent and authority of the general commanding the forces, as a volunteer aid. Since that time he has become one of my most competent and reliable assistants, and has been untiring in his labors, both night and day. In the battle he was active, energetic, and courageous. He has my hearty thanks for his invaluable assistance, and I strongly recommend and urge that he be offered the appointment of captain and assistant adjutant-general of volunteers, and that he be left on duty with me. I desire also to commend for gallantry and courageous conduct in this battle, and for faithful and valuable services generally, Mr. E. L. D. Breckenridge, a son of Major-General J. C. Breckenridge, inspector-general of the army, who has also been on duty on my staff during the campaign as volunteer aid. Mr. Breckenridge is educated and refined, a gentleman in every respect, and has proven in battle his courage and coolness. I earnestly recommend that he be appointed a second lieutenant in the army in consideration of the services rendered in this battle. To Lieutenant H. H. Warren, Second Massachusetts, aid-de-camp, I desire to tender my thanks for courageous and efficient performance of duty in this battle, and to recommend that he receive a brevet of captain of volunteers. To Surgeon H. S. Kilbourne, chief surgeon, is due the thanks, not only of myself, but of the whole division, for faithful and unremitting attention to the wounded on the field and under fire.

It may not be out of place for me to mention the fact that Captain J. C. Gil-

more, Jr., of the staff of the general commanding the forces, joined me with important instructions and that he might see for himself the situation, the better to inform the commanding general, he rode the firing line with me exhibiting a coolness under severe fire worthy a veteran.

Very respectfully,

H. W. LAWTON,

Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding Division.

HEADQUARTERS THIRD BRIGADE, SECOND DIVISION, FIFTH CORPS,

In Field near SANTIAGO, Cuba, *July 4, 1898.*

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL, SECOND DIVISION, FIFTH CORPS:

SIR.—In connection with the operations of the Third Brigade of July 1st, I have the honor to report that the road traversed by the army from Siboney toward Santiago de Cuba forks to the right about five miles from the latter place. The right-hand road runs a little west of north to a place called Caney, the distance in an air line being about four miles. The main road leads generally west to the city. Santiago and Caney are connected by a broad, well-marked road, and are about six miles apart. This road also is a main thoroughfare to Guantanamo. Thus the point first mentioned (the fork of the road), Santiago, and Caney form a sort of triangle inclosing a vast thicket of brush and vines, the interior of which is only traversed by paths, although called roads. About three miles from the fork, toward Caney, a road branches to the left to the northwest, and intersects the Santiago-Caney road at about a mile west of the latter place. Further on toward Caney, about 600 yards, a trail branches to Caney, passes around on the south side of a ridge overlooking Caney. This ridge, which is short, is about 800 yards from the southeast corner of the town, where was located on a round and prominent knoll a stone building, used by the Spanish troops as a place of defense. Outside the building was sunk a trench about three feet deep and covering the east, south, and westerly face of the building.

South of the town, on lower ground, perhaps 100 yards from the houses, was located a small blockhouse, the structure being of wood, banked with earth on the outside about four feet high. On the northwest corner of the town was a similar and larger blockhouse. On the northeast face was a line of intrenchments close into the town. The buildings and streets were also used by the Spanish troops for protection. About one mile northeast of the town, on the side of the mountain, was located a blockhouse, its capacity being

fifteen to twenty men. This blockhouse was to the right of the line of march of the Seventh and Seventeenth Infantry, to be explained.

On the 26th of June I examined this place from the ridge explained as being about 800 yards southeast of Caney, and reported the fact to the division commander. The main road to Caney continues on from the trail, passing around to the eastward of a sugar-loaf mountain, and intersects the Caney-Guantanamo road about two miles east of the former place. This section of the Caney road, a mere trail, is extremely difficult for troops in single file to march over. Being authorized by the division commander, I cleared the road for the passage of artillery for about three miles, also a position for a battery to the left of the road, this at the place where the first road branched to the left and intersects the main road (Caney-Santiago). The position for the battery was about 2,000 yards from the town.

On the afternoon of June 30th I received verbal orders from the division commander to march on the Caney road and attack the Spanish position from the eastward. I marched at about 5 o'clock and assembled my brigade at the sugar-loaf mountain after dark, passing on the way Capron's battery, supported by the First Infantry of the Second Brigade. We camped without fires.

I led forward on the Caney road Young's company of the Seventh Infantry about one mile, up to a point where it could seize a ridge at daylight. I also took forward by the trail a company of the Twelfth Infantry about half a mile and directed it to seize the ridge at daylight overlooking the town from the southeast. This ridge was the point on which the brigade was to base its left flank. Colonel Comba, commanding the Twelfth Infantry, was given orders to march by this trail, base on this ridge, and deploy to his right and attack in the direction of the town. I led the Seventh and Seventeenth, preceded by about fifty Cubans, by the Caney road to the Guantanamo road, following the latter toward the town. The head of the column came into connection with the right of the Twelfth at 7:50 A. M. and about three-fourths mile east of Caney. At this point we received the enemy's skirmish fire, both from the town and from the blockhouse on the right before referred to.

The Seventh Infantry was deployed on the right of the road in an irregular way because of the difficult nature of the terrain. Practically, the Seventh was on the right of the road and the Twelfth on the left, and formed a line of battle facing the town. The Seventeenth Infantry was directed to proceed to the right of the Seventh, the Cubans to attack the blockhouse to the right. The artillery, Capron's battery, opened fire on the stone building some minutes before my line was extended. As we pressed forward the enemy's fire became very severe, and in the course of the action the Seventh Infantry, particularly, met with heavy and severe loss in killed and wounded. The Twelfth also had

losses, the Seventeenth but few, owing to the fact that only the head of the column became exposed to the fire of the enemy.

The action lasted nearly throughout the day, terminating at about 4:30 P. M., at which time the stone blockhouse was assaulted by Captain Haskell's battalion of the Twelfth Infantry under the personal direction of Lieutenant-Colonel Comba, commanding the regiment. The resistance at this point had been greatly affected by the fire of Capron's battery. A few moments after the seizure of this point — the key to the situation — my left was joined by General Bates with a portion of his command. He soon after withdrew. This action was continuous throughout the day, with brief lulls for the purpose of quieting and resting the men, who were fatigued from their difficult march and broken sleep of the night previous. They marched to the field of battle without breakfast, except a cracker and a drink of cold water. The conduct of all officers observed by me, and I saw the most of them, is deserving of unlimited praise. The same may be said of the enlisted men, with some few exceptions. All of the men were without battle experience, but the great majority went forward into action in a very soldierly and gallant manner.

The reports of regimental commanders are herewith inclosed. These reports are unsatisfactory to these officers themselves because of the limited time that has elapsed since the engagement, nearly all of which has been expended in fatiguing march or in the preparation of trenches for defense. They are also without proper means to render their reports in form to insure durability. I very cordially and heartily concur now and for the future in any special mention of distinguished conduct on the part of officer or enlisted man which commanding officers of regiments have now or may hereafter submit. The brigade is greatly indebted in its successful operation for the assistance rendered to it by Capron's battery of artillery. Its fire on the stone blockhouse was accurate and very effective. The brigade is also indebted for assistance rendered by the command of General Bates, whose movements from the south on the town necessarily drew from me a portion of the enemy's fire.

Immediately after the action ceased I directed a thorough search of the field we had fought over for our wounded and dead. These, I think, were all collected before dark. After this I permitted the men to make coffee, detailed one company (Howell's Seventh Infantry) to remain with the wounded and bury the dead, and at 7:30 to 8 o'clock marched for the Ducourcaud House, a point of assembly of the division, previously directed by the division commander. We arrived at about 11 o'clock P. M., officers and men exhausted of strength to the extent they were hardly able to walk. The brigade lay down in the road and rested until 3 A. M. At the Ducourcaud House I joined the division commander, who informed me he had sent me an order to leave a regiment at

Caney. The courier had failed to find me before marching. The division commander concurred with my opinion that the return of a battalion would be sufficient strength. It was so ordered, Coolidge's battalion of the Seventh Infantry being sent back. This, in addition to Howell's company of the same regiment left behind, made five companies of this regiment on guard at Caney.

Through a misunderstanding of my order, or the noncompliance therewith on the part of Captain Howell, one company of the Seventeenth Infantry was left at Caney and is still absent at that place.

At 3 A. M., July 2d, the brigade resumed its march on El Poso, thence on San Juan, and took position on the right of the cavalry division, commanded by General Sumner, arriving on the ground at 7:20 A. M.

The losses of the brigade in battle from daylight July 1st to 7:30 A. M., July 2d, are as follows:

Seventh Infantry: Killed, officer, 1 (Second Lieutenant Wansboro); enlisted men, 32; wounded, officers, 4 (Major Corliss, Captain Jackson, First Lieutenant Grisard, adjutant, Second Lieutenant Lafferty); enlisted men, 91; missing, enlisted men, 3.

Twelfth Infantry: Killed, enlisted men, 7; wounded, officers, 2 (Second Lieutenants Dove and Churchman; the latter has since died of his wound); enlisted men, 29.

Seventeenth Infantry: Killed, enlisted men, 4; wounded, officers, 2 (Lieutenant-Colonel Haskell and First Lieutenant Dickinson, regimental quartermaster; the latter has since died of his wounds); enlisted men, 21; missing, enlisted men, 2.

Total loss: Killed, officers, 3 (including the 2 died since of wounds); enlisted men, 45 (including 2 died of wounds since the battle); wounded, officers, 6; enlisted men, 139; missing, enlisted men, 5; total loss, 198.

A map indicating the roads and some of the places herein mentioned is inclosed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ADNA R. CHAFFEE,

Brigadier-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.

SAN JUAN.

After a night of alternate halting and marching, the cavalry division, followed by Kent's First Infantry Division, reached El Poso. The enemy on San Juan ridge could be seen from an elevation near El Poso house; and from this point Grimes' battery opened upon them early on the morning of July 1st. The enemy replied with both



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A GROUP OF RED CROSS SISTERS

The four sisters of the New York Red Cross Hospital of Dr. and Mrs. A. Monae Lesser, who nursed sick reconcentrados and their orphans in Havana, and afterward assisted the surgeons on the ships and in the hospitals of Siboney in dressing the wounds of Cuban, Spanish and American soldiers and sailors, until they fell victims of the fever and went into hospital themselves.



A SPANISH OFFICER.

small arms and artillery, keeping up a severe, pelting fire upon our dismounted cavalry and infantry who were then marching toward San Juan ford.

The conformation of the country between El Poso and the San Juan river was such that the enemy could not be seen by our troops; besides being heavily timbered, the ground was covered with a profusion of thickets, jungles and bushes. The cavalry and a portion of the leading brigade of Kent's division, under General Hawkins, continued on the regular Santiago road; and these troops, General Kent and I, crossed at the main ford. The remainder of Kent's division was turned to a trail which led to a ford a short distance down the river.

While riding from El Poso to the ford, I readily saw the importance of hastening the troops forward. It was very clear that the Spaniards had a thorough knowledge of the location of the roads upon which we were advancing, and they were, therefore, enabled to concentrate their fire upon our troops. With as little delay as possible, and by the use of the two fords, San Juan river was crossed, and line formed, the left of the cavalry division resting on the Santiago road, and Kent's division being formed to the left of the cavalry.

To understand the situation at this stage of the day's operations, requires a brief description of the ground involved in the field of operations. After crossing the river, Wheeler's and Kent's divisions were in line near and parallel to its banks, facing nearly westward toward Santiago. Directly in front of this line of battle was San Juan ridge, about 500 yards distant and upon which were the enemy's intrenchments strengthened by Fort San Juan, which was to the left of the main Santiago road, and a blockhouse to the right, both of these fortifications being on the intrenched line upon the crest of the ridge. About 600 or 700 yards beyond or behind San Juan ridge and between that place and Santiago, was another line of Spanish fortifications. Between San Juan ridge and the cavalry division was an elevation, upon which was a large building called San Juan House, and upon this hill was a large body of Spaniards.

While the forces of Wheeler and Kent were approaching San Juan, General Lawton with the second division of infantry, numbering 5,280 men, Bates' brigade numbering 1,064 men, one battery of artillery, two troops of cavalry, and some 400 Cubans, making the entire force 6,889, appeared before El Caney about five miles northwest of Santiago.

The above strength is taken from the official reports of June 30th. It is probable that the actual number under General Lawton's command on July 1st, was less than these figures.

The defense at this place consisted of a fort, partly of rock and wood, and three blockhouses, the force defending these numbering 520 men. The plan of operations for July 1st was that General Duffield should move against Aguadores, that General Lawton would promptly take El Caney and then march down the main road to Santiago, the head of his column to unite with the right of the cavalry division; and the entire force was then to attack the main Spanish position. The plan contemplated that Wheeler and Kent, after crossing the river, would remain in position and await the approach of Lawton, but the difficulty of carrying out this soon became apparent. Kent's division was subjected to a severe fire from San Juan ridge only about 500 yards distant, while the cavalry division in addition to this fire was being pelted by the fire of a considerable force of Spaniards who occupied the elevation called Kettle hill, upon which San Juan house was situated, and to increase our discomfiture, both divisions were subjected to a heavy fire from the Spanish intrenchments beyond San Juan ridge, from which came a continuous fire passing over that ridge and plunging upon our troops.

After crossing the San Juan river and forming line we had finally reached a position from which we could direct our fire upon the enemy in the intrenchments on San Juan ridge, the heads and shoulders of the men being frequently exposed; and the officers with swords in hand could also be seen, directing and encouraging the men. In the reconnoissance made after the fight at Las Guasimas, I had become thoroughly familiar with the topography of San Juan ridge and the plain in front of it, all of which I had described to General Shafter, both verbally and in writing. It is true that our men could now return the enemy's fire, which was not the case before they crossed the river; but as the enemy continually dodged down behind their works it was evident our fire could not be effective. It was also true that some of our men were protected by inequalities of the ground, and some of the officers had put their men back into the river so as to secure the protection of its banks; but notwithstanding this, the great bulk of our troops were still under severe fire, and as the enemy knew our range with great accuracy, the Spanish fire was generally well directed. There was no question in my mind but that it was all important our troops should promptly advance from their

position and attack the ridge. It was clear that the moment we commenced advancing the enemy would be disconcerted and their fire would be less accurate as they would be compelled to continually change their range, and the formation of the ground was such that when we had crossed the plain and come within twenty or thirty yards of the ridge, the whole line would be within a dead space entirely screened from the enemy's fire.

Again, the road upon which Lawton was expected to approach from El Caney was located several hundred yards in front of our line and behind that occupied by the enemy, and it was evident that if we remained where we were until he reached the vicinity of Santiago he would be without any assistance from us, and might be confronted by a very large force of the enemy.

On the 30th, General Shafter had given directions to his other division commanders; but, although I was not on the sick report, it seems that he was informed that I was ill; and I was not invited to, and knew nothing of this conference. My information as to the plans was obtained after I reached the field, on the morning of July 1st, the two brigades of my division having been moved forward during the night of the 30th by direct instructions from General Shafter.

It is true that I was sick, but had carefully abstained from being put on the sick report, and continued to perform all my duties.

On the 28th, 29th, and 30th I suffered with fever caused by exposure to the hot suns by day and, being without a tent, to the heavy dews by night, but nevertheless I continued my duties and was not put on the sick report. On the 28th and 29th General Shafter came ashore and I visited him on both days. On the 30th General Shafter ordered the generals before him, but no notification was sent to me, and I was entirely ignorant of this meeting. In explanation of this General Shafter afterward told me that he understood I was sick, and his staff officer, Colonel Miley, in his book (page 103), states:

He (Wheeler) was sick with fever and whose attending physician advised against informing him of the proposed battle next day.

Notwithstanding this, I learned that preparations were being made for active operations, and early on the morning of the 1st I rode to the front. I learned from General Sumner, General Kent, and others of the proposed plan of battle, viz., that Lawton and Bates were to take El Caney, while General Kent's division and my division were to cross San Juan river and form line, the left of my division to be on the main

road, while Kent's division was to be formed on my left, and that these troops were to remain in that position until Lawton had taken El Caney, and, by a march of five miles, joined the head of his column to the right of my division, when all were to advance upon the fortifications of San Juan.

At 11 o'clock on July 1st the cavalry division and Kent's division were forming line on San Juan river, confronting the Spanish forces upon Kettle hill and San Juan ridge. General Lawton and General Bates, together with a body of Cubans were at El Caney, about three miles to the north, or rather to the northeast of this point. General Shafter's official report in speaking of himself, says:

My own health was impaired by overexertion in the sun and intense heat of the day before, which prevented me from participating as actively in the battle as I desired, but from a high hill near my headquarters I had a general view of the battlefield, extending from El Caney on the right to the left of our lines on San Juan hill.

This point referred to by General Shafter was on the Santiago and Siboney road about equi-distant from each of the two points, El Caney and San Juan. General Shafter was, therefore, at an apex of a triangle, the other two apices being San Juan and El Caney.

General Shafter, of course, exercised authority over both these forces, but my distance and that of Lawton from the commander being so great, each of us was responsible for the troops under his immediate command; and the general custom of the service, and my former instructions from General Shafter, made this responsibility in regard to myself more unquestioned. Colonel McClernand, adjutant-general of General Shafter's staff, a most gallant officer, was near El Poso and I hastened to him and after a short conference found that he agreed, and I received his full sanction to order the entire line forward, and he directed me to give the orders to General Kent. I rode rapidly to General Kent, explained the orders to him, and this gallant officer started his division forward in magnificent style. I also personally gave similar orders to General Sumner and, through my staff officers, to the brigade commanders, Colonel Leonard Wood and Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Carroll. The First Brigade was composed of the Third, Sixth and Ninth Regular Cavalry; the Second comprised the First and Tenth Regular and the First Volunteer Cavalry. These regiments were far below their full quota, details having been left at Tampa, and on duty at various points. The

cavalry division made a bold charge, carrying the San Juan House hill in a handsome manner, and driving the Spaniards from their position on its crest. This charge put the cavalry in line with Kent's division, the two divisions then being confronted by what is called San Juan ridge, on the crest of which, as before stated, was a line of breast-works and quite a formidable work called Fort San Juan, and further to the north or to our right was a strong blockhouse. The entire line advanced steadily across the valley, the fire upon them from the Spanish becoming less steady and less deadly as they advanced, and upon reaching the foot of the hill, the conformation of the ground was such that they were almost entirely screened from the Spanish bullets. With but little hesitation they ascended the hill and on reaching the crest were met by a heavy fire from the enemy's works, some 600 yards beyond, the casualties for a few moments being very severe.

It would be hard to picture or adequately describe the valor of these men. The superb training of the regulars had given them an advantage in drill and marksmanship, which highly enhanced their endurance and effectiveness; while many of the volunteers exhibited most commendable and enthusiastic valor, courage and determination, and this in a great degree compensated for their want of experience. The officers of foreign armies who accompanied the army as military experts, expressed their admiration of the bravery, inflexible determination and patient endurance exhibited by the American soldiers. That the enemy's retreat from the fort and ridge was precipitate was quite apparent; cooking utensils, rice, other foods, wines and various articles were found in abundance. Although our troops had gained the day by determined and heroic valor, the situation was far from satisfactory. Nothing had been heard from Lawton or Bates, and our troops were thoroughly broken down and exhausted. They had been up marching most of the night previous, had forded San Juan river, becoming soaked up to their waists, they had been under a fire more or less severe during the entire day. Of the 6,900 men in Wheeler's and Kent's divisions at daylight, 147 had been killed and about 1,000 wounded, most of whom had to be removed in improvised litters, each being carried by two men. A considerable number were engaged in burying the dead, which the warm climate required should be done without delay. I sent to the rear for intrenching tools and a large force was put to work with the determination to intrench sufficiently to protect our men from the fire which we felt certain would open warmly at daylight. All this left a very thin firing line which was

further weakened by the absence of many who had fallen from exhaustion and become separated from their commands.

In front of this thin line appeared a numerically strong enemy, whom many of the officers and men seemed to regard as firm and determined; and some of the bravest and best officers were earnest in their assertions that if the Spanish forces in our front should attack, the ridge could not be held. And it was insisted that should such a disaster befall our army, it would be virtually destroyed before it could reach the eastern bank of the San Juan river. Hearing that apprehensions had also been conveyed to General Shafter, I wrote to him at 8:30 as follows:

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,

SAN JUAN, *July 1, 1898, 8:20 P. M.*

General SHAFTER:

SIR.—I examined the line in front of Wood's brigade and gave the men shovels and picks and insisted on their going right to work. I also sent word to General Kent to come and get intrenching tools, and saw General Hawkins in person and told him the same thing. They all promised to do their best, but say the earth is very difficult, as a great part of it is rocky. The positions our men carried were very strong and the intrenchments were very strong.

A number of officers have appealed to me to have the line withdrawn and take up a strong position farther back, and I expect they will appeal to you. I have positively discountenanced this as it would cost us much prestige.

The lines are now very thin, as so many men have gone to the rear with wounded, and so many are exhausted; but I hope these men can be got up to-night, and with our lines intrenched and Lawton on our right we ought to hold to-morrow, but I fear it will be a severe day. If we can get through to-morrow all right, we can make our breastworks very strong the next night.

You can hardly realize the exhausted condition of the troops. The Third and Sixth Cavalry and other troops were up marching and halted on the road, all last night, and have fought for twelve hours to-day, and those that are not on the line will be digging trenches to-night.

I was on the extreme front line. The men were lying down and reported the Spaniards not more than 300 yards in their front.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOS. WHEELER,

Major-General Volunteers.

"The Fight for Santiago," by Stephen Bonsal, page 124, says:

The advancing columns followed the line of the stream until they came to the place, later known as the "Bloody Angle," where the road to Santiago crossed the Aguadores stream for the last time.

At this juncture our losses began to be very heavy indeed, in spite of every effort that was made to keep the troops under cover. The men were not over 600 yards from the advanced position of the Spaniards, and the Spanish artillery as well as the Mausers had their range well. A great many men were falling, and here the heaviest losses of the day were experienced. This was especially the case with the cavalry division, who later on, in closer quarters and at shorter range, did not lose so heavily. General Kent, who commanded the First Infantry Division, was at this moment, and not unnaturally, very much at a loss to know what to do. His orders had been from McClernand, adjutant-general at El Poso, to advance two miles toward Santiago, and there to bivouac and await orders and the result of the movements of Lawton's division and of Sumner's division.

Page 131, says:

There was, it is true, in addition to the devotion to duty which characterized our men, a material incentive to spur on the charge. The nearer we came to San Juan, the fewer men fell under the deadly fire. In depressing their rifles, as the Spaniards had to do, firing as they did down from a great height, the danger or killing space of each bullet became considerably shortened as the men advanced and drew nearer to the heights.

* * * * *

Throughout the advance the losses were very heavy, especially when they came to the San Juan river, which at this point was very deep, though not broad. Many of the men had narrow escapes from drowning, and were compelled to take refuge on the banks from which they had sprung and look for a shallower passage.

Page 135, says:

When they reached the foothills of the heights, they secured some protection and a better footing, and crept up the heights in little bunches, availing themselves of what shelter the inner qualities of the ground offered, while Hawkins, by his presence and his voice, spurred them on.

Page 163, says:

The Spaniards were well posted upon the line of march our advancing columns were compelled by the nature of the ground to take, and their sharpshooters, by the practice of the morning — if not by the previous exact measurement, as some think — had obtained the range at the more open places which our men had to pass over, and where there was not even the false, deceptive cover of the guinea-grass and the low jungle shrubbery. Our men were dropping every instant under this exasperating fire, which came in upon them from every side.

* * * * *

Page 164, says:

There is no doubt that, on the whole, more of the brave fellows of these devoted brigades fell in the jungle labyrinth and under the bullets of the unseen foe than when, later, they swung out into the open and charged up the hillside, bare of all protecting cover, to the Spanish works. And that march through the jungle, and the fire that could not be ambushed from an enemy that could not be seen, filled me with greater admiration than even the wild, heroic burst up the bullet-swept hill. There were few men, and certainly no one worthy of the name, who could have held back or stood aside when this tidal wave of high-beating hearts surged through the valley and swept up the hillside, and certainly no one wearing the blue coat did. But it seemed to me, as I saw the haggard and hard-drawn features of our men, as they stumbled and staggered on through the dense jungle which shut out the light and air, but not the death-dealing bullets, that the less spectacular part of this performance upon this glorious day required a less common order of courage. And I have always thought that the unwavering and unquestioning advance of our men through the wilderness, which led they knew not where, was the triumph of the day, and presented the highest exhibition of soldierly qualities of the many which were illustrated upon this field of battle consecrated by so many glorious memories.

* * * * *

Page 165, says:

To nine-tenths, and perhaps to a larger proportion still, of the five brigades which made the gallant advance through the jungle and up to the heights of San Juan, under such untoward circumstances and under such a withering and unrelenting fire, the trying experience was also a novel one. Only a few of the gray-haired colonels surviving from the Civil War could remember from their subaltern days to have confronted such a fire as this.

At midnight of July 1st, General Bates reported in person announcing the advance of his brigade. Meanwhile the gallant Lawton found the defenses at El Caney so strong and the resistance so determined that the action which it was expected would occupy some thirty or forty minutes occupied most of the day, and he did not reach us until the next day. General Bates's brigade arrived about daylight and was placed on the left of Kent's division. General Lawton's division reached us later in the morning and was placed in position on the right of the cavalry division. Before daylight on the morning of July 2d, I placed Best's, Parkhurst's and Grimes's batteries, under Major Dillenbach, on the ridge near the main Santiago road, where they did good service until they were withdrawn and placed in position near El Poso. The fighting continued during the 2d and 3d, including a night attack by the Spaniards, but as both sides were well protected by intrenchments, the losses were comparatively slight. About dark on the evening of July 2d, a meeting was held at General Shafter's headquarters, Generals Shafter, Kent, Lawton, Bates and myself being present, and the question of maintaining or abandoning our position on the ridge was seriously discussed. It resulted in a determination to encourage the troops, strengthen the breastworks, perfect the system of transportation and endeavor to secure the surrender of Santiago by surrounding the city and cutting off supplies.

The entire losses of the troops engaged in the battle of San Juan, which consisted of the cavalry division, Kent's division and the batteries just mentioned, were: Twenty officers and 127 men killed and 68 officers and 862 men wounded. Total killed and wounded, 88 officers and 989 men.

HEADQUARTERS FIRST DIVISION, FIFTH ARMY CORPS,

IN THE FIELD, FORT SAN JUAN, NEAR SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 7, 1898.*

THE ASSISTANT ADJUTANT-GENERAL, FIFTH ARMY CORPS:

SIR.—I have the honor to submit the following report of the operations of my command in the battle of July 1st:

On the afternoon of June 30th, pursuant to orders given to me verbally by the corps commander at his headquarters, I moved my Second and Third Brigades (Pearson and Wikoff) forward about two miles to a point on the Santiago road, near Corps Headquarters. Here the troops bivouacked, the First Brigade (Hawkins) remaining in its camp of the two preceding days, slightly in rear of Corps Headquarters.

On the following morning (July 1st) at 7 o'clock I rode forward to the hill where Captain Grimes's battery was in position. I here met Lieutenant-Colonel McClernand, assistant adjutant-general Fifth Corps, who pointed out to me a green hill in the distance which was to be my objective on my left, and either he or Lieutenant Miley, of Major-General Shafter's staff, gave me directions to keep my right on the main road leading to the city of Santiago. I had previously given the necessary orders for Hawkins's brigade to move early, to be followed in turn by Wikoff and Pearson. Shortly after Grimes's battery opened fire I rode down to the stream and there found General Hawkins at the head of his brigade at a point about 250 yards from the El Poso sugar house. Here I gave him his orders.

The enemy's artillery was now replying to Grimes's battery. I rode forward with Hawkins about 150 yards, closely followed by the Sixth Infantry, which was leading the First Brigade. At this point I received instructions to allow the cavalry the right of way, but for some unknown reason they moved up very slowly, thus causing a delay in my advance of full forty minutes. Lieutenant Miley, of General Shafter's staff, was at this point and understood how the division was delayed, and reported several times that he understood I was making all the progress possible. General Hawkins went forward, and word came back in a few minutes that it would be possible to observe the enemy's position from the front. I immediately rode forward with my staff. The fire of the enemy's sharpshooters was being distinctly felt at this time. I crossed the main ford of the San Juan river, joined General Hawkins, and with him observed the enemy's position from a point some distance in advance of the ford. General Hawkins deemed it possible to turn the enemy's right at Fort San Juan, but later, under the heavy fire, this was found impracticable for the First Brigade, but was accomplished by the Third Brigade coming up later on General Hawkins's left. Having completed the observation, with my staff I proceeded to join the head of my division, just coming under heavy fire. Approaching the First Brigade, I directed them to move alongside the cavalry (which was halted). We were already suffering losses caused by the balloon near by attracting fire and disclosing our position.

The enemy's infantry fire, steadily increasing in intensity, now came from all directions, not only from the front and the dense tropical thickets on our flanks, but from sharpshooters thickly posted in trees in our rear, and from shrapnel apparently aimed at the balloon. Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, of General Shafter's staff, met me about this time and informed me that a trail or narrow way had been discovered from the balloon a short distance back leading to the left to a ford lower down the stream. I hastened to the forks made by this road, and soon after the Seventy-first New York Regiment, of Hawkins's brigade,

came up. I turned them into the by-path indicated by Lieutenant-Colonel Derby, leading to the lower ford, sending word to General Hawkins of this movement. This would have speedily delivered them in their proper place on the left of their brigade, but under the galling fire of the enemy the leading battalion of this regiment was thrown into confusion and recoiled in disorder on the troops in rear. At this critical moment the officers of my staff practically formed a cordon behind the panic-stricken men and urged them to again go forward. I finally ordered them to lie down in the thicket and clear the way for others of their own regiment who were coming up behind. This many of them did, and the second and third battalions came forward in better order and moved along the road toward the ford. One of my staff officers ran back, waving his hat, to hurry forward the Third Brigade, who, upon approaching the forks, found the way blocked by men of the Seventy-first New York. There were other men of this regiment crouching in the bushes, many of whom were encouraged by the advance of the approaching column to rise and go forward. As already stated, I had received orders some time before to keep in rear of the cavalry division. Their advance was much delayed, resulting in frequent halts, presumably to drop their blanket rolls and due to the natural delay in fording a stream. These delays under such a hot fire grew exceedingly irksome, and I therefore pushed the head of my division as quickly as I could toward the river, in column of files or twos, parallel in the narrow way by the cavalry. This quickened the forward movement and enabled me to get into position as speedily as possible for the attack. Owing to the congested condition of the road the progress of the narrow columns was, however, painfully slow. I again sent a staff officer at a gallop to urge forward the troops in rear. The head of Wikoff's brigade reached the forks at 12:20 P. M., and hurried on the left, stepping over prostrate forms of men of the Seventy-first. This heroic brigade, consisting of the Thirteenth, Ninth and Twenty-fourth U. S. Infantry, speedily crossed the stream and were quickly deployed to the left of the lower ford. While personally superintending this movement, Colonel Wikoff was killed, the command of the brigade then devolving upon Lieutenant-Colonel Worth, Thirteenth Infantry, who immediately fell seriously wounded, and then upon Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum, Twenty-fourth Infantry, who, five minutes later, also fell under the withering fire of the enemy. The command of the brigade then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel E. P. Ewers, Ninth Infantry. Meanwhile, I had again sent a staff officer to hurry forward the Second Brigade, which was bringing up the rear. The Tenth and Second Infantry, soon arriving at the forks, were deflected to the left, to follow the Third Brigade, while the Twenty-first was directed along the main road to support Hawkins.

Crossing the lower ford a few minutes later, the Tenth and Second moved

forward in column in good order toward the green knoll already referred to as my objective on the left. Approaching the knoll the regiments deployed, passed over the knoll and ascended the high ridge beyond, driving back the enemy in the direction of his trenches. I observed this movement from the Fort San Juan hill. Colonel E. P. Pearson, Tenth Infantry, commanding the Second Brigade, and the officers and troops under his command, deserve great credit for the soldierly manner in which this movement was executed. I earnestly recommend Colonel Pearson for promotion. Prior to this advance of the Second Brigade, the Third, connecting with Hawkins's gallant troops on the right, had moved toward Fort San Juan, sweeping through a zone of most destructive fire, scaling a steep and difficult hill and assisting in capturing the enemy's strong position (Fort San Juan) at 1:30 P. M. This crest was about 125 feet above the general level and was defended by deep trenches and a loop-holed brick fort, surrounded by barbed wire entanglements. General Hawkins, some time after I reached the crest, reported that the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry had captured the hill, which I now consider incorrect; credit is almost equally due the Sixth, Ninth, Thirteenth, Sixteenth, and Twenty-fourth Regiments of Infantry. Owing to General Hawkins's representations, I forwarded the report sent to Corps Headquarters about 3 P. M. that the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry regiments had captured the hill. The Thirteenth Infantry captured the enemy's colors waving over the fort, but unfortunately destroyed them, distributing the fragments among the men, because, as was asserted, "It was a bad omen," two or three men having been shot while assisting Private Arthur Agnew, Company H, Thirteenth Infantry, the captor. All fragments which could be recovered are submitted with this report. The greatest credit is due to the officers of my command, whether company, battalion, regimental, or brigade commanders, who so admirably directed the formation of their troops, unavoidably intermixed in the dense thicket, and made the desperate rush for the distant and strongly defended crest. I have already mentioned the circumstances of my Third Brigade's advance across the ford where, in the brief space of ten minutes, it lost its brave commander (killed) and the next two ranking officers by disabling wounds, yet, in spite of these confusing conditions, the formations were effected without hesitation, although under a stinging fire, companies acting singly in some instances, and by battalion and regiments in others, rushing through the jungle across the stream, waist deep, and over the wide bottom thickly set with barbed wire entanglements. In this connection I desire to particularly mention First Lieutenant Wendell L. Simpson, adjutant, Ninth Infantry, acting assistant adjutant-general Third Brigade, who was noticeably active and efficient in carrying out orders which I had given him to transmit to his brigade commander, who no longer existed.

The enemy having retired to a second line of rifle pits, I directed my line to hold their positions and intrench. At ten minutes past 3 P. M. I received almost simultaneously two requests—one from Colonel Wood, commanding a cavalry brigade, and one from General Sumner, asking for assistance for the cavalry on my right, "as they were hard pressed." I immediately sent to their aid the Thirteenth Infantry, who promptly went on this further mission, despite the heavy losses they had already sustained.

Great credit is due to the gallant officer and gentleman, Brigadier-General H. S. Hawkins, who, placing himself between the two regiments, leading his brigade, the Sixth and Sixteenth Infantry, urged and led them by voice and bugle calls to the attack so successfully accomplished. My earnest thanks are due to my staff officers present at my side and under my personal observation on the field, especially to Major A. C. Sharpe, assistant adjutant-general; Major Philip Reade, inspector-general; Captain U. G. McAlexander, chief quartermaster, and my aids, First Lieutenant George S. Cartwright, Twenty-fourth Infantry, and First Lieutenant William P. Jackson, Second Infantry; also to Mr. Adolpho Carlos Munoz, the latter a volunteer aid, subsequently wounded in the fight of the 2d instant, who richly merits a commission for his able assistance, given without pay.

The officers enumerated should at least be brevetted for gallantry under fire. I also personally noticed the conduct of First Lieutenant F. J. Kirkpatrick, assistant surgeon, United States Army, on duty with the Twenty-fourth Infantry, giving most efficient aid to the wounded under fire. I observed several times First Lieutenant J. D. Miley, Fifth Artillery, aid to General Shafter, who was conspicuous throughout the day for his coolness under fire, delivering instructions with apparent unconcern. The bloody fighting of my brave command cannot be adequately described in words. The following list of killed, wounded, and missing, tells the story of their valor:

Report of killed, wounded, and missing July 1, 1898, First Division, Fifth Army Corps:

| Organization. | Killed. | | Wounded. | | Missing. |
|-------------------------------------|-----------|------|-----------|-----|----------|
| | Officers. | Men. | Officers. | Men | |
| First Brigade: | | | | | |
| Sixteenth Infantry | 1 | 13 | 5 | 82 | 6 |
| Sixth Infantry | 4 | 13 | 7 | 92 | |
| Seventy-first N. Y. Vol. Infantry.. | 4 | 12 | 1 | 47 | 43 |
| Total | 9 | 38 | 13 | 221 | 49 |

| Organization. | Killed. | | Wounded. | | Missing. |
|------------------------------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|----------|
| | Officers. | Men. | Officers. | Men. | |
| Second Brigade: | | | | | |
| Tenth Infantry | 1 | 4 | 5 | 21 | |
| Twenty-first Infantry | | 5 | 1 | 25 | |
| Second Infantry | | 1 | 4 | 16 | |
| | ===== | ===== | ===== | ===== | ===== |
| Total | 1 | 10 | 10 | 62 | |
| | ===== | ===== | ===== | ===== | ===== |
| Third Brigade: | | | | | |
| Brigade commander | 1 | | | | |
| Ninth Infantry | 1 | 3 | | 23 | 1 |
| Thirteenth Infantry | 2 | 16 | 5 | 81 | 1 |
| Twenty-fourth Infantry | 2 | 10 | 4 | 73 | 7 |
| | ===== | ===== | ===== | ===== | ===== |
| Total | 6 | 29 | 9 | 177 | 9 |
| | ===== | ===== | ===== | ===== | ===== |
| Grand total | 16 | 77 | 32 | 460 | 58 |
| | ===== | ===== | ===== | ===== | ===== |

At daylight on the morning of July 2d, the enemy resumed the battle, and firing continued throughout the day, part of the time in a drenching rain. At nightfall the firing ceased, but at 9 p. m. a vigorous assault was made all along our lines. This was completely repulsed, the enemy again retiring to his trenches. The following morning firing was resumed and continued until near noon, when a white flag was displayed by the enemy and firing was ordered to cease. The casualties of these two days (July 2d and 3d) were as follows:

Report of killed, wounded, and missing, July 21, 1898, First Division, Fifth Army Corps:

| Organization. | Killed. | | Wounded. | | |
|-------------------------------------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|----------|
| | Officers. | Men. | Officers. | Men. | Missing. |
| Division Staff: | | | | | |
| First Brigade | | | I | | |
| General officers | | | I | | |
| Field and staff: | | | | | |
| Sixth Infantry | | | | 2 | |
| Sixteenth Infantry | | I | | 2I | I |
| Seventy-first N. Y. Vol. Infantry.. | | I | | 7 | |
| | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Total | | 2 | I | 30 | I |
| | ===== | ===== | ===== | ===== | ===== |

| Organization. | Killed. | | Wounded. | | Missing. |
|------------------------------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|----------|
| | Officers. | Men. | Officers. | Men. | |
| Second Brigade: | | | | | |
| Field and staff | | | | | |
| Tenth Infantry | | 1 | | 14 | 3 |
| Twenty-first Infantry | | 1 | | 7 | |
| Second Infantry | | 4 | | 31 | |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| Total | | 6 | | 52 | 3 |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| Third Brigade: | | | | | |
| Field and staff | | | | | |
| Ninth Infantry | | | | 4 | |
| Thirteenth Infantry | | | | 3 | |
| Twenty-fourth Infantry | | 1 | 2 | 1 | |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| Total | | 1 | 2 | 8 | |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| Grand total | | 9 | 4 | 90 | 4 |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> |

Mr. A. C. Munoz, volunteer aid to division commander.

Report of killed, wounded, and missing, July 3, 1898, First Division, Fifth Army Corps:

| Organization, | Killed. | | Wounded. | | Missing. |
|-------------------------------------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|----------|
| | Officers. | Men. | Officers. | Men. | |
| First Brigade: | | | | | |
| Field and staff | | | | | |
| Sixth Infantry | | | | 2 | |
| Sixteenth Infantry | | | | 1 | |
| Seventy-first N. Y. Vol. Infantry.. | | | | 4 | |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| Total | | 1 | | | |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| Second Brigade: | | | | | |
| Field and staff | | | | | |
| Tenth Infantry | | | | | |
| Twenty-first Infantry | | | | | |
| Second Infantry | | 1 | | | |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| Total | | 1 | | | |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> |

| Organization. | Officers. | Men. | Officers. | Men. | Missing. |
|-------------------------------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|----------|
| | Killed. | | Wounded. | | |
| Third Brigade: | | | | | |
| Field and staff | | | | | |
| Ninth Infantry | | | | | |
| Thirteenth Infantry | | | | I | |
| Twenty-fourth Infantry | | | | | |
| | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Total | | | | I | |
| | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Grand total | | I | | 8 | |
| | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |
| Grand total, July 1, 2 and 3, | | | | | |
| 1898 : | 12 | 87 | 36 | 561 | 62 |
| | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- | ----- |

One hospital corps man killed, attached to Tenth Infantry, not included in above total.

I desire, in conclusion, to express my gratitude to Major-General Joseph Wheeler for his courteous conduct to me, and, through me, to my division, under the trying circumstances enumerated.

Though ill and suffering, General Wheeler was so perfectly at home under fire that he inspired all of us with assurance.

Attention is invited in this connection to the reports of brigade and subordinate commanders herewith. I cordially indorse their commendations.

Very respectfully,

J. FORD KENT,


Brigadier-General, United States Volunteers, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,

Before SANTIAGO, Cuba, July 7, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL FIFTH ARMY CORPS:

SIR.—After the engagement of June 24th I pushed forward my command through Sevilla into the valley, Lawton's and Kent's commands occupying the hills in the vicinity of that place. After two days' rest Lawton was ordered forward, and on the night of the 30th instructions were given by Major-General Shafter to this officer to attack Caney while the cavalry division and Kent's division were ordered to move forward on the regular Santiago road. The movement commenced on the morning of July 1st. The cavalry division



A SCENE IN EASTERN CUBA.



LOS FOSOS.

advanced, and formed its line with its left near the Santiago road; while Kent's division formed its line with the right joining the left of the cavalry division.

Colonel McClernand, of General Shafter's staff, directed me to give instructions to General Kent, which I complied with in person, at the same time personally directing General Sumner to move forward. The men were all compelled to wade the San Juan river to get into line. This was done under very heavy fire of both infantry and artillery. Our balloon, having been sent up right by the main road, was made a mark of by the enemy. It was evident that we were as much under fire in forming the line as we would be by an advance, and I, therefore, pressed the command forward from the covering under which it was formed. It merged into open space in full view of the enemy, who occupied breastworks and batteries on the crest of the hill which overlooks Santiago,—officers and men falling at every step. The troops advanced gallantly, soon reached the foot of the hill, and ascended, driving the enemy from their works and occupying them on the crest of the hill. To accomplish this required courage and determination, on the part of the officers and men, of a high order, and the losses were very severe.

Too much credit cannot be given to General Sumner and General Kent, and their gallant brigade commanders—Colonel Wood and Colonel Carroll of the cavalry. General Hamilton S. Hawkins, commanding First Brigade, Kent's division, and Colonel Pearson, commanding Second Brigade. Colonel Carroll and Major Wessells were both wounded during the charge; but Major Wessells was enabled to return and resume command. General Wyckoff, commanding Kent's Third Brigade, was killed at 12:10. Lieutenant-Colonel Worth took command, and was wounded at 12:15. Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum then took command, and was wounded at 12:20; and the command then devolved upon Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers, Ninth Infantry.

Upon reaching the crest, I ordered breastworks to be constructed, and sent to the rear for shovels, picks, spades and axes. The enemy's retreat from the ridge was precipitate, but our men were so thoroughly exhausted that it was impossible for them to follow. Their shoes were soaked with water by wading the San Juan river, they had become drenched with rain, and when they reached the crest they were absolutely unable to proceed further. Notwithstanding this condition, these exhausted men labored during the night to erect breastworks, and furnished details to bury the dead and carry the wounded back in improvised litters.

I sent word along the line that reinforcements would soon reach us, and that Lawton would join our right, and that General Bates would come up and strengthen our left. After reaching the crest of the ridge General Kent sent the Thirteenth Regulars to assist in strengthening our right. At midnight General Bates reported, and I placed him in a strong position on the left of our line.

General Lawton had attempted to join us from Caney; but when very near our lines he was fired upon by the Spaniards and turned back, but joined us next day at noon by a circuitous route.

During all the day, on July 2d, the cavalry division, Kent's division and Bates's brigade were engaged with the enemy, being subjected to a severe fire and incurring many casualties; and later in the day Lawton's division also became engaged.

During the entire engagement my staff performed their duties with courage, judgment and ability. Special credit is due to Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Dorst, Major William D. Beach, Captain Joseph E. Dickman, and Lieutenant M. F. Steele. I desire also to say that Lieutenants James H. Reeves and Joseph Wheeler, Jr., Captain Wm. Astor Chanler, Major E. A. Garlington, Mr. Aurelius E. Mestre and Corporal John Lundmark also deserve high commendation for courage and good conduct. Major West, my quartermaster, deserves special commendation for his energy and good conduct during the campaign; and Major Valery Havard and Mr. Leonard Wilson have also done their full duty. Captain Hardie and First Lieutenant F. J. Koester, with Troop 6, Third Cavalry, were detailed with headquarters, and conducted themselves handsomely under fire. The superb courage displayed by the officers and men will be specially mentioned in the reports of subordinate commanders.

Our aggregate strength, and our losses, were as follows:

| Organization. | Killed. | | Wounded. | | Aggregate. | Strength. | |
|----------------------|-----------|-------|-----------|-------|------------|-----------|-------|
| | Officers. | Men. | Officers. | Men. | | Officers. | Men. |
| First Brigade: | | | | | | | |
| Third Cavalry | | 3 | 6 | 47 | 56 | 22 | 420 |
| Sixth Cavalry | | 4 | 4 | 50 | 58 | 16 | 427 |
| Ninth Cavalry | 2 | 2 | 2 | 17 | 23 | 12 | 207 |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| Totals | 2 | 9 | 12 | 114 | 137 | 50 | 1,054 |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| Second Brigade: | | | | | | | |
| Attached | | | 3 | | 3 | | |
| First Cavalry | 1 | 13 | 1 | 47 | 62 | 21 | 501 |
| Tenth Cavalry | 2 | 6 | 9 | 66 | 83 | 22 | 450 |
| First Volunteer Cav- | | | | | | | |
| alry | 1 | 12 | 5 | 72 | 90 | 25 | 517 |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| Totals | 4 | 31 | 18 | 185 | 238 | 77 | 1,468 |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> |
| Grand totals, | 6 | 40 | 30 | 299 | 375 | 127 | 2,522 |
| | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> | <hr/> |

OFFICERS OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION KILLED AND WOUNDED
IN THE BATTLE OF SAN JUAN, CUBA.

OFFICERS KILLED.

Lieutenant-Colonel John M. Hamilton, Ninth Cavalry.
Major Albert G. Forse, First Cavalry.
Captain W. O. O'Neil, First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry.
First Lieutenant William E. Shipp, Tenth Cavalry.
First Lieutenant William H. Smith, Tenth Cavalry.
Acting Assistant Surgeon H. W. Danforth, Attached Ninth Cavalry.

OFFICERS WOUNDED.

Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Carroll, Sixth Cavalry.
Major Henry W. Wessells, Jr., Third Cavalry.
Major T. J. Wint, Tenth Cavalry.
Major and Assistant Surgeon H. La Motte, First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry.
Major W. C. Hayes, First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry.
Captain J. B. Kerr, Sixth Cavalry.
Captain George A. Dodd, Third Cavalry.
Captain George K. Hunter, Third Cavalry.
Captain C. W. Taylor, Ninth Cavalry.
Captain A. P. Blocksom, Sixth Cavalry.
Captain John Bigelow, Jr., Tenth Cavalry.
Captain M. T. Henry, commanding First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry.
First Lieutenant A. Mills, First Cavalry, captain and acting adjutant-general,
Volunteers.
First Lieutenant M. H. Barnum, Tenth Cavalry.
First Lieutenant Arthur Thayer, Third Cavalry.
First Lieutenant O. B. Meyer, Third Cavalry.
First Lieutenant W. S. Wood, Ninth Cavalry.
First Lieutenant A. C. Murrillat, Third Cavalry.
First Lieutenant E. D. Anderson, Tenth Cavalry.
First Lieutenant R. C. Livermore, Tenth Cavalry.
First Lieutenant Carr, First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry.
First Lieutenant David J. Leahey, First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry.
First Lieutenant R. C. Day, First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry.
Second Lieutenant Harry O. Williard, Tenth Cavalry.
Second Lieutenant Walter C. Short, Sixth Cavalry.

Second Lieutenant F. R. McCoy, Tenth Cavalry.

Second Lieutenant T. A. Roberts, Tenth Cavalry.

Second Lieutenant H. K. Devereaux, First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry.

Second Lieutenant H. C. Whitehead, Tenth Cavalry.

Cadet L. K. Haswell, First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry.

General Kent's report of casualties of officers has been forwarded.

The strength given in tabulated statements above, is the aggregate strength of the command; but as there were many details, above figures are about 15 per cent. greater than the forces actually engaged in battle.

The command has been active in strengthening their position, and commanders and their staffs have thoroughly informed themselves as to the topographical features of the country and the situation of the enemy.

Very respectfully,

JOS. WHEELER,

Major-General Volunteers, Commanding.

LIST OF OFFICERS TAKING PART IN THE BATTLE OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA, JULY 1, 2 AND 3, 1898.

FIFTH ARMY CORPS.

Major-General WILLIAM R. SHAFTER, Commanding.

Personal Staff.

| | |
|--|--------------------------|
| Major Robert H. Noble, A. A. G. U. S. V..... | On duty at headquarters. |
| Major John D. Miley, A. A. G. U. S. V..... | On duty at headquarters. |
| Captain William H. McKittrick, A. A. G. U. S. V..... | Aid. |
| Captain Stewart M. Brice, C. S. U. S. N..... | Aid. |
| Doctor George Goodfellow | Volunteer Aid. |
| Mr. G. F. Hawkins | Volunteer Aid. |
| Mr. James T. Ord | Interpreter. |

Corps Staff.

| | |
|---|----------------------------------|
| Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. McClernand, A. A. G. U. S. V.... | Adjutant-General. |
| Captain J. C. Gilmore, Jr., A. A. G. U. S. V..... | Assistant Adjutant-General. |
| Major S. W. Groesbeck, Judge-Advocate, U. S. A..... | Judge-Advocate. |
| Captain Charles G. Starr, First Infantry..... | Acting Inspector-General. |
| Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Astor..... | Inspector-General, U. S. V. |
| Lt.-Col. Chas. G. Humphrey, A. Qr.-Mr.-G.. | Chief Qr.-Mr. of the Expedition. |
| Major J. W. Jacobs, Quartermaster..... | Chief Quartermaster. |

Lieutenant-Colonel B. F. Pope, Chief Surgeon, U. S. V..... Chief Surgeon.
 Col. J. F. Weston, Asst. Com.-Gen. of Subs.... Chief Com. of the Expedition.
 Lieut.-Colonel Geo. McC. Derby, Chief Engineer, U. S. V.... Chief Engineer.
 Lieutenant William Brooke, Fourth Infantry..... Ordnance Officer.
 Major Frank Greene, U. S. V. Signal Corps..... Signal Officer.
 Major Hugh J. Gallagher Depot Commissary.
 Lieutenant Frank DeW. Ramsy Assistant to Depot Commissary.
 Captain E. H. Plummer, Tenth Infantry..... In charge of transportation.

CAVALRY DIVISION.

Major-General JOSEPH WHEELER, U. S. V., Commanding.

Personal Staff.

First Lieutenant M. F. Steele, Eighth Cavalry..... Aid.
 Second Lieutenant James H. Reeves, Sixth Cavalry..... Aid.
 Second Lieutenant Joseph Wheeler, Jr., Fourth Artillery..... Aid.
 Mr. Aurelius E. Mestre..... Interpreter and Volunteer Aid.
 Mr. Leonard Wilson Secretary and Volunteer Aid.

Division Staff.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Dorst, A. A. G., U. S. V..... Adjutant-General.
 Major Valery Havard, Surgeon, U. S. A..... Chief Surgeon.
 Major E. A. Garlington, Inspector-General, U. S. A..... Inspector-General.
 Major Wm. Beach, Chief Engineer, U. S. V..... Acting Engineer Officer.
 Captain P. W. West, Sixth Cavalry..... Acting Chief Quartermaster.
 Captain Wm. A. Chandler, U. S. V..... Acting Ordnance Officer.

FIRST DIVISION.

Brigadier-General J. FORD KENT, U. S. V., Commanding.

Personal Staff.

First Lieutenant George S. Cartwright, Twenty-fourth Infantry..... Aid.
 First Lieutenant W. P. Jackson, Second Infantry Aid.

Division Staff.

Major A. C. Sharpe, U. S. V..... Adjutant-General.
 Major Phillip Reade, Inspector-General, U. S. V..... Inspector-General.

Major James, I. G. U. S. V..... Assistant to Inspector-General.
Major Morris C. Hutchins, Q. M. U. S. V..... Chief Quartermaster.
Captain U. G. McAlexander, A. Q. M. U. S. V.... Assistant to Chief Qr.-Mr.
Major M. W. Wood, Surgeon, U. S. A..... Chief Surgeon.
Captain F. G. Lord, C. S., U. S. V..... Assistant to the Chief Commissary.
First Lieutenant E. F. Taggart, Sixth Infantry..... Acting Chief Commissary.
Mr. A. C. Munez Volunteer Aid.

Brigadier-General HENRY W. LAWTON, U. S. V., Commanding.

Second Lieutenant H. H. Warren, Second Massachusetts Vol. Inf. Aid.
Second Lieutenant William Brooke, Fourth Infantry Aid.

| | |
|---|---|
| Captain H. C. Carbaugh, A. A. G., U. S. V..... | Adjutant-General. |
| Major C. Creighton Webb, Inspector-General, U. S. V.... | Inspector-General. |
| First Lieutenant D. E. Holley, Fourth Infantry... | Acting Chief Commissary and Mustering Officer. |
| First Lieutenant C. S. Farnsworth, Seventeenth Inf.... | Acting Chief Qr.-Mr. |
| Major H. J. Kilbourne, Surgeon, U. S. A..... | Chief Surgeon. |
| Major H. C. Daniels, U. S. V..... | A. A. G. |
| Mr. R. C. Mendoza | Volunteer Aid. |
| Mr. E. L. D. Breckinridge | Volunteer Aid. |

Brigadier-General J. C. BATES, U. S. V., Commanding.

First Lieutenant S. E. Smiley, Fifteenth Infantry.. Aid and Ordnance Officer.
Second Lieutenant M. F. Smith, Twentieth Infantry Aid.

| | |
|---|--------------------|
| Major John A. Logan, A. A. G., U. S. V..... | Adjutant-General. |
| Major H. E. Wilkins, C. S., U. S. V..... | Chief Commissary. |
| Major Thomas M. Woodruff, I. G., U. S. V..... | Inspector-General. |
| Major F. J. Ives, Surgeon, U. S. V..... | Chief Surgeon. |

Captain W. M. Wright, A. A. G., U. S. V. Assistant Adjutant-General.
 First Lieutenant F. R. Day, Twentieth Infantry Chief Quartermaster.
 First Lieutenant H. H. Reeve, Third Infantry Engineer Officer.
 Major James A. Irons, U. S. V. Engineer Officer.

NAMES OF REGIMENTAL COMMANDERS AND ROSTER OF REGIMENTS AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS COM- POSING FIFTH ARMY CORPS IN BATTLE OF SAN- TIAGO DE CUBA.

CAVALRY DIVISION.

Major-General WHEELER, Commanding.

First Brigade.

General Sumner, Commanding.

Third Cavalry Major H. Wessells, Jr., Commanding.
 Sixth Cavalry Major Thomas C. Lebo, Commanding.
 Ninth Cavalry Major W. C. Forbush, Commanding.

Lieutenant-Colonel Henry Carroll commanded the Sixth Cavalry until assigned to the command of the brigade; he was wounded during the advance on San Juan.

Lieutenant-Colonel John M. Hamilton commanded the Ninth Cavalry; he was killed during the advance on San Juan, Major Forbush succeeding in command.

Second Brigade.

Brigadier-General Leonard Wood, Commanding.

First Cavalry Lieutenant-Colonel C. D. Viele, Commanding.
 Tenth Cavalry Lieutenant-Colonel T. A. Baldwin, Commanding.
 First U. S. Volunteer Cavalry Lieut.-Colonel T. Roosevelt, Commanding.

FIRST DIVISION.

Brigadier-General J. F. KENT, Commanding.

First Brigade.

Colonel H. A. Theaker, Sixteenth Infantry, Commanding.

Sixth United States Infantry Major Charles Miner, Commanding.
 Sixteenth United States Infantry . . Major Wm. B. McLaughlin, Commanding.
 Seventy-first N. Y. Volunteer Infantry . . Colonel W. A. Downs, Commanding.

Second Brigade.

Colonel E. P. Pearson, Tenth Infantry, Commanding.

Tenth Infantry..... Lieutenant-Colonel E. R. Kellogg, Commanding.
 Second Infantry..... Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. M. Wherry, Commanding.
 Twenty-first Infantry..... Captain F. H. E. Ebstein, Commanding.

Third Brigade.

Brigadier-General Adelbert Ames, Commanding.

Ninth Infantry..... Lieutenant-Colonel E. P. Ewers, Commanding.
 Thirteenth Infantry..... Major Wm. Auman, Commanding.
 Twenty-fourth Infantry.... Major A. C. Markley, Eleventh Inf., Commanding.

SECOND DIVISION.

Major-General H. W. LAWTON, Commanding.

First Brigade.

Brigadier-General Wm. Ludlow, Commanding.

Eighth Infantry..... Major C. H. Conrad, Commanding.
 Twenty-second Infantry..... Major Wm. M. Van Horne, Commanding.
 Second Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry..... Colonel Clark, Commanding.

Second Brigade.

Brigadier-General Chambers McKibbin, Commanding.

Fourth Infantry..... Major Stephen Baker, Commanding.
 First Infantry..... Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. H. Bisbee, Commanding.
 Twenty-fifth Infantry..... Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Daggett, Commanding.

Third Brigade.

Brigadier-General A. R. Chaffee, Commanding.

Seventh Infantry..... Lieutenant-Colonel G. S. Carpenter, Commanding.
 Twelfth Infantry..... Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Comba, Commanding.
 Seventeenth Infantry..... Major L. W. O'Brien, Commanding.

PROVISIONAL DIVISION.

Major-General BATES, Commanding.

First Brigade.

Colonel John H. Page, Third Infantry, Commanding.

Third Infantry..... Lieutenant-Colonel A. A. Harbach, Commanding.
 Twentieth Infantry..... Major Wm. S. McCaskey, Commanding.

Second Brigade.

Colonel Henry L. Turner, Commanding.

First Illinois Volunteer Infantry.. Lieutenant-Colonel Lauman, Commanding.
 First District Col. Volunteer Infantry..... Colonel Harries, Commanding.
 (Attached) Ninth Mass. Volunteer Inf..... Lieut.-Col. Logan, Commanding.
 Battalion of Engineers... Capt. Ed. Burr, Commanding (Companies C and E)
 Signal Corps, Company No. 15..... Captain Smead, U. S. V., Commanding.
 Mounted Squadron (Troops A, C, D and F), Second Cavalry,

Major Wm. Rafferty, Commanding.

Light Artillery Brigade (General Randolph) Commanding Light Batteries:
 "E" (Capron's); "K" (Best's) First Artillery; "A" (Grimes) and "F"
 (Vose), Second Artillery; "F" (Taylor), Fourth Artillery, and "F"
 (Reilly), Fifth Artillery.

BATTALION SIEGE ARTILLERY.

Fourth Artillery, Battalion "G" and "H," Capt. Wm. Enniss, Commanding.
 Gatling Gun Detachment... Second Lieut. John H. Parker, 13th Inf., Comd'g.
 Thirty-third Michigan Volunteer Infantry.... Colonel Boynton, Commanding.
 Thirty-fourth Michigan Volunteer Infantry.. Colonel Peterson, Commanding.
 Eighth Ohio Volunteer Infantry..... Colonel Hard, Commanding.

The plan of campaign must always, in a measure, be controlled by the disposition of the opposing forces. Lieutenant-General Linares, who commanded at Santiago, had in his immediate command and within two days' march of our point of disembarkation, at least 24,000 regular Spanish soldiers. It was certainly to be presumed that he would concentrate these forces against us, and our plans in the first instance were of necessity based upon the probability of such action upon his part. After landing and finding that the Spaniards were not concentrating their forces, it was plain that our best plan was to move with all rapidity upon the defenses of Santiago. It was hoped that such a movement would enable the Americans to fight the forces at Santiago before the arrival of reinforcements, and we also reduced to a minimum the chance of the army being depleted by sickness before the final conflict with the enemy.

Immediately after the fight of July 1st and 2d, I made a careful and exhaustive investigation of the defenses of the city and was convinced that to take the city by assault would cost us at least 3,000 men. This was fully confirmed by a closer inspection of the works

after the city was captured. The plan of extending our lines around the city was adopted, and this was done by continually spreading them to the right and lengthening the line by placing new troops in position as the reinforcements reached us.

The following communications describe the positions of the troops as they reached San Juan and were placed in line surrounding the city:

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,

July 2, 1898.

General SHAFER:

General Lawton's division is now taking position on the right of our cavalry. I had to let the artillery withdraw to take a better position. They were exposed to so hot infantry fire that they were unable to fire where they were. Major Dillenback is sure of being able to effectively bomboard Santiago from the position he had withdrawn to.

Very respectfully,

JOS. WHEELER,

Major-General Volunteers.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,

July 2, 1898.

General SHAFER:

General Chaffee's brigade of General Lawton's division is now in line on the right of cavalry. General Lawton's other two are on the road coming up. The Cubans, under Colonel Gonzales, have come up and General Lawton is holding them to decide where to put them in. The batteries have been delayed by bad ford and have caused General Lawton's two brigades some delay, but they are pushing on and hope they will be here soon.

General Ludlow's brigade is now arriving and General Lawton is putting it in position. The men are firing as little as they can and we are trying to let them rest as much as possible, in order that they may be in condition to work on the intrenchments to-night.

Very respectfully,

JOS. WHEELER,

Major-General Volunteers.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
SAN JUAN, July 2, 1898 — 11 A. M.

Major-General SHAFTER, *Fifth Corps*:

The situation is the same as it has been all day.

I have reinforced Kent's left with one of Duffield's regiments.

The Duffield regiment to remain only until I can give Kent back the Thirteenth Infantry.

I regret that we are having some killed and wounded.

The Cubans are still at this point.

Very respectfully,
JOS. WHEELER,
Major-General Volunteers.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
July 2, 1898 — 12:15 P. M.

General W. R. SHAFTER, *Commanding, Etc.*:

SIR.— General Bates is now on our extreme left with his left flank refused or thrown back so as to face southwest and also to face batteries that we feared would enfilade us. Kent's division is on Bates's right; the cavalry division is on the right of Kent; Lawton is formed on the right of cavalry division. One regiment of Duffield sent over to strengthen Kent's left, to remain until I could lend him the Thirteenth Infantry, which in the hurry of movement got mixed in with cavalry yesterday. I asked General Lawton to put one platoon in the San Juan building to northeast of us for purpose of observation.

The men have made some breastworks and they are endeavoring to keep as quiet to-day as possible so as to secure rest and peace, which they need very much.

We are losing a few killed and wounded, but are fighting as little as possible. I suppose Lawton will throw his right forward so as to somewhat encircle the city, but I presume he will await instructions from you on that point and that he has already received such instructions. One regiment of General Duffield is in reserve near my headquarters.

The Cubans have moved over to our right. We have distributed ammunition and rations so far as I learn there is any need for them.

Very respectfully,
JOS. WHEELER,
Major-General, Commanding Cavalry Division.

The following is a letter from General Shafter:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,

July 2, 1898.

My Dear General WHEELER:

What do you think of the idea of sending a division in rear of the left division to clear out the forts along the entrance to the bay so as to let the navy in and have the business over. Can it be done?

Very respectfully,

WM. R. SHAFTER.

To which I sent the following reply:

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,

July 2, 1898.

Major-General SHAFTER, *Commanding U. S. Forces:*

DEAR GENERAL.—I regret to say that I do not think infantry can take the forts along the entrance of the bay. I would like to do it, but the effort would be attended with terrible loss. We can procure artillery ammunition without limit. It seems to me it would be a good plan to place our siege guns and other artillery in position and hammer at Santiago and at all the batteries that interfere with us. Our artillerymen should be studying positions to do this work and I can have no doubt as to the final result. If we hammer at the enemy's batteries they will fire back upon ours, and we all know that there are so few men connected with batteries and they learn to take such care of themselves that losses are comparatively small. Again, if there is a heavy fire at the batteries which can enfilade our line they will be apt to neglect our line and devote themselves to our batteries.

Very respectfully,

JOS. WHEELER,

Major-General Commanding.

P. S.—What I mean by infantry not being able to take forts along entrance of bay is that it would take a large force and an enormous loss would be sustained.

Early on June 3d, General Shafter sent in a demand for the immediate surrender of Santiago. It was in the following words:

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,
Near SAN JUAN RIVER, Cuba, *July 3, 1898—8:30 A. M.*

To the COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE SPANISH FORCES, *Santiago de Cuba:*

SIR.—I shall be obliged, unless you surrender, to shell Santiago de Cuba. Please inform the citizens of foreign countries and all women and children that they should leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General, U. S. A.

The following is the Spanish reply:

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 3, 1898—3 P. M.*
HIS EXCELLENCY, *the General Commanding Forces of United States, near San Juan River:*

SIR.—I have the honor to reply to your communication of to-day, written at 8:30 A. M. and received at 1 P. M., demanding the surrender of this city; on the contrary case announcing to me that you will bombard this city and that I advise the foreign women and children that they must leave the city before 10 o'clock to-morrow morning. It is my duty to say to you that this city will not surrender and that I will inform the foreign consuls and inhabitants of the contents of your message.

Very respectfully,
JOSE TORAL,
Commander-in-Chief, Fourth Corps.

Colonel Dorst, who was the bearer of these letters, brought with him from the city a number of foreign consuls begging protection for noncombatants, as shown by the following:

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
July 3, 1898

General SHAFTER:

Colonel Dorst has just returned bringing the British, Portuguese, Chinese, Norwegian pro-consuls, representing the Consular Corps. They wish to know

if the old men and all noncombatants may come out and occupy Caney and places on the railway line. They also want a postponement till 10 A. M., the 5th instant. Please answer at once, as these gentlemen desire to return before dark.

Very respectfully,

JOS. WHEELER,

Major-General Volunteers.

P. S.—They received notice only at 3 o'clock.

There are 15,000 to 20,000 women and children in the city.

Consuls who called under flag of truce, July 3, 1898:

Frederick W. Ramsden, H. B. M. Consul, Santiago de Cuba.

Isidoro P. Augustini, Swedish and Norwegian Vice-Consul.

Modesto Ras, Portuguese Consul.

Robert Mason, British Pro-Consul and Chinese Consul.

Frederick Wm. Ramsden (fils).

To which General Shafter made the following reply:

July 3, 1898.

THE COMMANDING GENERAL SPANISH FORCES, *Santiago de Cuba:*

In consideration of the request of the consular officers in your city awarded the delay in carrying out my intention to fire on the city and in the interest of the poor women and children who will suffer very greatly by their hasty and in forced [enforced] departure from the city, I have the honor to announce that I will delay such action solely in their interest until noon on the 5th, providing during the interval your forces make no demonstration whatever upon those of my own.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

W. R. SHAFTER,

Major-General, United States Volunteers.

Late in the evening he received a communication from General Toral, as follows:

ARMY OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA, FOURTH ARMY CORPS,

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 3, 1898, at 9 o'clock.*

TO HIS EXCELLENCY, *the General of the Cavalry Division of the Forces of the United States:*

YOUR EXCELLENCY.—I am receiving at 9 at night, through the English consul, your esteemed communication dated this afternoon at 6:45, and refer-

ring to the withdrawal, from danger of the bombardment, of foreign subjects and women and children in the city. I do not hesitate to order my troops to remain quiet during that time, if they be not attacked by the Americans; this in aid of the proposals of your excellency, and believing that the commissioners of the foreign governments will go to-morrow, the 4th, and have a conference with your excellency, in accordance with a communication presented by the dean of the consuls.

I remain, your excellency, your most obedient servant,

J. TORAL,

*Commander-in-Chief, in the Interim, Fourth Army Corps,
and Military Governor of Santiago de Cuba.*

This occasioned a cessation of hostilities to give the noncombatants a chance to escape from the beleaguered city. During the following days a mournful procession streamed through the lines toward the neighboring villages; old men and helpless women and children, many of them in a starving condition. Our soldiers in many places shared their scanty rations with these poor people, whose condition excited our deepest sympathy.

On the 3d of June, we received the glorious news of the defeat and destruction of Cervera's fleet, as told in the following dispatches:

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,

July 3, 1898.

To Colonel McCLEARNAND, *in Field*:

The Spanish fleet ran out of Santiago harbor about 9 A. M. to-day. Terrific naval battle outside. Three Spanish gunboats and one torpedo boat destroyed. Run on beach and burned up. One Spanish gunboat still at large going westward and greater portion of fleet in pursuit.

I saw the three gunboats and one torpedo boat. Signal fires on hill west of Morro Castle last night. The torpedo boat on beach about three miles, two gunboats about six miles, and third gunboat about twenty miles west of Morro Castle.

FRED. A. SMITH,

A. A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,

EL POZO, *July 3, 1898* — I P. M.

Colonel McCLEARNAND.—Lieutenant Allen, Second Cavalry, from our extreme right, where he overlooked the bay, states that Admiral Cervera's fleet steamed out this morning and engaged our fleet. French consul, who came into our lines yesterday, informed General Garcia, Admiral Cervera said yesterday, it was better to die fighting than to sink his ships. Rush this notification all around our lines to the front.

SHAFTER,

Commanding.

The 4th of July was quietly observed in camp; no salutes could be fired on account of the truce, but the bands played at noon and the following general orders were published:

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES FORCES,

SAN JUAN RIVER, *July 4, 1898.*

GENERAL ORDERS, }
No. 21. }

I. The general commanding congratulates the army on the results of its first general engagement with the enemy. The strongly-fortified outpost and village of Caney was captured after a most stubborn resistance, nearly its entire garrison being killed, wounded, or captured, by the Second Division, Fifth Corps, Brigadier-General Lawton commanding. The heroic valor displayed by those troops adds another brilliant page to the history of American warfare. To Major-General Wheeler of the cavalry division was probably given the most difficult task, that of crossing a stream under fire, and deploying under the enemy's rifle-pits. These he almost immediately charged, and carried in the most gallant manner, driving the enemy from his strong positions to the shelter of the stronger works in rear. This was only accomplished by the most persevering and arduous efforts, officers and men exposing themselves to the deadly fire of the Spanish troops. In these efforts he was ably seconded by Brigadier-General Kent with the First Division on the extreme left, who also captured the works on his front.

Numerous distinguished acts have been reported, and in due time will be made known to the proper authorities.

By command of Major-General Shafter,

E. J. McCLEARNAND,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

The Port of
GUANTANAMO
 OR
CUMBERLAND HARBOUR
 on the
South Coast of Cuba
 From a Spanish printed Plan

Latitude of Point Barrowale $25.55.33$
 Longitude from Greenwich $76.52.08$

Nautical Miles



A double sand & rock, gyrene
 A shell and of clay





SPANISH FORT AND SIGNAL TOWER.

And the following telegram was read to the troops:

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 3, 1898.

General SHAFTER, *Siboney*:

Accept my hearty congratulations on the record made of magnificent fortitude, gallantry and sacrifice displayed in the desperate fighting of the troops before Santiago.

I realize the hardships, difficulties and suffering, and am proud that amidst it all the troops illustrated such fearless and patriotic devotion to the welfare of our common country and flag. Whatever the result to follow, their unsurpassed deeds of valor is already a gratifying chapter of history. Expect to be with you within one week with strong reinforcements.

MILES,

Major-General Commanding.

General Shafter had replied to General Miles's telegram in the following words:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,

Near SANTIAGO, July 3, 1898.

Major-General NELSON A. MILES, *Commanding the Army of the United States, Washington*:

I thank you in the name of the gallant men I have the honor to command for splendid tribute of praise which you have accorded them. Your telegram will be published at the head of the regiments, and this morning I feel that I am master of the situation and can hold the enemy for any length of time. I am delighted to know that you are coming, that you may see for yourself the obstacles which this army had to overcome. My only regret is the great number of gallant souls who have given their lives for our country's cause.

SHAFTER.

General Garcia with 400 Cubans was sent around the city to guard the Cobre road, but his forces were attacked and driven back by General Pando, who with 5,000 men entered the city to reinforce the garrison there.

The following letter was received informing me of Pando's arrival, and at the same time imparting the welcome news of the approach of reinforcements for ourselves:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,

July 4, 1898 — 10:20 A. M.

To General WHEELER:

Just received letter from General Garcia that 5,000 men entered the city last night over the Cobre road. I understood from Lawton that this road was securely covered by Garcia's men, nearly 4,000 in number, since the day before yesterday. Garcia must have withdrawn and given them free entrance. If this was the case there will probably be an attack made at any minute. Our lines must be made as strong as possible. I am expecting 6,000 men every hour and 3,000 from Camp Alger hourly. Telegram from General Miles last night says that he will be here with strong reinforcements within a week. Have just wired above information. Acknowledge receipt.

SHAFTER.

The following dispatch, passed along the whole line, greatly encouraged the troops:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,

July 5, 1898.

General WHEELER:

Please communicate the following dispatches, just received, along the whole line:

"WASHINGTON, D. C., July 5, 1898.

"General SHAFTER, Siboney:

"Reinforcements are being hurried to you. Randolph leaves Key West tonight with fast convoy; he has about 3,500 men, including the six light batteries from Tampa. The 'St. Paul' will leave New York Wednesday evening with the Eighth Ohio Volunteers. The 'Yale' and 'Harvard' will take all the troops they can carry, sailing from Charleston; the day and hour of their departure will be communicated to you as soon as known, probably the 6th.

"By command of Major-General Miles,

"H. C. CORBIN,

"Adjutant-General."

On July 4th, 5th and 6th, the following telegrams were exchanged, showing clearly the condition of affairs at Santiago:

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, July 4, 1898.

Major-General SHAFTER, *Playa del Este, Cuba.*

After conference with the President and the Secretary of War, I am directed to say your continued illness brings sorrow and anxiety. In case you are

disabled General Wheeler would, of course, succeed to command. His illness, which we also regret, is feared to be so serious as to prevent his assuming command. You must determine whether your condition is such as to require you to relinquish command. If so, and General Wheeler is disabled, you will order the next general officer in rank for duty to succeed you and to take up the work in hand. It is not expected that our forces will make assault until they are ready.

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via* HAITI, July 6, 1898 — 5:40 A. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington:*

Camp near Santiago, 5. I am not at present so much ill as exhausted from the intense strain that has been on me for the last two months. I am also suffering from an attack of gout, which prevents me from moving about. I have, however, the whole business in my hand and am managing it through able staff officers. When I do have to give up I will, of course, follow your order, but I hope to be better soon.

SHAFTER,
Major-General, Commanding.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 4, 1898 — 3:50 P. M.

Major-General SHAFTER, *Playa del Este, Cuba:*

Being on the ground and knowing all the conditions, the Secretary of War directs you will use your own judgment as to how and when you will take the city of Santiago, but, for manifest reasons, it should be accomplished as speedily as possible.

By command of Major-General Miles,

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via* HAITI, July 4, 1898 — 10:10 P. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., *Washington:*

Camp near Santiago, Cuba, 4. When am I to expect troops from Tampa? Report just received; Pando entered city last night by Cobre road with 5,000 from Holguin. Garcia was especially charged with blockading that road.

SHAFTER,
Commanding.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 4, 1898.

General SHAFTER, *Playa del Este, Cuba:*

Reinforcements are being hurried to you. Randolph leaves Key West to-night with fast convoy. He has about 3,500 men, including the six light batteries from Tampa. The "St. Paul" will leave New York Wednesday evening with the Eighth Ohio Volunteers. The "Yale" and "Harvard" will take all the troops they can carry, sailing from Charleston. The day and hour of their departure will be communicated to you as soon as known, probably the 6th.

By command of Major-General Miles,

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via* HAITI, July 4, 1898 — 11:50 P. M.
ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., *Washington:*

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, in camp near Santiago de Cuba, 4. There appears to be no reasonable doubt that General Pando succeeded in entering Santiago last night with his force, said to be about 5,000 men. This puts a different aspect upon affairs, and while we can probably maintain ourselves, it would be at the cost of very considerable fighting and loss. General Lawton reports that General Garcia, who was to block entrance of Pando, informed him at 10 o'clock last night that Pando had passed in on Cobre road. Lawton says cannot compel General Garcia to obey my instructions, and that if they intend to place themselves in any position where they will have to fight, and that if they intend to reduce Santiago, we will have to depend alone upon our own troops, and that we will require twice the number we now have. I sent message to Admiral Sampson, asking if he proposed entering the harbor so as to give us his assistance. Commodore Watson replies that he does not know Admiral Sampson's intentions since the destruction of the Spanish squadron, but does not himself think fleet should try to go into harbor of Santiago. This, under the circumstances, is not very encouraging. Have been expecting a division from Tampa and Duffield's Second Brigade from Camp Alger, but only a small number of recruits have appeared so far. We have got to try and reduce the town, now that the fleet is destroyed, which was stated to be the chief object of the expedition; there must be no delay in getting large bodies of troops here. The town is in a terrible condition as to food, and people are starving, as stated by foreign consuls this morning, but the troops can fight and have large quantities of rice, but no other supplies. There will

be nothing done here until noon of the 5th, and I suppose I can put them off a little longer to enable people to get out. Country here is destitute of food or growing crops, except mangoes. Men are in good spirits and so far in good health, though it is hard to tell how long the latter will continue. I am sorry to say I am no better, and, in addition to my weakness, cannot be out on account of slight attack of gout, but hope to be better soon. Lieutenant Miley had interview with consuls this morning, and his report will be telegraphed immediately. I do not send this in cipher, as time is precious.

SHAFTER,
Major-General.

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via* HAITI, July 5, 1898 — 12:53 A. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington:*

In the field near San Juan river, 4. I regard it as necessary that the navy force an entrance into the harbor of Santiago not later than the 6th instant and assist in the capture of that place. If they do, I believe the place will surrender without further sacrifice of life.

SHAFTER,
Major-General.

Please acknowledge receipt to me.

ALLEN.

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via* HAITI, July 5, 1898 — 1:10 A. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington:*

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, camp near San Juan river, 5. If Sampson will force an entrance with all his fleet to the upper bay of Santiago, we can take the city within a few hours. Under these conditions I believe the town will surrender. If the army is to take the place, I want 15,000 troops speedily, and it is not certain that they can be landed, as it is getting stormy. Sure and speedy way is through the bay. Am now in position to do my part.

SHAFTER,
Major-General.

Please acknowledge receipt to me.

ALLEN.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 5, 1898 — 11:20 A. M.

Major-General SHAFTER, *Playa del Este, Cuba:*

Secretary of War instructs me to say that the President directs that you confer with Admiral Sampson at once for co-operation in taking Santiago. After the fullest exchange of views you will agree upon the time and manner of attack.

By command of Major-General Miles,

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

PLAYA, July 5, 1898 — 1:37 P. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington:*

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, near Santiago de Cuba. Navy should go into Santiago harbor at any cost. If they do, I believe they will take the city and all the troops that are there. If they do not, the country should be prepared for heavy losses among our troops. After talking with the French consul myself, and Lieutenant Miley with several others, I do not believe I will bombard the town until I get more troops, but will keep up fire on trenches. If it was simply a going out of the women, and to outside places where they could be cared for, it would not matter much, but now it means their going out to starve to death or be furnished with food by us, and the latter is not possible now. I should very much like the Secretary's views.

SHAFTER,
Major-General.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 5, 1898 — 3:10 P. M.

Major-General SHAFTER, *Playa del Este, Cuba:*

Your telegram this date has been submitted to the President. After consideration, the Secretary of War directs me to say that it is evident from your several reports that you do not consider your force strong enough to make a successful assault upon the Spanish army intrenched in Santiago. This being the case, it is the part of wisdom to await reinforcements, the embarkation of which you have already been advised. As you have already been advised, you must be judge of the time and manner of assault. The President has directed

that you and Admiral Sampson have a conference and determine a course of co-operation best calculated to secure desirable results, with least sacrifice.

By command of Major-General Miles,

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *July 5, 1898* — 3:45 P. M.

General RUSSELL A. ALGER, *Secretary of War, Washington:*

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, near San Juan river, Cuba, 4th, 6 P. M. In accordance with your order I send a dispatch showing the situation at this time:

No firing on lines since 11 A. M. yesterday, and there will be none to-morrow; certainly not before 12 o'clock, noon. I have quite a number of seriously wounded Spanish officers and I have proposed to send them in, which the Spanish general has apparently gladly accepted. Only the severely wounded will be sent. This will probably occupy to-morrow. I am told troop ships are in sight; if so, I will get the men up to-morrow. Lieutenant Miley, of my staff, had an interview this morning with several of the consular officers. His report is telegraphed, so you may know all the circumstances, and is as follows:

Memorandum of an interview between Mr. Robert Mason, British pro-consul; M. Isidore Augustine, Swedish and Norwegian consul; Mr. Modesmo Ross, Portuguese consul; Mr. Angel Navarro, secretary to Cuban governor of the Province of Santiago; and first lieutenant of the Second Artillery, near Santiago de Cuba, July 4, 1898, at 9:45 A. M.

Lieutenant Miley met General Wheeler and Colonel Dorst on the American lines and proceeded with them, bearing a flag of truce, to a point from 500 to 600 yards in front of the lines, where they met the four first above-named gentlemen. It was explained to the consuls that Caney had been badly shelled in the last few days and that many wounded were still in the houses at that place, and also some of the dead unburied, but that any person leaving Santiago could go there if he wished to a limited few — 3,000 or 4,000. General Shafter could furnish the rougher components of the ration, namely, bread, sugar, coffee, and bacon. Left impossible at present to render assistance to a greater number. He did not expect there would be such a great number to leave the city. He also stated that General Shafter had submitted the question of bombardment to his home Government and expected a reply to-day. The alternative being a very close investment and starving the garrison out, which could

be easily done, as the Americans had a force several times stronger than the enemy. In the latter case the people who could get something to eat would probably stay in the city and come out gradually, as their provisions failed. By this time the general would undoubtedly be in a position to assist them, but not now, if all were forced out at once. The general, therefore, advised a short wait until he received orders from his home Government, relying on the fact that he will not throw shells into the city.

The British proconsul, speaking for the others, then explained the dreadful condition now existing among the inhabitants of Santiago. The condition has been gradually growing worse for the last three years. For the past two years no crops of any consequence have been raised. It would entail a dreadful hardship upon everyone if forced to leave the city, and day before yesterday the scenes in the streets and around the consulates were very distressing. It was then expected that the American fleet would attempt to enter the harbor and bombard the city. Mr. Mason and the other consuls insisted upon the importance of the use of the broad term noncombatants when designating the persons who could leave Santiago. They said that many inhabitants of Spanish birth and sympathies now engaged in civil pursuits would be glad to leave the city if given an opportunity by General Shafter and General Toral. He says there are about 15,000 or 20,000 women and children and foreigners and about 30,000 noncombatants. The secretary to the civil governor was also very anxious that the term noncombatants be used. The British consul submitted for the consideration of General Shafter the following propositions: First, whether the old and infirm and the sick could not be taken on board the Spanish merchant vessels now in and moored at a point not under fire; second, whether trains filled with noncombatants could be run from Santiago through American lines and the empty trains returned; third, whether some guaranty of disposition of American troops could not be given for the safety of noncombatants who might leave the city for territory now occupied by the Cuban forces. The first and second propositions were accepted, the third General Shafter could not agree to, as he could not afford to expose his troops in isolated places, where they will be forsaken by the Cuban forces when attacked.

E. J. McCLERNAND,

A. A. G.

PLAYA, *via* HAITI, July 5, 1898 — 6:50 P. M.

Secretary ALGER, *Washington*:

In camp near Santiago, 5. Large number of women and children coming out of Santiago this morning. With assistance of Miss Barton will try and feed them. Do not believe there will be any firing to-day on account of all the

people not being able to get out. Have also the enemy receiving some of his wounded which I am sending him. Heavy firing about midnight, which continued an hour, at entrance to bay. Don't know cause. Hope it was Sampson clearing the entrance of torpedoes. Appearance of fleet in harbor will settle Santiago. The land side is securely held.

SHAFTER,
Commanding.

It is evident from these communications that there was an intense desire upon the part of the army officers to end the siege as speedily as possible, to lessen the hardships of our own men and to prevent the ravages of sickness. The truce, commencing on the 3d, was frequently renewed on account of the deplorable condition of the noncombatants in the city and the delay in the arrival of our own reinforcements.

The news of the destruction of Admiral Cervera's fleet had a very depressing effect upon the Spaniards and created a corresponding enthusiasm among our troops, who were also encouraged by the arrival of reinforcements. As we have seen, the surrender of the city was demanded, and time was given to allow the non-combatants to leave Santiago; and for several days the constant interchange of letters between the commanding generals, under the flag of truce, caused the cessation of hostilities. On the 5th about 22,000 refugees from Santiago passed through our lines to El Caney, Siboney and other localities. These days of inaction in the trenches were, probably, more trying to the men than the time of active hostilities. They suffered from the burning sun of the morning, the drenching afternoon rains, the heavy dews of the night, and most of all from the suspense of uncertainty.

The abject fear exhibited by our prisoners when they were first brought in was pitiful to witness, as was their relief and gratitude when they found that they were to be treated with kindness and humanity. Those of the wounded officers who were able to bear the fatigue of transportation were sent back to Santiago, and the effect of this upon the sentiments of the besieged enemy was very beneficial to our cause. This was made apparent when on the 5th General Toral agreed to exchange Hobson and his men, who had been captured after the sinking of the "Merrimac" and had been for a month detained as prisoners in Santiago, for an equal number of Spanish prisoners. The exchange took place on the 6th, in full view of the army and amid the greatest delight and enthusiasm on part of the American troops.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,

July 5, 1898, 6:25 P. M.

General SHAFTER:

General Toral sends word by a flag that the wounded have arrived safely and he expresses his thanks for the kindness shown them.

JOS. WHEELER.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,

July 5, 1898.

General WHEELER:

General Toral has just acceded to my proposition to exchange Hobson and his men, and it will be done to-morrow A. M.

SHAFTER.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,

Camp near SANTIAGO, July 5, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington*:

I am just in receipt of a letter from General Toral, agreeing to exchange Hobson and men here. To make exchange in the morning. Yesterday he refused my proposition of exchange.

SHAFTER,

Major-General.

The good effects of our kind treatment of the Spanish prisoners has already been alluded to, and is more fully described in the following letter from General Shafter:

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via HAITI*, July 6, 1898 — 7:58 P. M.ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., *Washington*:

Siboney, 5, 7:29 A. M. I yesterday offered to return to the commanding officer of the Spanish forces a number of wounded officers and men left lying on the battlefield at Caney, the officers to give their paroles and the senior officer for the men. Did this, first, to get rid of the care of them; and, second, to show the Spanish troops they were not to be killed by us, as they had been told by their officers would be the case. This morning I sent Lieutenant Brooke and Dr. Goodfellow with some ambulances to Caney for the wounded, and from there

conducted them as far as they were to go. Four officers and twenty-four men were loaded and driven into the inner line of defenses, near the city. Large numbers of officers and soldiers gathered about the ambulances and assisted in removing the men. Two companies of troops were drawn up on either side of the road and arms were presented to the officers and their mounted escort. All of the officers gave their individual parole and desired to return. The men did not wish to go back, but were required to do so. I have just received a letter through a flag of truce from the general of the lines thanking me courteously for giving them their wounded. I am satisfied that it will tend more to create dissatisfaction in the ranks of the enemy than anything I could have done, as the soldiers said we were fighting the church and were going to kill them. There has not been a shot fired on the line to-day. I am simply making my lines stronger and hanging on. I shall expect many deserters, as a number of officers came out with the refugees last night, one of them a colonel, and two captains, who fought us on the 1st.

SHAFTER,
Major-General.

I sent the following communications to General Toral:

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
SAN JUAN, Cuba, July 6, 1898.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL TORAL, *Commanding Spanish Forces, Santiago, Cuba:*

GENERAL.—I am directed by the Commanding General, U. S. Forces, to inform you that Second Lieutenant C. F. Emilio Valez, Twenty-ninth Regiment, and seven men have arrived at my headquarters for exchange for Lieutenant Hobson and men. Through an error Second Lieutenant Constanzio Germain, Twenty-ninth Regiment, and First Lieutenant Adolfo Ario, Provisional Battalion, of Porto Rico, were not sent. The Commanding General, however, states that within the next four hours these officers will be here, so that you can make your selection of officers for exchange. Lieutenant Hobson should be sent on the San Juan road. Your officers will be sent on this road.

With great respect,

JOSEPH WHEELER,
Major-General, Commanding Advance Line.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,

Near SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 6, 1898.*

TO HIS EXCELLENCY, LIEUTENANT-GENERAL TORAL, *Commanding Spanish Forces at Santiago de Cuba:*

SIR.—There has been delay in getting the Spanish prisoners up to this point. They are now en route and we will follow them on immediately to effect their exchange for Lieutenant Hobson and his seven sailors.

With respect,

JOSEPH WHEELER,

Major-General, Commanding Advance Line.

The prisoners, escorted by Major Irles and a guard of Spanish soldiers, were met by Lieutenants Miley and Noble, aides to General Shafter, on neutral ground, under a magnificent ceiba tree, afterward to become famous as the "Surrender Tree," under whose wide-spreading branches the commission which arranged for the surrender of the city held its meetings. The exchange of prisoners took place about 4 o'clock, and it was expected the truce would end in about an hour, as shown by the following dispatches:

[Circular.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,

July 6, 1898.

The exchange of prisoners will be over in an hour, and we may expect an attack at any moment.

Have your men prepared for it.

By command of Major-General Wheeler,

J. H. DORST,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

[Circular.]

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,

Before SANTIAGO, Cuba, *July 6, 1898.*

The Major-General Commanding directs me to inform you that the truce will cease at 5 o'clock, P. M., this date.

By command of Major-General Wheeler,

J. H. DORST,

Lieutenant-Colonel U. S. Vols., Assistant Adjutant-General.

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via* HAITI, July 7, 1898 — 7 A. M.

SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington*:

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, Cuba, 6. Lieutenant Hobson and all his men have just been received safely in exchange for Spanish officer and prisoners taken by us. All are in good health except two seamen convalescent from remittent fever.

SHAFTER,

Major-General Commanding.

About this time General Shafter received a dispatch from the Secretary of War in regard to reports of alleged cruelty of Cubans. The telegram and General Shafter's answer are as follows:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 6, 1898 — 11 P. M.

Major-General SHAFTER, *Playa del Este, Cuba*:

The New York Journal reports that fifty Spanish prisoners were turned over to the Cubans and by them killed. Is there any truth in the report? We cannot believe it. Did you receive my dispatch of Saturday conveying the President's congratulations to you and your army?

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

PLAYA DEL ESTE, July 7, 1898 — 10:30 A. M.

Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington*:

Dispatch as to killing prisoners by Cubans absolutely false. None have been turned over to them, and they show no disposition to injure anyone coming into their hands.

SHAFTER,

Major-General.

General Shafter continued his efforts to have the navy force an entrance into the bay, and finally came to an agreement that a joint attack should be made upon the city by the army and navy.

PLAYA July 7, 1898 — 4:50 P. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., *Washington*:

Had consultation with Sampson. Navy disinclined to force entrance except as a last resource. They will bombard the city, which is within easy range of

their big guns, beginning at noon of the 9th, and if that is not effective, after twenty-four hours, will then force entrance with some of the smallest ships. I still have hopes they will surrender. Made a second demand on them yesterday, calling attention to the changed conditions because of the loss of the Spanish fleet, and offering to give them time to consult their home Government, which General Toral has accepted, asking that the British consul return to the city with employes of the cable company to permit him to do so. Meanwhile, I hope my reinforcements will arrive. Not one in sight yet except the 200 recruits for the Second Infantry, who came a week ago. As a last resource I will try running in transports. I do not consider my force sufficient to warrant an assault on the city, though I believe it would be successful, but at a fearful loss. Of course, it would be criminal to hope for the end to be gained, which is merely the capture of a few thousand men and when we see we are getting them by siege. Nothing has yet been seen of tugs, lighters and launches promised ten days ago.

SHAFTER,

Major-General Commanding.

On the 9th of July, General Toral proposed in reply to another demand for surrender, to withdraw his forces to the city of Holguin, provided he should not be molested before he reached that place.

General Shafter had telegraphed to Washington as follows, on the 8th and the morning of the 9th:

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via* HAYTI, July 8, 1898 — 8:35 A. M.

Hon. R. A. ALGER, *Secretary of War, Washington:*

Camp near Santiago, 7. Perfect quiet to-day. At request of Spanish general employes of English cable company were sent in to him to telegraph his Government as to surrendering. Men in good spirits and are making themselves more secure every hour. Five days' subsistence on hand. Wounds are much less dangerous than similar ones made by caliber .45. Among the large number of wounded, very few amputations; perhaps ten will cover it. Am looking anxiously for reinforcements; they seem to be delayed. Garretson's brigade expected ten days ago. Do not expect much results from long-range firing, but do from course promised for second day. General health of the command is good. One hundred and fifty cases of fever, which runs its course in four or five days and is not serious. I am feeling much better.

SHAFTER,

Major-General.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 9, 1898 — 11:15 P. M.

Major-General SHAFER, *Playa del Este, Cuba:*

In reply to your telegram recommending terms of evacuation as proposed by the Spanish commander, after careful consideration by the President and Secretary of War, I am directed to say that you have repeatedly been advised that you would not be expected to make an assault upon the enemy at Santiago until you were prepared to do the work thoroughly. When you are ready, this will be done. Your telegram of this morning said your position was impregnable and that you believed the enemy would yet surrender unconditionally. You have also assured us that you could force their surrender by cutting off the supplies. Under these circumstances your message, recommending that Spanish troops be permitted to evacuate and proceed without molestation to Holguin, is a great surprise and is not approved. The responsibility of destruction and distress to the inhabitants rests entirely with the Spanish commander. The Secretary of War orders that when you are strong enough to destroy the enemy and take Santiago that you do it. If you have not force enough, it will be dispatched to you at the earliest moment practicable. Reinforcements are on the way, of which you have already been advised. In the meantime nothing is lost by holding the position you now have and which you regard as impregnable. Acknowledge receipt.

By order of the Secretary of War,

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

The following communications show the offer of the commander of the Spanish forces, and the firm stand taken by the Administration against allowing the escape of the Spanish garrison from Santiago:

PLAYA, July 9, 1898 — 1 P. M.

R. A. ALGER, *Secretary of War, Washington:*

Camp near Santiago, Cuba, July 8. I am just in receipt of a letter from the commandant of Santiago de Cuba, who proposes to march out of the city with arms and baggage and not to be molested until he reaches Holguin, surrendering to the American forces the territory now occupied by him. I have replied that while I have submitted the matter to my home Government I did not think his terms would be accepted. He makes this proposition to avoid danger to the city and useless shedding of blood. This will give me another day to get up

troops from Siboney, the first transports of reinforcements having just arrived. In my opinion they will have to surrender unconditionally very soon after I open fire upon them.

W. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General, United States Volunteers.

ARMY OF THE ISLAND OF CUBA, FOURTH ARMY CORPS,
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 9, 1898.*

YOUR EXCELLENCY.—In acknowledging to your Excellency the receipt of your communication of this day, stating that you had notified Washington of my proposition of evacuation of the territory of Division of Santiago de Cuba, I have the honor to inform your Excellency that I repeat the orders for my troops to preserve the same attitude as the American troops.

By "arms" is to be understood portable weapons, that is, those that soldiers carry and the field artillery that is transported on mule back; there being excluded field guns and fixed siege and coast defense guns, which cannot be considered as forming an integral part of the units of the army. I make this explanation in reply to your note, and beg your Excellency to consider me

Your obedient servant,

JOSE TORAL,

Commander-in-Chief of the Fourth Corps of the Army of the Island of Cuba.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY, *the Commander-in-Chief of the United States Forces*, in camp at SAN JUAN RIVER.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, *July 9, 1898 — 1:50 P. M.*

Major-General SHAFTER, *Playa del Este, Cuba:*

Your telegram setting forth terms on which the enemy will evacuate Santiago has been submitted to the President by the Secretary of War, who instructs me to say that you will accept nothing but an unconditional surrender, and should take extra precautions to prevent the enemy's escape.

By order Secretary of War,

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.



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COMPANY SPANISH SOLDIERS FIRING.



By Courtesy of General Lawton.

VIEW OF SANTIAGO DE CUBA FROM THE HARBOR.

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via* HAITI, July 9, 1898 — 9 P. M.

SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington*:

Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, near Santiago. I forwarded General Toral's proposition to evacuate the town this morning without consulting anyone. Since then I have seen the general officers commanding divisions, who agree with me that it should be accepted. First, it releases at once the harbor; second, it permits the return of thousands of women, children and old men, who have left the town fearing bombardment and who are now suffering where they are, though I am doing my best to supply them with food; third, it saves the great destruction of property which a bombardment would entail, most of which belongs to Cubans and foreign residents; fourth, it at once relieves the command, while it is in good health, for operations elsewhere. There are now three cases of yellow fever at Siboney, in Michigan regiment; and if it gets started, no one knows where it will stop. We lose by this simply some prisoners we do not want and the arms they carry. I believe many of them will desert and return to our lines. I was told by sentinel, who deserted last night, that 200 men want to come but were afraid our men would fire upon them.

W. R. SHAFTER,
General.

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via* HAITI, July 10, 1898 — 2:50 P. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington*:

Headquarters near Santiago, Cuba, 10. Telegram of 9th regards to evacuation of Spanish troops received. My position is impregnable against any attack the enemy can bring against us, but I have not yet enough troops to entirely surround the town. The Cuban forces are not to be depended upon for severe fighting. Instructions of the War Department will be carried out to the letter.

SHAFTER,
Major-General.

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via* HAITI, July 10, 1898 — 5:55 P. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., *Washington*:

Siboney, Headquarters Fifth Army Corps, 10. I have just received letter from General Toral, declining unconditional surrender. Bombardment by the army and navy will begin at as near 4 P. M. to-day as possible.

SHAFTER,
Major-General.

It will be seen by the above correspondence that in advising the acceptance of General Toral's proposition, General Shafter was influenced by the knowledge that our lines did not surround the city, and that there were no American troops in position to prevent General Toral's marching his army out of Santiago on the Cobre road. Officers upon the line in front could not comprehend why Toral should make such a proposition when it was so easy for him to march out practically without molestation.

The opinion was also expressed that this would give us the harbor, and that if Toral took his troops toward Holguin, it would finally result nearly as much to the advantage of the United States as if they were in our hands as prisoners, and it was clear that other Spanish troops to the east of Santiago would fall into our hands. This being accomplished, the army would be free to enter upon a campaign in Porto Rico, which was understood to be the wish of the Government. Toral's proposition was, probably, due to the Spanish predilection for old ways—the old habit of fighting within walled towns, perhaps suggesting that any style of evacuation, save the one proposed, would be a reflection upon the honor of the mother country and the courage of the Spanish soldiers.

On the morning of July 10th, General Shafter made a demand for an unconditional surrender. He had received that day a dispatch from the Secretary of War stating that should the Spaniards surrender unconditionally and wish to return to Spain, they would be sent back direct at the expense of the United States Government.

General Toral refused to surrender and hostilities were resumed at 4 P. M. on the 10th.

The following letter was sent to me by Colonel McClernand:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,

Camp near SANTIAGO, Cuba, *July 10, 1898:*

COMMANDING GENERAL, CAVALRY DIVISION:

SIR.—The Commanding General directs me to say a demand has been made this morning for the unconditional surrender of Santiago, with notification that unless favorable reply is received by 3 P. M., hostilities will be resumed at 4 P. M. In resuming hostilities, it is the intention of the general commanding to drive the enemy out of his works and into the town by means of artillery and rifle fire. To do this the volume of fire is of importance, but its accuracy is of the

utmost importance. The greatest care, therefore, should be exercised to direct your fire wherever men can be seen, firing deliberately and taking good aim and keeping your own men well covered. An advance upon the city is not expected to be made until after the bombardment and until ordered. A shot from the battery with General Lawton's division will be the signal to authorize firing to be commenced.

Very respectfully,

E. J. McCLERNAND,

Assistant Adjutant-General.

At midnight General Shafter dispatched, as follows, to Washington:

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via* HAITI, July 11, 1898 — 12:01 A. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington:*

Headquarters Fifth Corps, 10. Enemy opened fire a few minutes past 4 with light guns, which were soon silenced by ours. Very little musket firing and the enemy kept entirely in their trenches. Three men slightly wounded. Will have considerable addition to force to-morrow, enough to completely block all the roads on the northwest. I am quite well. General Garcia reports enemy evacuated little town called Doscaminos, about three miles from Santiago and near the bay. Garcia's force now occupies it. Everything is looking well and men feeling well. Navy fired few shots from the sea near Aguadores. Effect was not perceptible.

SHAFTER,

Major-General.

The transports "City of Macon," "Hudson," "Gate City," "Commanche," "Neuces," and "Specialist" arrived at Siboney on July 9th bearing reinforcements of infantry and artillery. General Henry on the "St. Paul," with his command and stores arrived on the 10th; and about the same time the First District of Columbia Volunteers on board the "Catania," reached Siboney. All these reinforcements were hurried up to the front as rapidly as possible. Early on the morning of the 11th, General Shafter telegraphed as follows:

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via* HAITI, July 11, 1898 — 1:30 A. M.

HON. R. A. ALGER, *Secretary War, Washington:*

Headquarters Fifth Corps, camp near Santiago, 10. After twenty-four hours' bombardment navy promised to try and get in close the harbor with some

of her large draft boats. If to-morrow bombardment is not satisfactory I shall ask them to make the attempt. I will not sacrifice any lives. As soon as Henry reaches me the town will be surrounded and we can knock it to pieces with our light guns. The obtaining of launches from the navy was not satisfactory, and I prefer calling on them as little as possible. So Captain Goodrich assists very ably in disembarking troops, but means were all kept in their control.

SHAFTER,

Major-General.

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via* HAITI, July 11, 1898 — 1:53 A. M.

Hon. R. A. ALGER, *Secretary War, Washington:*

Headquarters Fifth Corps, near Santiago, 10. My plans for to-morrow are to keep a bombardment of the trenches and city and to complete the investment on the northwest by the troops that have just arrived at Siboney, one regiment of which, First Illinois, has now reached me. Should the operation be light at any point will push line nearer city, but will not assault.

SHAFTER,

Major-General.

As Congress was about to adjourn, the Secretary of War sent the following telegram to General Shafter:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,

WASHINGTON, D. C. July 6, 1898 — 10:41 P. M.

Major-General SHAFTER, *Playa del Este, Cuba:*

As the Senate may soon adjourn, the President requests that if you have any recommendations to make for promotions of officers in your command for distinguished services, you do so by telegram at the earliest possible date.

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

To which he received the following reply:

PLAYA DEL ESTE, July 7, 1898.

Hon. R. A. ALGER, *Secretary War, Washington:*

In absence of full reports I cannot at this time make all recommendations for promotion I would like to; but the following officers were so conspicuous for bravery and handled their troops so well I desire to recommend them for

promotion; Brigadier-Generals Hawkins, Lawton, Chaffee and Bates to be major-generals; Colonel Wood and Lieutenant-Colonel McKibbin to be brigadier-generals.

W. R. SHAFTER,

Major-General Commanding.

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via* HAITI, July 8, 1898 — 12 MIDNIGHT.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., *Washington:*

Camp near Santiago, 8. Omitted names of Young and Kent from lack of information I have just received to-day. Earnestly recommend both for promotion to major-general, also Lieutenant-Colonel Carroll, of the cavalry, for promotion to brigadier-general.

SHAFTER,

Major-General.

On July 9th, Generals Kent, Young, Bates, Chaffee, Lawton and Hawkins were promoted to the rank of major-general, and Colonels Wood, McKibbin and Carroll were made brigadier-generals, as seen by the following telegram:

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, July 9, 1898 — 2:10 P. M.

Major-General SHAFTER, *Playa del Este, Cuba:*

I am instructed by the Secretary of War to inform you that the following promotions have been made among the officers serving with you, to date from yesterday: Kent, Young, Bates, Chaffee, Lawton, Hawkins, to be major-generals; Wood, McKibbin and Carroll, to be brigadier-generals. Inform them, and extend to each the congratulations of the Secretary of War and myself.

H. C. CORBIN,

Adjutant-General.

Allusion has already been made to the assistance given us by the navy on the 11th, when they bombarded the city in conjunction with our attack by land. The presence of reinforcements who were hastily brought forward and placed in line to complete the investment of the city, enabled General Shafter to make a new demand on General Toral for unconditional surrender. His demand and the reply of the Spanish commander were as follows:

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,

Camp near SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 11, 1898.*

TO HIS EXCELLENCY, *Commander in Chief of the Spanish Forces, Santiago de Cuba:*

SIR.—With the largely-increased forces which have come to me, and the fact that I have your line of retreat securely in my hands, the time seems fitting that I should again demand of your excellency the surrender of Santiago and of your excellency's army. I am authorized to state that should your excellency so desire, the Government of the United States will transport the entire command of your excellency to Spain.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. R. SHAFTER,

Major-General Commanding.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 11, 1898.*

TO HIS EXCELLENCY, *Commander-in-Chief of the United States Army, in Camp at the San Juan:*

SIR.—I have the honor to advise your eminence that your communication of this date is received, and in reply desire to confirm that which I said in my former communication; also to advise you that I have communicated your proposition to the general-in-chief.

Reiterating my sentiments, I am, very respectfully,

JOSE TORAL,

Commander-in-Chief Fourth Corps and Military Governor of Santiago.

July 12th was very quiet and little fighting was done on that day. A flag of truce was up during the consideration of proposals for surrender. General Shafter reported to the War Department that the city was surrounded on the evening before, lines being completed by General Ludlow all the way to the bay; that these lines would be strengthened in the morning by the arrival of General Henry with his command, and also that two of the new batteries would be placed in position on that day. Meantime there was great suffering among the refugees from the city and the Americans were doing their best to

relieve the starving people about them. Yellow fever broke out and it was found necessary to destroy Siboney, which had become a pest-hole. Increase of sickness among our own troops made the situation alarming in the extreme and all were anxious for a speedy settlement. On the 13th the following letters were exchanged between General Shafter and the War Department:

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via* HAYTI, July 13, 1898—2 A. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington*:

The following communication has just been received from the Spanish commander in Santiago:

“SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 12.

“ESTEEMED GENERAL OF THE AMERICAN FORCES:

“SIR.—I have the honor to insist upon my proposition to evacuate the Plaza and the territory of the division of Cuba under conditions hereinafter stated, for the Spanish arms, trusting that your chivalry and sentiment as a soldier will make you appreciate exactly the situation, and, therefore, must a solution be found that leaves the honor of my troops intact; otherwise you will comprehend that I shall see myself obliged to now make defense as far as my strength will permit. I call the attention of your eminence to the advance of your troops by railroad, the movement of which I suppose you are ignorant, and I take that you will kindly order their return to their position during the time that the armistice is in existence.

“Very respectfully,

“JOSE TORAL,

“*Commander-in-Chief, Etc.*”

Will any modification of the recent order be permitted? I have been perfectly satisfied that he can be taken, but if he fights, as we have reason to believe he may, it will be at fearful cost of life; and to stay here with disease threatening may be as great loss from that cause. The suffering of the people who left the town is intense. I can only supply food enough to keep them from starvation, and if the rains continue I do not know how long I can do that.

SHAFTER,

Major-General.

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 13, 1898 — 2:14 A. M.

Major-General SHAFTER, *Before Santiago, Cuba, Playa del Este*:

Telegram just received. No modification of former order permitting the Spanish Army evacuating Santiago under such conditions as proposed by Toral will be made. The Secretary of the Navy will be consulted at once concerning the ordering of Sampson in to assist you.

R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.

The following letter was, in fact, sent that day to the Secretary of the Navy, but before it could be acted upon negotiations for the surrender of the city were on the way:

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, July 13, 1898.

SIR.—I have the honor to request that you order the fleet off Santiago to at once force its way into the bay, if possible, to aid the army in the capture of Santiago and the Spanish Army defending it.

The special reasons for immediate action are: First, the very heavy rains that are falling almost continuously have made the roads nearly impassable and threaten to cut off our supply of provisions for the army in the trenches altogether; second, the rains are making the holding of our lines almost impossible, as the trenches are filled with water; third, the lives of our men are in great danger from yellow fever, which has broken out among our troops and is spreading rapidly; and, fourth, the character of the works of the enemy is such that to take them by assault would be a terrible sacrifice of life.

These conditions, it is believed by the major-general commanding, would be changed were the navy in the bay to co-operate with the army, and the capture of the city and the Spanish Army thus made comparatively easy matter.

Very respectfully,

R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.

The Honorable the SECRETARY OF THE NAVY.

The breaking out of the yellow fever among the troops caused great alarm and anxiety throughout the United States and rendered it necessary to make some changes in the original orders concerning the disposition of General Shafter's troops. On July 14th, while the negotiations for the capitulation of the city were in progress, the following telegrams were exchanged between General Shafter and the War Department:

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, *July 13, 1898*—3 P. M.

Major-General SHAFTER, *Playa del Este, Cuba:*

Secretary of War directs that as soon as the military situation admits of such action, that troops should be withdrawn from proximity to the infected towns and encamped on high ground near the coast and within easy reach of their base of supplies. The camps should be well separated, and any regiment which remains in such fresh camp for five days without having any cases of yellow fever among the troops could be put on a transport, if desired, to return home or to go to some other point of active preparations. If cases of yellow fever occur in any regiment camped by itself, they should at once be sent to the hospital established for the reception of such cases and the regiment should not be put upon a transport until at least five days have elapsed since the last case of yellow fever. In general, no cases of yellow fever and no suspicious cases of yellow fever should go upon the transports, as it is extremely important that these should not become infected. Major John Guiteras, surgeon, United States Volunteers, who is at Santiago, is an expert with reference to the management of yellow-fever epidemics, and his advice should be carefully followed.

By order Secretary of War,

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *July 14, 1898.*

Major-General MILES, *Cuba:*

The conditions are such on account of yellow fever that I have ordered all further shipment of troops to Santiago to cease. We are now arranging transportation for 25,000 men for Porto Rico. As soon as matters are settled at Santiago, I think you had better return and go direct with this expedition. Yellow fever breaking out in camps at Santiago will, I fear, deprive you of the use of all forces there. That, however, can be determined later. As soon as Santiago falls the troops must all be put into camps as comfortable as they can be made, and remain, I suppose, until the fever has had its run. It is a most difficult problem to solve, but we are sure you and General Shafter, with the aid of the surgeon in charge, will do all that can be done. Have ordered two immune regiments to Santiago, and they, with the colored regulars, it seems to me, will answer to garrison the places as long as our forces have to remain.

R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *July 14, 1898* — 9:56 A. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., *Washington*:

Am I to understand from your telegram about yellow fever that Fifth Army Corps has to remain here through an epidemic of that disease?

SHAFTER,
Major-General Commanding.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 14, 1898 — 1 P. M.

General SHAFTER, *Playa del Este, Cuba*:

Telegram of yesterday meant that as soon as the surrender was accomplished the Fifth Army Corps was to be put in camp on ground near by and above the fever belt. Experts here say this can be done. This is the first set to fight the fever. If later it is found advisable to bring your troops away, it will be done. After careful consideration of the question, your views and recommendations are desired. Every possible aid in the power of the Government will be given you.

By order Secretary War,

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

It will be remembered that the original orders issued to General Shafter, contemplated his troops being taken after the fall of Santiago, directly to Porto Rico; but the prevalence of disease among the troops in front of Santiago rendered them unfit for further immediate active service, and the reinforcements which had been hurrying to the front were detained, and many of them sent to Porto Rico instead of to Cuba where the capture of Santiago rendered their presence no longer necessary.

On the 12th of July, the archbishop of Santiago came out between the lines to meet the officers who had gone out with the flag of truce, and stated that he had come out without consulting the commander-in-chief, to get permission for himself and the priests and nuns in Santiago to leave the city and seek a place of safety before the bombardment should recommence. His request was transmitted to General Shafter who declined to grant it, knowing that the influence of the archbishop, if used upon the commander-in-chief, in favor of surrendering the city, would be very useful to our cause. The following letters describe the situation in this respect:

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
Before SANTIAGO, Cuba, July 12, 1898.

Major General WILLIAM R. SHAFTER, *Commanding United States Forces:*

SIR.—The archbishop of Santiago met the officer who went out with the flag of truce to receive the last message, and said he had come out to speak to this officer without consulting the commander-in-chief of the town. He wishes to get permission for himself and all his priests — about thirty in number — and for the nuns — some twenty-eight in all — to leave the city and come within our lines before the bombardment recommences. He said that he made this request without letting the military authorities know that he was going to make it. He would like to get the answer in duplicate in two envelopes left unsealed, one addressed to him and one addressed to the commander-in-chief, so that there will be no delay in the permission getting to him. He stated that about a dozen houses were blown down by the shells yesterday, but no one was killed.

Respectfully,

JOSEPH WHEELER,
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via* HAITI, July 13, 1898 — 2:50 A. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington:*

Camp Santiago, 12. I have just received a letter from the archbishop of Santiago, asking that he be freed; that his nuns be permitted to come in our lines before bombardment recommences. He reports that the shells destroyed several houses, but killed no one. I have declined to grant his request for the present, and advised him to urge the surrender.

WM. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General.

General Miles, on the "Yale," accompanied by the "Columbia," both transports bearing reinforcements, arrived off Siboney July 11th, and proceeded to General Shafter's headquarters on the following day. After an interview with General Shafter, he sent the following statement to the Secretary of War:

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via* HAITI, July 13, 1898 — 2:40 A. M.

SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington:*

Camp near Santiago, 12. The Spanish general to-day asked that some conclusion be reached that shall save his honor. Offers to surrender Santiago

province, force, batteries, munitions of war, etc., all except the men and small arms. Under ordinary circumstances would not advise acceptance, but this is a great concession, and would avoid assaulting intrenching lines with every device for protecting his men and inflicting heavy loss on assaulting lines. The siege may last many weeks, and they have the provisions for two months. There are 20,000 starving people who have fled the city and were not allowed to take any food. The fortitude and heroism of the army has been unsurpassed, and, under the circumstances, I concur with General Shafter and the major-general, and would request that discretion be granted as to terms, in view of the importance of other immediate operations in which both this part of the army and navy will participate. The very serious part of this situation is that there are 100 cases of yellow fever in this command and the opinion of the surgeon that it will spread rapidly.

MILES,

Major-General, Commanding.

To which he received the following reply:

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 13, 1898.

Major-General MILES, *Camp near Santiago, Playa del Este, Cuba:*

You may accept surrender by granting parole to officers and men, the officers retaining their side arms, the officers and men after parole to be permitted to return to Spain, the United States assisting. If not accepted, then assault, unless in your judgment an assault would fail. Consult with Sampson, and pursue such course as to the assault as you jointly agree upon. Matter should now be settled promptly.

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

Later, on the morning of the 13th, he came to the front, and together with General Shafter and myself went out and had a long interview with General Toral between the lines. Upon General Miles's return to my camp, he sent the following dispatch to the Secretary of War:

GENERAL WHEELER'S HEADQUARTERS,

Before SANTIAGO, Cuba, July 13, 1898.

To Hon. SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington, D. C.:*

At a meeting between the lines, at which Generals Shafter and Wheeler and Spanish General Toral were present, the latter claims that he is unable to act

without authority of his Government, but has received authority to withdraw and surrender harbor, forts, munitions of war, and eastern portion of Cuba. He urgently requests until to-morrow noon to receive answer from his Government regarding offer of our Government to send his forces to Spain, which was granted.

NELSON A. MILES,
Major-General, Commanding the Army.

To which the Secretary of War replied:

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 13, 1898.

Major-General MILES, *Camp near Santiago, Playa del Este, Cuba:*

I telegraphed you an hour since in regard to the action of the army. Since then your dispatch has been received conveying the result of the meeting between the lines, at which conference Toral requested until to-morrow noon to hear from his Government regarding our offer, which you granted. Your action is approved. This Government will send the Spanish prisoners who surrender home if they wish.

R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.

General Shafter thus describes the situation on July 13th:

PLAYA, July 13, 1898 — 2:12 P. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington:*

Headquarters near Santiago, 13. Your telegram saying no modifications of orders allowed just received. Have had an interview of an hour and a half with General Toral and have extended truce until noon to-morrow. Told him that his surrender only will be considered, and that he was without hope of escape and had no right to continue the fight. I think it made a strong impression on him, and hope for his surrender. If he refuses I will open on him at 12, noon, to-morrow, with every gun I have, and have the assistance of the navy. Am ready to bombard the city with thirteen-inch shells. There is a good deal of nervousness throughout the army on account of yellow fever, which is among us certainly. Twenty-nine new cases yesterday and probably 150 all told. Whatever happens, one or two immune regiments should be sent here to act as hospital guards and garrison for the town.

W. R. SHAFTER.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *July 13, 1898—4:30 P. M.*

Major-General SHAFTER, *Playa del Este, Cuba:*

Your message announcing that unless your terms are accepted before noon to-morrow you will make an assault all along the line is received and approved. God bless you and your heroic army.

R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.

On the next day, the 14th, the same officers had a much more extended interview, during which the question of surrender was discussed. Previous to that time, General Toral had repeatedly stated that under the laws of Spain, a general could not surrender without the authority of the home, or Madrid, government. He stated, however, that he had authority from General Blanco to arrange terms to capitulate on the basis of the Spanish troops being transported to Spain, and that these terms would become effectual upon the reception of authority from the Madrid government. He also stated with great emphasis that the Spanish government would accede to the terms because it was the custom to comply with the recommendations of their captains-general.

It seems, however, that owing to some misunderstanding or carelessness on the part of the interpreters, General Miles and General Shafter were led to understand that General Toral had consented to an absolute capitulation; that they were under this impression when we returned from the conference to my headquarters is evident from a careful perusal of the following dispatches:

PLAYA, *July 14, 1898—11:05 A. M.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL U. S. ARMY, *Washington:*

Camp near Santiago, 14. Fifth Army Corps have at this moment received communication from General Toral asking that commissioners be appointed to arrange terms of the surrender on basis of returning to Spain. Has appointed his commissioners. Has not surrendered, however. How soon can the Spanish Army be sent back?

W. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 14, 1898 — 12 NOON.

General SHAFTER, *Playa del Este, Cuba:*

Your message referring to General Toral's last communication is received. The assistance of the United States to return the Spanish prisoners to Spain is a matter of detail which will require time, but will be done promptly and with the least possible delay. That can be arranged after surrender, which should be immediate on lines of instruction already given you.

By order of the Secretary of War:

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

PLAYA, July 14, 1898 — 2:04 P. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington:*

Have just returned from interview with General Toral. He agrees to surrender upon the basis of being returned to Spain. This proposition embraces all of eastern Cuba, from Aserraderos, on the South, to Sagua, on the north, via Palma, with practically the Fourth Army Corps. Commissioners meet this afternoon at 2:30 to definitely arrange terms.

W. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General.

The letter of July 14th, in which General Toral transmitted the telegraph from General Blanco in regard to the capitulation, was forwarded by General Miles on the 16th. It will be seen the terms are very ambiguous and add to the misunderstanding which arose during the conference of July 14th:

PLAYA, July 16, 1898 — 10:38 A. M.

Hon. R. A. ALGER, *Washington:*

Siboney, 16. The letter of July 14 instant is as follows (translation dated Santiago de Cuba, July 14, 1898):

"GENERAL-IN-CHIEF AMERICAN FORCES:

"HONORED SIR.—His excellency, the general-in-chief of the army of the island of Cuba, telegraphs from Havana yesterday at 7 P. M. the following: 'Believing that business of such importance as the capitulation of that place should be known and decided upon by the government of His Majesty, I give you notice that I have sent the conditions of your telegram, asking an immediate

answer, and enabling you also to show this to the general of the American Army to see if he will agree to await the answer of the government, which cannot be as soon as the time which he has decided, as communication by way of Bermuda is more slow than by Key West. In the meanwhile your honor and the general of the American Army may agree upon capitulation on the basis of repatriation, returning to Spain.' I have the honor to transmit this to you that in case you may think the foregoing satisfactory he may designate persons in representation of himself, who, with those in my name, may agree to clauses of the capitulation upon the basis of return to Spain, accepted already in the beginning by the general-in-chief of this army. Awaiting a reply, I am, very respectfully,

Your servant,

"JOSE TORAL, Etc."

The positive statement of General Toral and the claims of the capitulation are such, and have been signed by both Spanish and American commissioners, that I think there can be no possible failure. It was a positive and gratifying surrender of a brave people on generous terms.

MILES.

It having been agreed that commissioners on the part of the United States and Spain should be appointed to negotiate the terms of capitulation, the commission to meet between the lines at 2 o'clock on the 14th, directions on the subject were given by General Miles as follows:


GENERAL WHEELER'S CAMP,
Before SANTIAGO, Cuba, *July 14, 1898.*

To Major-General WILLIAM R. SHAFTER, *Commanding U. S. Forces:*

SIR.—You are authorized to appoint commissioners to draw up articles of capitulation on the terms upon which the Spanish division have been surrendered, namely, the return of the Spanish troops to Spain at the expense of the United States. The Spanish troops will be supplied at the expense of the United States and assembled at such a place as may be available for their embarkation on the arrival of the necessary transportation.

The attention of the commissioners should be called to the importance of the return of the people that have fled from the city of Santiago and the supplying them with food.

2. The sending of supplies into the harbor on the Red Cross ship and other vessels.



SECRETARY OF THE NAVY LONG.



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A PART OF THE RED CROSS CORPS

That was working with the Reconcentrados in Cuba before the declaration of war, sailing at Tampa, Florida, for the Red Cross Relief Ship "State of Texas," to carry them back to Cuba to resume their work

3. The removal of all obstructions to the entrance of the harbor or notification to the fleet that no obstacle will be placed in the way of their removing such obstructions.

Respectfully,

NELSON A. MILES,

Major-General Commanding the Army.

In accordance with these instructions, General Lawton, Lieutenant Miley and I were appointed commissioners to represent General Shafter at the conferences which were to arrange for the surrender of Santiago, and we immediately commenced to prepare the preliminary articles of capitulation. While I was dictating this document, Mr. Mestre, my own interpreter (who has since died from the effects of his arduous labors during the campaign) told me that he thought General Toral did not mean to convey the idea that he was agreeing to an absolute and immediate capitulation; but as many who were present at the conference had taken the contrary view, the United States commissioners decided to complete the paper contemplating an absolute surrender. We proceeded to the neutral ground at the hour appointed, where we were met by the Spanish commissioners appointed by General Toral—General Escario, Lieutenant-Colonel Frontan and Mr. Robert Mason of Santiago. Our negotiations took place on the spot before referred to as the scene of the exchange of Lieutenant Hobson and his men. On reaching there we soon found that there was a misunderstanding, as suggested to me by Mr. Mestre during the preparation of the preliminary article; and at 4 o'clock the Spanish commissioners returned to the city for further instructions. They met us again at 6 o'clock, stating that it would be necessary to postpone the negotiation until the next day, but I made such serious objection to this that they finally consented to return with General Toral at half-past 9 that night. The third meeting took place at this hour, General Toral himself being present; and he was very positive in the assertion that he had no power to capitulate, but was acting under authority received from General Blanco, the extent of which was that he might open negotiation for the basis of a capitulation, awaiting the action of Spain upon a cablegram which had been sent to Madrid.

This complicated the situation to some extent, but upon my suggestion it was agreed by the commissioners that we discuss separately

each paragraph of the paper prepared, modifying it in such a manner that the Spanish commissioners would be willing to submit it as a proposition on their part. With this view, we took up each paragraph separately, writing it out in English and also in Spanish, and after making a few changes in the document, the Spanish commissioners consented to submit it to us as their proposition, and we adjourned at twenty minutes after midnight, agreeing to meet again the next morning at 9 o'clock.

I have already mentioned that on the afternoon of the 14th, the Spanish officers urged that all matters be postponed until the next day, while we insisted that they should return that night, and if possible complete the negotiations. We had become so accustomed to the Spanish peculiarity of procrastination in deferring everything until the *manana*, and we were so very anxious for a prompt settlement of the affair that it did not occur to me at the time that the Spaniards might regard this insistence as a singular and unwarranted action on our part. However, when we passed our outposts to go to the appointed place at 9:30 that night, the sentinels informed us that they had heard a large body of men not far from the place of rendezvous. When we reached the place we found no one in the vicinity, but after a little delay the Spanish officers came up accompanied by a larger escort than before and armed as they had not been at the previous meeting. I was so interested in the negotiations that I did not observe this at the time, and we proceeded with our consultation which occupied some three hours when, after the customary salutations, we parted and returned to our respective lines.

This conference is thus referred to in a work entitled "The Fall of Santiago," by Vivian, where, on page 240, he says:

At length when midnight was past and a crystallization of result seemed as far off as ever, General Wheeler insisted on a test of *bona fide* and articles were taken up *seriatim* and each was dealt with until it was accepted. When all had thus been declared satisfactory, Wheeler further insisted that the Spanish commissioners should affix their signatures to the articles and this, much against their will, they did, in the early morning hours of July 15th. But satisfactory as this was, back of it all remained the unpleasant facts that nothing was completed. Toral had insisted that everything was preliminary and subject to orders from Madrid, and Toral carried the day. There was no apprehension, however, on the American side as to the outcome, and the concession to Toral's dignity was not regarded as calculated to jeopardize the result.

Next day the atmosphere was cleared up by the receipt of a dispatch from Toral saying that his government had "authorized him to capitulate." This one phrase was intelligible both in its original Spanish and in the unique translation which lies in the archives of the War Department, but the rest of it was a mystery.

The Commission met at the hour agreed upon and was in session the greater part of the 15th. Meanwhile, owing to the dispatches received at Washington on the 14th, it seemed difficult for the administration to comprehend the cause of delay in the negotiations and the following communications were exchanged between General Shafter and the War Department:

PLAYA, July 15, 1898 — 4:10 P. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington*:

Headquarters near Santiago, 15. Sent you several telegrams yesterday, as did General Miles, in regard to surrender. General Toral agreed yesterday positively to surrender all the forces under his command in eastern Cuba upon a distinct understanding that they were to be sent to Spain by the United States; that this surrender was authorized by General Blanco, and that its submission to-morrow was merely formal. Commissioners to arrange details were appointed; Wheeler, Lawton and Miley on part of United States. Points were immediately raised by Spanish commissioners. The discussion lasted until 10 last night. At last my commissioners think the matter will be settled to-day, and meet at 9:30 o'clock this A. M. The great point with Spanish is that they may be allowed to carry their arms with them to Spain, marching out here and depositing them in my charge, but having them shipped with them to Spain. There are about 12,000 troops in the city and about as many more in the surrounding district; 25,000 in all will be transported. General Miles was present, and said the surrender was as absolute and as complete as possible. It cannot be possible that there will be a failure in completing arrangements. Water famine in city imminent. Have supply cut. This was to Lieutenant Miley by English commissioners. Will wire frequently when negotiations are progressing.

SHAFTER.

Major-General, Commanding.

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 15, 1898 — 12:35 P. M.

Major-General SHAFTER, *Camp before Santiago, Cuba:*

Have you received the absolute surrender of the enemy? We are awaiting the conditions with impatience.

R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 15, 1898 — 5:59 P. M.

Major-General SHAFTER, *Camp near Santiago, Playa:*

It is not possible that you are entertaining the proposition of permitting the Spanish to carry away their arms. Such a suggestion should be rejected instantly. You have been instructed the terms of surrender acceptable to the President, and they must be concluded on those lines.

R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 15, 1898 — 4:45 P. M.

Major-General SHAFTER, *Playa del Este:*

Secretary War suggests is it not possible that Toral is gaining time to get reinforcements that may be on the way to assist him?

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

PLAYA DEL ESTE, July 15, 1898 — 9 P. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY, *Washington:*

Headquarters near Santiago, Cuba, 15. I do not believe that Toral is trying to gain time in hopes of getting reinforcements. Cubans have forces in vicinity of all Spanish troops. Toral asked to send messages to Guantanamo and to Palmas to notify Spanish troops of condition. Wheeler, Lawton and Miley are thoroughly convinced that they are earnest, and they have been in consultation with the Spaniards twenty-four hours. Am told by reliable persons of Santiago that the Spanish officers are greatly pleased at the thought of going home, but generals are afraid of the consequences with themselves unless terms of surrender are sanctioned by the Madrid Government.

SHAFTER,
Major-General.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,
WASHINGTON, July 15, 1898 — 9:20 P. M.

Major-General SHAFTER, *Playa del Este*:

The President and Secretary of War are becoming impatient with parley. Any arrangement that allows the enemy to take their arms had as well be abandoned once for all, as it will not be approved. The way to surrender is to surrender, and this should be fully impressed on General Toral. I send this as your friend and comrade, and not by authority, but you can be guided by it with entire safety. Forwarded your telegram last night as requested.

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

PLAYA DEL ESTE, *via HAITI*, July 15, 1898 — 11:20 P. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. ARMY, *Washington*:

Headquarters near Santiago, 15. I do not entertain the proposition for the Spanish to retain their arms. They are to surrender them absolutely, immediately after articles of capitulation are signed, but they beg, as an act of consideration to them, that I will intercede with my Government that they be shipped with them to Spain. I regard this as a small matter that in no way binds the Government, but is one I would not let stand between clearing 20,000 Spanish soldiers out of Cuba or leaving them there to be captured later, and probably with much loss to ourselves.

SHAFTER,
Major-General.

PLAYA DEL ESTE, July 16, 1898 — 2:20 A. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington*:

Headquarters near Santiago, 15. Surrender was made by Toral yesterday afternoon absolutely on conditions of returning troops to Spain. Delay was caused by the commissioners on his part insisting on approval of Madrid. I think they fear death when they get home. We may have to fight them yet.

SHAFTER.

WASHINGTON, D. C., July 16, 1898 — 1:18 A. M.

Major-General SHAFTER, *Playa del Este, Cuba, Camp near Santiago*:

Our understanding from your message is that you have agreed with the commander of the Spanish forces in eastern Cuba for their complete surrender,

with a single condition granted on your part that the United States would transport them to Spain, officers and soldiers to give their paroles and the former to retain their side-arms. The demand of General Toral that the arms belonging to his command shall be shipped with him to Spain has been rightly declined by you.

R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.

Early on the morning of the 16th, General Toral informed General Shafter that he had received the authorization of his Government to make the final capitulation on the terms and conditions agreed upon. The letter was as follows:

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 16.

TO HIS EXCELLENCY, *Commander-in-Chief American Forces:*

EXCELLENT SIR.—I am now authorized by my Government to capitulate. I have the honor to so apprise you, and request that you designate hour and place where my representatives shall appear to compare with those of your excellency to effect the articles of capitulation on the basis of what has been agreed upon to this date, in due time. I wish to manifest my desire to know the decision of the United States Government respecting the return of the army, so as to note on the capitulations; also the great courtesy of your commissioners in return for their great generosity and kindness for the Spanish soldiers, in desiring to allow them to return to the peninsula with the arms the American Army does them the honor to acknowledge, as dutifully defended.

JOSE TORAL,
Commanding General Fourth Army Corps.

The final meeting took place on the 16th in order to settle final details and sign the final document. Typewritten copies of the article were prepared both in Spanish and English and were duly signed in duplicate by the Spanish and American commissioners at 4 o'clock. General Shafter having come forward during this meeting of the commission discussed with General Toral and the commissioners the details of the ceremony to be observed the following day in carrying out the terms of the final capitulation; and that evening arrangements were completed as to the method of surrender which it was agreed to take place at 9 the next morning.

Pending the negotiations for surrender the following dispatches were sent to the War Department by General Miles and General Shafter:

GENERAL WHEELER'S CAMP,
Before SANTIAGO, Cuba, July 14, 1898.

To the Honorable SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington, D. C.:*

General Toral formally surrendered the troops of his army corps and division of Santiago on the terms and understanding that his troops would be returned to Spain.

General Shafter will appoint commissioners to draw up conditions of arrangement for carrying out the terms of surrender. This is very gratifying, and General Shafter and the officers and men of this command are entitled to great credit for their tenacity, fortitude and the almost insurmountable obstacles which have been overcome. A portion of the army has been infected with yellow fever, and efforts will be made to separate those who are infected and those free from it and keep those that are still on board ship separated from those on shore. Arrangements will be immediately made for carrying out the further instructions of the President and yourself.

NELSON A. MILES,
Major-General Commanding the Army.

GENERAL WHEELER'S CAMP,
Before SANTIAGO, Cuba, July 14, 1898.

To Major-General WM. R. SHAFTER, *Commanding U. S. Forces:*

SIR.—The Spanish Army having surrendered, the terms of capitulation will be carried into effect with as little delay as practicable on the understanding that their troops will be returned to Spain at the expense of the United States.

You will, with as little delay as practicable, place such troops as are not infected with yellow fever in separate camps and as soon as practicable report the number that will be available for service with another expedition. Those organizations which have been infected with yellow fever, every effort will be made to improve their sanitary condition and to check the spread of the disease by placing them in as healthy camps as possible.

Respectfully,

NELSON A. MILES,
Major-General Commanding the Army.

DAQUIRI, July 15.

SECRETARY OF WAR, *Washington*:

Commission on behalf of the United States was appointed, consisting of Generals Wheeler and Lawton and Lieutenant Miley, with Spanish commission, to arrange details for carrying into effect the capitulation. I will reach Siboney to-morrow.

MILES.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,

July 15, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, *Washington*:

Sent you several telegrams yesterday, as did General Miles, in regard to the surrender. General Toral agreed yesterday positively to surrender all the forces under his command in eastern Cuba upon a distinct understanding that they were to be sent to Spain by the United States; that this surrender was authorized by General Blanco, and that its submission to-morrow was merely formal. The commissioners to arrange details were appointed—Wheeler, Lawton and Miley on the part of the United States. Points were immediately raised by Spanish commissioners. The discussion lasted until 10 o'clock last night. My commissioners think the matter will be settled to day, and met at 9:30 o'clock this morning. There are about 12,000 troops in the city, and about as many more in the surrounding district; 25,000 in all will be transported. General Miles was present, and said the surrender was as absolute and complete as possible. It cannot be possible that there will be a failure in completing arrangements. Water famine in city imminent. Have supply cut; this was told Lieutenant Miley by English commissioners. Will wire frequently when negotiations are progressing.

SHAFTER.

The document surrendering the division of Santiago de Cuba as finally signed, is as follows:

Terms of the military convention for the capitulation of the Spanish forces occupying the territory which constitutes the division of Santiago de Cuba, and described as follows: All that portion of the island of Cuba east of a line passing through Aserraderos, Dos Palmas, Cauto Abajo, Escondida, Tanamo and Aguilera, said troops being in command of General José Toral; agreed upon by the undersigned commissioners—Brigadier-General Don Fed-

erico Escario, Lieutenant-Colonel of Staff, Don Ventura Frontan, and as interpreter, Mr. Robert Mason, of the city of Santiago de Cuba, appointed by General Toral, commanding the Spanish forces, on behalf of the Kingdom of Spain; and Major-General Joseph Wheeler, U. S. V., Major-General H. W. Lawton, U. S. V., and First Lieutenant J. D. Miley, Second Artillery, A. D. C., appointed by General Shafter, commanding the American forces, on behalf of the United States.

1. That all hostilities between American and Spanish forces in this district shall absolutely and unequivocally cease.

2. That this capitulation includes all the forces and war material in said territory.

3. That the United States agrees, with as little delay as possible, to transport all the Spanish troops in said district to the Kingdom of Spain, the troops being embarked, as far as possible, at the port nearest the garrison they now occupy.

4. That the officers of the Spanish Army be permitted to retain their side arms, and both officers and private soldiers their personal property.

5. That the Spanish authorities agree to remove, or assist the American Navy in removing, all mines or other obstructions to navigation now in the harbor of Santiago and its mouth.

6. That the commander of the Spanish forces deliver, without delay, a complete inventory of all arms and munitions of war of the Spanish forces in above described district to the commander of the American forces; also a roster of said forces now in said district.

7. That the commander of the Spanish forces, in leaving said district, is authorized to carry with him all military archives and records pertaining to the Spanish Army now in said district.

8. That all of that portion of the Spanish forces known as volunteers, movilizados and guerrillas who wish to remain in the island of Cuba are permitted to do so upon condition of delivering up their arms, and taking a parole not to bear arms against the United States during the continuance of the present war between Spain and the United States.

9. That the Spanish forces will march out of Santiago de Cuba with honors of war; depositing their arms thereafter at a point mutually agreed upon, to await their disposition by the United States Government; it being understood that the United States commissioners will recommend that the Spanish soldier return to Spain with the arms he so bravely defended.

10. That the provisions of the foregoing instrument become operative immediately upon its being signed.

Entered into this sixteenth day of July, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight,

by the undersigned commissioners, acting under instructions from their respective commanding generals and with the approbation of their respective governments:

| | |
|---|-------------------|
| JOSEPH WHEELER, | FEDERICO ESCARIO. |
| <i>Major-General U. S. Volunteers.</i> | |
| H. W. LAWTON, | VENTURA FRONTAN. |
| <i>Major-General U. S. Volunteers.</i> | |
| J. D. MILEY, | ROBERT MASON. |
| <i>First Lieutenant, Second Artillery, A. D. C.</i> | |

General Shafter had the pleasure and honor of sending the following dispatches:

Camp near SANTIAGO, July 16.

Adjutant-General CORBIN:

The surrender has been definitely settled; and the arms will be turned over to-morrow morning, and the troops will be marched out as prisoners of war. The Spanish colors will be hauled down at 9 o'clock, and the American flag hoisted.

SHAFTER,
Major-General.

HEADQUARTERS FIFTH ARMY CORPS,
Near SANTIAGO, July 16, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, Washington:

The conditions of capitulation include all forces and war material in described territory. The United States agrees with as little delay as possible to transport all Spanish troops in the district to the Kingdom of Spain, the troops, so far as possible, to embark near the garrison they now occupy. Officers to retain their side-arms, and officers and men to retain their personal property. Spanish commander authorized to take military archives belonging to surrendered district. All Spanish forces known as volunteers, movilizados and guerrillas who wish to remain in Cuba may do so under parole during the present war, giving up their arms. Spanish forces march out of Santiago with honors of war, depositing their arms at a point mutually agreed upon, to await the disposition of the United States Government, it being understood the United States commissioners will recommend that the Spanish soldiers return to Spain with arms so bravely defended. This leaves the question of return of arms entirely in the hands of the Government. I invite attention to the fact that

several thousand surrendered — said by General Toral to be about 12,000 — against whom a shot has not been fired. The return to Spain of the troops in this district amounts to about 24,000 according to General Toral.

W. R. SHAFTER.

To which he received the following reply from the President:

General SHAFTER, *Commanding Front, near Santiago*:

The President of the United States sends to you and your brave army the profound thanks of the American people for the brilliant achievements at Santiago, resulting in the surrender of the city and all of the Spanish troops and territory under General Toral.

Your splendid command has endured not only the hardships and sacrifices incident to campaign and battle, but in stress of heat and weather has triumphed over obstacles which would have overcome men less brave and determined. One and all have displayed the most conspicuous gallantry and earned the gratitude of the nation. The hearts of the people turn with tender sympathy to the sick and wounded. May the Father of Mercies protect and comfort them.

WILLIAM McKINLEY.

From the beginning of the negotiation it was evident to me that the great desire on the part of General Toral was to maintain his honor and prestige as a soldier. It was explained to me, by one of the commissioners, that, as general commander of the Spanish forces he would be held accountable for the surrender and that he would possibly have to answer for the same before a court-martial at Madrid. This was doubtless his main reason for insisting so strongly on allusions to the bravery of the Spanish soldiers, and desiring to eliminate from the document everything that might possibly reflect upon his courage or give ground for any charges against him. I also saw that he was a man of keen pride and sensitive temper; every effort was made by myself and the other commissioners to avoid anything that would in any way wound the feelings of the Spanish officer. We readily consented to change words and phrases which seemed to us immaterial but appeared to have great weight with the Spanish commissioners whose entire conduct at this time was such as to elicit our regard and sympathy.

The request drawn up by the American commissioners in reference to the return of the arms captured from the Spanish soldiers, was not granted by the United States. It reads as follows:

Neutral Camp near SANTIAGO DE CUBA,
Under the Flag of Truce, *July 14, 1898.*

Recognizing the nobleness, valor and bravery of Generals Linares and Toral and of the Spanish troops who took part in the actions that have recently occurred in the vicinity of Santiago de Cuba, as shown in said battles, we, the undersigned officers of the United States Army, who had the honor of taking part in the actions referred to, and who now constitute a committee, duly authorized, treating with a similar committee of officers of the Spanish Army for the capitulation of Santiago de Cuba, unanimously join in asking the proper authorities that these brave and gallant soldiers may be granted the privilege of returning to their country carrying the arms which they have so nobly defended.

(Signed.)

JOSEPH WHEELER,

Major-General, U. S. V.

H. W. LAWTON,

Major-General, U. S. V.

J. D. MILEY,

First Lieutenant, Second Artillery Aid.

The army was promptly apprised of the surrender of Santiago, and the soldiers went to rest that night happy in the consciousness of a triumphant termination of their efforts, trials and sufferings.

Sunday, July 17th, was a bright and beautiful day. General Shafter, with his generals and their staffs, accompanied by a troop of cavalry, rode to a large field in front of Santiago, where he was met by General Toral and the other Spanish generals and their staff officers, and a detail of 100 men from the different Spanish regiments. General Shafter presented General Toral with the sword and spurs of the Spanish General Vara del Rey who was killed at El Caney. The Spanish officers retained their side arms. The Spaniards filed to the left and returned to the city, where they, together with the entire Spanish Army, were marched to the arsenal and their arms turned over to the American officials. The American generals rode into the city in columns of two, General Shafter and the next senior general in front, the other generals following in order of rank, then the staff officers, the whole being followed by the cavalry troops. When we

reached the palace we were met by all the officials, the civil governor, the archbishop, consuls, etc. At about 11 o'clock we were entertained at lunch and then marched out to the plaza, where thousands of the populace, Spaniards and Cubans, had congregated to witness the hoisting of the American flag.

The governor's palace faces the plaza opposite the cathedral. As the clock commenced to strike the hour of noon, the United States flag (it was my headquarters flag) was hauled to the masthead by Lieutenant Miley, Captain McKittrick and Lieutenant Joseph Wheeler, Jr., who had previously mounted the roof of the palace to accomplish this object, and the Stars and Stripes triumphantly floated in the place of the Spanish flag, which for 382 years had waved over the city. A national salute was fired by Capron's battery, and the band of the Sixth Cavalry played "Hail Columbia" and other national airs. The Ninth Infantry, which was drawn up in the plaza, presented arms to the American colors; and the eastern province of Santiago, with 23,000 Spanish soldiers, and its forts, batteries, guns, and ammunition, was surrendered to the United States.

The arms captured at Santiago were as follows:

| | |
|--------------------------------|-----------|
| Mauser rifles | 16,902 |
| Argent rifles | 872 |
| Remington rifles | 6,118 |
| Mauser carbines | 833 |
| Argent carbines | 84 |
| Remington carbines | 330 |
| Revolvers | 75 |
| Rifled cannon: | |
| Bronze | 30 |
| Cast-iron | 10 |
| Steel | 8 |
| Smooth bore and obsolete | 44 |
| Mortars | 5 |
| Projectiles: | |
| Solid shot | 3,551 |
| Shrapnel | 437 |
| Shells | 2,577 |
| Small-arm ammunition: | |
| Mauser, rounds | 1,471,200 |
| Argent, rounds | 1,500,000 |
| Others | 1,680,000 |

The following description of the terms of capitulation were sent by General Shafter:

PLAYA, July 16, 1898 — 3:52 P. M.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., *Washington*:

Headquarters, near Santiago, 16. The conditions of capitulation include all forces and war material in described territory. The United States agrees with as little delay as possible to transport all Spanish troops in district to Kingdom of Spain, the troops, as far as possible, to embark near the garrison they now occupy. Officers retain their side arms, and officers and men retain their personal property. Spanish commander authorized to take military archives belonging to surrendered district. All Spanish forces known as volunteers, *moirilizadves*, and guerrillas, who wish to remain in Cuba may do so under parole during present war, giving up their arms. Spanish forces march out of Santiago with honors of war, depositing their arms at a point mutually agreed upon to await disposition of United States Government, it being understood the United States commissioners will recommend that the Spanish soldiers return to Spain with the arms they so bravely defended. This leaves the question of return entirely in the hands of the Government. I invite attention to the fact that several thousand surrendered, said by General Toral to be about 12,000, against whom a shot has not been fired. The return to Spain of the troops in this district — about 24,000, according to General Toral — in my opinion closes the war in Cuba. Not a word has been said about the parole of Spanish officers and men, as it did not seem possible to me that we should fight them in Spain, and once there it does not seem possible that they can ever return.

W. R. SHAFTER,

United States Volunteers.

As we rode for the first time into Santiago, we were struck by the excellent manner in which the Spanish lines were intrenched, and by the formidable defenses barricading the roads. The road by which we entered the city was barricaded in four different places; quantities of barbed wire lines crossing one another in every direction, were stretched across the entire width of the road, with an enormous mass in the center. Behind these were immense barrels filled with sandstone and concrete, above which were placed sand bags so arranged as to leave small holes through which the Spaniards could sight their guns. Nothing short of artillery could have swept such obstructions out of the way, and even then they would have been difficult to get rid of on account of the narrowness of the road, which was inclosed

by high banks on either side. The streets of the city were defended in a similar manner and the Spaniards had evidently expected that the siege would finally come to a hand-to-hand fight. To have made an assault upon the city would have cost an enormous sacrifice of life.

Shortly after the surrender, with my staff and various other officers, I made a tour of inspection of the wrecks of the Spanish fleet. Passing down the bay, the first wreck we approached was that of the "Reina Mercedes," which was sunk in some thirty feet of water, just inside of the bay near Morro Castle. I have already alluded to her unsuccessful effort to block the channel, which was defeated by our brave seamen. The gaping holes which were visible, part of the decks and smoke-stacks being out of the water, spoke eloquently of the skill and marksmanship of American gunners.

Some six miles up the coast we found the wrecks "Maria Teresa" and "Oquendo," which we were not allowed to board, it being considered unsafe; we saw enough, however, to show the terrible havoc made by American shells on these once fine battle ships. Later on, I boarded and examined the "Maria Teresa," which was probably the least injured of all these ships, and which was afterward raised and unfortunately lost on her journey north. Continuing our trip some ten miles farther up, we came upon the remains of the proud and beautiful "Vizcaya," which we boarded. Here we found a scene of utter and complete ruin; not a vestige of woodwork remained, and the massive iron beams were twisted into the most fantastic shapes, the large guns on board being the only things which retained a semblance of their original form. The "Colon," having been grounded at such a great distance up the coast, was not included in our tour, and we returned to Santiago after a brief visit to examine the defenses of Morro Castle. I afterward visited and examined the fortifications of the Punta Gorda and Socopa batteries.

It must have been with feelings of pride and satisfaction that General Shafter turned from the scene of his brilliant triumph on the afternoon of the 17th and dictated the following dispatch:

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 17, 1898.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., *Washington*:

I have the honor to announce that the American flag has been this instant, 12 o'clock, noon, hoisted over the house of the civil government in the city of Santiago. An immense concourse of people present, a squadron of cavalry and a regiment of infantry presenting arms, and band playing national airs.

Light battery fired salute twenty-one guns. Perfect order is being maintained by municipal government. Distress is very great, but little sickness in town. Scarcely any yellow fever. A small gunboat and about 200 seamen, left by Cervera, have surrendered to me. Obstructions are being removed from mouth of harbor. Upon coming into the city I discovered a perfect entanglement of defenses. Fighting as the Spaniards did the first day, it would have cost 5,000 lives to have taken it. Battalions of Spanish troops have been depositing arms since daylight in armory, over which I have guard. General Toral formally surrendered the plaza and all stores at 9 A. M.

W. R. SHAFTER,
Major-General.

On the day after the entry of the American Army into Santiago, the following instructions were received from the President, as to the conduct to be observed during the military occupation:

EXECUTIVE MANSION,
WASHINGTON, July 18, 1898.

THE SECRETARY OF WAR:

SIR.—The capitulation of Spanish forces in Santiago de Cuba and in the eastern part of the province of Santiago and the occupation of the territory by the forces of the United States render it necessary to instruct the military commander of the United States as to the conduct which he is to observe during the military occupation.

One of the important and most practical problems with which it will be necessary for him to deal is that of the collection and administration of the revenues. You will, therefore, at once arrange to collect customs duties and port charges on goods and ships entering Santiago or other ports or places coming under our control. For customs dues you will adopt the Spanish schedules as heretofore applied to Spanish products, whether the goods are shipped from the United States or other country.

You will abolish, also, \$1 tax per ton on cargoes imported or exported; require every vessel entering to pay twenty cents per registered ton as port dues; collect present tax of five cents per gross ton on iron ore exported; collect charges as per export tariff schedule.

This order is subject to modification at a later date.

WILLIAM McKINLEY.



A TYPICAL CUBAN CAMP.



A SOLDIER FUNERAL.

This form shows the manner of giving the tollie by the head and horns.

OFFICERS DISTINGUISHED IN THE SANTIAGO CAMPAIGN.

I wish to say a few words in regard to the officers serving in Cuba during our late war with Spain.

The commander-in-chief of the American forces of invasion, Major-General William R. Shafter, has a brilliant and enviable army record. He did exceptionally good and honorable service during the trying days of the civil war, from the date of his appointment as a first lieutenant in the Seventh Michigan Infantry on August 22, 1861, to the time when he was brevetted a brigadier of volunteers for marked gallantry in the field in March, 1865. Early in the month of May, 1898, he was made a major-general of volunteers and assigned to the command of the Fifth Army Corps, which conducted the operations in front of Santiago de Cuba, and caused the surrender of the Spanish forces of that city and province.

One of General Shafter's most marked characteristics is his thorough grasp of detail which was of special value in the conduct of the expedition and which helped not a little in effecting the brilliant results of the campaign. The difficulties attending the transportation of ammunition and rations to the front were successfully overcome, and mismanagement in connection with such important details would have been attended with very great suffering, and might seriously have affected the entire situation. With his ships lying off a hostile shore, and without a harbor, he was compelled to unload his ships into small boats and run them through the waves and surf on to the open coast. The difficulties were increased also by the condition of the roads which, especially after the frequent and heavy rains, became well-nigh impassable. It is worthy of special remark that notwithstanding these disadvantages and drawbacks, General Shafter remained master of the situation, and if any portion of the American troops failed to procure sufficient rations and ammunition for all its requirements it was owing to lack of initiative on the part of subordinate officers.

General Shafter's plan of the battle to be undertaken by the Americans on July 1st, was for General Lawton and his division, strengthened by General Bates's independent brigade, to take at day-break the town of El Caney, which was defended by 520 Spaniards.

It was anticipated that the town would capitulate within an hour, and that the American troops would then march on Santiago by the most direct road, there to take their place on the right of the cavalry.

The persistency of the defense of El Caney by the Spaniards was such, however, as to occupy the assailants until about 4 o'clock in the afternoon, when the town was taken. Leaving some of his troops to occupy El Caney, General Lawton then marched to join the rest of the army on the heights of San Juan, but being met by some Spanish soldiery during the darkness of the night, he changed the direction of his march, and reached his destination the next morning. General Bates, who had started in advance of General Lawton, reached the foot of San Juan hill at midnight, and at daylight on the morning of the 2d, placed his brigade on the ridge on the left of Kent's division.

To General Lawton and to his brigade commanders, is due great credit for the victory achieved at El Caney. Both General Lawton and General Chaffee, commander of his First Brigade, are superb soldiers, and conducted their operations in a very praiseworthy manner. General Ludlow, who commanded a brigade under General Lawton, is an officer of marked ability; although, being younger, he has had less experience than either Generals Lawton or Chaffee. Colonel Evan Miles, commanding the Second Brigade, was an officer of distinction and had a creditable service of thirty-seven years; he was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general. General Bates, too, rendered valuable services; he is a military man of high attainments, and during his career in the army has established for himself an enviable reputation.

Major-General Joseph Breckenridge was with the army at San Juan as the representative of the commanding general of the army. Before he was of age, he was appointed first lieutenant and aid-de-camp, and afterward a lieutenant of the Second Artillery. He served creditably during the entire war and was a graduate of the Artillery School in 1871; was promoted through all the grades, reaching the high office of inspector-general of the army in January, 1889. He was among the first appointed major-generals of volunteers. At the battle of El Caney, he assisted General Lawton and was highly commended by that distinguished officer. He was again with General Lawton in the advance upon San Juan on July 2d. At this time the enemy in front of San Juan were firing very freely upon our troops at San Juan, many

of the shots passing over their heads and falling along the road from San Juan to El Poso. One of these shots struck General Breckenridge's horse as he was crossing San Juan river at what was called the "Bloody Ford." Soon after this General Breckenridge was placed in command of the troops of the Second Corps at Chattanooga, Tennessee, and later he was in command of the same corps at Lexington, Ky. Had the war continued, it is more than probable this officer would have earned great distinction.

I must say a special word concerning Major-General J. Ford Kent, with whom my acquaintance dates back to the classes at West Point. He has always been considered as an officer possessing the most excellent qualities. His command, which consisted of the first division of infantry, joined forces with the cavalry division in the attack on San Juan. Having been directed to issue orders to this gallant officer as well as to those of my own division, his conduct was necessarily to a great extent under my own personal observation.

As the troops of General Kent and those of my own division were alone in their attack on San Juan on July 1st, and as I was the senior officer on the firing line, it was deemed advisable that I should issue instructions to General Kent as well as to the officers of my own division. General Shafter had very properly chosen an elevated position from which he could overlook the movements of the troops both at El Caney and at San Juan, as, being responsible for the entire army, he was thus enabled to control the two battles which it became his duty to direct.

As has already been stated, the orders given me on June 24th, had placed me in command of all the troops on shore. And although, of course, I no longer occupied that position after General Shafter came ashore and assumed command in person, yet this character of delegated control was to a certain degree extended to me for some time afterward. Although General Kent's good military record was well known to me, and although I had always had a high opinion of his qualifications, yet the intelligent and courageous manner in which he handled his troops during the engagements at San Juan still more increased my admiration for him.

General Hamilton S. Hawkins was very greatly distinguished in the battle and exhibited courage and determination. He was also at West Point with me, and commanded the First Brigade of the First Infantry Division of the Fifth Army Corps at this time. He was un-

fortunately wounded in the foot on the evening of July 2d, which temporarily incapacitated him from retaining his place on the firing line, and it was very gratifying to us all to know that he, together with Generals Kent, Bates, Lawton, and Chaffee, and eventually Generals Sumner and Ludlow, were all of them promoted to the rank of major-general of volunteers.

General Samuel S. Sumner, mentioned in my report, commanded the First Brigade of Cavalry. He was the son of Major-General Edwin B. Sumner, a distinguished corps commander of the war of 1861-1865. He was appointed lieutenant of cavalry in June, 1861, serving on his father's staff; he also served as commander of a company of cavalry; he was promoted through all the grades, and became colonel of the Sixth Cavalry, May, 1896. His record shows a most creditable career as a soldier; he is now serving as military attaché with the American legation in London.

General S. B. M. Young, who, as has already been seen, was quite distinguished at the battle of Las Guasimas, was absent at this time, sick. I joined very strongly in recommending him also to the Government for promotion, which was, we were pleased to see, favorably acted upon. His experience as an officer in the army has been very large, and his qualifications, which are of the very highest order, are well known. General Ludlow, who had received his military training as an officer of engineers, although being in command for a very short period, showed marked ability in the handling of his men, and although brief, his management as a commander of soldiers was very creditable.

General Ed. D. Pearson entered the army April 18, 1861. He served continuously with great distinction, passing through all grades up to and including colonel in the regular army and brigadier-general of volunteers. His service was always creditable, particularly at San Juan.

General Wallace F. Randolph, commander of the artillery, did not reach Cuba until after the battle of San Juan. He was distinguished during the civil war and had a very excellent record as an artillery officer.

Colonel Charles A. Wikoff entered the army April 20, 1861. He passed through all the grades of the regular army to colonel, and was killed while gallantly commanding his brigade at San Juan.

Colonel William S. Worth entered the army in April, 1861. He passed through all the grades to colonel; was made brigadier-general for gallantry at San Juan, where he was wounded.

Colonel Emerson H. Liscum entered the army in May, 1861. He served through all grades to the rank of colonel; he was badly wounded while gallantly fighting at San Juan, and was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general of volunteers.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ezra P. Ewers entered the army in 1862. He served up to the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and was made brigadier-general of volunteers for gallant conduct in battle.

Colonel Leonard Wood reported for duty at Tampa in May, 1898, as colonel of the First Volunteer Cavalry. He showed great energy and determination. He was distinguished at Las Guasimas and San Juan and was afterward made brigadier-general and appointed military governor of Santiago, being finally promoted major-general of volunteers.

Colonel Charles D. Viele commanded the First Regiment of United States Cavalry. He was distinguished at San Juan and was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general of volunteers for gallantry.

Colonel Henry Carroll entered the army in 1859. He commanded the Sixth Cavalry at San Juan; a portion of the time he commanded the First Cavalry Brigade; was distinguished and wounded in that battle, and was promoted brigadier-general of volunteers.

Lieutenant-Colonel Norvell entered the army in 1858; was distinguished at the battles of Las Guasimas and San Juan, and was recommended for promotion to colonel by brevet.

Colonel T. A. Baldwin commanded the Tenth United States Cavalry in the battle of San Juan; was promoted brigadier-general of volunteers for distinguished gallantry.

Major James M. Bell served in the regular army for thirty-three years; was distinguished at the battle of Las Guasimas where he was badly wounded; he was recommended for promotion for gallantry.

Major Henry W. Wessells, Jr., was very distinguished in the battle of San Juan; was recommended for promotion by brevet for good conduct.

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt volunteered for the war and served with great distinction at Las Guasimas and San Juan, for which he was nominated for the brevets of colonel and brigadier-general.

Major T. J. Wint has spent his life in the army; was wounded and distinguished for gallantry in the battle of San Juan

Colonel Derby of the Engineer Corps, Colonel E. J. McClermand, General Shafter's adjutant-general, and Lieutenant J. D. Miley, aide-de-camp, were all very gallant officers. They rendered exceptionally good service throughout the campaign, and contributed not a little to its ultimate success. It was very pleasing to me to know that all three of these officers were recommended and promoted for gallantry.

Colonel Harry C. Egbert commanded the Sixth Infantry, First Brigade of Kent's division; was very distinguished and was wounded in the battle of San Juan, and was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general of volunteers for good conduct on that field. He became colonel of the Twenty-second Infantry and was ordered to join that regiment at Manila, where he was afterward killed while gallantly leading in battle.

Colonel Richard Comba was very distinguished at El Caney, and was promoted to the rank of brigadier-general of volunteers in recognition of his gallantry.

Major William H. Boyle was distinguished at San Juan. He served during the civil war and has spent his life in the army.

There are very many others whose services I would like to mention in detail; their names are among those commended by their superior officers and among those recommended by the President for brevet promotion, full lists of which will be found further on.

On July 23d, I wrote a letter consolidating some recommendations previously made by me of officers who served with distinction in the battles of Las Guasimas and San Juan. It was as follows:

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
Near SANTIAGO DE CUBA, July 23, 1898.

To Colonel E. J. McClermand, *Adjutant-General, Fifth Army Corps:*

SIR.—I received your letter instructing me to consolidate all the recommendations commending officers for good conduct in the battle of Las Guasimas on June 24th, in the battle of San Juan on July 1st, and in subsequent operations. I therefore transmit herewith the recommendations referred to.

I also respectfully recommend, for the consideration of the Government, the following officers who served upon my staff:

Major William D. Beach did distinguished service in the battle of Las Guasimas on June 24th and in operation before San Juan.

Lieutenant-Colonel Dorst, adjutant-general of the cavalry division, Major E. A. Garlington, Captain Joseph P. Dickman, First Lieutenant Matthew W. Steele, Second Lieutenant James H. Reeves and Second Lieutenant Joseph Wheeler, Jr., were all distinguished in the battle of July 1st and in subsequent operations. I recommend them for the consideration of the Government.

In forwarding these recommendations I respectfully request a favorable indorsement from the commanding general of the forces in Cuba.

I also desire to commend the good conduct of Captain William Astor Chanler of the volunteers and of Mr. Aurelius Mestre, volunteer aid, in the battle of July 1st and in the operations around San Juan.

I also desire to commend Captain P. W. West, who although not actually in the engagements, has been efficient in the highest degree in performing the duties of quartermaster of the division and in assisting materially as quartermaster of the Army.

Respectfully,

JOS. WHEELER,

Major-General U. S. Volunteers, Commanding Cavalry Division.

My association with General José Toral who, in the illness of General Linares, commanded the Spanish forces at Santiago, and with General Federico Escario, was quite extensive. I saw both of these officers several times, and many communications passed between us. They both stand high in the army of Spain, and I was very favorably impressed with both of them. The rapid and skilful march made by General Escario with his troops from Manzanillo to Santiago, where he reinforced General Linares, won him promotion to the rank of brigadier-general in the Spanish army. He commanded on this march some 2,500 men, rapidly marched with them a distance of more than a hundred miles, and, although his approach to the city was opposed by General Garcia, yet he easily forced a passage and reached the city without difficulty. General Linares, the Spanish commander-in-chief of the Santiago district, commanded his forces in person at the action of Las Guasimas on June 24th, and also at the San Juan battle, where he was quite severely wounded. I called on him one morning after the surrender and found him in bed with his arm bandaged and lying upon a pillow. The wound had much weakened him, given him much pain, and caused him to have almost constant attacks of fever. This officer is evidently highly regarded by his fellow countrymen. He is lieutenant-general by rank, and impressed me very favorably.

When the formal ceremonies of the surrender took place on July 16th, the American generals and their staffs repaired to the governor's palace in Santiago, and I met at this time a large number of public functionaries, among them the archbishop, civil governor and the judges. My impressions of them were, of course, based upon a very short interview with them, but they did not impress me at all as well as does the average American official.

One of the causes which rendered the army of Santiago a unique one, and which had attracted considerable public attention, was the number of people of wealth and distinction who enlisted in the army of the United States as privates at the outbreak of the war, or who went through the campaign with subordinate commissions. Among these was one very prominent gentleman, Colonel John Jacob Astor, whose wealth is said to be certainly not less than \$100,000,000, but who voluntarily suffered the hardships and incurred the risks of his brother officers throughout the whole campaign. Two of his cousins, too, did valuable service, both gentlemen of means, Captain William Astor Chanler and Lieutenant Woodbury Kane. When the position of these three gentlemen is considered, I think due credit should be given them for the disinterested services rendered. Colonel Astor, I think, supplies the only instance on record of a man of his wealth voluntarily neglecting his large interests and sacrificing his comfort in time of war in a tropical and unhealthy district in the service of his country. Many other gentlemen also are entitled to the fullest credit for the same self-sacrifice. Among them might be mentioned Major G. Creighton Webb, Henry Bull, Craig Wadsworth, Joseph Stephen, Captain Brice, son of Senator Brice, and last but not least, Lieutenant Tiffany, who died in Boston soon after landing, from the effects of fever contracted during the campaign, and Sergeant Hamilton Fish of the First Volunteer Cavalry, who fell while bravely fighting at Las Guasimas, the first battle of the American army on Cuban soil.

On Sunday, August 1st, the command and officers of the various brigades and divisions which participated in the campaign, together with some members of their staff, met in the building which had formerly been occupied by the Spanish governor of Santiago, where General Shafter's headquarters were then established. A meeting was held which was called to order by General Lawton, who explained that its purpose was to establish the Society of the Army of Santiago.

General Lawton moved that General Wheeler be elected chairman, which was unanimously carried. Upon taking the chair General Wheeler addressed his fellow-officers as follows:

GENTLEMEN.—I thank you for the honor of being called as the temporary chairman of this gathering of my fellow officers, who have met to consider the advisability of organizing a society of the Army of Santiago.

The rapidly occurring events of the campaign of the past five or six weeks have been of a character which will ever bring together the hearts of those who have participated.

This army, by its endurance and courage, has already won the admiration of the civilized world, and it is most natural and appropriate that men who have stood shoulder to shoulder in such a struggle, crowned as it has been with glorious victory, should desire to cherish and perpetuate such memories.

General Wheeler adverted to the historic character and value of similar societies, which had been organized at the close of the several wars in which our country had been engaged; enumerating the Order of the Cincinnati, organized by Washington's officers at the close of the American Revolution, the Society of the War of 1812, the Aztec Society, which grew out of the war with Mexico, and the various societies growing out of the war of 1861-5.

It was eventually carried upon the motion of General Ludlow, that the following officers be appointed to draw up the constitution and by-laws of the whole society: Generals Ludlow, Lawton, Kent, Bates, Captain Woodbury Kane, Lieutenant J. D. Miley.

The meeting then adjourned on the understanding that a further meeting was to be held at the same place on the following Sunday, August 7th. At this adjourned meeting, however, the only business that was transacted was the election of a president, vice-president and secretary. After requesting General Lawton to take the chair, General Wheeler spoke in complimentary terms of General Shafter, and nominated him to be the permanent president of the new-founded society. This motion was unanimously adopted, General Wheeler being elected vice-president and Major Alfred C. Sharpe, secretary. After the chair had appointed a committee to notify General Shafter of his unanimous election as president of the society, the meeting adjourned to meet at the call of the president.

The following nominations for brevet appointments were sent by the President to the Senate in January, 1899:

APPOINTMENTS BY BREVET, TO RANK FROM JULY 1, 1898.

TO BE MAJOR-GENERAL BY BREVET.

Brigadier-General William R. Shafter, United States Army, for distinguished service in the conduct of the Santiago campaign, June 22, 1898, to July 17, 1898.

TO BE BRIGADIER-GENERAL BY BREVET.

Colonel Hugh A. Theaker, Sixteenth Infantry (since retired), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

TO BE COLONELS BY BREVET.

Lieutenant-Colonel Charles W. Miner, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Lieutenant-Colonel Jacob H. Smith, Twelfth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Lieutenant-Colonel Abram A. Harbach, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Lieutenant-Colonel John M. Hamilton, Ninth Cavalry (killed in action July 1, 1898), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Lieutenant-Colonel Stevens T. Norvell, Ninth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Lieutenant-Colonel Arthur L. Wagner, assistant adjutant-general, United States Army, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

TO BE LIEUTENANT-COLONELS BY BREVET.

Major Stephen W. Groesbeck, judge-advocate, United States Army, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Samuel Q. Robinson, surgeon, United States Army, for meritorious service in attending wounded under fire, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Henry S. Kilbourne, surgeon, United States Army, for meritorious service in attending wounded under fire, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Ernest A. Garlington, inspector-general, United States Army, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Charles A. Dempsey, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Sumner H. Lincoln, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Richard I. Eskridge, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Augustus W. Corliss, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Charles A. Coolidge, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major James Miller, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major William Auman Thirteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Alfred C. Markley, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major William M. Van Horne, Twenty-second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Stephen Baker, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Lyster M. O'Brien, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Henry W. Wessells, Jr., Third Cavalry, for most distinguished gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Henry Jackson, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Thomas C. Leño, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major George McCreery, surgeon, United States Army (since deceased), for meritorious service in attending wounded under fire, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Albert G. Forse, First Cavalry (killed in action July 1, 1898), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Jacob G. Galbraith, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898. (Nominated for brevet major, to rank from June 24, 1898.)

Captain Robert P. P. Wainwright, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898. (Nominated for brevet major, to rank from June 24, 1898.)

Major Theodore J. Wint, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain William H. Beck, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898. (Nominated for brevet major, to rank from June 24, 1898.)

Captain Charles G. Ayres, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898. (Nominated for brevet major, to rank from June 24, 1898.)

Captain James W. Watson, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898. (Nominated for brevet major, to rank from June 24, 1898.)

Captain Lloyd S. McCormick, Seventh Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898. (Nominated for brevet major, to rank from June 24, 1898.)

Major William S. McCaskey, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

TO BE MAJORS BY BREVET.

Captain Lloyd M. Brett, Second Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Henry C. Fisher, assistant surgeon, United States Army, for meritorious service in attending wounded under fire, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain William B. Banister, assistant surgeon, United States Army, for meritorious service in attending wounded under fire, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Harry M. Hallock, assistant surgeon, United States Army, for meritorious service attending wounded under fire, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Madison M. Brewer, assistant surgeon, United States Army (since deceased), for meritorious service attending wounded under fire, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Alexander M. Wetherill, Sixth Infantry (killed in action), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Charles Byrne, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Lyman W. V. Kennon, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain George B. Walker, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Zerah W. Torrey, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Charles H. Noble, Sixteenth Infantry (now major, Twenty-fifth Infantry), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain George H. Palmer, Sixteenth Infantry (now major, Fourth Infantry), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain William C. McFarland, Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain William Lassiter, Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Leven C. Allen, Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Theophilus W. Morrison, Sixteenth Infantry (killed in action, July 1, 1898), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Richard R. Steedman, Eleventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Harry L. Haskell, Twelfth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Wallis O. Clark, Twelfth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Palmer G. Wood, Twelfth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Robert K. Evans, Twelfth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Millard F. Waltz, Twelfth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain William J. Turner, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Charles W. Rowell, Second Infantry (killed in action, July 10, 1898), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain John K. Waring, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Abner Pickering, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Frederick T. Van Liew, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Joel T. Kirkman, Tenth Infantry (now major, Sixteenth Infantry), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Gregory Barrett, Tenth Infantry (since deceased), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain John F. Stretch, Tenth Infantry (now major, Eighth Infantry), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Walter T. Duggan, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain William Paulding, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Robert C. Van Vliet, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Charles J. T. Clarke, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Frederick M. H. Kendrick, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain John T. Van Orsdale, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Charles A. Booth, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Charles A. Worden, Seventh Infantry (since deceased), for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain George S. Young, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain James B. Jackson, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Daniel L. Howell, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain George W. McIver, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Daniel A. Frederick, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Frederick H. E. Ebstein, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Daniel Cornman, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Joseph W. Duncan, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Willis Wittich, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Charles A. Williams, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Francis E. Eltonhead, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Charles H. Bonesteel, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Harry L. Bailey, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Lawrence J. Hearn, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain John S. Parke, Jr., Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Morris C. Foote, Ninth Infantry (now major, Ninth Infantry), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain James Regan, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Edgar B. Robertson, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Thomas S. McCaleb, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Charles R. Noyes, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain John B. Rodman, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Joseph F. Huston, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Alfred Reynolds, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Herbert S. Foster, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain James S. Rogers, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Henry B. Moon, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain James A. Irons, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain John C. Dent, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain John F. Morrison, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Henry A. Greene, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Marion B. Saffold, Thirteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain William N. Hughes, Thirteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Ammon A. Augur, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Charles Dodge, Twenty-fourth Infantry (since deceased), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain John J. Brereton, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Arthur C. Ducat, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain James E. Brett, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Henry Wygant, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Benjamin W. Leavell, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Benjamin C. Lockwood, Twenty-second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain John J. Crittenden, Twenty-second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Robert N. Getty, Twenty-second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain William H. Kell, Twenty-second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Richard H. Wilson, Eighth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Colville P. Terrett, Eighth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Butler D. Price, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Henry E. Robinson, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Edward H. Browne, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Leonard A. Lovering, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Frank B. Andrus, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle. El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.


Captain Henry Seton, Fourth Infantry (now major, Twelfth Infantry), for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain George O. Webster, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.


Captain Charles W. Mason, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Carver Howland, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Charles L. Hodges, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.



THE PIER AT BAQUIRI.



MORTAR BATTERIES FOR HARBOR DEFENSE.

Captain Robert H. R. Loughborough, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Eaton A. Edwards, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Robert W. Dowd, United States Army, retired (when serving as first lieutenant, Seventeenth Infantry), for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Daniel H. Brush, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain George H. Roach, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Edward Chynoweth, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Charles St. J. Chubb, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain James T. Kerr, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Jown W. Hannay, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Omar Bundy, Sixth Infantry (then serving as first lieutenant, Third Infantry), for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Arthur Williams, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain George Bell, Jr., First Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Chase W. Kennedy, Eighth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Joseph Hale, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898 (since deceased).

Captain Charles Morton, Third Cavalry (now major, Fourth Cavalry), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain George A. Dodd, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain George K. Hunter, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Henry L. Ripley, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain George H. Morgan, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Daniel H. Boughton, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Francis H. Hardie, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Franklin O. Johnson, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain John B. Kerr, Sixth Cavalry (now major, Tenth Cavalry), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain William Stanton, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Henry P. Kingsbury, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Frank West, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Augustus P. Blocksom, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain John F. R. Landis, Sixth Cavalry (now captain, First Cavalry), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Clarence A. Stedman, Ninth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Charles W. Taylor, Ninth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain John F. McBlain, Ninth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain George J. Newgarden, assistant surgeon, United States Army, for meritorious service in attending wounded under fire, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Charles J. Stevens, Second Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Herbert E. Tutherly, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain William C. Brown, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Peter E. Traub, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898. (Nominated for brevet captain, to rank from June 24, 1898.)

First Lieutenant Edmund S. Wright, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898. (Nominated for brevet captain, to rank from June 24, 1898.)

Captain Thaddeus W. Jones, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain John Bigelow, Jr., Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Robert J. Fleming, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898. (Nominated for brevet captain, to rank from June 24, 1898.)

Captain Allyn Capron, First Artillery (since deceased), for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Clermont L. Best, First Artillery, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain George S. Grimes, Second Artillery, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Charles D. Parkhurst, Second Artillery, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Thomas H. Wilson, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Joseph T. Dickman, Eighth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Albert B. Scott, Thirteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Eugene D. Dimmick, Ninth Cavalry (now major, Fifth Cavalry), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

TO BE CAPTAINS BY BREVET.

First Lieutenant Thomas L. Smith, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Benjamin F. Hardaway, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant John D. Miley, Second Artillery, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Samuel E. Smiley, Fifteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Matthew W. Steele, Eighth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Edward R. Chrisman, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant William H. Simons, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Stephen M. Foote, Fourth Artillery, for gallant and meritorious service in presence of the enemy, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Benjamin W. Atkinson, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant William C. Bennett, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Edwin T. Cole, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Willard E. Gleason, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant S. J. Bayard Schindel, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Jules G. Ord, Sixth Infantry (killed in action), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant William K. Jones, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Guy G. Palmer, Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Edward C. Carey, Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Lewis S. Sorley, Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant John F. Preston, Jr., Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Isaac Erwin, Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Charles P. George, Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Samuel P. Lyon, Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Frank L. Winn, Twelfth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Willis Uline, Twelfth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant William J. Lutz, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Charles H. Muir, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant William P. Jackson, Second Infantry (now first lieutenant, Twenty-fourth Infantry), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant John L. Hines, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Carl Koops, Tenth Infantry (since deceased), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant James Baylies, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Eli A. Helmick, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Samuel Burkhardt, Jr., Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Truman O. Murphy, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Mathew E. Saville, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Robert S. Offley, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant John S. Grisard, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Harry H. Bandholtz, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant William Wallace, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant William C. Rogers, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant George H. Jamerson, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Otho B. Rosenbaum, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Almon T. Parmerter, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Edward W. McCaskey, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Charles Crawford, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Peter Murray, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant William M. Morrow, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant John J. O'Connell, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant William H. Mullan, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Frank H. Lawton, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant David G. Spurgin, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Wendell L. Simpson, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Edgar F. Koehler, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Andre W. Brewster, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant John M. Sigworth, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Edwin V. Bookmiller, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Francis H. Schoeffel, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Louis B. Lawton, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Thomas W. Connell, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Hugh D. Wise, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant John H. Parker, Thirteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, while commanding Gatling-gun detachment, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant William H. H. Chapman, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Robert W. Mearns, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Morton F. Smith, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Ulysses G. Worrlow, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Charles C. Smith, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Lorrain T. Richardson, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant George H. Estes, Jr., Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Edward M. Lewis, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Frederick R. Day, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Thomas W. Darrah, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Hansford L. Threlkeld, Thirteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Frederick W. Fuger, Thirteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Frank D. Ely, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Charles E. Tayman, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Albert Laws, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Henry G. Lyon, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Henry C. Keene, Jr., Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Joseph D. Leitch, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Isaac C. Jenks, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Hunter B. Nelson, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant William P. Jackson, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant John A. Gurney, Nineteenth Infantry (killed in action), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Walter L. Taylor, Twenty-second Infantry (since deceased), for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant William H. Wassell, Twenty-second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant George J. Godfrey, Twenty-second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant William C. Neary, Fourth Infantry (since deceased), for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Charles McQuiston, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Austin H. Brown, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Vernon A. Caldwell, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Marcus D. Cronin, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Ross L. Bush, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Dennis M. Michie, Seventeenth Infantry (killed in action), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Hollis C. Clark, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Henry L. Kinnison, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant William T. Schenck, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant James A. Moss, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Charles D. Clay, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Verling K. Hart, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Arthur Johnson, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant James H. McRae, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant James W. McAndrew, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant, Harry Freeland, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Horace M. Reeve, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant James T. Moore, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant George E. Houle, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Hamilton A. Smith, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant John W. Barker, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant John C. McArthur, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Alexander L. Dade, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Thomas B. Dugan, Third Cavalry (now captain, Seventh Cavalry), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Arthur Thayer, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Francis J. Koester, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Alfred C. Merillat, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Oren B. Meyer, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant John A. Harman, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant James A. Cole, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Richard B. Paddock, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Edward C. Brooks, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Winthrop S. Wood, Ninth Cavalry (now captain and assistant quartermaster, United States Army), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Henry A. Barber, Ninth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Wilbur E. Dove, Twelfth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Michael M. McNamee, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant John D. L. Hartman, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Milton F. Davis, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Clough Overton, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant William H. Osborne, First Cavalry (since deceased), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant George W. Goode, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant William E. Shipp, Tenth Cavalry (killed in action), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant William H. Smith, Tenth Cavalry (killed in action), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant John J. Pershing, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant James B. Hughes, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Malvern-Hill Barnum, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Richard L. Livermore, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Edward D. Anderson, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant George Vidmer, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898. (Nominated for brevet first lieutenant, to rank from June 24, 1898.)

Second Lieutenant Dennis E. Nolan, First Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898. (Nominated for brevet first lieutenant, to rank from May 12, 1898.)

Second Lieutenant Alexander M. Miller, Jr., Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898. (Nominated for brevet first lieutenant, to rank from June 24, 1898.)

First Lieutenant William Lassiter, First Artillery, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant William L. Kenly, First Artillery, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant John Conklin, Jr., Second Artillery, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant William W. Quinton, assistant surgeon, United States Army, for distinguished public service in presence of the enemy, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Briant H. Wells, Eighteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

TO BE FIRST LIEUTENANTS BY BREVET.

Second Lieutenant Edmund M. Leary, Second Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant James H. Reeves, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Joseph Wheeler, Jr., Fourth Artillery, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Dwight W. Ryther, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Clarence N. Purdy, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Louis H. Gross, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant William F. Nesbitt, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant James V. Heidt, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant John Robertson, Sixth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Reuben S. Turman, Sixth Infantry (since deceased), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Edmund N. Benchley, Sixth Infantry (killed in action), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Benjamin T. Simmons, Sixteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant William F. Creary, Second Infantry, for gallantry, in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Alexander E. Williams, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Franklin S. Hutton, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Oscar J. Charles, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Alga P. Berry, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Romulus F. Walton, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Thomas A. Pearce, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Charles E. Russell, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Henry M. Dichmann, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Curtis W. Otwell, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Herbert A. Lafferty, Seventh Infantry (since deceased), for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Thomas A. Wansboro, Seventh Infantry (killed in action), for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Anton Springer, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant William M. Fassett, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Edgar T. Conley, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Francis K. Meade, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Louis M. Nuttman, Twenty-first Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Arthur R. Kerwin, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Claude H. Miller, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Isaac Newell, Twenty-second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Charles S. Lincoln, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant William L. Murphy, Twenty-fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Joseph N. Augustin, Jr., Twenty-fourth Infantry (since deceased), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Halstead Dorey, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant John H. Hughes, Fourth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant John J. Bernard, Fourth Infantry (killed in action), for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Howard W. French, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant John E. Hunt, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Berkeley Enochs, Twenty-fifth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Paul Giddings, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant George L. Byroade, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Thomas T. Frissell, Third Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Ira C. Welborn, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Ira L. Reeves, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Thomas F. Dwyer, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Harry F. Rethers, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Warren S. Barlow, Fifteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Charles W. Exton, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Lucian Stacy, Twentieth Infantry (since deceased), for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant G. Maury Crallé, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Lyman M. Welch, Twentieth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Thomas M. Anderson, Jr., Thirteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Alvan C. Read, Thirteenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Lincoln C. Andrews, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Julius T. Conrad, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Andrew E. Williams, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Harry H. Pattison, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant John Morrison, Jr., Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant William D. Chitty, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Edgar A. Sirmyer, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant George C. Barnhardt, Sixth Cavalry (now first lieutenant, Fourth Cavalry), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Harry H. Stout, Sixth Cavalry (now first lieutenant, Ordnance Department), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Nathan K. Averill, Seventh Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant August C. Nissen, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Alvord Van P. Anderson, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant John C. Raymond, Sixth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Kenzie W. Walker, Ninth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Edward E. Hartwick, Ninth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Walter M. Whitman, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Henry C. Smither, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Charles McK. Saltzman, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Robert C. Williams, First Cavalry (now first lieutenant, First Cavalry), for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Hugh D. Berkeley, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Newton D. Kirkpatrick (since deceased), First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Harry O. Williard, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Henry C. Whitehead, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Frank R. McCoy, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Thomas A. Roberts, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Alfred E. Kennington, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Alston Hamilton, First Artillery, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Otho W. B. Farr, Second Artillery, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Charles D. Roberts, Seventeenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

TO BE MAJOR-GENERAL BY BREVET.

Brigadier-General Henry M. Duffield, United States Volunteers, for gallant and meritorious service in the presence of the enemy, Aguadores, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

TO BE BRIGADIER-GENERALS BY BREVET.

Colonel Embury P. Clark, Second Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898. (Nominated for brevet colonel, to rank from June 24, 1898.)

TO BE COLONELS BY BREVET.

Lieutenant-Colonel Edward J. McClernand, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Lieutenant-Colonel George McC. Derby, United States Volunteer Engineers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Lieutenant-Colonel John Jacob Astor, inspector-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph H. Dorst, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major William D. Beach, United States Volunteer Engineers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898. (Nominated for brevet lieutenant-colonel, to rank from June 24, 1898.)

Lieutenant-Colonel Edwin R. Shumway, Second Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

TO BE LIEUTENANT-COLONELS BY BREVET.

Major Robert H. Noble, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Charles G. Starr, inspector-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Henry S. T. Harris, brigade surgeon, United States Volunteers, for meritorious service attending wounded under fire, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Henry T. Allen, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Alfred C. Sharpe, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major C. Creighton Webb, inspector-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major John A. Logan, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Francis J. Ives, brigade surgeon, United States Volunteers, for meritorious service attending wounded under fire, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Harry E. Wilkins, chief commissary of subsistence, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Reuben A. Whipple, Second Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major George H. Sands, United States Volunteer Engineers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Albert L. Mills, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898. (Nominated for brevet major, to rank from June 24, 1898.)

Major Webb Hayes, First Ohio Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Philip Reade, inspector-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Victor C. Vaughn, surgeon, Thirty-third Michigan Volunteer Infantry, for meritorious service in attending wounded under fire, Aguadores, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Major Charles B. Nancrede, surgeon, United States Volunteers, for meritorious service in attending wounded under fire, Aguadores, Cuba, July 1, 1898.



A HAVANA VEGETABLE SELLER.

TRANSPORTING SUGAR CANE.



TO BE MAJORS BY BREVET.

Captain Stewart M. Brice, commissary of subsistence, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain John C. Gilmore, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain William A. Chandler, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain William H. McKittrick, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Cornélis De W. Willcox, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallant and meritorious services in presence of the enemy, Aguadores, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain James H. McMillan, assistant quartermaster, United States Volunteers, for gallant and meritorious services in presence of the enemy, Aguadores, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Frederick M. Alger, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallant and meritorious services in presence of the enemy, Aguadores, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Charles D. Rhodes, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallant and meritorious services in presence of the enemy, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Ulysses G. McAlexander, quartermaster, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain William E. Horton, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Harvey C. Carbaugh, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain William H. Wright, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Robert L. Howze, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Robert H. Beckham, commissary of subsistence, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Morton J. Henry, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Edward Anderson, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain William R. Sample, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Micah J. Jenkins, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain William H. H. Llewellyn, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Frederick Muller, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain Maximilian Luna, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Captain William O'Neill, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

TO BE CAPTAINS BY BREVET.

First Lieutenant Joseph A. Carr, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

First Lieutenant Herbert H. Warren, Second Massachusetts Volunteer Infantry, for gallantry in battle, El Caney, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Woodbury Kane, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Frank Franz, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant James H. Pound, Thirty-third Michigan Volunteer Infantry, for gallant and meritorious service in presence of the enemy, Aguadores, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant George H. Brown, Thirty-third Michigan Volunteer Infantry, for gallant and meritorious service in presence of the enemy, Aguadores, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant George L. Harvey, Thirty-third Michigan Volunteer Infantry, for gallant and meritorious service in presence of the enemy, Aguadores, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

First Lieutenant Guy G. Bailey, assistant surgeon, Thirty-third Michigan Volunteer Infantry, for meritorious service in attending wounded under fire, Aguadores, Cuba, July 1, 1898.

TO BE FIRST LIEUTENANTS BY BREVET.

Second Lieutenant David J. Leahy, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Horace K. Devereux, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant David M. Goodrich, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Second Lieutenant John C. Greenway, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

TO BE COLONEL BY BREVET.

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

TO BE LIEUTENANT-COLONELS BY BREVET.

Major Alexander O. Brodie, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

Major William D. Beach, engineer officer, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

TO BE MAJORS BY BREVET.

Captain Albert L. Mills, assistant adjutant-general, United States Volunteers, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

Captain Allyn Capron, First Volunteer Cavalry (killed in action), for gallantry in action, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

Captain James H. McClintock, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

TO BE CAPTAINS BY BREVET.

First Lieutenant James R. Thomas, First Volunteer Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

First Lieutenant James R. Church, assistant surgeon, First Volunteer Cavalry, for meritorious service in attending wounded under fire, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

Appointment by brevet in the Army of the United States, to rank from June 24, 1898, namely:

TO BE A COLONEL BY BREVET.

Major James M. Bell, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898. (Brevet lieutenant-colonel, to rank from February 27, 1890.)

TO BE LIEUTENANT-COLONEL BY BREVET.

Major Stevens T. Norvell, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

TO BE MAJORS BY BREVET.

Captain Thomas T. Knox, First Cavalry (now major and inspector-general), for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

Captain Robert P. P. Wainwright, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

Captain Jacob G. Galbraith, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

Captain William H. Beck, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

Captain Charles G. Ayres, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

Captain James W. Watson, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

Captain Lloyd S. McCormick, Seventh Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

TO BE CAPTAINS BY BREVET.

First Lieutenant George L. Byram, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

First Lieutenant Peter E. Traub, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

First Lieutenant Edmund S. Wright, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

First Lieutenant Robert J. Fleming, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

First Lieutenant Tyree R. Rivers, Third Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

First Lieutenant Leigh A. Fuller, assistant surgeon, United States Army, for meritorious service attending wounded under fire, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

TO BE FIRST LIEUTENANTS BY BREVET.

Second Lieutenant Robert C. Williams, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Henry C. Smither, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

Second Lieutenant George Vidmer, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Alexander M. Miller, Jr., Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

Second Lieutenant William R. Smedberg, Fourth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Harry O. Williard, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Frank R. McCoy, Tenth Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Walter M. Whitman, First Cavalry, for gallantry in battle, La Guasima, Cuba, June 24, 1898.

Appointments by brevet in the Army of the United States, to rank from July 2, 1898, namely:

TO BE MAJORS BY BREVET.

Captain Edward H. Plummer, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898.

Captain Daniel A. Frederick, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898.

Captain Clermont L. Best, First Artillery, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898.

TO BE CAPTAIN BY BREVET.

First Lieutenant Ernest Hinds, Second Artillery, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898.

TO BE FIRST LIEUTENANTS BY BREVET.

Second Lieutenant Robert McCleave, Second Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Harry H. Tebbetts, Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Benjamin M. Hartshorne, Jr., Tenth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898.

Second Lieutenant James W. Clinton, Seventh Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Ira C. Welborn, Ninth Infantry, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898.

Second Lieutenant Harry E. Smith, First Artillery, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 2, 1898.

Appointment by brevet in the Army of the United States, to rank from July 10, 1898, namely:

TO BE CAPTAIN BY BREVET.

First Lieutenant Alfred M. Hunter, Fourth Artillery, for gallantry in battle, Santiago de Cuba, July 10, 1898.

Appointment by brevet in the Volunteer Army of the United States, to rank from July 2, 1898, namely:

TO BE CAPTAIN BY BREVET.

First Lieutenant Guy E. Manning, Third Ohio Volunteer Infantry, for gallantry while delivering orders in battle near Santiago de Cuba, July 1, 1898.

Following is a list of officers and men in the several divisions of the Fifth Army Corps who were mentioned in the various official reports as deserving commendation for their gallantry and valuable services in the battles of Las Guasimas, June 24th, El Caney, July 1st, and San Juan, July 1, 2 and 3, 1898:

By Major-General William R. Shafter:

Major-General Joseph Wheeler.

Brigadier-General J. Ford Kent.

Brigadier-General Hamilton S. Hawkins. wounded, July 2d, San Juan.

Brigadier-General S. S. Sumner.

Brigadier-General John C. Bates.

Brigadier-General S. B. M. Young.

Brigadier-General Henry W. Lawton.

Brigadier-General Adna R. Chaffee.

Colonel Leonard Wood.

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt.

Colonel John F. Western.

Colonel Charles A. Wykoff, killed, July 1st, San Juan.

Lieutenant-Colonel G. McC. Derby.

Lieutenant-Colonel William A. Rafferty, Second Cavalry.

Lieutenant-Colonel E. J. McClernand.

Lieutenant-Colonel Charles F. Humphrey.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. J. Astor.

Lieutenant-Colonel B. F. Pope.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. D. Miley.

Major R. H. Noble.

Major S. W. Groesbeck.
Major C. G. Starr.
Major Leon Roudiez.
Major Hugh J. Gallagher.
Captain Lloyd M. Brett, Second Cavalry.
Captain Thomas J. Lewis, Second Cavalry.
Captain S. M. Brice.
Captain W. H. McKittrick.
Captain J. C. Gilmore, Jr.
Captain E. H. Plummer.
Lieutenant John H. Parker, Thirteenth Infantry.
Lieutenant Henry T. Allen, Second Cavalry.
Lieutenant William F. Clark, Second Cavalry.
Dr. G. Goodfellow, volunteer aid.
Mr. G. F. Hawkins, volunteer aid.

By Major-General Joseph Wheeler:

Brigadier-General J. Ford Kent.
Brigadier-General S. S. Sumner.
Brigadier-General Hamilton S. Hawkins, wounded, July 2d, San Juan.
Colonel Leonard Wood.
Colonel Henry Carroll, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.
Colonel Edward P. Pearson.
Lieutenant-Colonel John M. Hamilton, Ninth Cavalry, killed, July 1st, San Juan.

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt.
Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Dorst.
Major Theodore J. Wint, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.
Major Albert G. Forse, First Cavalry, killed, July 1st, San Juan.
Major W. D. Beach.
Major James M. Bell, wounded, June 24th, Las Guasimas.
Major Henry W. Wessels, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.
Major Thomas C. Sebo, Sixth Cavalry.
Major E. A. Garlington.
Major Valery Havard.
Captain Eugene D. Dimmick, Ninth Cavalry.
Captain W. H. Beck.
Captain Robert P. P. Wainwright.
Captain Jacob G. Galbraith.
Captain Thomas T. Knox, wounded, June 21st, Las Guasimas.
Captain Charles D. Parkhurst, wounded, July 2d, San Juan.

Captain Theophilus W. Morrison, killed, July 1st, San Juan.

Captain Joseph T. Dickman.

Captain William Astor Chanler.

Captain P. W. West.

Captain Francis H. Hardie.

Captain Charles W. Taylor, Ninth Cavalry, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Captain John F. McBlain, Ninth Cavalry.

Captain Robert L. Howze, Sixth Cavalry.

Captain Robert H. Beckham, commissary or subsistence, volunteers.

First Lieutenant Charles J. Stevens, Ninth Cavalry.

First Lieutenant Henry A. Barber, Ninth Cavalry.

First Lieutenant Michael McNamee, Ninth Cavalry.

First Lieutenant Winthrop S. Wood, Ninth Cavalry.

Lieutenant Albert L. Mills, First Cavalry, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

First Lieutenant William E. Shipp, Tenth Cavalry, killed, July 1st, San Juan.

First Lieutenant William H. Smith, Tenth Cavalry, killed, July 1st, San Juan.

Lieutenant John A. Harmon, Sixth Cavalry.

Lieutenant George L. Byram, wounded, June 24th, Las Guasimas.

Lieutenant M. F. Steele.

Lieutenant James H. Reeves.

Lieutenant Lincoln C. Andrews, Third Cavalry.

Lieutenant Joseph Wheeler, Jr.

Lieutenant F. J. Koester.

Second Lieutenant Kinzie W. Walker, Ninth Cavalry.

Second Lieutenant Edward E. Hartwick, Ninth Cavalry.

Corporal John Lundmark.

Mr. E. A. Mestre, volunteer aid.

Mr. Leonard Wilson, secretary and volunteer aid.

Mr. Adolfo Carlos Munoz, volunteer aid.

By Brigadier-General J. Ford Kent:

General H. S. Hawkins, wounded, July 2d, San Juan.

Colonel Charles A. Wikoff, killed, July 1st, San Juan.

Colonel E. P. Pearson.

Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. S. Worth, Thirteenth Infantry, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Lieutenant-Colonel Emerson H. Liscum, Twenty-fourth Infantry, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Lieutenant-Colonel Ezra P. Ewers, Ninth Infantry.

Lieutenant-Colonel J. H. Smith, Twelfth Infantry.

Major H. C. Sharpe.

Major Philip Reade.

Captain U. G. McAlexander.

First Lieutenant Wendell L. Simpson, Ninth Infantry.

First Lieutenant George S. Cartwright, Twenty-fourth Infantry.

First Lieutenant William P. Jackson, Second Infantry.

First Lieutenant F. J. Kirkpatrick.

First Lieutenant J. D. Miley, aid to General Shafter.

Mr. Adolfo Carles Munoz, volunteer aid, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

By Brigadier-General H. S. Hawkins:

Colonel H. A. Theaker.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Egbert, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Captain W. E. Horton.

Lieutenant Dennis M. Michie, killed, July 1st, San Juan.

Lieutenant J. D. Ord, killed, July 1st, San Juan.

Corporal Megill.

Trumpeter Shroeder, Sixteenth Infantry.

Trumpeter Dorris, Sixteenth Infantry.

By Brigadier-General John C. Bates:

Colonel John H. Page.

Major William S. McCaskey.

Major John A. Logan.

Major Harry E. Wilkins.

Major Francis J. Ives, surgeon.

Captain Wright.

Lieutenant Samuel E. Smiley.

Lieutenant Horace M. Reeves.

Lieutenant Smith.

By Brigadier-General Henry W. Lawton:

Major-General J. C. Breckinridge.

Brigadier-General A. R. Chaffee.

Brigadier-General William Ludlow.

Colonel George H. Harries, First District of Columbia.

Lieutenant-Colonel Aaron S. Daggett.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Wagner.

Major C. D. Hine.

Major H. S. Kilbourne, surgeon.

Major D. Creighton Webb.

Captain H. C. Carbaugh.

Captain J. C. Gilmore, Jr.

Lieutenant H. H. Warren, Second Massachusetts.

Mr. E. L. D. Breckinridge, volunteer aid.

Mr. R. D. Mendoza, volunteer aid.

By Brigadier-General William Ludlow:

Captain R. N. Getty, Twenty-second Infantry.

By Colonel Leonard Wood:

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. D. Viele.

Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore A. Baldwin.

Major Theodore I. Wint, Tenth Cavalry, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Major Webb Hayes, First Ohio, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Captain M. J. Heney.

Captain A. L. Mills, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Captain William O. O'Neill, killed, July 1st, San Juan.

Captain Loyd S. McCormick, Seventh Cavalry.

Lieutenant J. H. Parker, Thirteenth Infantry.

Lieutenant W. E. Shipp, killed, July 1st, San Juan.

Cadet Ernest Haskell, United States Military Academy, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Lieutenant J. B. Hughes, Tenth Cavalry.

Sergeant William Brittain, Troop G, First Cavalry.

Sergeant Hallett A. Burrowe.

By Colonel E. P. Pearson, Tenth Infantry:

First Lieutenant C. J. T. Clarke, Tenth Infantry.

First Lieutenant E. H. Plummer, Tenth Infantry.

First Lieutenant J. S. Parke, Jr., Tenth Infantry.

Second Lieutenant O. J. Charles, Tenth Infantry.

Second Lieutenant L. M. Nuttman, Twenty-first Infantry.

By Colonel G. H. Harries, First District of Columbia:

Major C. D. Hine, First District of Columbia.

Captain Charles S. Domer, First District of Columbia.

Captain Harry Walsh, First District of Columbia.

First Lieutenant W. E. Crist, First District of Columbia.

By Colonel C. L. Boynton, Thirty-third Michigan.

George L. Harvey, adjutant, Thirty-third Michigan.

By Colonel E. Miles, Twenty-second Infantry:

Captain Jose Vergas.

Captain Aveleus Brago.

Lieutenant Nicolas Franco, killed, July 1st, San Juan.

Lieutenant Tomas Repelo.

Second Lieutenant Dennis E. Nolan, First Infantry.

Lieutenant Paul A. Wolf, Fourth Infantry.

Private Henry Downey, Company H, First Infantry.

By Colonel E. P. Clark, Second Infantry:

Captain W. S. Warriner, Second Infantry, wounded, July 1st, El Caney.

First Lieutenant Charles H. Field, Company E, Second Infantry, killed, July 1st, El Caney.

Second Lieutenant D. J. Moynihan, Second Infantry, wounded, July 1st, El Caney.

Second Lieutenant O. D. Hapgood, Second Infantry, wounded, July 1st, El Caney.

Private Arthur H. Packard, Second Infantry, killed, July 1st, El Caney.

Private George A. Richmond, Company G, Second Infantry, killed, July 1st, El Caney.

Private Frank E. Moody, Company K, Second Infantry, killed, July 1st, El Caney.

Private George A. Brooks, Company E, Second Infantry, killed, July 1st, El Caney.

By Lieutenant-Colonel H. C. Egbert, Sixth Infantry:

Captain Alexander M. Wetherill, Sixth Infantry, killed, July 1st, San Juan.

Captain Charles Byrne, Sixth Infantry.

Captain Lyman W. V. Kennon, Sixth Infantry.

Captain George B. Walker, Sixth Infantry.

Captain Zerah W. Torrey, Sixth Infantry.

Captain Samuel R. Whitall, Sixteenth Infantry.

First Lieutenant Clarence N. Purdy, Sixth Infantry.

First Lieutenant Jules G. Ord, Sixth Infantry, killed, July 1st, San Juan.

Lieutenant William C. Bennett, Sixth Infantry.

Lieutenant Benjamin W. Atkinson, Sixth Infantry.

Lieutenant John Robertson, Sixth Infantry.

Lieutenant Edmond D. Benchley, Sixth Infantry, killed, July 1st, San Juan.

Lieutenant John H. Parker, Thirteenth Infantry.

Lieutenant Dennis M. Michie, Seventeenth Infantry, killed.

Second Lieutenant Reuben S. Turman, Sixth Infantry, killed, July 4th, San Juan.

Second Lieutenant William H. Simons, Sixth Infantry.

Second Lieutenant Louis H. Gros, Sixth Infantry.

First Sergeant Thomas Farrell, Sixth Infantry, Company B.
First Sergeant Harold M. Hallman, Sixth Infantry, Company A.
First Sergeant James Bennett, Sixth Infantry, Company B.
First Sergeant Dick Carter, Sixth Infantry, Company F.
First Sergeant William Wiley, Sixth Infantry, Company D.
First Sergeant John Murray, Sixth Infantry, Company C.
First Sergeant William J. Brown, Sixth Infantry, Company H.
Private James Mullen, Sixth Infantry, Company F.

By Lieutenant-Colonel F. Greene, Signal Corps:
Major Joseph E. Maxfield.

Lieutenant-Colonel George McC. Derby, Engineers.

By Lieutenant-Colonel E. R. Kellogg, Tenth Infantry:
Major Richard I. Eskridge, Tenth Infantry.
Captain Sumner H. Lincoln, Tenth Infantry.
Captain Joel T. Kirkman, Tenth Infantry.
Captain Gregory Barrett, Tenth Infantry.
Captain John Drum, Tenth Infantry, killed, July 1st, San Juan.
Captain John F. Stretch, Tenth Infantry.
Captain Walter T. Duggan, Tenth Infantry.
Captain William Paulding, Tenth Infantry.
Captain Robert C. Van Vliet, Tenth Infantry.
First Lieutenant Carl Koops, Tenth Infantry.
First Lieutenant James Baylies, Tenth Infantry.
First Lieutenant Eli Helmick, Tenth Infantry.
First Lieutenant Samuel Burkhardt, Jr., Tenth Infantry.
First Lieutenant Truman O. Murphy, Tenth Infantry.
Second Lieutenant Matthew E. Saville, Tenth Infantry.
Second Lieutenant Robert S. Offley, Tenth Infantry.
Second Lieutenant William T. Schenck, Tenth Infantry.
Second Lieutenant Alger P. Berry, Tenth Infantry.
Second Lieutenant Harry H. Tebbetts, Tenth Infantry.
Second Lieutenant Benjamin M. Hartsorne, Jr., Tenth Infantry.
Second Lieutenant Romulus F. Walton, Tenth Infantry.

By Lieutenant-Colonel Theodore Roosevelt:
Captain William O. O'Neill, killed, July 1st, San Juan.
Captain John H. Parker, Thirteenth United States Infantry.
Captain Micah Jenkins.
Captain W. H. H. Lewellen.
Captain Maximilian Luna.

Captain Frederick Muller.

Lieutenant Michael J. Leahy, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Lieutenant H. K. Devereux, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Lieutenant Woodbury Kane.

Lieutenant William W. Greenwood, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Lieutenant J. A. Carr, wounded, July 2d, San Juan.

Lieutenant D. M. Goodrich.

Lieutenant John C. Greenway.

Lieutenant Frank Frantz.

Acting Second Lieutenant Ernest Haskell, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Sergeant David L. Hughes, Troop B, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Sergeant John E. Campbell, Troop B.

Sergeant Robert M. Ferguson, Troop K.

Sergeant William E. Dame, Troop E.

Corporal Waller, Troop E, wounded, June 24th, Las Guasimas.

Corporal Fortesque, Troop E, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Corporal John D. Roades, Troop D, wounded, June 24th, Las Guasimas.

Corporal Joseph J. Lee, Troop K.

Trooper George Roland, Troop G, wounded, June 24th, Las Guasimas.

Trooper Lewis Cevens, Troop G, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Trooper Winslow Clark, Troop G, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Trooper Charles E. McKinley, Troop E, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Trooper Edward J. Albertson, Troop F, wounded, June 24th, Las Guasimas.

Trooper John G. Winter, Troop F, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Trooper Herbert P. McGregor, Troop F, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Trooper Ray V. Clark, Troop F, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Trooper Fred. W. Bugbee, Troop A, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Trooper Charles B. Jackson, Troop A, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Trooper John H. Waller, Troop A, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Trooper Oliver B. Norton, Troop B, killed, July 1st, San Juan.

Trooper Sherman Bell, Troop K.

Trooper John F. Carroll, Troop K.

Trooper G. Campbell, Troop B.

Trooper Dudley Dean, Troop D.

Trooper Samuel Greenwald, Troop A.

Trooper H. Bardshar, Troop A.

Trumpeter Frank R. McDonald, Troop L, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Trumpeter John Foster, Troop B.

Saddler Richard E. Goodwin, Troop B.

By Lieutenant-Colonel Charles D. Viele, First Cavalry:
Major Albert G. Forse, killed, July 1st, San Juan.

Captain J. G. Galbraith, Troop B.

Captain R. P. P. Wainwright, Troop G.

Capt. H. E. Tutherly, commanding squadron.

Captain W. C. Brown, Troop C.

First Lieutenant E. S. Wright, Troop A.

First Lieutenant J. D. L. Hartman, Troop K.

First Lieutenant Milton F. Davis, Troop C.

First Lieutenant C. Overton, Troop D.

First Lieutenant W. H. Osborne, Troop E.

First Lieutenant G. W. Goode, Troop I.

First Lieutenant P. E. Traub, adjutant.

Second Lieutenant H. G. Smither, Troop A.

Second Lieutenant Charles Saltzman, Troop G.

Second Lieutenant W. M. Whitman, Troop G.

Second Lieutenant R. C. Williams, Troop C.

Second Lieutenant H. D. Berkley, Troop D.

Second Lieutenant M. D. Kirkpatrick, Troop I.

Lieutenant J. F. R. Landis, regimental quartermaster.

By Lieutenant-Colonel W. M. Wherry, Second Infantry:

Captain William B. Banister, surgeon.

Post Chaplain Charles S. Walkley.

By Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Daggett, Twenty-fifth Infantry:

Captain W. S. Scott.

First Lieutenant V. A. Caldwell.

Second Lieutenant J. A. Moss.

Second Lieutenant J. E. Hunt.

Second Lieutenant H. W. French.

By Lieutenant-Colonel Richard Comba, Twelfth Infantry:

Captain Millard F. Waltz.

Captain Henry L. Haskell.

Captain Palmer G. Wood.

Captain Wallace O. Clark.

First Lieutenant Fred. S. Wild.

Second Lieutenant Wilber E. Dove, wounded, July 1st, El Caney.

Second Lieutenant William M. Wood.

Second Lieutenant A. T. Smith.

Corporal Joseph E. Able.

By Major Henry H. Humphreys, Twelfth Infantry:
Captain Millard F. Waltz.
First Lieutenant Mark L. Hersey, Twelfth Infantry.
Sergeant Major John S. E. Young.
Quartermaster Sergeant John W. Blair, Twelfth Infantry.
First Sergeant John B. Murphy, Company H.
First Sergeant Daniel Arundell, Company H.
Corporal Edward Meyers, Company E, Twelfth Infantry.
Corporal Joseph E. Able, Company E, Twelfth Infantry.
Private James W. Smith, Company H, Twelfth Infantry.
Private James McMillen, Company H, Twelfth Infantry.
Hamilton J. Carroll, Company C.

By Major S. Baker, Fourth Infantry:
Captain Henry Seton.
Captain Frank B. Andrus.
Captain Henry E. Robinson.
First Lieutenant W. C. Neary, Fourth Infantry, killed, July 1st, El Caney.
Second Lieutenant J. J. Bernard, Fourth Infantry, killed, July 1st, El Caney.
Lieutenant Halstead Dorey.

By Major William S. McCaskey, Twentieth Infantry.
Lieutenant Ed. M. Lewis.
Lieutenant Fred R. Day.
Acting Assistant Surgeon Thomas Y. Aby.

By Major J. A. Smith, Second Infantry:
First Sergeant Meyer, Company A.
Surgeon Banister.

By Captain Charles Byrne, Sixth Infantry:
Lieutenant William K. Jones, Company G.
Second Lieutenant Reuben S. Turman, killed, July 4th, San Juan.
Second Lieutenant William F. Nesbitt.

By Captain G. S. Grimes, Second Artillery:
First Lieutenant W. W. Quinton, assistant surgeon.
First Lieutenant John Conklin, Jr.
Second Lieutenant Otho W. B. Farr.
Corporal Herbert D. Keene.
Private Michael J. Gresham, Hospital Corps.

By Captain P. W. Jones, Tenth Cavalry:
First Lieutenant Edward D. Anderson, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.
Second Lieutenant Henry C. Whitehead, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

By Captain L. W. V. Kennon, Sixth Infantry:

First Lieutenant William H. Simons.

Second Lieutenant Edward D. Benchley, killed, July 1st, San Juan.

By Captain William Lassiter, Sixteenth Infantry:

First Sergeant Frank Stevens.

Sergeant R. N. Davidson.

Private Samuel J. Shay.

Private Robert Colling.

Private W. F. Gilhooly.

Private Percy Foster.

By Captain Benjamin W. Leavell, Twenty-fourth Infantry:

Lieutenant Arthur R. Kerwin.

By Captain H. L. Haskell, Twelfth Infantry:

Captain Robert K. Evans.

Captain Wallace Clark.

Captain Palmer G. Wood.

First Lieutenant David J. Baker, Jr.

First Lieutenant Willis Uline.

First Lieutenant William Morton Wood, killed, July 1st, El Caney.

First Lieutenant Fred S. Wild.

Lieutenant F. L. Winn.

Lieutenant Clark Churchman, killed, July 1st, El Caney.

Lieutenant Glen H. Davis.

Lieutenant F. Wilson Smith.

Lieutenant A. T. Smith.

First Sergeant John B. Murphy, Company H.

Sergeant Feldcamp.

Corporal Meyers.

Corporal Estabueau.

Private James W. Smith, Company H.

Private James L. McMillen, Company H.

By Captain W. C. McFarland, Sixteenth Infantry:

Captain Leven C. Allen, Company C.

Captain Sumter, Company G.

Lieutenant Guy S. Palmer, Company C.

Lieutenant Lewis S. Sorley, Company G.

Private Boone, Company E.

Private Edward Stewart, Company E.

Private Goud, Company E.



MAJOR-GENERAL N. B. MILES.

Private Spears, Company B.
Private Harris, Company A.
Private Fleming, Company A.

By Captain George H. Palmer, Sixteenth Infantry:
Corporal Clifton M. Spears.
Corporal McGiffin.
Corporal Theodore Kokocinski.
Private Thure A. Strand.
Private Andrew J. Connors.
Private Frederick J. Liesman.
Private George W. Miller.

By Captain L. C. Allen, Sixteenth Infantry:
Musician Emmanuel Sammet.
Corporal John Hanavan.
Corporal Edward Berg.
Corporal Daniel P. Meadows.
Private William Morrow.
Private John D. Hess.
Private Robert Borchart.

By Captain H. L. Bailey, Twenty-first Infantry:
Lieutenant F. H. Lawton.
Sergeant Charles R. Burr.
Sergeant Charles F. Pearson.
Sergeant P. Rosat.
Private Kerigan.
Private Hogan.
Private B. F. Bowling.
Private Hafer Mauz.
Private Oscar Moody.
Private Thomas McDonald.

By Captain William H. Beck, Tenth Cavalry:
First Lieutenant R. L. Livermore, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.
Second Lieutenant F. R. McCoy, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

By Captain Madison M. Brewer, assistant surgeon:
Captain Fuller, assistant surgeon.

By Captain A. W. Brewster, Ninth Infantry:
Lieutenant L. B. Lawton.

By Captain James W. Watson, Tenth Cavalry:
Corporal W. F. Johnson, Troop B.

By Captain S. R. Whitall, Sixteenth Infantry:

First Lieutenant John F. Preston, Jr.

Lieutenant Isaac Irwin.

Sergeant Deihl, Sixteenth Infantry.

Acting First Sergeant John Dudley.

Sergeant Alvah T. Kase.

Corporal Charles E. Morgan.

Corporal Fredrick Harfas.

Private Robert M. McCrory.

Private G. Moseley.

Private William Litinger.

Private John Allen.

Private William Stone.

Private Fred G. Schroeder.

Private Otto Hasenfuss.

Private Henry Iddings.

Private Walter T. Noyes.

By Captain C. A. Williams, Twenty-first Infantry:

Lieutenant W. H. Mulloy.

Private John C. Barnard.

By Captain Willis Wittich, Twenty-first Infantry:

Lieutenant Edgar C. Conley.

Corporal Loomis.

Private Mulford.

Private Flynn.

Private Glenning.

Private Depew.

By Captain E. B. Robertson, Ninth Infantry:

Lieutenant H. D. Wise.

By Captain S. E. Sparrow, Twenty-first Infantry:

Sergeant Prefer.

By Captain R. K. Evans, Twelfth Infantry:

Corporal Meyers.

Private Abele.

By Captain Millard F. Waltz, Twelfth Infantry:

Second Lieutenant Wilber E. Dove, wounded, July 1st, El Caney.

First Sergeant Carroll.

Sergeant Van Horn.

Sergeant Eckert.

Corporal Perry, wounded, July 1st, El Caney.

Private Lehr, killed, July 1st, El Caney.

Private James, wounded, July 1st, El Caney.

Private Johnson, wounded, July 1st, El Caney.

Private Trimmer, wounded, July 1st, El Caney.

Private Hatch, wounded, July 1st, El Caney.

Private Little, wounded, July 1st, El Caney.

Private Grothe, wounded, July 1st, El Caney.

Private Wilmer, wounded, July 1st, El Caney.

By Captain E. D. Dimmick, Ninth Cavalry:

Lieutenant-Colonel T. M. Hamilton, killed, July 1st, San Juan.

Captain C. A. Stedman.

Captain C. W. Taylor, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

Captain J. F. McBlain.

First Lieutenant W. S. Wood, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

First Lieutenant C. W. Stevens.

First Lieutenant M. M. McNamee.

First Lieutenant A. A. Barber.

Second Lieutenant K. W. Walker.

Second Lieutenant E. E. Hartwick.

By Captain Robert N. Getty, Twenty-second Infantry:

First Lieutenant W. L. Taylor.

Third Lieutenant W. H. Wassell.

First Sergeant John P. Byrne.

Sergeant William Parnell, wounded, July 1st, El Caney.

Sergeant Cornelius Cullman.

Private Martin P. Broberg.

Private Belton Johnson.

By Captain L. M. O'Brien, Seventeenth Infantry:

Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph T. Haskell, killed, July 1st, El Caney.

Lieutenant Walter M. Dickenson, killed, July 1st, El Caney.

By Captain J. B. Kerr, Sixth Cavalry:

Captain George H. Sands, Sixth Cavalry.

Lieutenant R. B. Paddock.

Lieutenant A. V. P. Anderson.

Lieutenant N. K. Averill.

Sergeant Blamey.

Corporal Douglas McCaskey.

Trumpeter Joseph Wilson, Troop K.

By Captain John Bigelow, Jr., Tenth Cavalry.
Lieutenant J. G. Ord, Sixth Infantry.
First Sergeant William H. Gevens.
Sergeant George Dyals, Troop D, killed, July 1st, San Juan.
Sergeant James Elliott, Troop D.
Corporal John Walker.
Private Luchius Smith.

By Captain C. H. Noble, Sixteenth Infantry:
Captain Woodbury, wounded, July 1st, El Caney.
Captain G. H. Palmer.
Captain L. C. Allen.
Captain W. C. McFarland, wounded, July 1st, El Caney.
Captain W. Lassiter.
Captain S. R. Whittall.
First Lieutenant R. R. Steedman.
First Lieutenant S. W. Dunning, wounded, July 1st, El Caney.
Second Lieutenant G. G. Palmer.
Second Lieutenant B. L. Simmons.
Second Lieutenant E. C. Carey.
Second Lieutenant L. S. Sorley.
Second Lieutenant Ridenour.
Second Lieutenant Isaac Erwin.

By Captain Henry Wygant, Twenty-fourth Infantry:
Captain Charles Dodge, Jr.
Captain Arthur C. Ducat, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.
Captain A. A. Auger.
First Lieutenant J. D. Leitch.
First Lieutenant Albert Laws.
Second Lieutenant A. R. Curwin.
Corporal Richard Williams, Company B.

By First Lieutenant M. M. McNamee, Ninth Cavalry:
Second Lieutenant Ed. E. Hartwick.
Sergeant Elisha Jackson, Tenth Volunteers.
Sergeant John Mason, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.
Private Bates.
Private Pumphrey.
Private Nelson, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.
Private Ed. Davis, wounded, July 1st, San Juan.

By First Lieutenant William G. Elliott, Twelfth Cavalry:
Private John Taylor, wounded, July 1st, El Caney.

By First Lieutenant Fred S. Wild, Twelfth Infantry:
First Sergeant Daniel Arundell, wounded, July 1st, El Caney.

By First Lieutenant Willis Uline, Twelfth Infantry:
Private McMillen.
Private Smith.

By First Lieutenant Henry T. Ferguson, Thirteenth Infantry:
Private John Davis.
Private Frederick Anthony.

By First Lieutenant R. J. Fleming:
Second Lieutenant A. M. Miller.
Farrier Sherman Harris.
Wagoner John Boland.
Private Elsie Jones.

By First Lieutenant Ernest Hinds, Second Artillery:
Lieutenant D. E. Altman.
First Sergeant Hidlund.

By First Lieutenant James B. Hughes, Tenth Cavalry:
First Sergeant Arthur Watson, Troop B.
Private Peter Saunders.
Private Daniels, Troop F.
Sergeant Bivins, Troop G.

By Lieutenant A. E. Kennington, Tenth Cavalry:
Corporal J. Walker.

By First Lieutenant John M. Sigworth, Ninth Infantry:
Second Lieutenant Warren S. Barlow.
First Sergeant Bailey.

By First Lieutenant Wendell L. Simpson, Ninth Infantry:
Lieutenant Edgar F. Koehler, Ninth Infantry
Lieutenant Paul V. Malone, Thirteenth Infantry.
Lieutenant Charles E. Tayman, Twenty-fourth Infantry.

By Second Lieutenant Arthur R. Kerwin, Twenty-fourth Infantry:
Second Lieutenant John A. Gurney, killed, July 1st, San Juan.

By Second Lieutenant Dwight E. Aultman, Second Artillery:
First Sergeant John O. Brien.
Corporal William Underwood.
Lance — Corporal William R. Logan.

By Second Lieutenant Louis H. Bash, Thirteenth Infantry:
Artificer Samuel W. Hilliard.
Private Samuel W. Crouter, Company E.

THE PORTO RICO CAMPAIGN.

CHAPTER XI.

General Miles left Guantanamo on July 21st, with 3,415 infantry and artillery, two companies of engineers and one company of the signal corps on nine transports convoyed by Captain Higginson's fleet, the flagship "Massachusetts" and two smaller vessels. The "Yale" and "Columbia," although armed vessels, were used as transports, being crowded with troops. About 100 of the soldiers were sick, leaving 3,300 effectives. The Spanish troops at Porto Rico numbered 8,233 regulars and 9,107 volunteers.

The American forces arrived at Guanico, July 25th, and entered the harbor without opposition, the "Gloucester" firing a few shots at the Spanish troops on shore. After a short skirmish the Americans took possession of the landing and the United States flag was raised on the island. General Miles was accompanied by Captain Whitney, whose knowledge of the country, gained during his perilous journey in the spring, was of great assistance in the Porto Rico campaign. The navy was active in assisting at the landing. Ten lighters were captured from the Spaniards here and seventy at Ponce.

On July 26th, with six companies of the Sixth Massachusetts, and one company of the Sixth Illinois, General Garretson attacked the Spanish near Yauco, drove them back and took possession of the railroad and highway. On the 27th, Commander Davis of the "Dixie" examined the harbor of Ponce and found it free of mines. General Wilson entered the next day and took possession of the city, General Henry following with his troops. Finding there was great disaffection toward the Spanish cause among the citizens and the volunteers, General Miles issued the following proclamation, at the same time giving detailed instruction as to the protection to be afforded by our troops to the inhabitants of Porto Rico. The effect of these measures was very beneficial:

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY.

PONCE, Puerto Rico, *July 28, 1898.*

TO THE INHABITANTS OF PUERTO RICO:

In the prosecution of the war against the Kingdom of Spain by the people of the United States in the cause of liberty, justice, and humanity, its military

forces have come to occupy the island of Puerto Rico. They come bearing the banner of freedom, inspired by a noble purpose to seek the enemies of our country and yours, and to destroy or capture all who are in armed resistance. They bring you the fostering arm of a nation of free people, whose greatest power is in its justice and humanity to all those living within its fold. Hence, the first effect of this occupation will be the immediate release from your former political relations, and it is hoped a cheerful acceptance of the Government of the United States. The chief object of the American military forces will be to overthrow the armed authority of Spain and to give to the people of your beautiful island the largest measure of liberty consistent with this military occupation. We have not come to make war upon the people of a country that for centuries has been oppressed, but, on the contrary, to bring you protection, not only to yourselves but to your property, to promote your prosperity, and bestow upon you the immunities and blessings of the liberal institutions of our Government. It is not our purpose to interfere with any existing laws and customs that are wholesome and beneficial to your people so long as they conform to the rules of military administration of order and justice. This is not a war of devastation, but one to give to all within the control of its military and naval forces the advantages and blessings of enlightened civilization.

NELSON A. MILES,

Major-General, Commanding United States Army.

General Brooke, commanding the First Army Corps, arrived on July 31st, and disembarked at Arroyo. On August 5th, there was an engagement at Guayama in which a few of our men were wounded. This was followed by a second engagement on the 8th. Preparations to attack Cayey were about completed when hostilities ceased in compliance with the following order:

PORT PONCE, *August 13, 1898.*

Major-General BROOKE, *Arroyo:*

By direction of the President all military operations against the enemy are suspended. Negotiations are nearing completion, a protocol having just been signed by representatives of the two countries. All commanders will be governed accordingly.

By command of Major-General Miles,

GILMORE,

Brigadier-General.

The troops engaged at this place were the Third Illinois, Fourth Pennsylvania, Fourth Ohio, Troop "H" of the Sixth Cavalry, the Pennsylvania city troops, Pennsylvania Battery "B," "Missouri "A," Illinois "A," and the Twenty-seventh Indiana Battery. General Brooke reported the action of these troops as follows:

HEADQUARTERS FIRST ARMY CORPS,
GUAYAMA, Porto Rico, *August 20, 1898.*

General JOHN C. GILMORE, *Adjutant-General, Headquarters of the Army, Ponce, Porto Rico:*

SIR.—Complying with telegraphic instructions of this date, I have the honor to report that, accompanied by my staff, I embarked with the Second Brigade, First Division, of my corps (Hains) at Newport News, Va., on Thursday, the 28th of July, 1898, for Porto Rico on the steamer "St. Louis," arriving off the port of Guanica, Sunday, July 31st, at 2 o'clock, P. M., where information was received that General Miles was at Ponce, and I directed the "St. Louis" to that point and found General Miles at Playa, the port of Ponce, about three miles south of it, reporting to the major-general commanding about 4 P. M. On Monday night, August 1st, I proceeded, in the steamship "St. Louis," with the Third Illinois Volunteer Infantry, along the coast in an easterly direction to Arroyo, where, on Tuesday, the 2d instant, I disembarked this regiment and established my headquarters, making arrangements at once to land the remaining regiments of Hains's brigade and four batteries of artillery, with quartermaster and commissary supplies. There being no wharf and the landing being difficult, I went with Captain Chester and Lieutenant Wainwright, of the navy, on the U. S. S. "Gloucester" along the coast in search of a more accessible landing. Failing to find one, I directed my engineer officer to construct a wharf on which I could land the transportation and artillery. Owing to a lack of lighters and launches, the work of disembarkation was very slow and seriously impeded my intended movements.

The steamer "St. Paul," with General Hains, his staff, and the Fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, arrived August 3d; also the transports "Seneca" and "City of Washington," with the Fourth Pennsylvania Volunteer Infantry. The transports "Roumania" and "Massachusetts," on which were the artillery, cavalry, officers' horses and rations, went aground at Ponce, and a further delay was thereby occasioned. On August 5th the transport "Roumania" arrived, and the artillery was disembarked at once. On this day I directed an advance on the town of Guayama, and at 1 o'clock, P. M., the Fourth Ohio, Colonel Coit commanding, supported by the Third Illinois, Colonel Bennitt

commanding, and dynamite guns, commanded by Captain Potter, Fourth Ohio Volunteer Infantry, all under immediate command of General Hains, entered and took possession of Guayama. A special report of this movement has been made to your headquarters.

The enemy made slight resistance about one mile from town. We had four men wounded slightly.

On Wednesday, August 8th, a reconnoissance for the purpose of developing the enemy's position and to clear the way for the engineers to correctly map the country was made by order of General Hains during my absence at Ponce, where I had been summoned by the commanding general. It was found that the enemy had taken position on a crest commanding the road, from six to eight miles from Guayama. A special report of this reconnoissance has been made and forwarded to army headquarters. Our loss was five enlisted men wounded, none seriously.

On Saturday, August 13th, I determined to move forward in force and proceed against Cayey. The movement was well under way when hostilities were suspended by receipt of telegram from headquarters of the army, publishing the President's order to that effect. A special report of this movement was also made to your headquarters.

Withdrawing the troops from their advanced position, I placed them in as healthful camps as I could find; established outposts and moved my own headquarters to Guayama. On August 14th I sent to the commanding officer Spanish troops in my front, and to Governor-General Macias, under flag of truce, copies of the President's orders as communicated to me by you, and on August 15th, General Macias, under flag of truce, acknowledged receipt. Since that date nothing of importance has occurred in my front.

Very respectfully,

JOHN R. BROOKE,

Major-General Commanding.

On August 9th, General Schwan left Yauco with the Eleventh Infantry, Light Batteries "C," Third Artillery, and "D," Fifth Artillery, and Troop "A," Fifth Cavalry, with orders to drive out or capture all the Spanish troops in western Porto Rico. He successively occupied the towns of Sabana Grande, San German, Lajas, Cabo Rojo, Hormigueros and finally captured the city of Mayaguez, after an engagement on August 10th; the Spaniards were routed with severe loss, the American loss being one killed and sixteen wounded. The pursuit of the Spaniards continued until the order to suspend

hostilities was received. From August 7th to 15th, General Schwan's forces had marched ninety-two miles, captured nine towns, taking 162 prisoners, paroled 200 volunteers and captured valuable material. The commanding officer thus describes the condition and spirit of his men when the order to suspend hostilities was received:

MAYAGUEZ, Porto Rico, *August 16, 1898.*

My Dear GILMORE:

Availing myself of the first breathing spell I have had for some time, I wish in this informal way and in advance of my regular report to say a few words to the general and yourself regarding our last Saturday's work. As soon as the result of the Hormiguero fight became known in Mayaguez — about 9 o'clock — Colonel Soto, the commander, "pulled up stakes." That the Spanish troops left in the greatest hurry the condition of their barracks abundantly evidenced. Our advance guard found the city entirely clear of the Spanish, and I ordered my cavalry to keep in touch with them; but the cavalry took the right-hand (the easterly) of the two roads leading to Lares, on which some of the Spanish troops had actually gone, and in the evening the troop commander reported that they were some seven or ten miles off and still retreating. My command was thoroughly tired. No one not witnessing it can conceive of the distress an infantry soldier suffers while marching in this hot climate in a deep column, weighted down as he is, even without his pack, and some rest seemed actually imperative. But the next day I found that the main body of the Spanish had taken the westerly road to Lares, and early on Friday — there being many other things to engage the attention of myself and troops — I started Burke out in pursuit with about 700 men all told. I overtook him Saturday morning about three and one-half miles north of Los Marias. His infantry had pulled his guns over roads that were almost perpendicular. His troops were exchanging shots at long range across a deep valley with the retreating Spaniards, most of whom had gotten across (losing a lot of men, who were drowned) a deep and rapid river, known in that country as the Rio Grande. Our fire had thoroughly demoralized the already disheartened and half-famished Spanish soldiers, and their rear guard at least was also disorganized and hiding in the hills. A company of infantry I had sent out brought in, about 10 o'clock in the evening, forty-odd prisoners, a number of pack animals, etc. Our men were thoroughly worn out from the day's work. Early the next morning I had four companies of infantry, the cavalry and two guns ready to resume the pursuit. And there cannot be a shadow of a doubt that had I had five more hours I should have taken Lares, for that the flying Spaniards had prepared to

abandon it at once I have the most reliable information. But at this particular juncture the notice that hostilities would be suspended came to me. No troops ever "suspended" with a worse grace. We had given the Spanish no peace, and had taken all the starch out of them. The colonel and the lieutenant-colonel had surrendered, and their troops were thoroughly demoralized and disintegrated. It seemed a pity to deprive us of the full fruits of a victory for which we had labored so hard; but of course we had to bow to the inevitable. Please let the general read this.

Faithfully, your friend,

THEO. SCHWAN.

While General Schwan was proceeding to Western Porto Rico, General Henry moved over the new road constructed by General Stone, through the interior, his advance reaching Arecibo by the 14th of August.

At Coamo, General Wilson's troops, under the personal direction of General Ernst, had a serious engagement with the Spanish forces. The main feature of this fight was the skillful flank movement made by the Sixteenth Pennsylvania Volunteers under Colonel Hulings. This regiment made a detour over an almost impassable mountain trail, cutting off the Spanish retreat on the military road to San Juan. The Spanish commander and the second in command were killed and 167 prisoners taken. This victory cleared the road to Aibonito. The Spanish loss was six killed and about thirty wounded; American loss, seven wounded. The troops engaged were the Second and Third Wisconsin Infantry, Sixteenth Pennsylvania, Battery "F," Third United States Artillery, and Battery "B," Fourth United States Artillery. The town was defended by about 400 Spanish troops well intrenched, and a strong blockhouse was occupied by an infantry outpost. General Ernst says, the satisfactory result of this action was due

(1) To the excellent plan of the division commander; (2) to the daring and skillful reconnoitering of Lieutenant-Colonel Biddle and Lieutenant Pierce, frequently under fire; (3) to the fortitude on the march and steadiness under fire of the Sixteenth Pennsylvania, and (4) to the impressive advance of the main body of the brigade in front. Every portion of the brigade behaved in a highly satisfactory manner, though the brunt of the affair fell upon the Sixteenth Pennsylvania.

The report of Colonel Hulings, of the Sixteenth Pennsylvania, is herewith

transmitted. I invite attention to the names especially mentioned by him, and in addition thereto I beg leave to name Colonel Hulings himself. As an example and inspiration to his men, he dismounted from his horse and made the long mountain march on foot, and conducted himself with great coolness under fire.

On August 12th, General Wilson began shelling the Spanish position at Asomante and General Ernst was preparing to attack in the rear the following day when hostilities were suspended. In the nineteen days of the Porto Rican campaign, the Spanish were defeated in six engagements and driven from one position to another, the desertion of the volunteers and demoralization of the army assisting in their defeat. Our loss was three killed and forty wounded. The Spanish loss was, probably, five times as great. The success of the enterprise and the comparatively small loss to the Americans was largely due to the skill and good generalship of the officers in command, and the efficient use of artillery.

The island of Porto Rico, which has since become a part of the United States, comprises nearly 3,700 square miles, with a population a little less than a million.

It is 1,000 miles from Havana and is described as "one of the most lovely of all the regions of loveliness which are washed by the Caribbean sea; even in that archipelago it is distinguished by the luxuriance of its vegetation and the soft variety of its scenery." It has only one-twelfth the area of Cuba and scarcely equals in dimensions the smallest province of that island. Although the smallest of the great Antilles, it is the most productive in proportion to its size, and the most densely settled. The majority of its inhabitants are of the white race, and it produces sufficient food to supply its inhabitants and has a surplus which is shipped to the adjacent islands.

Porto Rico is ninety-five miles long and thirty-five miles wide, with a coast line of nearly 300 miles. Its general aspect is that of a hilly landscape, a low range of mountains extending through its length, with low and broken slopes. It has beautiful fertile plains, a mild climate and luxurious vegetation and is well supplied with water.

Among the minerals found in Porto Rico are magnetic pyrite, agate, manganite, limonite, crystal quartz and garnet; gold was formerly mined but its quantity or location is not now definitely known. The climate, though warm, is said to be more healthful than

any of the other Antilles. A number of medicinal plants are found, some of which are used as condiments, and a number for dyeing and tanning. It has many large trees bearing edible fruits, such as pines, cocoas, oranges, lemons and mangoes. There is a deficiency of native animals and the island is said to be free from noxious reptiles and insects.

The hottest months are June, July, August and September. The coldest, December, January and February. The mean monthly temperature scarcely varies six degrees throughout the year, the extreme limits being within forty degrees of each other. The average rain fall of the past twenty years has been 59.5 inches, about the same as that of New Orleans. It rains very hard and abundantly during the hottest months. The rain comes in heavy gusts with strong winds, as a rule between 9 and 4 o'clock; it seldom rains at night.

The island of Porto Rico was discovered November 16, 1493, by Columbus, who took possession of it on the 19th of the same month. It was conquered by Ponce De Leon in 1508 from the aborigines, and the first town was founded in 1509, near the present capitol and was called Caparra. Its early history, with the exception of a few attacks by buccaneers, offers but few incidents of interest. For three centuries it served as a penal colony only. In 1870, it was made a province of Spain instead of a colony, and acquired the same right and government which existed in the mother country, with representation in the Cortes elected by universal suffrage. In 1897, the system of autonomy, which was offered to Cuba, was granted to Porto Rico, and under it the island has a premier, and a house of representatives. In 1894 Porto Rico had thirty-five newspapers and periodicals, seventeen of which were published in San Juan, seven in Ponce and eight in Mayaguez.

The chief cities of Porto Rico are San Juan, Ponce and Mayaguez. There are fifty smaller towns. San Juan, the capital, was built over 250 years ago. It is a walled town with moats, gates and battlements. It had a population in 1887 of 27,000; Ponce, founded in 1872, has about 15,000 inhabitants, and Mayaguez, founded in the same year, has a population of 20,000. Playa, which has about 5,000 population, contains the custom-house and the consular offices. Its port will hold vessels of twenty-five feet draft. Aguadilla, founded in 1770, has a population of 5,000. Among other towns are Arecibo, Arroyo, San German, Caya and Aibonito.

THE CAMP AT MONTAUK POINT.

CHAPTER XII.

The many hardships and protracted exposures to which our troops had been subjected had very seriously affected the health of the entire command; so much so, indeed, that the chief surgeons of the various divisions unanimously reported that a change in locality and a move to a more healthy country was absolutely essential to restore the troops to health. The sick list was not so very large until after the surrender, when the men settled down to more comfortable quarters, and where their only duty was to guard unarmed Spanish prisoners. The result of exposure to the sickly climate of Cuba in the rainy season can be well understood when the composition of the army in Cuba is borne in mind. Two of the regiments serving in the field came from Massachusetts, one from New York, two from Michigan, one from Ohio, one from Illinois, one from the District of Columbia, and the regiment of "Rough Riders," about one-half of which came from the north, and most of the rest from the healthy plains of New Mexico and Texas. The regiments of the regular army which, together with the volunteers, composed the Fifth Army Corps, had nearly all been stationed in the extreme north, and consequently it would have been difficult to find a body of men so little adapted to retain its health and vigor during such a campaign.

As the army had been disembarked so quickly, and it was necessary to rush them to the front with all speed, it had not been practicable for the men to take their tents, and as a consequence, they were exposed to the torrid suns of the days and the heavy dews of the night, without even a canvas protection. They had slept upon the ground, when sleep was possible, for more than three consecutive weeks. To this might be added the forced marches over rough roads, and on the morning of the battle of San Juan, the soldiers became soaked to the waist by wading through the San Juan river, and as they were without a change of clothing or shoes, they were more or less wet for several days. All these things together had reduced this army of

physically strong men to a deplorable condition, and the majority of them were so weak from the fevers of which they were continually the victims, that an extended march would have been very difficult if not impossible. Instead of becoming better this condition of things had grown steadily worse, until by August 1st, when the immune regiments arrived in Santiago, orders were received for the embarkation of General Shafter's army.

The following communications describe the condition of affairs at this time, and the gradual evolution of a plan which resulted in the encampment at Montauk Point:

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 23, 1898.* (3:14 A. M., *July 24, 1898.*)

ADJUTANT-GENERAL OF THE ARMY, *Washington:*

Referring to the question of more immune regiments, I have to say I think there should be at least four to make this place secure against attack if the Holguin troops remain at that place. Should they go west the two regiments will be sufficient, but there should be all the time one and I think better if two small ships of the navy could remain here. This upon the supposition that the Fifth Corps is all removed. I fully appreciate the fact that everything that can be done for the comfort of the troops will be. The greatest need now is for hospital tents. I think at as early a day as possible the Fifth Army Corps should be rapidly moved to some point in the north. It can be done so quickly that but few would die in making the change, and once landed recovery would be speedy. Up to this time but comparatively few deaths.

SHAFTER,
Major-General.

ADJUTANT-GENERAL'S OFFICE,

WASHINGTON, *July 23, 1898.*

General SHAFTER, *Santiago, Cuba:*

Of the transports with you, including those reported having left yesterday, we need room for 6,000 from Tampa, having no transportation for that number. You will then order all others to repair to New York as speedily as possible. We can handle the quarantine question better there than at southern ports, and land troops there quite readily.

The Secretary of War asks for report on fever conditions to-day, and what progress is being made in getting troops to the high grounds, and how effective this is going to be. Would you advise sending more than two im-

mune regiments now on the way to you? The desire is to help you in every way possible. As soon as it can be done with safety, etc., it is the intention to bring the entire Fifth Corps north for rest and recuperation.

H. C. CORBIN,
Adjutant-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *July 28, 1898.*

General SHAFTER, *Cuba:*

Would it not be well to encourage your command by telling them they will be moved north as soon as the fever cases subside? It would stimulate them, it seems to me, and that frequently is a tonic. We have selected Montauk Point, Long Island, for your command when it can be moved. How many troops should be sent to take the places of your command? How many Spaniards have surrendered to date?

R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, VIA HAITI, *July 30, 1898 — 10:45 A. M.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., *Washington:*


Made known Secretary's telegram that troops would go to Long Island as soon as fever subsided, and it had a very good effect on the men. Two regiments of immunes in addition to the two already sent will be sufficient to garrison this place and the surrounding towns, where insurgents are already behaving badly and where there is great and well-grounded fear of molestation. This force will be sufficient to defend the town, even if the Spanish troops at Holguin do not leave there or surrender. The count of prisoners has not yet been accurately made, but so far about 21,500 have surrendered and there should be 3,000 or 4,000 at Sagua and Baraçoá. Will send transport around there to receive their surrender as soon as immunes arrive.

SHAFTER,
Major-General.

WASHINGTON, *August 2, 1898.*

Major-General SHAFTER, *Santiago:*

After full consideration with Surgeon-General it is deemed best to have you move your command up to end of railroad where yellow fever is impossible.



PREPARED TO RAM THE ENEMY.



CITIZENS OF JARUO PRESENTING A MEMORIAL FOR THE VICTIMS OF THE "MAINE."

Then we will move them north as rapidly as possible. What do you advise? It is going to be a long job at best to get so many troops away.

R. A. ALGER,

Secretary of War.

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, VIA HAITI, *August 3, 1898.*

ADJUTANT-GENERAL, U. S. A., *Washington:*

In reply to telegram this date, stating that it is deemed best that my command be moved to end of railroad, where yellow fever is impossible, I have to say that under the circumstances this move is practically impossible. The railroad is not yet repaired, although it will be in about a week. Its capacity is not to exceed 1,000 men a day at the best, and it will take until the end of August to make this move, even if the sick list should not increase. An officer of my staff, Lieutenant Miley, who has looked over the ground, says that it is not a good camping ground. The country is covered with grass as high as a man's head when riding a horse, and up in the hills there is no water and it will be required to pump water two miles. He also states that rainfall is twice as great as it is here and the soil is a black loam that is not suitable for camping. Troops that have been sent to that locality have been housed in barracks. In my opinion there is but one course to take, and that is immediately to transport the Fifth Corps and the detached regiments that came with it to the United States. If it is not done, I believe the death rate will be appalling. I am sustained in this view by every medical officer present. I called together to-day the general officers and the senior medical officers and telegraph you their views. There is more or less yellow fever in almost every regiment throughout the command. As soon as it develops they are sent to hospital, but new cases arise, not very many, it is true, and it is of a mild type, but nevertheless it is here. All men taken with it will, of course, have to be left and have to take their chances. Some will undoubtedly be taken sick on the ships and die, but the loss will be much less than if an attempt is made to move this army to the interior, which is now really an army of convalescents; at least 75 per cent. of the men having had malarial fever, and all so much weakened by the exposure and hardships which they have undergone that they are capable now of very little exertion. They should be put at once on all the transports in the harbor and not crowded at all, and this movement should begin to-morrow and be completed before the 15th. All here believe the loss of life by doing this will be much less than if more time is taken. If the plan is adopted of waiting until the fever is stamped out,

there will be no troops moved from here until the fever season is passed, and I believe there will then be very few to move. There are other diseases which are prevailing—typhoid fever, dysentery, etc., and severe types of malarial fever which are quite as fatal as yellow fever. The matter of moving this army has been placed before you, and you have the opinions of all commanding officers and chief surgeons, who fully agree with me as to the only course left open for the preservation of this army. There can be no danger to the people at home, as it seems to me that infected ships is a matter of small moment.

SHAFTER,
Major-General.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
WASHINGTON, *August 4, 1898.*

General SHAFTER, *Santiago, Cuba:*

You can load all ships in harbor that can be properly supplied with medicine and medical attendance for Montauk Point. Will hurry other ships forward as rapidly as possible. The ships on the way from Spain should take at least 15,000 prisoners. We are doing everything possible to relieve your gallant command.

R. A. ALGER,
Secretary of War.

It was a matter of great regret to the officers and men of the cavalry division that they were not permitted to take part in the Porto Rican campaign. I had myself strongly urged that my division be sent to Porto Rico, as I felt assured that the sea voyage to that healthy island, together with a change of diet would put them in good campaigning condition, and it is still my belief that such a movement would have had the favorable result I anticipated.

I give below two letters addressed by me to General Miles on this subject:

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 21, 1898.*

Major-General NELSON A. MILES, *Commanding the Army:*

SIR.—My command is now on high ground and is improving. They were simply worn out by constant service and the rest they are now getting will

soon restore them. There is not a particle of infection of yellow fever in the command, and has not been. I think the cavalry division would be of great service in Porto Rico.

With great respect,

Your obedient servant,

JOSEPH WHEELER,

Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,

SANTIAGO DE CUBA, *July 24, 1898.*

Major-General NELSON A. MILES, *Commanding the Army:*

DEAR GENERAL.—I am very glad to hear that you have started with the Porto Rican expedition, and that you are to command it. We still have some sickness, but it is a fever which is by no means of the character of yellow fever and not contagious at all. Our total sick list was 340 cases yesterday. Our command is isolated on the hills nearly five miles from Santiago, and there has been but one case sent from the whole division that was regarded even with suspicion as yellow fever. We could move to Porto Rico with 2,200 or 2,300 men entirely free from disease or contagion of any kind, and they would be very valuable to you. If you do not want to move the cavalry division immediately, I am certain that I could be very valuable to you with my staff, and should be very glad to serve you in any capacity whatever.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOSEPH WHEELER.

As it was eventually decided by the authorities that none of the troops which took part in the Santiago campaign were to be sent to Porto Rico, my repeated applications for my troops to be sent there were not acted upon, and on August 6th, orders were given me to embark my command upon three ships to be sent to the United States. General Sumner embarked with the advance portion of the command on the "Gate City," other of my troops went on the "Matteawan," and in compliance with orders, Colonel Roosevelt, myself and some 700 of our men boarded the "Miami" and sailed from Santiago on Monday, August 8th.

Our voyage home was uneventful. On the night of the 8th we

sailed through the "Windward channel" and passed Cape Maisa about 3 o'clock on Tuesday morning. Castle Island lighthouse was passed at 5 o'clock that afternoon, and Watlings island the following day about the same time. It is said that it was upon this island that Columbus landed 407 years ago. There appears to be nothing of interest on it and but few houses could be seen. The chief occupation of the inhabitants is, I am informed, that of fishing.

As our ship took a direct line for Montauk Point, our destination, this threw us some 400 miles east of the Florida coast, and we were quite out of the range of the usual line of travel. The sanitary condition of our ship was excellent, and the continued efforts of the officers and men were directed to taking care of the sick. We lost by death but one man during the voyage, Sergeant George Walsh of Troop "A," First United States Volunteer Cavalry, who was buried at sea on the morning of Friday, August 12th, with the usual soldierly and Christian services.

On the afternoon of Sunday, August 15th, we sailed into the harbor at Montauk Point. We remained anchored in the bay that night, and after a rigid inspection by the quarantine officers, we were allowed to disembark next day. After reporting my arrival to Washington by telegram I was at once summoned by the President to proceed to that city. After an interview with the Chief Executive and the Secretary of War, I was directed to return to Montauk Point, and to take command of the troops at that place.

My duties here comprised the supervision of the disembarkation of the troops as they arrived from Cuba, locating the various camps for their reception, seeing that the necessary tent accommodation had been erected, and above all, caring for the sick who arrived on the various vessels in large numbers.

Within the space of less than three weeks, the necessary hospitals, storehouses and tents for more than 25,000 soldiers, besides accommodations for the attendant nurses and physicians, were erected on the barren fields of Montauk Point. About half the soldiers brought from Cuba were invalids and were installed in the various wards of the mammoth hospitals. By September 5th, so well were these arrangements completed, that Dr. Sands, the eminent Chicago physician, stated that the fever patients at the camp at Montauk Point were better taken care of than in any other hospital he had ever seen; that in fact the convalescents were living luxuriously. The Pennsylvania and New York Central Railroad companies, issued half-rate tickets

to officers and men of the various commands going home on furlough and paying their own transportation, these tickets being freely issued to any one wearing the uniform of a soldier.

No sooner had the camp been established than the most liberal offers of money, help and supplies came in from all parts of the United States. One gentleman, who has forbidden his name to be mentioned, telegraphed me that he had placed to my personal credit the sum of \$5,000 to be expended by me in such way as I thought best, for the comfort of the soldiers. I preferred, however, not to expend this money myself, and so notified him; he afterward spent it in sending a barge of ice to Montauk Point for the use of the command. It would be impossible to give a full list of the generous-hearted people who gave freely of their substance for the benefit of the soldiers, but I cannot refrain from mentioning the names of a few of these benefactors.

Hon. Sherman Hoar, on behalf of the Massachusetts Volunteer Aid Association, donated cargoes of very valuable supplies. This distinguished man twice visited the camps occupied by the Massachusetts volunteers and worked very hard in helping to provide for their comfort. He died at his home in Concord, Massachusetts, October 7, 1898, of typhoid pneumonia, brought on from overwork in this noble cause. Cargoes of supplies were also furnished by the Merchants' Association of New York; the War Relief Committee of Philadelphia; Hon. George F. Hoar, of Worcester, Mass.; Hon. Melville Bull; Mrs. S. E. Winthrop, and Mr. C. Dorcher, and others, of Newport, R. I.

We were similarly indebted to Mr. D. W. Lord and a committee from Illinois; to Commander Gerry, who in person donated stores for the sick, bringing them to Montauk Point in his own yacht; to Commissioner Powers of the United States Fish Commission, who sent 1,000 pounds of fresh fish for distribution to the soldiers; to Mrs. K. M. Bostwick of the Woman's Veteran Auxiliary Corps of Brooklyn, Mrs. R. B. Cooley of the Soldiers' Relief Committee, Poughkeepsie, N. Y., and to R. S. Howland, Esq., editor of the Providence "Journal."

The Murray Hill Hotel, New York, gratuitously furnished our hospital with forty quarts of consomme daily; and Mr. George H. Cassidy, New York, offered to receive into his home, furnishing medical attendance and nurses free of charge, a number of our soldiers who needed such care.

Mr. Charles Palmer, of Watch Hill, R. I., and his colleagues did most excellent work in donating supplies and superintending their distribution at the detention hospital; while the kindly interest manifested in the welfare of the soldiers by Mrs. S. M. McMaster, then staying at Watch Hill, and by my numerous other correspondents in all parts of the United States, was much appreciated.

The Messrs. Kane, Van Cortland & Co., of New York, offered also a large sum of money; and Mrs. Ireland sent her steamboat "Kelpie," loaded with delicacies.

Mr. Stuyvesant Fish, president of the Illinois Central Railroad, telegraphed me, offering \$1,000. Mention cannot be omitted of the help given by the officials of the "Red Cross" and other kindred societies; or of the liberality of Miss Helen M. Gould, whose donations probably far exceeded any like gifts ever made before for such a purpose, and who personally devoted her time and efforts to relieve the sufferings of the soldiers.

The example given to humanity by the gentle and generous acts and bounteous charity of this lady has made a deep impression upon the world, and has marked her as one whom posterity will honor and whose name will be pre-eminent in the history of this century for her good and noble works.

When the pleasing duty of commanding the soldiers at Montauk Point was intrusted to me, I was instructed by the President to spare no expense in providing for the comfort of the soldiers and in endeavoring to restore the sick to health. In consequence of this we were soon able to supply them with the most nourishing articles of food and permission was obtained for expenditure of money by the surgeons in the purchase of unusual and extra supplies for the sick under their care. Trained nurses were brought to the camp and extra physicians and hospital stewards were employed. Some uneasiness being felt as to the purity of the water supply, an immense filtering plant was purchased and erected at a cost of some \$7,000; a steam laundry was erected for the express purpose of laundering clothes and linen for the sick, and all the clothes and linen used in the hospitals were thoroughly disinfected. In every possible way the solicitude of the Government was shown for the safety and comfort of the soldiers who had been in Santiago, and provisions were made for their comfortable transportation to their homes when they left the camp. Not only officials appointed for the purpose, but committees

of citizens waited at the different railroad stations to care for the returned soldiers. The Red Cross Society joined nobly in this work.

Perhaps the most trying part of our work at Montauk was endeavoring to relieve the anxiety of anxious relatives in regard to their loved ones who had been in the war. Every effort was made to investigate promptly and telegraph immediate answers to inquiries as to the safety or whereabouts of the soldiers.

On August 24th, the Secretary of War visited Montauk Point and made a thorough investigation of all parts of the camp, remaining two days, during which he made many valuable suggestions and gave directions regarding the administration of the command.

On September 3d, the President and party arrived and made a visit of inspection; and the occasion was much enjoyed by the soldiers at Montauk.

On the 6th of September, Surgeon-General Sternberg made a visit to the camp, and after a rigid inspection of all its departments, expressed himself as highly gratified at the result of his investigation. In speaking of the camp, he says:

It is the finest place in the United States, and the water is all right. Lieutenant-Colonel Smart's present investigation is the second on his part. The first analysis of the water was made before the camp was opened, and we are having another analysis made, largely to reassure the public.

The commands who were with me were mustered out at different dates, commencing with the Seventy-first New York Volunteers, which, on August 27th, were ordered to be sent on furlough, at the expiration of which time they were to be mustered out. Following this command in order came the Thirty-third and Thirty-fourth Michigan Volunteers, the Eighth Ohio, First District of Columbia and the First Volunteer Cavalry.

I give below the farewell letters addressed to these different commands respectively upon their departure:

HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,

CAMP WIKOFF, L. I., *August 27, 1898.*

TO THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE SEVENTY-FIRST REGIMENT, NEW YORK VOLUNTEER INFANTRY:

Pursuant to the directions of the President, you will proceed to your homes and friends to receive the welcome which Americans love to accord return-

ing heroes who have fought, endured, and suffered for the sake of country, its honor and its prestige.

This short but severe campaign has made ours the leading among the great countries of the earth, and you have done your full part in this great accomplishment. Your comrades who fell in battle, and those who became victims of disease in a tropical clime, will be revered and honored, not only by the people of your Empire State, but by the 70,000,000 of this great Republic.

In bidding you adieu, I shall always remember each and all of you as honored comrades of the Santiago Campaign, the effect of which, in importance and far-reaching benefits to our Republic, can hardly be estimated.

JOS. WHEELER,
Major-General Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,
CAMP WIKOFF, L. I., *September 1, 1898.*

TO THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE THIRTY-THIRD AND THIRTY-FOURTH
MICHIGAN VOLUNTEER INFANTRY:

When your country called upon the brave men of the west to rally to the standard which waves as the emblem of American liberty, you were among the first to respond. You made no request but to be given the post of danger and honor. You gladly faced the torrid sun and the disease of a tropical climate. You bravely hastened to the firing line in front of Santiago, and nobly did your duty as heroic soldiers.

During this short but sharp campaign, in which you well performed your part, our country was elevated to a leading position among the greatest nations of the earth. Your work having been accomplished, the Secretary of War directs that you proceed to your homes, where the people of your great commonwealth await your coming, eager to shower plaudits and honors upon you.

To those of your comrades whose lives became a sacrifice to the cause you so bravely upheld, we reverently bow our heads; and it will be the delight of a grateful country to cherish and perpetuate their memories.

You take with you to your homes my best wishes for your prosperity and happiness, and in bidding you adieu, with my whole heart I say, may God give you His best blessing!

JOSEPH WHEELER,
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers, Commanding.

TO THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE EIGHTH OHIO VOLUNTEER INFANTRY:

By direction of the Secretary of War you are to proceed to your homes, where you will receive the heartfelt welcome and generous plaudits of the people of the great State of Ohio.

You were prompt to answer the call of your country. You eagerly sought to meet your country's foes upon far distant foreign soil. You braved deadly disease in a tropical land. You did your full duty in a war which has won for us the highest place among the nations of the earth.

In bidding you adieu, I wish you Godspeed, and may health, prosperity and honor be showered upon you.

JOSEPH WHEELER,
Major-General Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,
CAMP WIKOFF, L. I., *September 6, 1898.*

TO THE FIRST DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA VOLUNTEER INFANTRY:

The purpose for which you so promptly gave your services to your country has been accomplished. You were among the first to respond to the nation's call to arms. In the face of tropical suns you hastened to the scene of conflict, and with eager steps marched to the front of our line of battle at Santiago, and, together with your brave comrades, engaged your country's foes until you saw them surrender their strongholds and lay down their arms at the feet of the valorous American army.

The results of this campaign, in which you did your full duty, have been so momentous and beneficial as to win for you and your fellow soldiers the applause and gratitude of your countrymen.

In bidding you adieu, I beg to express my personal admiration for the fortitude, endurance, and soldierly qualities which you displayed, and to wish for you every possible blessing and the best prosperity and happiness.

JOS. WHEELER,
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers.

HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
CAMP WIKOFF, L. I., *September 7, 1898.*

TO THE OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS OF THE CAVALRY DIVISION, ARMY OF SANTIAGO:

The duties for which the troops comprising the cavalry division were brought together have been accomplished.

On June 14th we sailed from Tampa, Florida, to encounter in the sickly season the diseases of the tropical island of Cuba, and to face and attack the historic legions of Spain in positions chosen by them and which for years they had been strengthening by every contrivance and art known to the skillful military engineers of Europe.

On the 23d one squadron each of the First and Tenth Regular Cavalry, and two squadrons of the First Volunteer Cavalry, in all 964 officers and men, landed on Cuban soil. These troops marched on foot fourteen miles, and, early in the morning of the 24th, attacked and defeated double their number of regular Spanish soldiers under the command of Lieutenant-General Linares. Eagerly and cheerfully you pushed onward, and on July 1st the entire division, consisting of the First, Third, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Cavalry and First Volunteer Cavalry, forded San Juan river, and gallantly swept over San Juan hill, driving the enemy from its crest. Without a moment's halt you formed, aligning the division upon the First Infantry Division under General Kent, and, together with these troops, you bravely charged and carried the formidable intrenchments of Fort San Juan. The entire force which fought and won this great victory was less than 7,000 men.

The astonished enemy, though still protected by the strong works to which he had made his retreat, was so stunned by your determined valor that his only thought was to devise the quickest means of saving himself from further battle. The great Spanish fleet hastily sought escape from the harbor and was destroyed by our matchless navy.

After seizing the fortifications of San Juan ridge, you, in the darkness of night, strongly intrenched the position your valor had won. Reinforced by Bates's brigade on your left and Lawton's division on your right, you continued the combat until the Spanish Army of Santiago province succumbed to the superb prowess and courage of American arms. Peace promptly followed, and you return to receive the plaudits of 70,000,000 of people.

The valor displayed by you was not without sacrifice. Eighteen per cent., or nearly one in five, of the cavalry division fell on the field either killed or wounded. We mourn the loss of these heroic dead, and a grateful country will always revere their memory.

Whatever may be my fate, wherever my steps may lead, my heart will always burn with increasing admiration for your courage in action, your fortitude under privation, and your constant devotion to duty in its highest sense, whether in battle, in bivouac, or upon the march.

JOSEPH WHEELER,

Major-General, U. S. V., Commanding.

The cavalry division lost in the Santiago campaign 18 per cent., or nearly one in five; Kent's division lost $13\frac{3}{4}$ per cent., or nearly one in seven; while Lawton's division lost 7 per cent., or one in fourteen. In the cavalry division the proportionate losses were twice as great as those in many great battles of Europe. At Waterloo the English lost but about 10 per cent., and the average loss in Napoleon's great battles did not exceed 8 per cent.

My report for the months of August and September shows the number of troops which arrived at Montauk Point between August 13th and September 13th; the number sick on date of arrival, the number of deaths on the voyage and the condition of the vessel on the date of arrival. It also shows the quantity and description of the extra prices of food and lumber supplied for the various buildings and many other interesting facts in connection with the camp, especially the number of deaths at the hospital:

REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL WHEELER, COMMANDING CAV-
ALRY DIVISION, U. S. VOLUNTEERS.

HEADQUARTERS U. S. FORCES,

CAMP WIKOFF, Montauk Point, L. I., *September 26, 1898.*

THE ADJUTANT-GENERAL U. S. ARMY:

SIR,—In compliance with General Orders, No. 108, dated War Department, Adjutant-General's Office, July 28, 1898, I have the honor to submit the following report for the months of August and September, "specifying the nature of my duties during that period, the dates of my assignments, and the authority by which I was assigned."

During the first week in August, the cavalry division under my command was encamped near El Caney, about five miles north of Santiago. Pursuant to the instructions from the commanding general, these troops were embarked upon transports "Gate City," "Matteawan," and "Miami," to be transported to Montauk Point. I embarked on the last-named steamer and sailed on August 8th, reaching Montauk Point August 15th.

I proceeded to Washington, pursuant to orders from the Secretary of War, which were in these words:

* * * * *

On the 17th I received verbal instructions from the Secretary of War and the President to return to Montauk Point, and take command of the troops at that place and those that were to arrive from Santiago. Before the arrival of any troops Montauk Point was a barren pasturage, with no buildings whatever in which troops could be quartered or stores sheltered.

I give below a statement of the number of troops which arrived at this place from Santiago:

TABLE showing the number of troops which arrived at Montauk Point during the thirty days from August 13 to September 13, 1898; also the number sick on date of arrival, number of deaths on voyage, and condition of the vessel on the date of arrival.

| NAME OF VESSEL. | Date of arrival. | Troops on board. | Number sick | Deaths on voyage. | Condition of vessel. |
|-------------------------|------------------|------------------|-------------|-------------------|----------------------|
| Gate City..... | Aug. 13 | 551 | 41 | 0 | Not infected. |
| Vigilancia..... | " 14 | 699 | 21 | 0 | " " |
| St. Louis..... | " 14 | 872 | 24 | 1 | Infected. |
| Miami..... | " 14 | 680 | 84 | 1 | Not infected. |
| St. Paul..... | " 15 | 1,113 | 89 | 0 | " " |
| Grande Duchesse..... | " 15 | 1,143 | 224 | 0 | Infected. |
| Matteawan..... | " 15 | 527 | 70 | 1 | Not infected. |
| Seneca..... | " 18 | 416 | 73 | 0 | " " |
| Comanche..... | " 18 | 488 | 114 | 0 | " " |
| Mobile..... | " 18 | 1,600 | 300 | 10 | " " |
| Rio Grande..... | " 20 | 636 | 30 | 1 | " " |
| Breakwater..... | " 20 | 345 | 50 | 1 | " " |
| Olivette..... | " 21 | 275 | 192 | 8 | " " |
| City of Macon..... | " 21 | 462 | 92 | 2 | " " |
| Mortua..... | " 21 | 312 | 20 | 0 | " " |
| Leona..... | " 22 | 523 | 104 | 1 | " " |
| Resolute..... | " 23 | 688 | 61 | 0 | " " |
| Badger..... | " 23 | 186 | 82 | 0 | " " |
| Arcadia..... | " 23 | 185 | 27 | 0 | " " |
| Gale..... | " 23 | 1,069 | 178 | 1 | " " |
| Mohawk..... | " 24 | 1,199 | 130 | 2 | " " |
| Harvard..... | " 25 | 670 | 33 | 1 | " " |
| D. H. Miller..... | " 26 | 376 | 20 | 0 | " " |
| Yucatan..... | " 26 | 486 | 110 | 4 | " " |
| Hudson..... | " 26 | 514 | 95 | 1 | " " |
| Catania..... | " 26 | 401 | 50 | 9 | " " |
| Santiago..... | " 26 | 489 | 124 | 2 | " " |
| Prairie..... | " 26 | 214 | 99 | 0 | " " |
| Minnewaska..... | " 28 | 816 | 49 | 1 | " " |
| Specialist..... | " 30 | 118 | 20 | 0 | " " |
| San Marcus..... | " 30 | 397 | 5 | 0 | " " |
| Berlin..... | " 30 | 836 | 150 | 1 | " " |
| Panther..... | " 31 | 106 | 15 | 1 | " " |
| Alleghany..... | " 31 | 480 | 145 | 14 | " " |
| Mexico..... | Sept. 1 | 62 | 3 | 0 | " " |
| City of Washington..... | " 1 | 4 | 0 | 0 | " " |
| Berkshire..... | " 1 | 348 | 3 | 0 | " " |
| Orizaba..... | " 2 | 24 | 0 | 0 | " " |
| Nueces..... | " 2 | 385 | 28 | 0 | " " |
| Unionist..... | " 4 | 86 | 0 | 0 | " " |
| Roumanian..... | " 4 | 600 | 100 | 7 | " " |
| Missouri..... | " 10 | 249 | 249 | 13 | " " |
| Saratoga..... | " 11 | 312 | 28 | 2 | " " |
| Vigilancia..... | " 13 | 224 | 70 | 2 | " " |
| Total..... | | 22,221 | 3,252 | 87 | |

In addition to the soldiers arriving from Santiago, some 8,000 were brought to this point from Tampa, Fort McPherson barracks, and other recruiting stations, making the total number of soldiers brought here in thirty days about 30,000 men.

Tents were erected and hospitals were constructed from plank and canvas sufficient to care for between 3,000 and 4,000 sick.

While only 3,252 were reported sick when the ships landed, the great bulk of the troops that were at Santiago were by no means well, and many of them, fully 5,000 or 6,000, developed sickness after their arrival.

The physicians recommended a change of diet for the entire command as essential to their prompt restoration to health, and with their aid I prepared a list of articles such as they recommended to be furnished the soldiers in addition to their regular rations. I immediately ordered these articles by telegraph, and after some delay they were received, the first invoice reaching Montauk Point on August 22d.

The quantity and description of the extra articles of food is as follows: Halibut, 2,100 pounds; lima beans, 47,947 pounds; ice, 379,350 pounds; evaporated apples, 21,000 pounds; cans apples, 6,120; evaporated apricots, 15,000 pounds; butter, 20,964 pounds; green corn, 14,400 cans; cocoa, 1,080 pounds; crackers, 3,990 pounds; sugar-cured hams, 21,000 pounds; evaporated cream, 28,800 cans; oatmeal, 23,040 pounds; cans peaches, 14,856; evaporated peaches, 18,125 pounds; cans pears, 12,000; cans peas, 14,400; prunes, 10,500 pounds; soups, 19,104 cans; pickles, 5,296 gallons; lemons, 150 boxes; oranges, 300 boxes; eggs, 53,070 dozen; tea, 250 pounds; fresh milk, 28,630 gallons.

For building frames for hospitals and floors to tents, etc., we hauled 1,494 loads of lumber, each containing about 1,000 feet. The total amount of lumber accounted for as delivered to the depot up to September 10th was 1,446,326 feet.

In order to supply the camp with water, wells were dug, and 62,545 feet, or 12 miles, of pipe were laid. On these lines there were 178 faucets.

Late in August fears were entertained that the purity of the water would not be maintained, and to obviate this difficulty a filtering plant was erected at the cost of \$7,000.

The entire number of deaths up to this date, including those who died on shipboard and were brought ashore for burial, was 263. This is a very low death rate when we consider that it is the rate for some 30,000 men, nearly all of whom had been subjected to the malarial climate of Cuba.

It must be borne in mind that all of these soldiers had come from a yellow-fever country, and most of them either directly from yellow-fever camps or their immediate vicinity. When we consider the apprehension which was felt

and expressed throughout the country at the announcement that this large body of soldiers who had been exposed to yellow fever were to land in this country, and when we consider that there was not a spread of one single case outside of the ships or camps, we should feel very grateful for so fortunate an outcome. This was accomplished by the exercise of the greatest care on the part of the officials. Every ship was carefully inspected immediately upon its arrival, and all the passengers were placed in detention camps and hospitals under strict quarantine. As a further prevention, disinfecting plants were established at the pier and also in connection with the hospital where the sick were entered in the first instance, and, to keep everything isolated which was in any way connected with the sick, a steam laundry plant was erected sufficient to do laundry work for hospitals containing 5,000 patients.

Last, but by no means least, I desire to express the gratitude which every officer and soldier of this camp feels for the most bounteous generosity of the people. Steamboat loads and carloads of luxuries of every kind were donated with a lavish hand. The hospitals of our leading cities were thrown open and shelter, medical care, and nursing freely offered to our sick soldiers, and very many ladies left their luxurious homes and hastened to our camps, tendering their services to nurse the sick. This beautiful exhibition of sympathy and devotion on the part of the people most strikingly supplemented the exhibition of fortitude and courage which was displayed by our soldiers in their campaign under the torrid suns in the fever-stricken land of Cuba.

All of which is respectfully submitted.

Very respectfully,

JOS. WHEELER,
Major-General, U. S. Volunteers.

THE TREATY OF PEACE.

CHAPTER XIII.

When diplomatic relations between the United States and Spain were broken off in April, 1898, the Spanish minister, Senor Polo y Bernabé, by direction of his Government, confided to the French ambassador, M. Jules Cambon, and the minister of Austria-Hungary, Mr. Hengelmuller, the protection of Spanish subjects and interests in the United States.

These two gentlemen had a meeting in which they agreed upon their action in regard to all affairs of interest to Spain. The following letter addressed by the Secretary of State to the French ambassador, and a similar one to the Austro-Hungarian minister, contain a full description of the plans of these two diplomats as communicated to the United States Government:

THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

WASHINGTON, *April 25, 1898.*

EXCELLENCY.—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 22d instant, whereby you inform me that Mr. Polo de Bernabé, before leaving Washington and in fulfillment of the instructions of his Government, intrusted to you, and at the same time to the Austro-Hungarian minister, the protection of Spanish subjects and interests in the United States. To the end of simplifying in practice the accomplishment of this commission, which your respective governments have accepted, you and the Austro-Hungarian minister have agreed upon certain convenient arrangements, which you are pleased to communicate to me, as follows:

“First. The archives of the Spanish legation in Washington will remain stored in the legation of Austro-Hungary.

“Second. The care of the consular archives and the protection of Spanish interests will be confided to the consulates-general of Austria-Hungary in New York and Chicago, and to the consulates of France in New Orleans, San Francisco and Philadelphia.

"Third. In those localities where only one of the two countries has a representative, he will assume the protection of Spanish interests; in those places where the two countries are only represented by consular agents, such protection will be exercised by the French agent.

"Fourth. Questions, the adjustment of which may necessitate representations to the Department of State, will be dealt with either by the minister of Austria-Hungary or by me [the French ambassador], accordingly as the Austrian or the French consul shall have had the initiative therein.

"Fifth. In all other cases I shall charge myself [the French ambassador] alone with the steps to be taken with respect to the Government of the United States."

In reply, I beg to inform you that the Government of the United States admits your friendly action in assuming charge of the protection of Spanish subjects and interests in the United States, and that the scheme which you and the Austro-Hungarian minister have devised for the practical division of the charge you have simultaneously assumed is provisionally accepted so long as experience shall show its convenience in practice. It is, of course, understood, in conformity with the international usage which obtains in circumstances like the present, that the arrangement contemplates only the friendly offices of yourself or of your esteemed colleague, as well as of the consular representatives of your respective nations, should occasion therefor arise, with regard to Spanish subjects and their interests actually within the jurisdiction of the United States, and embraces no representative office by either of you on behalf of the Government of Spain, between which and the Government of the United States a condition of war unhappily exists.

I shall communicate to the competent authorities copies of the notes thus addressed to me by yourself and the Austro-Hungarian minister, to the end that they may give all due heed to such representations as the agents of either country may feel called upon to make in behalf of Spanish subjects and interests in fulfillment of the friendly office of protection thus assumed and admitted. In order, however, that no confusion may exist as to the distribution of protective functions among the respective consulates, I beg that you will favor me with a list of the French consular officers who have been designated to act in the manner stated in your note.

Be pleased to accept, etc.,

JOHN SHERMAN.

M. Cambon transacted with great discretion and good judgment the duties thus devolved upon him in the interests of Spanish citizens and also prisoners taken by the United States during the war.



SECRETARY ALGER.

After the fall of Santiago it became evident that Spain had determined to make proposals looking forward to a cessation of hostilities, and the following information, given out from the White House, July 25th, was gladly received by thousands in the United States, who anxiously awaited the return of peace:

The French ambassador, on behalf of the Government of Spain, and by direction of the Spanish minister for foreign affairs, presented to the President this afternoon at the White House a message from the Spanish Government, looking to the termination of the war and a settlement of terms of peace.

The letter addressed by Her Majesty's Government to the President of the United States, was as follows:

MADRID, *July 22, 1898.*

MR. PRESIDENT:

Since three months the American people and the Spanish nation are at war because Spain did not consent to grant independence to Cuba and to withdraw her troops therefrom.

Spain faced with resignation such uneven strife, and only endeavored to defend her possessions with no other hope than to oppose, in the measure of her strength, the undertaking of the United States, and to protect her honor.

Neither the trials which adversity has made us endure nor the realization that but faint hope is left us could deter us from struggling till the exhaustion of our very last resources. This stout purpose, however, does not blind us, and we are fully aware of the responsibilities which would weigh upon both nations in the eyes of the civilized world were this war to be continued.

This war not only inflicts upon the two peoples who wage it the hardships inseparable from all armed conflict, but also dooms to useless suffering and unjust sacrifices the inhabitants of a territory to which Spain is bound by secular ties that can be forgotten by no nation either of the old or of the new world.

To end calamities already so great and to avert evils still greater, our countries might mutually endeavor to find upon which conditions the present struggle could be terminated otherwise than by force of arms.

Spain believes this understanding possible, and hopes that this view is also harbored by the Government of the United States. All true friends of both nations share, no doubt, the same hope.

Spain wishes to show again that in this war, as well as in the one she carried on against the Cuban insurgents, she had but one object: the vindication of her prestige, her honor, her name. During the war of insurrection it was her desire to spare the great island from the dangers of premature independ-

ence; in the present war she has been actuated by sentiments inspired rather by ties of blood than by her interests and by the rights belonging to her as mother country.

Spain is prepared to spare Cuba from the continuation of the horrors of war if the United States are, on their part, likewise disposed.

The President of the United States and the American people may now learn from this message the true thought, desire and intention of the Spanish nation.

And so do we wish to learn from the President of the United States upon which basis might be established a political status in Cuba and might be terminated a strife which would continue without reason should both Governments agree upon the means of pacifying the island.

In the name of the Government of H. M. the Queen Regent I have the honor to address this message to your excellency, with the expression of my highest consideration.

DUC D'ALMODOVAR DEL RIO.

Ministre d'Etat.

To this letter the Secretary of State replied:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,

WASHINGTON, *July 30, 1898.*

EXCELLENCY.—The President received on the afternoon of Tuesday, the 26th instant, from the hand of his excellency, the ambassador of France, representing for this purpose the Government of Spain, the message signed by your excellency as minister of state in behalf of the Government of Her Majesty, the Queen Regent of Spain, and dated the 22d instant, as to the possibility of terminating the war now existing between the United States and Spain.

The President received with satisfaction the suggestion that the two countries might mutually endeavor to ascertain the conditions on which the pending struggle may be brought to an end, as well as the expression of Spain's belief that an understanding on the subject is possible.

During the protracted negotiations that preceded the outbreak of hostilities the President earnestly labored to avert a conflict, in the hope that Spain, in consideration of her own interests, as well as those of the Spanish Antilles and the United States, would find a way of removing the conditions which had, for half a century, constantly disturbed the peace of the Western Hemisphere and on numerous occasions brought the two nations to the verge of war.

The President witnessed with profound disappointment the frustration of his peaceful efforts by events which forced upon the people of the United States the unalterable conviction that nothing short of the relinquishment by Spain

of a claim of sovereignty over Cuba which she was unable to enforce would relieve a situation that had become unendurable.

For years the Government of the United States, out of regard for the susceptibilities of Spain, had by the exercise of its power and the expenditure of its treasure preserved the obligations of neutrality. But a point was at length reached at which, as Spain had often been forewarned, this attitude could no longer be maintained. The spectacle at our very doors of a fertile territory wasted by fire and sword, and given over to desolation and famine, was one to which our people could not be indifferent. Yielding, therefore, to the demands of humanity, they determined to remove the causes in the effects of which they had become so deeply involved.

To this end the President, with the authority of Congress, presented to Spain a demand for the withdrawal of her land and naval forces from Cuba, in order that the people of the island might be enabled to form a government of their own. To this demand Spain replied by severing diplomatic relations with the United States, and by declaring that she considered the action of this Government as creating a state of war between the two countries.

The President could not but feel sincere regret that the local question as to the peace and good government of Cuba should thus have been transferred and enlarged into a general conflict of arms between two great peoples. Nevertheless, having accepted the issue with all the hazards which it involved, he has, in the exercise of his duty, and of the rights which the state of war confers, prosecuted hostilities by land and sea, in order to secure at the earliest possible moment an honorable peace. In so doing he has been compelled to avail himself unsparingly of the lives and fortunes which his countrymen have placed at his command; and untold burdens and sacrifices far transcending any material estimation, have been imposed upon them.

That as the result of the patriotic exertions of the people of the United States the strife has, as your excellency observes, proved unequal, inclines the President to offer a brave adversary generous terms of peace.

The President, therefore, responding to your excellency's request, will state the terms of peace which will be accepted by him at the present time, subject to the approval of the Senate of the United States hereafter.

Your excellency in discussing the question of Cuba intimates that Spain has desired to spare the island the dangers of premature independence. The Government of the United States has not shared the apprehensions of Spain in this regard, but it recognizes the fact that in the distracted and prostrate condition of the island, aid and guidance will be necessary, and these it is prepared to give.

The United States will require.

First. The relinquishment by Spain of all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba and her immediate evacuation of the island.

Second. The President, desirous of exhibiting signal generosity, will not now put forward any demand for pecuniary indemnity. Nevertheless he cannot be insensible to the losses and expenses of the United States incident to the war or to the claims of our citizens for injuries to their persons and property during the late insurrection in Cuba. He must, therefore, require the cession to the United States and the immediate evacuation by Spain of the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrões, to be selected by the United States.

Third. On similar grounds the United States is entitled to occupy and will hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines.

If the terms hereby offered are accepted in their entirety commissioners will be named by the United States to meet similarly authorized commissioners on the part of Spain for the purpose of settling the details of the treaty of peace and signing and delivering it under the terms above indicated.

I avail myself of this occasion to offer to your excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

WILLIAM R. DAY.

To his Excellency DUKE OF ALMODOVAR DEL RIO, *Minister of State, etc.*

The Spanish minister of state and foreign affairs replied to this, reluctantly agreeing to the terms proposed, but differing somewhat from the deductions drawn by Mr. Day as to the order of events leading to the war. Mr. Day finding the letter of the Duke of Almodovar not entirely explicit, replied, inclosing a draft of the proposed agreement. The text of these two letters is here given:

MADRID, *August 7, 1898.*

MR. SECRETARY OF STATE:

The French ambassador at Washington, whose good offices have enabled the Spanish Government to address a message to the President of the United States, has forwarded by cable your excellency's reply to this document.

In examining the arguments used as a preamble to the specification of the terms upon which peace may be restored between Spain and the United States,

it behooves the Spanish Government to deduce from the order of events that the severance of diplomatic relations with the United States had no other purpose than to decline the acceptance of an ultimatum which Spain could only consider as an attempt against her rightful sovereignty over Cuba.

Spain did not declare war; she met it because it was the only means of defending her right in the Greater Antilles. Thus did the Queen and the United States see fit to transform and enlarge the purely local question of Cuba.

From this fact your excellency draws the conclusion that the question at stake is no longer only the one which relates to the territory of Cuba, but also that the losses of American lives and fortunes incident to the war should in some manner be compensated.

As to the first condition, relating to the future of Cuba, the two Governments reach similar conclusions in regard to the natural inability of the people to establish an independent government; be it by reason of inadequate development, as we believe, or on account of the present distracted and prostrate condition of the island, as your excellency states, the fact remains that Cuba needs guidance. The American people are willing to assume the responsibility of giving this guidance by substituting themselves to the Spanish nation, whose right to keep the island is indisputable; to this intimation we have nothing to oppose. The necessity of withdrawing from the territory of Cuba being imperative, the nation assuming Spain's place must, as long as this territory shall not have fully reached the conditions required to take rank among other sovereign powers, provide for rules which will insure order and protect against all risks the Spanish residents, as well as the Cuban natives still loyal to the mother country.

In the name of the nation the Spanish Government hereby relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba, and engages to the irremediable evacuation of the island, subject to the approval of the Cortes — a reserve which we likewise make with regard to the other proffered terms — just as these terms will have to be ultimately approved by the Senate of the United States.

The United States require, as an indemnity for or an equivalent to the sacrifices they have borne during this short war, the cession of Porto Rico and of the other islands now under the sovereignty of Spain in the West Indies, and also the cession of an island in the Ladrões, to be selected by the Federal Government.

This demand strips us of the very last memory of a glorious past, and expels us at once from the prosperous island of Porto Rico and from the Western Hemisphere, which became peopled and civilized through the proud deeds of our ancestors. It might, perhaps, have been possible to compensate by some other cession for the injuries sustained by the United States. However, the

inflexibility of the demand obliges us to cede, and we shall cede, the island of Porto Rico and the other islands belonging to the Crown of Spain in the West Indies, together with one of the islands of the archipelago of the Ladrões, to be selected by the American Government.

The terms relating to the Philippines seem, to our understanding, to be quite indefinite. On the one hand, the ground on which the United States believe themselves entitled to occupy the bay, the harbor, and the city of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, cannot be that of conquest, since in spite of the blockade maintained on sea by the American fleet, in spite of the siege established on land by a native supported and provided for by the American Admiral, Manila still holds its own, and the Spanish standard still waves over the city. On the other hand, the whole archipelago of the Philippines is in the power and under the sovereignty of Spain. Therefore the Government of Spain thinks that the temporary occupation of Manila should constitute a guaranty. It is stated that the treaty of peace shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines; but as the intentions of the Federal Government by regression remain veiled, therefore the Spanish Government must declare that, while accepting the third condition, they do not *a priori* renounce the sovereignty of Spain over the archipelago, leaving it to the negotiators to agree as to such reforms which the condition of these possessions and the level of culture of their natives may render desirable.

The Government of Her Majesty accepts the third condition, with the above-mentioned declarations.

Such are the statements and observations which the Spanish Government has the honor to submit in reply to your excellency's communication. They accept the proffered terms, subject to the approval of the Cortes of the Kingdom, as required by their constitutional duties.

The agreement between the two Governments implies the irremeable suspension of hostilities and the designation of commissioners for the purpose of settling the details of the treaty of peace and of signing it, under the terms above indicated.

I avail myself of this occasion to offer to your excellency the assurances of my highest consideration.

ALMODOVAR DEL RIO.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
WASHINGTON, August 10, 1898.

EXCELLENCY.—Although it is your understanding that the note of the Duke of Almodovar, which you left with the President on yesterday afternoon, is

intended to convey an acceptance by the Spanish Government of the terms set forth in my note of the 30th ultimo as the basis on which the President would appoint commissioners to negotiate and conclude with commissioners on the part of Spain a treaty of peace, I understand that we concur in the opinion that the Duke's note, doubtless owing to the various transformations which it has undergone in the course of its circuitous transmission by telegraph and in cipher, is not, in the form in which it has reached the hands of the President, entirely explicit.

Under these circumstances it is thought that the most direct and certain way of avoiding misunderstanding is to embody in a protocol, to be signed by us as the representatives, respectively, of the United States and Spain, the terms on which the negotiations for peace are to be undertaken.

I, therefore, inclose herewith a draft of such a protocol, in which you will find that I have embodied the precise terms tendered to Spain in my note of the 30th ultimo, together with appropriate stipulations for the appointment of commissioners to arrange the details of the immediate evacuation of Cuba, Porto Rico, and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, as well as for the appointment of commissioners to treat of peace.

Accept, excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

WILLIAM R. DAY.

His Excellency M. JULES CAMBON, etc.

PROTOCOL.

William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and His Excellency Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of France at Washington, respectively possessing for this purpose full authority from the Government of the United States and the Government of Spain, have concluded and signed the following articles, embodying the terms on which the two Governments have agreed in respect to the matters hereinafter set forth, having in view the establishment of peace between the two countries, that is to say:

ARTICLE 1. Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over or title to Cuba.

ARTICLE 2. Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladronez, to be selected by the United States.

ARTICLE 3. The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay, and harbor of Manila pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace, which shall determine the control, disposition, and government of the Philippines.

ARTICLE 4. Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Porto Rico, and other

islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies; and to this end each Government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, appoint commissioners, and the commissioners so appointed shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at Havana for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands; and each Government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, also appoint other commissioners, who shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at San Juan, in Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies.

ARTICLE 5. The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than five commissioners to treat of peace, and the commissioners so appointed shall meet at Paris not later than October 1, 1898, and proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, which treaty shall be subject to ratification according to the respective constitutional forms of the two countries.

ARTICLE 6. Upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as possible by each Government to the commanders of its military and naval forces.

It having been agreed upon what terms the United States and Spain should treat for peace, the preliminary protocol was signed on the 12th of August by the American Secretary of State, William R. Day, and M. Cambon, French ambassador, on the part of Spain. M. Cambon received by cable his powers to sign the protocol, but the document conferring the authority, received later by mail, read as follows:

[Translation.]

DON ALFONSO XIII

BY THE GRACE OF GOD AND THE CONSTITUTION, KING OF SPAIN, AND IN HIS
NAME AND DURING HIS MINORITY,

DONA MARIA CRISTINA,

QUEEN REGENT OF THE KINGDOM.

Whereas it has become necessary to negotiate and sign at Washington a protocol in which the preliminaries of peace between Spain and the United States of America shall be settled, and as it is necessary for me to empower for that purpose a person possessing the requisite qualifications; Therefore, I have decided to select, after procuring the consent of His Excellency the

President of the French Republic, you, Don Julio Cambon, ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary of the French Republic in the United States of America, as I do, by these presents, select and appoint you to proceed, invested with the character of my plenipotentiary to negotiate and sign with the plenipotentiary whom His Excellency the President of the United States of America may designate for that purpose the aforesaid protocol. And I declare, from the present moment, all that you may agree upon, negotiate, and sign in the execution of this commission acceptable and valid, and I will observe it and execute it, and will cause it to be observed and executed as if it had been done by myself, for which I give you my whole full powers in the most ample form required by law. In witness whereof I have caused these presents to be issued, signed by my hand, duly sealed and countersigned by the undersigned, my minister of state. Given in the palace at Madrid, August 11, 1898.

[L. s.] MARIA CRISTINA.

JUAN MANUEL SANCHEZ Y GUTIERREZ DE CASTRO,

Minister of State.

The protocol of agreement between the United States and Spain, signed at Washington, August 12, 1898, was as follows:

PROTOCOL.

William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and His Excellency Jules Cambon, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the Republic of France at Washington, respectively possessing for this purpose full authority from the Government of the United States and the Government of Spain, have concluded and signed the following articles, embodying the terms on which the two Governments have agreed in respect to the matters hereinafter set forth, having in view the establishment of peace between the two countries, that is to say:

ARTICLE I.

Spain will relinquish all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.

PROTOCOLE.

William R. Day, Secrétaire d'Etat des Etats-Unis, et Son Excellence M. Jules Cambon, Ambassadeur Extraordinaire et Plénipotentiaire de la République Française à Washington, ayant respectivement reçu à cet effet pleine autorisation du Gouvernement des Etats-Unis et du Gouvernement d'Espagne, ont conclu et signé les articles suivants qui précisent les termes sur lesquels les deux Gouvernements se sont mis d'accord en ce qui concerne les questions ci-après désignées et ayant pour objet l'établissement de la paix entre les deux pays, savoir:

ARTICLE I.

L'Espagne renoncera à toute prétention à sa souveraineté et à tout droit sur Cuba.

ARTICLE II.

Spain will cede to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and also an island in the Ladrões to be selected by the United States.

ARTICLE III.

The United States will occupy and hold the city, bay and harbor of Manila, pending the conclusion of a treaty of peace which shall determine the control, disposition and government of the Philippines.

ARTICLE IV.

Spain will immediately evacuate Cuba, Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies; and to this end each Government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, appoint commissioners, and the commissioners so appointed shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at Havana for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Cuba and the adjacent Spanish islands; and each Government will, within ten days after the signing of this protocol, also appoint other commissioners, who shall, within thirty days after the signing of this protocol, meet at San Juan, in Porto Rico, for the purpose of arranging and carrying out the details of the aforesaid evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies.

ARTICLE II.

L'Espagne cédera aux Etats-Unis l'île de Porto-Rico et les autres îles actuellement sous la souveraineté Espagnole dans les Indes Occidentales, ainsi qu'une île dans les Ladrões qui sera choisie par les Etats-Unis.

ARTICLE III.

Les Etats-Unis occuperont et tiendront la ville, la baie et le port de Manille en attendant la conclusion d'un traité de paix qui devra déterminer le contrôle, la disposition et le Gouvernement des Philippines.

ARTICLE IV.

L'Espagne évacuera immédiatement Cuba, Porto Rico et les autres îles actuellement sous la souveraineté Espagnole dans les Indes Occidentales; à cet effet chacun des deux Gouvernements nommera, dans les dix jours qui suivront la signature de ce protocole, des commissaires, et les commissaires ainsi nommés devront, dans les trente jours qui suivront la signature de ce protocole, se rencontrer à la Havane afin d'arranger et d'exécuter les détails de l'évacuation sus-mentionnée de Cuba et des îles Espagnoles adjacentes; et chacun des deux Gouvernements nommera également, dans les dix jours qui suivront la signature de ce protocole, d'autres commissaires qui devront, dans les trente jours de la signature de ce protocole, se rencontrer à San Juan de Porto-Rico afin d'arranger et d'exécuter les détails de l'évacuation sus-mentionnée de Porto-Rico et des autres îles actuellement sous les Indes Occidentales.

ARTICLE V.

The United States and Spain will each appoint not more than five commissioners to treat of peace, and the commissioners so appointed shall meet at Paris not later than October 1, 1898, and proceed to the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, which treaty shall be subject to ratification according to the respective constitutional forms of the two countries.

ARTICLE VI.

Upon the conclusion and signing of this protocol, hostilities between the two countries shall be suspended, and notice to that effect shall be given as soon as possible by each Government to the commanders of its military and naval forces.

Done at Washington in duplicate, in English and in French, by the undersigned, who have hereunto set their hands and seals, the 12th day of August, 1898.

[SEAL.] WILLIAM R. DAY.

[SEAL.] JULES CAMBON.

ARTICLE V.

Les Etats-Unis et l'Espagne nommeront, pour traiter de la paix, cinq commissaires au plus pour chaque pays; les commissaires ainsi nommés devront se rencontrer à Paris, le 1^{er} Octobre, 1898, au plus tard, et procéder à la négociation et à la conclusion d'un traité de paix; ce traité sera sujet à ratification, selon les formes constitutionnelles de chacun des deux pays.

ARTICLE VI.

A la conclusion et à la signature de ce protocole, les hostilités entre les deux pays devront être suspendues, et des ordres à cet effet devront être donnés aussitôt que possible par chacun des deux Gouvernements aux commandants de ses forces de terre et de mer.

Fait à Washington, en double exemplaire, anglais et français, par les Soussignés qui y ont apposé leur signature et leur sceau, le 12 Août, 1898.

[SEAL.] WILLIAM R. DAY.

[SEAL.] JULES CAMBON.

The American commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacuation of Cuba were Major-General Wade, Admiral Sampson and Major-General Butler; those for Porto Rico, Major-General Brooke, Admiral Schley and Brigadier-General Gordon. These gentlemen immediately proceeded to the Islands of Cuba and Porto Rico and superintended the arrangements made for the evacuation of these islands and the substitution of American authority in the place of Spanish authority which had been paramount there for nearly four centuries.

In accordance with the stipulation of Article V of the protocol, the two governments proceeded to appoint commissioners for the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty of peace, the commissioners immediately preparing to meet at Paris at the specified time.

On October 1, 1898, the peace conference met at Paris, America being represented by Messrs. William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray and Whitelaw Reid; the Spanish commissioners being Eugenio Montero Rios, B. de Abarzuza, J. de Garnica, W. R. de Villa-Urrutia and Rafael Cerero, the secretary of the American board of commissioners, Mr. Moore, and the interpreter, Mr. Ferguson. The Spanish secretary, Senor Ojeda, not being present, Senor Villa-Urrutia acted in his stead. The commissions and full powers of the commissioners were exchanged.

The commissioners gave many weeks to the completion of the task set before them, during which every phase of the questions arising was fully considered. The Spanish debts in Cuba and Porto Rico, and the status of the Philippines, were the most difficult subjects to agree upon, but the diplomatic skill of the Spanish commissioners was fairly met by the determined attitude of the Americans, and in the end they were forced to grant the American proposals. The last conference was held on December 8th, and the final meeting took place on December 10th, when the treaty of peace was read, approved and signed in duplicate by the plenipotentiaries of the two high contracting parties. We give the document as it was finally signed in English.

A TREATY OF PEACE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
SPAIN, SIGNED AT THE CITY OF PARIS, ON DECEMBER 10,
1898.

The United States of America and Her Majesty, the Queen Regent of Spain, in the name of her august son Don Alfonso XIII, desiring to end the state of war now existing between the two countries, have for that purpose appointed as plenipotentiaries:

The President of the United States —

William R. Day, Cushman K. Davis, William P. Frye, George Gray and Whitelaw Reid, citizens of the United States.

And Her Majesty, the Queen Regent of Spain —

Don Eugenio Montero Rios, president of the Senate, Don Buenaventura de Abarzuza, senator of the Kingdom and ex-minister of the Crown; Don José de Garnica, deputy to the Cortes and associate justice of the Supreme Court; Don Wenceslao Ramirez de Villa-Urrutia, envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary at Brussels, and Don Rafael Cerero, general of division;

Who having assembled in Paris, and having exchanged their full powers, which were found to be in due and proper form, have, after discussion of the matters before them, agreed upon the following articles:

ARTICLE I.

Spain relinquishes all claim of sovereignty over and title to Cuba.

And as the island is, upon its evacuation by Spain, to be occupied by the United States, the United States will, so long as such occupation shall last, assume and discharge the obligations that may under international law result from the fact of its occupation, for the protection of life and property.

ARTICLE II.

Spain cedes to the United States the island of Porto Rico and other islands now under Spanish sovereignty in the West Indies, and the island of Guam in the Marianas or Ladrões.

ARTICLE III.

Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine islands, and comprehending the islands lying within the following line:

A line running from west to east along or near the twentieth parallel of north latitude, and through the middle of the navigable channel of Bachi, from the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) to the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence along the one hundred and twenty-seventh (127th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes ($4^{\circ} 45'$) north latitude, thence along the parallel of four degrees and forty-five minutes ($4^{\circ} 45'$) north latitude to its intersection with the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes ($119^{\circ} 35'$) east of Greenwich, thence along the meridian of longitude one hundred and nineteen degrees and thirty-five minutes ($119^{\circ} 35'$) east of Greenwich to the parallel of latitude seven degrees and forty minutes ($7^{\circ} 40'$) north, thence along the parallel of latitude of seven degrees and forty minutes ($7^{\circ} 40'$) north to the intersection with the one hundred and sixteenth (116th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, thence by a direct line to the intersection of the tenth (10th) degree parallel of north latitude with the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich, and hence along the one hundred and eighteenth (118th) degree meridian of longitude east of Greenwich to the point of beginning.

The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars (\$20,000,000) within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty.

ARTICLE IV.

The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine islands on the same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States.

ARTICLE V.

The United States will, upon the signature of the present treaty, send back to Spain, at its own cost, the Spanish soldiers taken as prisoners of war on the capture of Manila by the American forces. The arms of the soldiers in question shall be restored to them.

Spain will, upon the exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, proceed to evacuate the Philippines, as well as the island of Guam, on terms similar to those agreed upon by the commissioners appointed to arrange for the evacuation of Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, under the protocol of August 12, 1898, which is to continue in force till its provisions are completely executed.

The time within which the evacuation of the Philippine islands and Guam shall be completed shall be fixed by the two governments. Stands of colors, uncaptured war vessels, small arms, guns of all calibres, with their carriages and accessories, powder, ammunition, live stock and materials and supplies of all kinds, belonging to the land and naval forces of Spain in the Philippines and Guam, remain the property of Spain. Pieces of heavy ordnance, exclusive of field artillery, in the fortifications and coast defenses, shall remain in their emplacements for the term of six months, to be reckoned from the exchange of ratifications of the treaty; and the United States may, in the meantime, purchase such material from Spain, if a satisfactory agreement between the two governments on the subject shall be reached.

ARTICLE VI.

Spain will, upon the signature of the present treaty, release all prisoners of war, and all persons detailed or imprisoned for political offenses, in connection with the insurrections in Cuba and the Philippines and the war with the United States.

Reciprocally, the United States will release all persons made prisoners of war by the American forces, and will undertake to obtain the release of all Spanish prisoners in the hands of the insurgents in Cuba and the Philippines.

The Government of the United States will at its own cost return to Spain and the Government of Spain will at its own cost return to the United States,

Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines, according to the situation of their respective homes, prisoners, released or caused to be released, by them, respectively, under this article.

ARTICLE VII.

The United States and Spain mutually relinquish all claims for indemnity, national and individual, of every kind, of either Government, or of its citizens or subjects, against the other Government, that may have arisen since the beginning of the late insurrection in Cuba and prior to the exchange of ratifications of the present treaty, including all claims for indemnity for the cost of the war.

The United States will adjudicate and settle the claims of its citizens against Spain relinquished in this article.

ARTICLE VIII.

In conformity with the provisions of articles I, II, and III of this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba and cedes in Porto Rico and other islands in the West Indies, in the island of Guam, and in the Philippine archipelago, all the buildings, wharves, barracks, forts, structures, public highways and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain, and as such belong to the Crown of Spain.

And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be.

The aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, includes all documents exclusively referring to the sovereignty relinquished or ceded that may exist in the archives of the peninsula. Where any document in such archives only in part relates to said sovereignty, a copy of such part will be furnished whenever it shall be requested. Like rules shall be reciprocally observed in favor of Spain in respect of documents in the archives of the island above referred to.

In the aforesaid relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, are also included such rights as the Crown of Spain and its authorities possess in respect of the official archives and records, executive as well as judicial, in the islands above referred to, which relate to said islands or the rights and property of their inhabitants. Such archives and records shall be carefully preserved,

and private persons shall without distinction have the right to require, in accordance with law, authenticated copies of the contracts, wills and other instruments forming part of notarial protocols or files, or which may be contained in the executive or judicial archives, be the latter in Spain or in the islands aforesaid.

ARTICLE IX.

Spanish subjects, natives of the peninsula, residing in the territory over which Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty, may remain in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry, commerce and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as are applicable to other foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted the nationality of the territory in which they may reside.

The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress.

ARTICLE X.

The inhabitants of the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be secured in the free exercise of their religion.

ARTICLE XI.

The Spaniards residing in the territories over which Spain by this treaty cedes or relinquishes her sovereignty shall be subject in matters civil as well as criminal to the jurisdiction of the courts of the country wherein they reside, pursuant to the ordinary laws governing the same; and they shall have the right to appear before such courts, and to pursue the same course as citizens of the country to which the courts belong.

ARTICLE XII.

Judicial proceedings pending at the time of the exchange of ratifications of this treaty in the territories over which Spain relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty shall be determined according to the following rules:

1. Judgments rendered either in civil suits between private individuals, or in criminal matters, before the date mentioned, and with respect to which there



CONVOY CROSSING HILLY COUNTRY — CUBA.



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LITTLE CONVALESCENTS IN HOSPITAL.

is no recourse or right of review under the Spanish law, shall be deemed to be final, and shall be executed in due form by competent authority in the territory within which such judgments should be carried out.

2. Civil suits between private individuals which may on the date mentioned be undetermined shall be prosecuted to judgment before the court in which they may then be pending or in the court that may be substituted therefor.

3. Criminal actions pending on the date mentioned before the Supreme Court of Spain against citizens of the territory which by this treaty ceases to be Spanish shall continue under its jurisdiction until final judgment; but, such judgment having been rendered, the execution thereof shall be committed to the competent authority of the place in which the case arose.

ARTICLE XIII.

The rights of property secured by copyrights and patents acquired by Spaniards in the island of Cuba and in Porto Rico, the Philippines and other ceded territories, at the time of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, shall continue to be respected. Spanish scientific, literary and artistic works, not subversive of public order in the territories in question, shall continue to be admitted free of duty into such territories, for the period of ten years, to be reckoned from the date of the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty.

ARTICLE XIV.

Spain will have the power to establish consular officers in the ports and places of the territories, the sovereignty over which has been either relinquished or ceded by the present treaty.

ARTICLE XV.

The Government of each country will, for the term of ten years, accord to the merchant vessels of the other country the same treatment in respect of all port charges, including entrance and clearance dues, light dues, and tonnage duties, as it accords to its own merchant vessels, not engaged in the coastwise trade.

This article may at any time be terminated on six months' notice given by either Government to the other.

ARTICLE XVI.

It is understood that any obligations assumed in this treaty by the United States with respect to Cuba are limited to the time of its occupancy thereof; but it will, upon the termination of such occupancy, advise any Government established in the island to assume the same obligations.

ARTICLE XVII.

The present treaty shall be ratified by the President of the United States, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate thereof, and by Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain; and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington within six months from the date hereof, or earlier if possible.

In faith whereof, we, the respective plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty and have hereunto affixed our seals.

Done in duplicate at Paris, the tenth day of December, in the year of Our Lord, one thousand eight hundred and ninety-eight.

| | |
|---------------------------|---------------------------------|
| [SEAL.] WILLIAM R. DAY. | [SEAL.] EUGENIO MONTERO RIOS. |
| [SEAL.] CUSHMAN K. DAVIS. | [SEAL.] B. DE ABARZUZA. |
| [SEAL.] WILLIAM P. FRYE. | [SEAL.] J. DE GARNICA. |
| [SEAL.] GEO. GRAY. | [SEAL.] W. R. DE VILLA-URRUTIA. |
| [SEAL.] WHITELAW REID. | [SEAL.] RAFAEL CERERO. |

On January 4, 1899, it was transmitted by the President to the Senate and discussed in executive session until the 11th, when the injunction of secrecy was removed, and on the 13th, it was ordered to be printed. The treaty of peace was ratified by the United States Senate at 3 o'clock on the afternoon of February 6, 1899; and was also ratified by the Queen Regent of Spain, March 19, 1899.

Diplomatic relations between Spain and the United States were formally resumed at Washington on June 3d, when the Duke of Arcos, the new Spanish minister, was received by President McKinley at the White House. The ceremony was very simple, and the speeches exchanged were short but cordial and to the point. After the introductions the Spanish minister handed his credentials to the President and addressed him as follows:

MR. PRESIDENT.—I have the honor to place in your excellency's hands the royal letter by which Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, in the name of her august son, King Don Alfonso XIII, accredits me near this Government in the capacity of envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.

I have come to renew the relations of friendship which have existed from of old between Spain and the United States, and which were interrupted by the war of last year. The treaty of peace which Spain has signed put an end to that war, and now, looking only to the future, Spain desires that her relations with this Republic may be as friendly as they were in times past, and from the days in which this country was struggling to gain its independence. It is my task to contribute to the renewal of these relations, to strengthen them and to draw them closer; and, in the discharge of it, I hope to be aided by the kindness and co-operation of your excellency and of your Government.

The President responded as follows:

MR. MINISTER.—I receive with the greatest gratification the letter by which Her Majesty the Queen Regent of Spain, in the name of her august son, King Alfonso XIII, has accredited you near this Government as envoy extraordinary and minister plenipotentiary.

You will find, Mr. Minister, a cordial welcome in this country, not only from those whose friendship you acquired during your former residence, but from all our people, who rejoice as I do, at the renewal of the ancient bonds of amity, which with a brief interruption have united our nations for more than one hundred years. That these friendly relations may be confirmed and strengthened to the advantage of both peoples is my earnest wish, and I can assure you that every member of this Government will heartily co-operate with you to that desirable end.

The speeches were briefer than usual, and, while purely formal, may be accepted as models in their way.

At the conclusion of the address, the President stepped forward and shook hands cordially with the new minister, and they engaged in conversation in a low tone for a few moments. The President inquired gracefully after the health of the Queen Regent and the King. He referred courteously to the Duke's former residence in this country, and repeated the assurances in his formal greeting that all would unite in making the minister's stay in this country pleasant and satisfactory.

The French ambassador, M. Cambon, on the same day called upon the Secretary of State and formally surrendered the representation of Spanish affairs, which at the mutual wish of the two Governments he had conducted during the interruption of our friendly relations with Spain.

A few days later, Hon. Bellamy Storer, the newly appointed American minister to Spain, was kindly received at Madrid by the Queen Regent.

Thus closed the brief chapter, which in a few short months had changed the map of the world, and added an empire of domain to the territory under the control of the United States.

CUBA AS IT IS TO-DAY.

CHAPTER XIV.

Cuba is not only the largest, fairest and most fertile, but it is the most important of the tropical islands of the Western world, owing to its geographical position, the great fertility of its soil and its wealth in timber and minerals. Lying at the mouth of the Gulf of Mexico, ninety-six and one half miles from Key West, 130 miles from Yucatan, fifty-four miles from Haiti and eighty-five miles from Jamaica, it commands three great gateways—Florida Strait, connecting the Gulf of Mexico with the Atlantic ocean, the Windward passage, connecting the ocean with the Caribbean sea and the Channel of Yucatan, connecting the gulf with the Caribbean sea.

The importance of its geographical position is mainly political, its commanding station making it something like a sentinel at the entrance of the Gulf of Mexico, or in the hands of an enemy, a powerful menace to the peace and prosperity of the gulf States and their neighbors. The political importance thus acquired by the island has already been dwelt upon in the course of this narrative.

Cuba comprises a very small proportion of untillable land, is thoroughly watered and drained, with no sandy, arid or sterile plains; it is covered with rich, fertile loams, capable of producing in abundance every form of useful vegetation known to tropical or temperate climes. Including the numberless islands which depend upon it, the area of Cuba exceeds 45,000 square miles, of which about one-tenth is cultivated, a small part is forest land, and the greater part unreclaimed wilderness.

From Cape Maysi, on the extreme east, to Cape San Antonio on the west, it measures 730 miles in length, its width varying from 117 to 22 miles. Its longitude is between 74° and 85° west, Cape Maysi being on a line directly south of New York and Cape San Antonio south of Cincinnati, and its latitude is from $19^{\circ} 40'$ to $23^{\circ} 33'$ north, lying within the extreme northern edge of the torrid zone.

The three provinces into which Cuba is divided—eastern, western and central—are not merely political divisions, but are the natural

result of the great diversity of topography, climate and productions. The eastern end is rugged and mountainous, containing the well-defined range of the Sierra Maestra with several small mountains, of which the most formidable is the Pico del Turquino, rising abruptly to a height of about 8,600 feet. La Gran Piedra, near Santiago, is 5,200 feet high and its peak is surmounted by a gigantic rock which appears poised on the summit ready to topple over. A small range of mountains called Sierra de Los Organos runs northeast and southwest through the province of Pinar del Rio, between Mariel and Cape San Antonio, sloping down on the south to the celebrated Vuelto Abajo, where the finest tobacco in the world is raised.

South of Havana, and along the northern coast are low wooded hills which have long formed strongholds for the insurgents. The greater part of the Santa Clara province consists of long extensive plateaus, considerably elevated above the sea level, ending in the Sierras Zaticorico and Cubitas, the latter being the rebel stronghold and seat of government during the rebellion of 1895. One of the most remarkable things about Cuba is the peculiar terrace formation extending throughout the southeastern part; this is especially noticeable in the vicinity of Santiago, and gives a most singular appearance to the island as approached from the sea.

The Cuban mountains are not composed of barren and rocky soils, but consist mainly of rich clays and are densely wooded, sloping down into plains covered with verdure. The central province is well elevated above the sea level and affords vast rolling and gently sloping plains for the culture of the sugar cane or for any branch of agriculture. The western province consists of a series of low mountains with fertile slopes and valleys of less rugged contour than the general formation of the eastern extremity; it is, in fact, more temperate in every respect. Over the whole island is a fadeless mantle of tender vegetation, kept green by copious showers and the humidity of the atmosphere.

The coast of Cuba is the most remarkable in the world. With a shore line of 2,000 miles, it has, including its indentations, a coast of 6,800 miles; a hundred pouch-like harbors indent its sides, and most of these are good harbors. About half the coast is bordered by keys aggregating an area of 1,350 square miles. They are small islands, for the most part formations of coral, built upon the shallow submerged edge of the island, sometimes presenting serious obstruction to navigation, at other times affording safe and quiet coves for shelter or

forming the outside arm of a beautiful harbor. Some of these islands are quite large, the Cayo Ramano, for instance, having an area of 140 square miles.

The Isle of Pines, off the southern coast, was ceded direct to the United States by the treaty of peace with Spain. It is directly south of the city of Havana, and is nearly one-third the size of Porto Rico, having an area of about 1,200 miles. The greater part of the island is extremely fertile, and the air is so pure and bracing that it is destined to become quite important as a health resort, although, under the Spanish rule, it was used principally as a penal settlement. Its principal products are marble, rock-crystal, tortoise shells, pine, cedar, mahogany and other valuable woods. There are also deposits of mercury and iron. It is probable that this island will prove of great value as a naval station, as it will be our nearest outpost to the Nicaragua canal.

The rivers of Cuba are quite numerous, but not of any great length owing to the topography of the country; few of them are navigable for vessels of light draft. The Cauto, which flows westward through the province of Santiago, is the largest in the island, being 150 miles long and is navigable for fifty miles; but its mouth is obstructed by a treacherous sand-bar deposited there by a heavy flood in 1661, when many large vessels, including a Spanish man-of-war, were imprisoned and abandoned there.

The little river of Yumuri winds its way through one of the finest bits of scenery in the world, so beautiful that the land through which it flows is known as the "Happy Valley."

Several of the streams of Cuba have no visible outlet, but appear to lose themselves in the ground. Among these is the Rio San Antonio in the province of Havana, which drains the wonderful lake of Ariguanabo, about twenty miles southwest of the city, passes through the town of San Antonio de los Banos and disappears beneath a large tree. There is another short stream called the Moa, having a remarkable cataract with a fall of 300 feet and also a cave into which it plunges to appear again farther down. The San Diego river in its course passes under some beautiful natural arches and bridges.

There are many resorts of great beauty in Cuba, the principal of these being known as the "Caves of Bellamar," about two and a half miles southeast of the city of Matanzas. This cave, while it does not equal in size the famous mammoth cave of Kentucky, or the Luray caverns of Virginia, excels them in the richness and splendor of its

crystal formations, the most remarkable of which are the "Fountain of Snow," the "Cloak of the Virgin," "Columbus' Mantle," "The Altar," and "The Guardian Spirit," while on every side in this vast apartment known as the "Gothic Temple," are formations in which the visitor can find representations of fairies and shadowy spirits.

Besides the "Caves of Bellamar" are those of San Jose de los Remedios together with the caverns of Cubitas, Jibara, Yumuri, Holguin, and Bayamo, also the noted Monte Libano caverns.

In Cuba, the year is divided into two seasons, the wet and the dry; though there is really no excessively dry weather, the air being always humid. The wet season corresponds to our summer and the rainfall is heavier in the eastern part. The average rainfall for the year is not excessive, being similar to that of our eastern States, but differently distributed. Frost is sometimes, but rarely seen, and a slight skim of ice has been known to form; but the only record of snow having fallen in Cuba was in the year 1856.

The temperature is not excessively high, the average at Havana being 82° Fahrenheit, during July and August, the warmest months, and 72° during December and January. It is probably warmer at Santiago on the extreme southeast coast; and that section is more liable to be visited by earthquakes; though the whole island is more or less subject to storms of great violence.

The climate of Cuba is more salubrious than we would be led to suppose from some recent accounts. The sickness which prevails at some seasons, and is supposed to be inseparable from the climate, is due, to a great extent, to the neglect of sanitary precautions and to indiscretion in diet.

Localities having an altitude of more than 700 feet are free from the ravages of yellow fever, and there are some portions of the island where the yellow fever and certain malarial fevers are unknown.

Surgeon-General Sternberg, who has made an exhaustive study of this subject, believes that it is possible to put the city of Havana in such a good sanitary condition as to make it exempt from yellow fever; and Surgeon-General Wyman, marine hospital service, is of the same opinion. This is confirmed by the experience of England in Jamaica and other West India islands, and the general experience of our own people in the control of diseases resulting from a want of proper sanitary regulations. Could Cuban cities be reclaimed from the unhealthy conditions which create and foster disease, the island would be a delightful place of residence.

The flora of Cuba is abundant and magnificent, embracing nearly all the forms of vegetation found in the other West Indies, southern Florida and the central American seaboard. More than 3,350 native plants have been catalogued, besides many which have been introduced from abroad.

Trees, remarkable for their size, foliage and fragrance, abound, and woods of the most valuable kind are found here. Twenty-six different varieties of palms, including the famous royal palm, are found in great abundance. Mahogany, logwood, lignum-vitæ, granadilla, the coca-wood, out of which reed instruments are made, the *cedrela odorata* used for making cigar boxes and lining cabinet-work, ebony, orange and lime trees, and others too numerous to mention, are found in great abundance, those used in cabinet-making, shipbuilding and the arts furnishing the material of most lucrative industries.

The palm tree, which has been called the queen of the Cuban forest, furnishes the Cuban peasant with numerous useful articles. The bud in the center of the green leaves is a palatable food; the wood is used for lumber; fans, hats and other articles are made from the leaves; basins, buckets and kettles are made from the stems of the long leaves, and the stems, when boiled, even furnish salt to the natives.

The most important cities of Cuba are Havana, Matanzas, Pinar del Rio, Cardenas, Puerto Principe, Cienfuegos, Santo Espiritu, Trinidad, Santiago, Holguin, Santa Clara, and Manzanillo. The undue proportion of city population in an agricultural country like Cuba, and the crowded condition of the poorer classes are due partly to the sociable disposition of the natives and to the expense of building, stone houses being used almost exclusively; besides this, a great number of country homes have been destroyed in the various rebellions.

Havana, called by its founder "Llave del Nuevo Mundo," was founded in 1519, a hundred years before the Pilgrim Fathers landed in New England. It is a beautiful picturesque city, eminently Spanish in its architecture and the habits and characteristics of its citizens. It presents a fine appearance as approached from the sea. The deep blue of the open sea is fringed by a narrow belt of pearl-green shallow water washing the shores of the bay. To the east high wooded land stretches toward Matanzas. The harbor is a quadrangle with the city of Havana on the right, and Regla, its chief suburb, on the left. To the right is the fortification of La Punta, across from the light-house and fortification of Morro Castle, which commands the entrance

to the harbor. The cliffs on the east side are surmounted by fortifications called Cabanas, built of white stone. At the south end of the harbor is a hill called "Atares," surmounted by antique battlements; it was here that Crittendon and his men were shot in 1851. South and west of the city are low hills, the western-most being crowned by the Castillo del Principe; others filled with handsome suburban dwellings.

The beautiful bay of Havana is alive with shipping, sailing vessels, steamers and war ships, ferry boats and yachts. A sea wall built of stone borders the Havana side of the harbor, and the handsome street runs parallel with the water's edge. The houses are built of light-colored stone, and are kalsomined in various colors, giving a massive and gorgeous effect. The windows are protected by gratings; very little glass is seen, but heavy curtains are sometimes used inside the window casings. The streets are very lively in the evening, filled with equipages, horsemen, promenaders, gaily uniformed soldiers and bands of music. The city contains fine theatres and clubhouses, market-houses, cigar factories, hospitals, churches, many charitable and benevolent institutions, the University of Havana, and a vast number of mercantile establishments where wholesale business is done on a large scale; the jewelers and goldsmiths of the city were at one time famous, but their trade has been ruined by the wars. The chief buildings in the city are the captain-general's palace and the old cathedral formerly claiming to contain the tomb of Columbus, to which many pilgrimages have been made. The honor of possessing the remains of the celebrated navigator has been disputed by San Domingo, where the alleged tomb of Columbus is preserved with great care and constantly guarded. It is impossible to prove whether the relics preserved in Havana were those of Columbus or of some member of his family, but the Spaniards have long considered his casket as one of their most precious possessions.

Among the many charitable and benevolent institutions of Havana are the Casa de Beneficiencia, for poor children, a hospital for lepers and one for the insane. There are also asylums for the care of all classes of needy and afflicted persons. The Jesuit College de Belen possesses a very fine observatory and library, probably the finest in the West Indies.

The poorer quarters of Havana are densely populated, with no regard to sanitary regulations. The street-car service and carriage service are very good. The city is well supplied with water, but the

sewerage is bad. The people are devoted to amusement and pleasure, and before the island was devastated by such ruinous wars Havana was one of the gayest and handsomest cities of America.

In the western province of Pinar del Rio, there are many pretty towns; Cabanas, Mariel, Bahia Honda, on the northern coast, are small reproductions of Havana. In the interior are Guanajay, Pinar del Rio and San Cristobal; San Antonio de los Banos is a summer resort, possessing fine mineral springs. This province was much damaged in the late war with the insurgents.

Matanzas, sixty miles east of Havana, is a comparatively modern city, founded in 1693. It has a population of 27,000 and rejoices in the most beautiful scenery in the world. The rivers Yumuri and San Juan have their outlet in the vicinity. The Caves of Bellamar are a few miles from the city and handsome suburban towns surround it. The climate is fine and the city extremely healthy. It has handsome clubhouses, theatres and churches, an administration building and a fine boulevard. The principal business carried on here is exportation of sugar and molasses, chiefly to the United States, the value of this exportation in 1895 being \$59,988,497. There are also railroad-car machine-shops, warehouses, distilleries and refineries, and the railroad connections with Havana and other cities are convenient.

Cardenas is also comparatively new, dating only from 1828. It has a population of 23,680 and is a thriving shipping place for sugar and molasses. Many Americans are engaged in business there.

Sagua la Grande, 200 miles from Havana, is the eastern terminus of the Havana railroad system, and is important as a sugar depot. The railroad crosses Cuba from here to Cienfuegos on the southern coast. This latter is a modern place of 27,430 inhabitants. It was founded by refugees from San Domingo and emigrants from Louisiana in 1819. It is entered through the bay of Jagua which was visited by Columbus and is described by Father Las Casas as the most magnificent port in the world. It is the second seaport in importance and the metropolis of central Cuba, some of the largest and finest sugar estates in the world being located in this neighborhood. The city is well built. It is lighted by gas and electricity, has good water-works and many fine buildings.

Trinidad, east of Cienfuegos, was settled by Diego Velasquez in 1513 and is a fine specimen of an old fortified city. It was the scene of many piratical adventures in the days when the buccaneer reigned supreme in West India waters. It is convenient to three good harbors

and has a fine road. It is built on the slope of Vigia (Lookout) Mountain and is surrounded by pleasant drives and rides where the mountain heights command magnificent views. It has a population of 27,640 and is very gay in the winter, being the resort of many prosperous planters.

Santa Clara, now called Villa Clara, was founded in 1689. It formerly possessed a very wealthy community and the women were renowned for their beauty, but the surrounding country has been devastated by war. It is connected by railroad with Havana and Cienfuegos.

Camaguey, or Puerto Principe, is the chief interior city. It has a population of more than 46,000 and claims to be the most purely Cuban of all the towns.

Bayamo, in the valley of the Cautõ, is a very old town. It was the cradle of the revolution of 1868, and was a stronghold during the war of 1895, costing the Spaniards many hundreds of lives in efforts to keep its garrison supplied with provisions. Holguin is also an important city.

Manzanillo, on the southern coast between Santiago and Trinidad, has a population of 23,300 and is the principal outlet of the Cauto valley, shipping annually large quantities of tobacco, sugar, wax, honey and other products. It is low and unhealthy, but has importance as a commercial port.

Santiago, the capital of eastern Cuba, is next to Havana in political and strategic importance. It was the seat of government in 1514 under Velasquez. It lies 100 miles west of the eastern extremity of Cuba on a beautiful land-locked bay six miles long. The entrance to the harbor is scarcely visible, appearing like a narrow rent in a mountainous coast line. It is 180 feet wide and of good depth. Santiago bay is one of the finest harbors in the world. On the east is Morro Castle built by Pedro de la Rocca about 1640. It forms a perfect picture from an artistic point of view, and half a century ago would have been regarded as a formidable defense. To the east of Morro Castle there is a modern fortification facing the ocean. Further up the bay was another fortification called La Punta Gorda Battery, its armament consisting of two modern breech-loading, sixteen centimeter guns and two smaller guns of the same character. On the other side of the bay, directly west of Morro Castle, is Socapa battery; all of the Spanish batteries being arranged with commendable engineering skill. To the north, east and west, tall mountains rear

their heads, forming a vast amphitheatre back of the bay. The city lies on the northeast indentation of the bay six miles from the sea on a sloping hillside. The city is quaint and peculiar with old Moorish architecture. The modest houses are surmounted by red tile roofs. There are few imposing buildings, the largest being the government house, the San Carlos club, the military barracks and hospital. There is a dilapidated theatre where it is claimed that Adalina Patti made her debut at the age of fourteen under the direction of Gottschalk. The cathedral occupies a central position back of a plaza or large public square. The first cathedral of Santiago, built in 1522, was destroyed by fire. Its successor, proving defective in architecture, was abandoned in 1672; the present structure was erected in 1790. Unfortunately this venerable building was slightly damaged by shells from the ships during the bombardment of the city. Opposite the cathedral stands the governor's palace facing the plaza. It was over this building that the Spanish flag which had floated for 382 years was furled forever on Sunday, July 17th, and the American flag was hoisted in its place.

Santiago is the center of the mineral district of Cuba, several short railroads running from the city to various mines worked by American companies — the Juragua, the Spanish-American and the Sigua. The city will always be of importance owing to its commanding position near the Windward Passage. The mountains in its vicinity offer good sites for coffee culture and fruit growing, but the locality is very unhealthy. It does a large trade in exporting raw materials and importing manufactures and provisions. The population in 1895 was nearly 60,000.

Guantanamo, fifty miles east of Santiago, is a charming little city, formerly a famous resort of wealthy planters. In this neighborhood are many cafetals or coffee plantations where long rows of coffee bushes are cultivated in the shade of lemon and lime trees which are not only very beautiful but of great commercial value. Many handsome estates owned by rich Cuban and American planters are found here.

Baracoa, the most eastern city on the northern coast, was founded by Diego Columbus in 1514, and was originally the seat of government and the site of the first cathedral of the new world. It has a population of 7,000 and is the center for the shipment of fruits and manufactures of cocoanut oil. It has a limited communication with other parts of the island but possesses a beautiful harbor. Here

Maceo and his companions landed at the beginning of the rebellion in 1895. This is one of the oldest cities of the island and the inhabitants still point out the ruins of the house of Diego Columbus and the spot where the first cross was erected.

There has been much misapprehension and misunderstanding in regard to the population of Cuba. It is divided into five classes: the white Cubans, the black Cubans, colored Cubans, Spaniards and foreigners. The white Cubans are the owners of the soil. They are as a class educated and refined and are skilled agriculturalists. They have contributed scholars, scientists and writers to enrich with their learning the countries to which they have been forced to flee. While naturally a gentle and peace-loving people, their circumstances have developed a brave, independent spirit. They are simple-hearted and hospitable, with strong family affection, but lack the energy of more northern nations. The women are of a peculiar style of beauty, elegant and graceful, with fine hair, eyes and teeth, and in character they are loyal, affectionate and virtuous.

The black Cubans, who are laborers, and formed part of the Cuban army, although quite illiterate, are not of so low a class as many imagine. Before the abolition of slavery, they had the rights of free marriage, choice of masters, purchase of freedom, and the right to acquire property, and were in many respects treated better by the Spanish laws than were their masters. The colored Cubans are a mixed race, some of them descended from African slaves and some of them from the negroes who came with the first Spaniards to Cuba. The men are better laborers than the same class of natives in the other West India islands. The black and colored Cubans are not numerous enough or strong enough morally or physically to cause them to preponderate to such an extent as to Africanize the island. There is no danger that Cuba will ever pass from the control of the white race. The Spanish governing class in Cuba has lost its occupation, and the civilian class will either return to Spain or become amalgamated with the native Cubans; and the same can be said as to other foreigners who cast their fortunes upon the island.

The soil of Cuba excels in fertility that of all the other West Indies and the greater part of the gulf States, and heretofore agricultural pursuits have been the mainstay of the island, the principal products consisting of sugar cane, tobacco, coffee, bananas, corn, oranges and pine apples.

First in importance comes the culture of the sugar cane, and so great

is the fertility of the soil that the cane requires to be planted only once in seven years. On many of the sugar estates, the finest and most modern machinery in the world is used, and many hundreds of miles of private railway have been constructed on these estates for the purpose of conveying the grain to the mills in the grinding season. In 1892 and 1893, the yield of sugar from Cuban plantations amounted to 1,054,214 tons, valued at \$80,000,000, besides giving employment to an enormous number of men and women and building up large commercial interests. The sugar plantations, which vary in extent from 100 to 1,000 acres and employ about one man to two acres, are models in every respect. The houses and quarters are neatly built and provision is made for the comfort and care of the employees. The great centrals or grinding plants are enormous establishments which in the grinding seasons are busy centers of industry. The superior systems of handling the cane and extracting the juice have made it possible to continue the profitable cultivation of this crop in Cuba in spite of the great competition of European beet sugar which has proved so disastrous to American sugar manufacturers in many other places. The climate and soil are admirably adapted to the culture of the cane which yields a larger percentage of sugar than in any American country with the exception of Mexico; and the Spaniards and the Cubans combined have been wise enough to equip their plants with modern machinery. This industry builds up many others, locomotives and cars being necessary to haul the cane, and large herds of cattle required to supply provisions for those employed on the estates and at the grinding centrals.

Next in importance to the culture of the sugar cane is the raising of tobacco which is more profitable in proportion to acreage. This plant grows well in all parts of the island; but the chief seat of its cultivation is the famous Vuelta Abajo region on the southern slope of the Organos mountains in the province of Pinar del Rio. Here the finest tobacco in the world is produced. The best tobacco farms are known as vegas averaging thirty-three acres in size and are generally located on the river bank. These vegas employ from twenty to thirty hands. The usual buildings are a dwelling-house, a drying-house, laborers' huts and a few sheds for cattle. The residence is generally a roomy house, surrounded by porches and beautiful gardens, usually fenced with deep stone walls, having handsome gateways from which avenues of royal palms lead up to the residence.

The Cuban tobacco planters have a wonderful knowledge of the

processes necessary to produce the plant in its greatest perfection, and the high grade of Havana cigars is in a large measure due to the remarkable care with which the different leaves of the plant are graded, every plant producing four different grades of tobacco. The leaves when dyed are packed in bales of 100 pounds, averaging in value according to grade, from \$20 to as much as \$300 per bale. In 1893, 6,160,000 pounds of leaf tobacco and 134,210,000 cigars were exported.

Coffee culture was introduced into Cuba in 1727 and was for a long time very profitable. This industry has greatly declined, very little coffee being grown except what is consumed locally. The mountain sides and the hill lands are expressly favorable for this product, which may again become a large and flourishing source of revenue.

The culture of tropical fruits is quite profitable in Cuba, which will undoubtedly become one of the greatest fruit-growing centers in the world.

In the eastern province the cattle industry has already reached large proportions owing to the extensive and fertile grazing lands, rich in natural grasses which are luxuriant all the year around. The Cuban horse is not large, but is a stout pony, very hardy and with a peculiar pacing gait which renders it very easy to ride. Sheep are not successfully raised in Cuba, the wool losing its soft texture and changing to stiff hair like that of the goat. Poultry flourishes and is cheap and abundant.

In consequence of the fertility of the soil and mildness of the climate, Cuba offers great inducement to small farmers, fruits and vegetables of all kinds being easily raised and being greatly in demand.

The mineral resources of the island consist principally of iron ores, asphaltum, manganese, copper and salt. Gold and silver have been mined in limited quantities; but iron ore has thus far proved the chief mineral resource of the island. Important iron mines are located a few miles east of Santiago. They are owned and worked by American companies and the ore brought from these mines is largely used in this country in the manufacture of steel armor-plate. There is also an American mining company employed in mining and shipping manganese from the province of Santiago to manufacturers in this country. These mines were closed by the insurgents on account of the large tonnage royalty they yielded to the mother country.

Asphaltum of superior quality has long been mined for exportation in the vicinity of Cardenas, the average quantity obtained being from one to one and a half tons daily, bringing from \$86 to \$125 per ton.

The deposits lie beneath the waters of Cardenas bay and appear to be inexhaustible. Some of the cities in Cuba use illuminating gas made from this mineral.

Copper occurs in many places in Cuba, having been mined at the village of Cobre north of Santiago from 1524 to 1857; but the mines are now filled with water and have been abandoned. It is believed, however, that a large deposit of copper still remains in the same locality.

Salt occurs abundantly along the northern keys of the island, large natural salt pans having been formed along the margins of these islands, where in depressions from twelve to sixteen inches deep the accumulated sea waters are evaporated leaving perfect crystallized beds of salt far more than sufficient for the consumption of the Cuban population.

The railroad facilities of Cuba are quite limited, the public railways aggregating only about 1,000 miles. The length of the island from northwest to southeast is very nearly the distance from New York to Chicago. There is no system of railway connecting Havana with Santiago, the principal lines running north and south across the island and connecting Havana with neighboring cities.

Cuba is so rich in fine harbors that the greater part of the transportation is by sea. Highways for even wheel vehicles hardly exist except in the vicinity of the largest cities; even where these roads exist they are often rendered impassable by the heavy rains, and, although the streams are not large, the necessity for bridges is great.

It will thus be seen that outside of the enormous wealth of agricultural resources possessed by Cuba, the internal improvements which will become necessary under the new regime and the untrammelled outlay of capital in Cuba offer great inducements to the ambitious and enterprising; and it is hoped that the introduction of modern sanitary laws and appliances will greatly decrease the unhealthiness of the island, which is due to a large extent to the over-crowded condition of the cities and the neglect of the simplest hygienic laws.

For Wheeler.



LIEUTENANT-COMMANDER RICHARD WAINWRIGHT.



DESTRUCTION OF THE BATTLESHIP "MAINE."

THE DESTRUCTION OF THE "MAINE."

By LIEUT.-COMDR. RICHARD WAINWRIGHT, U. S. N.

CHAPTER XV.

ON Monday evening, January 24, 1898, the "Maine" received orders to proceed to Havana. She arrived there the following morning, and was moored to a buoy in that harbor without any unusual incident.

The "Maine" was 324 feet in length; beam, 57 feet; displacement, 6,682 tons; horse power, 9,295; speed between seventeen and eighteen knots. She was rated as a second-class battleship and carried four 10-inch guns, two in the forward and two in the after turret; six 6-inch guns, and a number of six and one pounders.

Her officers were as follows: Captain, C. D. Sigsbee; executive officer, Lieutenant-Commander R. Wainwright; navigator, Lieutenant G. F. W. Holman; watch officers, Lieutenants John Hood and Carl W. Jungen; lieutenants (junior grade), G. P. Blow, J. J. Blandin, and F. W. Jenkins; naval cadets, J. H. Holden (captain's clerk), W. T. Cluverius, Amon Bronson, Jr., and D. F. Boyd, Jr.; surgeon, L. G. Heneberger; paymaster, C. M. Ray; chief engineer, C. P. Howell; passed assistant engineer, F. C. Bowers; assistant engineers, J. R. Morris and D. P. Merritt; naval cadets (engineers), Pope Washington and A. Crenshaw; chaplain, J. P. Chidwick; first lieutenant, A. W. Catlin, U. S. M. C.; boatswain, F. E. Larkin; gunner, J. Hill; carpenter, G. Helms, and pay clerk, Brent McCarthy. She carried on her rolls at the time of the disaster, 328 men.

When the orders were received on Monday evening, preparations were made to reply in case of attack. As the mission was a friendly one, the ship had to appear in perfect order from the outside, but the officers and men were at their stations and the ammunition and torpedoes were handy for immediate use. From the commencement we were prepared for treachery and every precaution was taken consistent with a peaceful appearance from the outside. Special sentries, with rigid orders, were stationed about the ship. Crews were kept on deck at night ready to man the rapid-fire guns, and ammunition was placed

near at hand. The closing of all water-tight doors was rigidly carried out; and lines were run under the ship (hogging lines), so that the collision mats could be used in a minute's notice to cover a hole in the side. Steam was carried in two boilers, to insure the turrets turning readily. In fact, we were ready at all times to repel an attack or to repair an injury. While treachery was not expected, it was deemed wise by the captain to take all possible precautions.

On the day of our arrival the usual salutes were fired, viz.: The national salute to the Spanish flag and the salute to the flag of the Spanish admiral, Admiral Manterola.

The customary official visits were made by the captain, commencing with Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee; and they were duly returned. Captain-General Blanco being absent, his representative, General Parado, returned the captain's visit. There was nothing to indicate at this time that we were not anchored in a friendly port. At first the officers and men were not permitted to visit the shore, unless on duty; but after a few days this restriction was removed from the officers. The men were not allowed to go on shore, so as to prevent any slight unpleasantness that might arise should there be any friction between them and the police.

Visitors were permitted to visit the ship, and the inhabitants availed themselves of this privilege quite freely. Care was taken not to allow too many on board at one time. Everyone that went below decks was accompanied by a guide, who was also a guard, and watched that no explosives or bombs could be left behind by some treacherous visitor. The officers had many visitors and the captain entertained many guests. The larger portion of these were Cubans, and only once did any Spanish army officer come on board except during the official visits.

The Spanish were trying, or pretending to try, a new experiment in governing Cuba, and the Autonomistic Council came into power shortly before we reached Havana. The removal of General Weyler and the inauguration of this so-called reform were ascribed to the pressure of the United States. The Spanish party in Cuba believed in General Weyler and in his methods. They hated the idea of autonomy and despised the members of that party. Their long-cherished hatred of America was augmented by the removal of Weyler and by the arrival of the "Maine," as they chose to translate her appearance as a menace. This feeling was greatly increased after a visit made by Captain Sigsbee to the Autonomistic Council and its return visit.

During the latter visits some speeches were made, and the few words of the captain were tortured in the party papers into a support by our government of the council's policy.

There was little outward show of unfriendly feeling. Once in the early part of February a ferry-boat crowded with passengers returning from a bull fight passed near our stern, and there were some jeering remarks made by the crowd. The absence of Spanish army officers from our entertainments was rather significant. Consul-General Lee, who was held in the highest esteem by all Americans and respected by the Cubans and better class of Spaniards, was threatened frequently; but he was not the man to bother about threats.

On the afternoon of February 15th, the "City of Washington," Captain Stevens, one of the Ward line, came in the harbor and anchored off our quarter. We were then headed out of the harbor. The usual routine had been carried out during the day, and at eight o'clock in the evening the chief engineer reported his department and the various petty officers reported their storerooms secure. Eight o'clock lights and galley fires were reported out, and as required by regulation, I reported to the captain that everything was secure. Only four officers were absent from the ship. It has been falsely asserted that most of the officers were on shore or that a large number of the officers were on board the "City of Washington" taking part in an orgy. These reports were spread by the Spanish papers to throw discredit upon the discipline of the ship. They also said that the officers and men were lazy and that we seldom drilled the men. The various exercises and drills were carried out on the "Maine" with more than ordinary care and regularity.

At nine I heard the officer of the deck after he had the watch mustered questioning them as to their stations at the guns. There were occasional changes in the watch and he was careful to see that the men knew what to do in case of an alarm. At half-past nine I finished writing some letters in my office and passed across to the captain's office for some mucilage as my stamps would not stick on the envelopes. As I went along the passage between the offices, I noticed Captain Sigsbee sitting in his cabin at a desk. While I was standing in the office talking to Mr. Holden, I felt a very heavy shock, and heard the noise made by objects falling on deck. I was so much shaken up that it took an appreciable time to find the handle of the door, the door having been closed by the shock, and pull it open. I was under the impression at the time that we had been blown up by a mine and that

the "Alfonso XII" was firing on us. The nature of the shock felt by the survivors was carefully inquired into by the Court and some separated the sensation into two shocks. Mr. Hood was very clear on this point before the Court. He said: "I was sitting on the port side of the deck with my feet on the rail, and I both heard and felt — felt more than I heard — a big explosion, that sounded and felt like an under-water explosion. I was under the impression that it came from forward starboard, at the time. I instantly turned my head, and the instant I turned my head there was a second explosion." Hood who was always cool was remarkably so during the excitement attending the disaster, and he could not have been mistaken. Blandin who was officer of the deck said, "I am under the impression that there were two explosions, though I cannot be sure of it." I believe that the difference was due to the position. That those furthest forward on the berth deck, like Jungen, felt the overhead crash the more keenly. Those on the open deck felt the greater blow from the under-water explosion, and where Holden and I were, the two explosions were nearly or quite run into one. The first shock being the blow on the underbody of the ship, and the second the bursting of gases into the open air.

I rushed out of the office, followed by Mr. Holden, with the intention of getting our battery ready to return the "Alfonso's" fire. I reached the main deck through the starboard door and passed up on the after superstructure by means of the starboard ladder. On reaching the deck I heard the captain's voice and went towards him to get his directions. He ordered me to flood the magazines, but some one pointed down the hatch near by and I saw the water had risen so high as to make the flooding of the magazines useless.

The cries of the wounded, mostly rising from the water, made manifest the necessity of lowering our boats. The captain told me to see the boats ready for lowering, and I gave the order to clear away and man them. I saw very few men moving to obey the order, so I went from davit to davit, to see some one was there ready to cast off the falls. I then began to realize the extent of the disaster, as I found the boats were largely manned by officers. Only a few men had been able to reach the poop. The boats were lowered promptly and did good service in saving life.

About this time I noticed that we were on fire forward, and called for aid to endeavor to put it out. Hood and Boyd started forward with me. We were unable to get further than what was apparently the

break of the central superstructure, the after part of the deck just forward of the after turret. As soon as I got there it was evident to me from the burning mass that there was no chance of fighting the fire. The smoke was very unpleasant—I think it was from burning cellulose—and for many a day, when I had time to think, I could smell and choke over the pungent odor. Boyd climbed from the awning to the top of the superstructure and passed down to me two men, who were crying out loudly—one, I think, had his arm broken—and we got them both into the gig.

When I reached the poop again, we were surrounded by boats from the "City of Washington" and from the "Alfonso XII." They were aiding our boats in rescuing the wounded. When I felt confident that there were no more to be rescued, either on board ship or in the water, I suggested to the captain that there might be more explosions from the burning mass forward, and that it would be well to get the crowd of boats out of danger. Our boats shoved off and the gig backed in. The captain was loath to go until I pointed out to him that the only means of getting the other boats out of the way was to shove off ourselves. When at last he followed me into the gig, we pushed in among the boats and induced them to leave, taking the wounded to different vessels. Sigsbee was very determined to be the last man to leave the ship, and when he did, the water was nearly level with the poop.

The gig made for the "City of Washington." We found our wounded being well cared for, the officers, crew, and passengers assisting as nurses. The discipline on this ship was greatly to the credit of Captain Stevens. The promptness with which boats were lowered saved many lives that would have been lost otherwise, and the rapidity with which the saloon was cleared and turned into a hospital greatly reduced the suffering of the wounded.

Blandin was sent in the gig to pull around the ship, but not having sufficient men to continue the patrol, he was ordered back. Holman was sent over to the "Alfonso" to get the survivors and to take a list of the wounded and an immediate muster was held to ascertain the list of killed and wounded. That night we ascertained that there were eighty-five survivors of the disaster and of these only nineteen or twenty were uninjured. Two officers were missing, Jenkins and Merritt, the former's body was found by the divers many days afterwards, but Merritt's was never seen although searched for with great care by the divers. Fifteen more were afterwards added to the list of the saved. Besides the wounded on the "City of Washington," some

were taken to the two hospitals, the "San Ambrosio" and the "Alfonso XIII," and some were cared for by the fire organization of the city.

General Lee, the principal Spanish officials, and many American citizens and reporters came on board the "City of Washington" to offer assistance and to express their sympathy. It was at this time that Captain Sigsbee wrote his cable dispatch to the navy department. Within a few minutes of the great disaster and while pressed on all sides by visitors, he composed his celebrated telegram that induced a portion of the American people to suspend their judgment until the decision of the Court of Inquiry was made public.

At daylight the next morning, I took the gig with Lieutenant Hood and a few of the men and attempted to board the wreck, but I was warned off by an armed boat's crew from the "Alfonso XII." I then pulled around the wreck. It was evident that she was blown to pieces forward, but it was too dark to estimate the damages aft. There were still some fragments of wood and cellulose burning and the "Maine" appeared to be a total wreck.

The Spanish authorities made claim to have jurisdiction over the wreck, but this question was soon settled in our favor; although the Spaniards kept an armed patrol about the "Maine" during all the subsequent diving operations.

Later, on the morning of the sixteenth, I made a careful examination of all of the wreck that was visible above water. The after part of the ship appeared to be intact from the forward crane for the steam launch aft, with a heavy list to port, the port turret being about two feet under water. The main deck was folded back, carrying the central superstructure with it at a line between the two forward cranes and about the line between the two firerooms. It was folded in a direction from port to starboard, so that the port 6-inch gun was lying nearly on top of the starboard 6-inch. They were both mounted on the central superstructure, and the conning tower was pointing downward about where the armory was—that is, at the starboard after corner of the superstructure. The forward smokestack was lying abreast and partly over where the first whaleboat hung, on the starboard side aft; the siren was on the starboard side of the superstructure. The after smokestack was lying on the port side abreast the fore-and-aft bridge, between the after and central superstructure. At the lowest tide we had, I stood on the port waterways, and could see nothing that I could recognize as any part of the ship forward of the crane on the port side

of the main deck. That is, there was nothing of the ship visible above the water forward of the after fireroom, except that part of the main deck that was turned over and some scattering pieces sticking out of the water.

There were small portions of the wreck on the starboard side forward of this line. By looking in underneath it I saw the torpedo port of the forward torpedo. Near this I recognized a portion of the firemen's washroom, that was situated just abaft the starboard turret. There was a small scupper, with a hold-down valve and a half-round bulkhead, used to separate a portion of the washroom into stalls. Forward again, sticking out of the water, was a piece of bottom plating. This was an important find, for from it the position of the broken keel was traced. Forward of all, one of the foreyard arms was sticking up. As far as I could tell at that time, from an above-water view, there was an angle between the after body of the ship and the forward, with the apex of the angle to starboard — as a stick would show a break if held fast at both ends and pushed from left to right until broken.

During this examination of the wreck, I was impressed with the fact that the force of the explosion was in a direction from port forward to starboard aft. The main deck and superstructure were thrown in that direction, also the forward smokestack and siren. The crane was bent in that direction. There was no wreckage above water on the port side forward and the ship itself appeared to be bent by a force moving in that direction.

The day after the disaster, the Plant Line steamer "Olivette," the lighthouse steamer "Mangrove," and the United States ship "Fern," Lieutenant-Commander W. S. Cowles commanding, entered the harbor. All the survivors who were well enough to be moved were sent to Key West on the "Olivette" except some of the officers and two men retained by the captain to aid him in his work in connection with the wreck. The "Mangrove" brought over some seamen divers from the fleet and a day or two later took back some of the injured who had recovered sufficiently to be moved from the hospital. With the exception of a few days, when she was used to transport provisions to Sagua la Grande, the "Fern" remained in the harbor of Havana until Consul-General Lee left for the United States. Captain Cowles and his officers and men lent us willing assistance in wrecking the "Maine." It was to Ensign Powelson's exertions, that we were indebted for the complete manner in which the facts connected with the work of the divers was placed before the Court of Inquiry.

By direction of the Department, Rear-Admiral Sicard immediately appointed a Court of Inquiry and the members arrived in Havana on the lighthouse steamer "Mangrove," on February 21st.

The Court consisted of Captain W. T. Sampson, Captain F. E. Chadwick, Lieutenant-Commander W. P. Potter, members, and Lieutenant-Commander Adolph Marix, judge advocate.

The decision of such a Court was sure to carry conviction abroad as well as at home. The senior two had international reputation and the juniors stood high in the United States. Marix was peculiarly well fitted for his position both from his legal experience and from his knowledge of the structure of the "Maine," he having been her executive officer for over two years.

The Court proceeded to take testimony at once, and after calling all the witnesses in Havana, sailed to Key West. Here they heard all the survivors and then returned to Havana, remaining there until they had reached their decision.

The most important evidence produced before this Court was that of the divers, as from them was gained the knowledge of the condition of the wreck under water, which proved conclusively that the "Maine" was blown up from the outside.

Captain Sigsbee placed me in charge of the wreck and of the diving operation. When the contract was made with the Merritt & Chapman Wrecking Company and the Boston Towboat Company, I was made the representative of the Department, Captain Sharp, of the Merritt & Chapman Company, being the representative of the contractors.

Diving operations commenced on the seventeenth with naval divers, and our first endeavor was to secure certain important books and papers. The question of preventing their falling into unauthorized hands was more important than their recovery. In fact, nearly all that were secured by the divers were burnt up. On the twenty-second, more naval divers arrived and two parties were then kept at work, one aft, searching for papers, bodies, and valuables, and the other forward, examining the vicinity of the explosion. All but one of the naval divers were seamen gunners. Men trained in diving at the torpedo station and trained in the service from the time they became apprentices. They were intelligent men, as only the brightest apprentices are sent to the torpedo station, and they had some experience. Their operations were carried on under great difficulties. How well they overcame these is known to all who are familiar with the

proceedings of the Court of Inquiry. Ensign Brumby and Gunner Morgan were sent with the divers. The latter was an expert diver himself, and his services were valuable in superintending their work. Ensign Powelson and Naval Cadet Cluverius were also detailed to assist me. The former was given charge of the work for the Court.

The tug "Right Arm" was the first wrecking boat to put in an appearance. She arrived on the twenty-third and commenced work on the following day. This party did some little wrecking about the hull, taking on board some articles of value, but their most important work was searching the wreck for bodies. She left soon after the arrival of the other wrecking boats.

The next boats to come were the tug "Merritt," and the barge "Sharp," and later the tug "Underwriter" towed down the derrick "Chief" and the barge "Lone Star."

From this time on until the contract was closed, the work of the wrecking company was continuous. Guns, anchors, chains and various kinds of ammunition were recovered, also many bodies. The search for the latter was most thorough and careful. A barge was anchored near the wreck with coffins, the undertaker and his men. Father Chidwick was in constant attention and under his immediate superintendence, every effort was made to identify the dead.

The wreckers made a careful examination of the wreck and it was evident from their report that while it might be possible to raise the after body of the ship that it would be a most expensive operation and that even sentimental grounds would hardly justify the undertaking. We hoped to save the 10-inch guns, but the only way that was practicable was by breaking off the top of the turret with dynamite. It was decided not to use high explosives, so after the Court left, it only remained for the wreckers to remove guns, torpedoes and such equipments as were of value. A board composed of Captain Chadwick, Lieutenant-Commander Cowles and myself, after considering the reports of the divers, recommended that all wrecking operations be abandoned. This board met on March 27th and remained in session two or three days. Upon the receipt of its report, the Department closed the contract with the wreckers and they withdrew their plant. Then the flag that had been hoisted at half mast over the wreck day and night was hauled down.

The work that the divers did to inform the Court of the condition of affairs about the wreck under water was slow and difficult. It took several days' steady work to gain any idea of how the mass was situated

and to recognize the various portions. The danger was great from the ragged portions of plates and frames cutting air-hose or life line. The region of the 10-inch magazine was carefully explored and powder tanks and shell hoisted to the surface. A start was made from the bottom plate found above water forward. From this point careful measurements were made in all directions. The distance between frames and intercostals was measured, and the keel being found the locations of sea valves and man-holes were determined. All important measurements were verified by sending down a second diver. Powelson would check off the measurements on the drawings and make notes of the divers' reports. All divers would signal up the feet and inches by jerking on the guide rope and often they would in this way give most valuable information without being able to see its importance.


The water was very filthy, and except when the sun was in a favorable position the diver could see very little. An attempt was made to use electric lights under water, but it failed of success. The courage of these men was perfect. Rondquist, finding that his life line was too short to permit his examining a certain portion of the wreck, anchored it with a lump of coal and went ahead. Had he failed to find this line, on his return, and there was a good chance of his missing it, he would hardly have reached the surface alive. Olsen once found his air-hose caught below him and his life line above. Had he not kept cool he must have been lost. When he reached the surface, he was fairly exhausted and did not want to go down again that day. The only time on any day when he did not wish to continue to do more work than was thought good for his health. Olsen and Smith took the breech plugs out of the 10-inch guns in the after turret. A good job for two men under ordinary circumstances, above water. This prevented the Spanish from making use of the guns provided they were able to raise them. Olsen and Smith entered the after 10-inch magazine by way of the turret, the hatch on the other side being blocked by debris. One of them tended the other from the gun platform, being tended in turn by a man on top the turret.

The work of the naval divers ceased when the Court of Inquiry had reached a decision, and as they filled important billets on board ship and their services might be needed shortly, they were sent back to the fleet.

The decision of the Court is dated March 21st. To all of us who survived the disaster, the most important portion of this was paragraph 6, "The Court finds that the loss of the "Maine" on the oc-

casion named was not in any respect due to fault or negligence on the part of any of the officers or members of the crew of said vessel." This, after a most searching inquiry into every detail connected with the disaster and after asking such questions, that, had any possible precaution been neglected, it must have appeared in the evidence.

To me the next most important point in the findings was paragraph 5, "At frame seventeen the outer shell of the ship, from a point eleven and one-half feet from the middle line of the ship, and six feet



above the keel when in its normal position, has been forced up so as to be now about four feet above the surface of the water, therefore, about thirty-four feet above where it would be had the ship sunk

uninjured." This piece of plating was readily recognized as bottom plating, as it was covered on the outside by McInnis paint, a green paint only used on the under-water portions of ships. This paragraph continues: "The outside bottom plating is bent in a reversed V-shape (Δ), the after wing of which, about fifteen feet broad and thirty-two feet in length (from frame seventeen to frame twenty-five), is doubled back upon itself against the continuation of the same plating extending forward.

"At frame eighteen the vertical keel is broken in two, and the flat keel bent into an angle similar to the angle formed by the outside bottom plating. This break is now about six feet below the surface of the water, and about thirty feet above its normal position.

"In the opinion of the Court, this effect could have been produced only by the explosion of a mine situated under the bottom of the ship at about frame eighteen and somewhat on the port side of the ship."

These facts were established by the divers, aided and guided by the intelligence of Powelson. They were determined by actual measurements referred to the ship's drawings. There have been some, who, while admitting the facts as to the condition of the hull, still maintained that this condition was produced by an inside explosion. It is hard to imagine how an explosion from inside could throw or draw the bottom of the vessel to the surface of the water. It would be natural to suppose that the force of the explosion would follow the lines of least resistance and that it would blow up the protective deck above it, and perhaps force out the sides at and near the surface of the water, where the pressure from the water was slight. As there was little in previous experience to guide us so far as actual explosions of great magnitude were concerned, it might have left those who preferred the flights of a vivid imagination to the dictates of common sense to believe that the "Maine" was blown up by her own magazine. But since the crime was committed, we have had actual experience in the destructive effect of exploding magazines on board the Spanish ships that were destroyed off Santiago on July 3d. The decision of the Court was fully upheld by the knowledge gained from these explosions.

There were many facts discovered by the divers that served to corroborate this evidence. They could not find any coal on the port side forward and they found quantities on the starboard side. There was a coal bunker to port of the 10-inch magazine. Many of the

10-inch shells remained in about their original position on the port side of the magazine. A quantity of 6-inch powder tanks were found on top the 10-inch. Many powder tanks were found that had not been exploded, some with the powder still in them; and the mud near the magazines was full of powder. Quantities of this mud was brought up by the divers, dried and burnt. It undoubtedly contained a large proportion of brown powder.

Can any one fail to believe that the "Maine" was blown up by a powerful mine? Those who have seen the horrors surrounding the wreck will not readily forget the wholesale murder.

The dead have been buried or lie quietly with the wreck at the bottom of Havana harbor. The commissioners of the United States are sitting in that city, and before the anniversary of the "Maine" disaster the troops of the United States were maintaining order in Cuba.

Richard Hannington

THE FIFTH CORPS AT SANTIAGO.

By COLONEL THEODORE ROOSEVELT, U. S. V.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE two striking facts in the war with Spain were the preparedness of the navy and the unpreparedness of the army. Both facts were mainly due to causes that had been in operation for years, for no attempt had been made since the Civil War to put the army on a really effective fighting basis; while after 1883 under Secretaries Chandler, Whitney, Tracy, Herbert and Long, the navy had been steadily built up. The difference was partly due also to the fact that for months before the outbreak of war, preparations had been going on in the navy in anticipation of the event, while the War Department had done nothing until the war was upon us. It was then entirely too late to make up for lost time. The ships of the Navy had been gathered from the distant seas and assembled in three fleets long before the scattered battalions and companies of the army were even put in motion towards the camps of assemblage. Battleships and cruisers had been trained for months in squadron evolutions under commodores and admirals, while not a general in the United States army was exercising so much as a major's command. The auxiliary ships of the navy had been practically all purchased and fitted up before the effort to purchase similar ships as transports for the army began. The ordnance bureau of the army was fossilized; that of the navy was doing splendid work. The quartermaster's and commissary bureaus of the army were unfortunately under the control of officers who were entirely separated from the line, and both bureaus broke down when the strain came. The medical department was in a similar plight. There was no good organization, no general staff; and no proper subordination, there being no proper division of the duties of the secretary, the adjutant-general and the major-general, who was in nominal command of all the forces. The field artillery were equipped with black powder and slow-firing guns. The men had but little practical training, and the

battery commanders were for the most part old. The engineers were a highly-trained body of men, able to do admirable work in civil engineering, but they were not used to rough field work of the kind to be encountered in war. Against all the defects there was one offset, namely: the splendid fighting capacity of the officers and enlisted men of the cavalry and infantry. The cavalry and infantry were well armed with good, modern military carbines and rifles, which they knew how to use, and they had been well drilled in field work, although only in small bodies. The elder officers were relatively much less good than the younger ones, for, although some of them had kept their vigor and force, others had completely rusted; but the junior captains, the lieutenants, the noncommissioned officers and the rank and file formed as splendid a body of fighting men as could be found in the world.

The real responsibility for the shortcomings lies with the men — and especially the legislators — who refused throughout long years (as some even yet refuse) to provide an adequate army. Every senator or congressman who refused to vote for a fair-sized army, who refused to vote the means to properly exercise that army, and every newspaper that upheld such a cause, must share the guilt of all that befell in the way of evil during the war, just as all who interfered, as in the present year, with our having the army raised to the proper size, will stand as the real authors of any disasters that may hereafter befall our army in the field, as the real cause of any national dishonor or disaster. The votes of these men, recorded in the journals of the two houses at Washington, will stand as a roll of dishonor.

No effective plan for the use of the army had been made in advance, and in the actual event whatever it did, merely followed the action of the navy. When Dewey destroyed the Spanish fleet at Manila, an army corps was sent to the Philippines, and when Cervera shut himself in Santiago harbor, another army corps was sent there, so as to ensure the fleet falling into Sampson's hands. The larger part of the small Regular army of the United States, or at least the larger part of the cavalry and infantry, was gathered at Tampa, Florida, together with a number of volunteer regiments, to be ready for descent upon Cuba. Tampa was a poor choice in some ways, the climate in summer being almost as trying as that of Cuba, while the facilities for gathering troops and stores were bad in the extreme. It was the terminus of a single track railway which speedily became

choked to the point of congestion with men and material of war. It would be difficult to overstate the weltering chaos of the Tampa yards.

General Miles was in command at Tampa, but General Shafter was put in command of the expedition. When it was definitely known that Cervera's fleet was in Santiago harbor, blockaded by Sampson's fleet, the proper objective for our army was at once clear. The



BAY OF SANTIAGO.

Bay of Santiago is completely land-locked and is entered by a narrow, winding channel, running between high precipitous shores. There were Spanish batteries on the shores. There were Spanish mines in the channel. Only dire need would have justified an attempt by the warships to force an entrance where the chance of disaster was so great. This dire need could never arise if a good and well-handled army was sent against the city itself; and accordingly the War Department decided, quite properly, to send an army thither. It could not make up its mind quite when the army was to go, until, misled



COLONEL THEODORE ROOSEVELT.



BY PERMISSION OF LESLIE'S WEEKLY

WRECK OF THE BATTLESHIP "MAINE," HAVANA HARBOR.

by a report that the city was already practically battered into submission by the fleet, it suddenly decided to hurry forward our forces in order to take possession. I doubt if anyone realized the serious fighting that was ahead, although the effects of disease were more or less anticipated, but not provided against. In view of the presence of the Spanish fleet in Santiago harbor, it would, of course, have been folly to defer operations until cool weather. It would have been much to our military advantage had War been declared the preceding fall, but as things were, the need of bringing matters to a conclusion outweighed the danger of disease.

The decision to sail immediately was reached in a great hurry and word cabled to the Generals at Tampa that they must embark next morning. It was late in the evening when the order was received, and a night of utter confusion followed getting the troops down to the quay, which was nine miles away. The expedition included about sixteen thousand men, chiefly regulars. There was also the First United States volunteer cavalry, eight troops strong; and the Sixth Massachusetts and the Seventy-first New York infantry. Two Washington regiments, an Illinois regiment, a District of Columbia regiment and another Massachusetts regiment with some other corps joined later. There were several regular regiments of cavalry along, each of eight troops, the First, Third and Sixth being white, and the Ninth and Tenth colored. These were all dismounted, but some of the Second cavalry were mounted to act as orderlies. There were some eighteen regiments of regular infantry and a few field batteries. The supply of mules and wagons was utterly inadequate for a serious campaign. The men were unsuitably clothed, having exactly the same garments that they would have worn in the Klondike, and the food was also unsuited for a tropic climate. The loading of the transports was accomplished in utter confusion, without any system whatever.

The transports were overcrowded. It was expected, however, that they would get under way at once, thus minimizing the length of time the troops would be aboard, and, therefore, their discomfort. As we were on the eve of starting, however, word was brought by the naval commander of one of our small scout boats that a Spanish squadron had been seen off the Florida coast. This information naturally produced consternation at Washington. Nobody was positive of the whereabouts of all the Spanish ships. It was certain that

most of Cervera's squadron was in Santiago harbor, and most of the remaining Spanish ships of the Atlantic fleet in the Spanish ports;



SPANISH FLEET IN SANTIAGO HARBOR.

but there was a bare chance that there were some ships unaccounted for, and if this was the case, the convoy would be in great danger. Accordingly word was wired to hold the transports where they were while our war vessels scouted for the supposed enemy. It took some five days of this before it was developed that the alarmist report was not warranted by facts, the officer having mistaken our own ships for those of the enemy. Meanwhile the transports swung idly at their anchors in shallow Tampa Bay, the pitch bubbling in the seams under the intense sun rays. The travel rations were good, except in two important particulars. The meat issued consisted of what was called "canned roast beef." This was unsalted and at the best insipid, while at the worst it was positively nauseating. The men could eat but little of it. Moreover, there was not a sufficiency of vegetables, while the water was poor and there was no ice for the men. No provisions had been made for cooking. With few exceptions the men were clad in the ordinary blue uniform with heavy shirts and underclothes, a costume much better suited for Manitoba than for an expedition in the tropics.

I have commented very strongly upon the general superiority of the management of our naval as compared with our land forces. It is but fair to say that in the Santiago campaign the navy was partly

responsible for some of the hurry and unpreparedness at one time, and for some of the delay at another. The report of the scouting officer above mentioned had its share to do with the latter. As for the former, one cause of the hurried embarkation of the troops was the receipt of a telegram from the American admiral off Santiago stating that he had silenced the works and continuing as follows: "If ten thousand men were here, city and fleet would be ours within forty-eight hours. Every consideration demands immediate movement." It is true that the admiral, who both before and after this rendered service second only to Dewey's, had a plan of campaign, which included for the work of the army the taking of the forts at the mouth of the harbor. It is possible that this might have been done within a comparatively short space of time, and as in this case the army would have been close to the sea coast, there would have been less difficulty about transportation and less need of a greater number of troops. As it turned out ultimately, the course actually followed made the victory far more complete, as it resulted not only in the capture of the fleet and the city, but in the capture of the hostile army also, as the city was surrounded and attacked from the landward side. In any event, the sending of such a despatch was assuming a grave responsibility, for it could not but convey what was, as events proved, an entirely erroneous idea of the magnitude of the task and the defensive power of the Spanish garrison. Moreover, the ship captains had themselves been misled by the ease and impunity with which they silenced the forts, into the belief that they had crippled them. As a matter of fact, they hardly did any real damage, and the defenses were in practically as good shape as ever. The troops actually sent were, of course, abundantly fitted with everything necessary for a forty-eight hours' campaign, or even for one twice as long, and they had boats enough with them, taken in conjunction with those of the fleet, to permit the speedy landing of these men, with provisions enough to carry on their backs for three days. They did not, however, have boats sufficient to land all the stores aboard, in any reasonable time, and they had no transportation adequate to taking these stores to the front, when once the army was encamped at any distance from the coast.

It was June 9th that we received the order to embark. It was June 14th when we finally weighed anchor and started down Tampa Bay. Next day the convoy put to sea and sailed southeastward between the Tortugas and the Florida coast. There were about thirty

transports and some sixteen warships, ranging from the great battleship "Indiana" through cruisers and gunboats to the swift, delicate little torpedo boats. The transports were drawn up in three columns, and, of course, the speed of the whole was regulated by that of the slowest; so that it was very slow indeed. It was an impressive sight, especially at night, when the long rows of lights gleamed ahead and behind for miles and the warships kept signalling to one another. We were favored by fine weather and pushed steadily eastward while the trade-wind blew in our faces. The sky was a bright blue overhead and the waters beneath were a wonderful indigo.

The transports should have been under the control of the navy. Trouble arose now and then with their commanders, who were, of course, responsible to the shipowners for the safety of their vessels and who had nothing to gain by taking risks. Moreover the military men in command had no idea of what was or was not needed to ensure the safety of the convoy. Thus when one of the transports, which was towing a schooner, dropped behind, another transport was actually sent back to accompany it; the only effect being to give the rearmost war vessel two ships to protect instead of one. The warships kept a most vigilant lookout, and neither by night nor by day did they permit any stranger to come within danger distance. I think, however, that most of us who were aboard realized that after nightfall a swift and daring hostile warship, willing to take chances, could, in all probability, have slipped into the middle of the fleet unobserved, and have wrought great havoc among the clumsy, helpless troop-ships, swarming with men.


It was June 19th before we reached Inagua Island. Up to this time only the generals had known whither we were bound, and there had been a good deal of speculation among the regimental officers whether it was for Porto Rico or Santiago; but after sighting the light-house on Inagua, the fleet turned sharply toward the southwest and steamed steadily through the rolling seas, with the trade-wind aft, and the southern coast of eastern-most Cuba on the right hand. All the following day we coasted along not far from shore, high barren-looking mountains rising almost from the water's edge, while the low country was broken and covered with thick jungle. It was a very difficult-looking country for an offensive campaign. About a hundred and fifty years before an English fleet and Army had attempted what we were about to attempt, but had failed signally, the fleet being unable to force an entrance into Santiago harbor, while

the army, after disembarking (not far from where we intended to disembark), was unable to advance through the jungle-covered country, and finally re-embarked. However, nobody had any foreboding of failure or indeed of special difficulty. The Spaniards had shown such lack of enterprise, and their gunners had been so completely unable to do any damage to our ships, that, unmindful of the lessons of Spanish history, especially in the Peninsular War, we did not anticipate much hard fighting with the Spanish troops on shore.

On the twenty-first the fleet lay off Santiago harbor, while General Shafter and staff landed to meet the Cuban General Castillo. It was decided to make the landing east of Santiago, and the so-called Cuban army was largely taken there in our ships, although some of it straggled around by land. The Cuban soldiers were almost all blacks and mulattoes and were clothed in rags and armed with every kind of old rifle. They were utterly unable to make a serious fight, or to stand against even a very inferior number of Spanish troops, but we hoped they might be of use as scouts and skirmishers. For various reasons this proved not to be the case, and so far as the Santiago campaign was concerned, we should have been better off if there had not been a single Cuban with the army. They accomplished literally nothing, while they were a source of trouble and embarrassment, and consumed much provisions.

The landing place selected was at the little ruined hamlet of Daiquiri, some fifteen or twenty miles from the city of Santiago; very long miles, however, when following a tortuous trail up and down hill through the jungle. It was an open roadstead, but as it was a shipping point for iron ore, and as the sea was comparatively calm, it was possible to land the army by the use of the small boats belonging to the warships and transports. There was a strongly-built iron pier extending out some distance from the shore, but too high above the water for use. The surf was sufficiently severe to prevent landing on the beach, which was flanked by projecting rocky promontories. The boats, therefore, were obliged to land at the end of a small dock, which extended some thirty yards out into the water. This dock had been partially burned by the Spaniards and the connecting walk between the end of it and the shore consisted of one or two loose boards on charred but heavy cross-ties. Naturally such a landing place offered but few facilities for easy disembarkation, and even to get the first two or three brigades ashore on the twenty-second taxed the capacity of the dock. Extraordinarily to relate, the engineers never repaired it,

and it remained as it was throughout the time of siege. Their work in bridge building and road building was not much better, whether through their own fault or because they could not procure enough laborers, I do not know.



HARBOR OF PONCE, LANDING PLACE.

Before landing, the ships made feints along the coast to distract the attention of the Spaniards, and briskly shelled the woods and heights in our immediate front to dislodge any lurking enemy. A small force of the latter had held the place, but they left without striving to interfere with our landing. This was very foolish on their part, for the country offered absolutely unlimited opportunities for defensive work, and was the most difficult imaginable for offensive operations. The steep, jungle-covered hills made a hundred natural fortresses, and a very few hundred men, resolutely commanded, could have put a complete stop to the disembarkation, while even a few score could have inflicted severe loss with practical impunity. However, nothing of this kind was done, and when we landed, we found that the Spaniards had fled, and that a swarm of practically naked Cubans had come in.

General Lawton was the first to disembark part of his division. There was very little order in the disembarkation, however — the different regiments getting ashore partly in accordance with the general plan and partly in accordance with the individual initiative of their commanders. General Lawton at once moved some of his troops to the front and established outposts, pickets and scouting parties, well in advance. Several of the regular infantry regiments and the Second Massachusetts disembarked, and General Young's brigade of Wheeler's cavalry division, including the First and Tenth regular cavalry and the First volunteer cavalry. Camp was made wherever each regiment could find room, the men putting up their dog tents, or, more generally, sleeping out in the open — the officers all sleeping out in the open, as practically none of the officers' baggage was landed. The generals, Wheeler, Lawton, Young and Chaffee, fared no better than the privates. General Wheeler having landed, was in command until General Shafter should come ashore, and as General Shafter was obliged to take very many of the transports with troops and stores farther to the west to the little town of Siboney to land, General Wheeler had the immediate direction of the movements for some days.

Landing the mules and the few horses proved difficult. The transports could not go near shore and the animals had to be flung overboard to make their way to the beach as best they could. Some were drowned. Enough were gradually gathered to make a few small mule trains.

Next day, the twenty-third, the advance was begun. At this time the generals believed that the Cubans could be used, not merely as scouts, but in bush fighting in the front, and they were ~~were~~ accordingly sent forward to find where the Spaniards were. They served the purpose of scouts well enough on this occasion, the Spaniards being found at a place called Las Guasimas, just at the hither side of the ruined hamlet, on the road to Santiago.

Under the direction of General Shafter, General Wheeler led the army towards Siboney, he himself going first. There he found that the Spaniards had left the block houses, followed by the Cubans, who had engaged their rear guard and been repulsed. General Wheeler rode out in person towards the scene of the engagement, and, having satisfied himself where the Spaniards were, and determined that there should be an attack upon them the next morning, he returned to Siboney.

Meanwhile by his orders the head of the army had taken up its march. General Lawton had brought forward the regiments of General Chaffee's brigade; and General Young's brigade, so far as it was landed, consisting of the two squadrons of the First volunteer cavalry and of one squadron each of the First and Tenth regular cavalry, was marched to the extreme front. The march was not long, but it was a trying one. The men had been cooped up for a fortnight aboard ship where it was impossible to take any exercise whatever. The road was a mere jungle trail and the heat intense. There were not a few stragglers. Naturally these were especially numerous in the Second Massachusetts, a regiment of gallant men, who were unaccustomed to field work; but there were a number in the regular regiments. A noteworthy fact was that the cavalry walked quite as well as the infantry. It was after eight o'clock at night when the cavalry brigade reached Siboney and camped ahead of the infantry regiments. Each general was anxious to be the first to strike the Spaniards. General Wheeler being in command, allotted the task to General Young's brigade, the foremost of his own cavalry division.

General Castillo and a number of Cubans were at or near Siboney. General Wheeler consulted with him and General Young, and directed the latter to strike the Spaniards at Las Guasimas early the following morning, General Castillo promising his aid. General Young then sent for Colonel Wood, of the First volunteer cavalry, and arranged the plan of battle with him. From Siboney the main road to Santiago runs up through a valley and at its head crosses a spur of the great mountain chains towards the interior, and thence runs down hill to the city. Just where it crosses this spur it is joined by another ~~spur~~ ^{trail} from Siboney which runs along the hill-crest to the ~~top~~ ^{summit} of it, that is, between it and the sea. General Young directed Colonel Wood to lead the two squadrons of the First volunteer cavalry along this hill trail to the left, while he himself with a squadron of the First and a squadron of the Tenth regular cavalry, took the valley road.

Next morning the two small columns started before daybreak and after marching a couple of hours they struck the Spaniards. A sharp little fight followed and the Spaniards were driven from their position, although they were superior in numbers. At the sound of the firing, the infantry regiments who were nearest, started forward in great haste, as did one squadron of the Ninth cavalry, the foremost of Sumner's brigade. The fight was over before they got to the

front, however. This little brush put the men in good spirits and cleared the way to Santiago, the Spaniards not making another stand. Some seventy Americans and about fifty Spaniards were killed and wounded.

The next week was spent in getting the army within striking distance of Santiago, the camps of the regiments being strung out along the road from Savilla to within three miles or so of the city. There were available for the attack somewhat over twelve thousand men all told, of whom ten thousand were regulars. The Spaniards in Santiago at this time numbered six thousand troops, one thousand of whom were sailors and marines from the ships. There were in the province of Santiago, all told, twenty-three thousand, and although great supineness had been shown by the Spanish general in gathering his forces, there was a body of four thousand troops from the outside actually in motion towards Santiago.

Gangs of men were employed to repair the road from Siboney and make it passable for the army wagons which had now been landed and were in constant use bringing provisions to the front. The amount of transportation was utterly insufficient and the number of boats on the transports was also insufficient, although not to the same extent. In consequence, though there was plenty of food on the transports, the Army was on salt pork and hardtack, generally without the full amount of coffee and sugar. In the afternoon there were usually heavy downpours of rain, such as are only seen in the tropics, which turned the road into a furious torrent and the camp grounds into morasses. The time was too short to permit of extensive development of fever, but cases began to crop out here and there. Gallant General Young was one of the victims and was obliged to go home.

There was very hard work for everybody during this week, the most efficient portion of it being done by the line officers and men of the infantry and cavalry. The fact that these showed to such advantage in this campaign when compared with the engineers and artillerymen ought to be enough to show to even the blindest, what, of course, really needs no proof, viz.: That it is the system which makes the difference between efficiency and inefficiency when men are equally good to start with. The officers of the engineers and artillery were certainly at the outset, at least as good as those of the cavalry and infantry. In theory they were supposed to be better. But the cavalry and infantry were armed and drilled according to the most

modern methods, and had seen actual practice in the field. The engineers had not been trained in the field. The artillerymen were also without field training, and in addition they had slow-firing guns and black powder, the last making them hopelessly inferior to the Spaniards. The commissary department was under the immediate charge of Colonel Weston, and his energy, good sense and willingness to cut through red tape and take responsibilities, enabled those who came into immediate contact with him to do pretty well; but the quartermaster's department did badly. Too much cannot be said for the men, and indeed, for the beasts of the mule trains. The packers and the mules worked all the time in getting up provisions and ammunition. They were ravaged by fever, their ranks being so depleted that at one time a draft was made on the Rough Riders for twenty-four of their number to supply the packers' places. But all the efforts of the pack trains would not alter the fact that their numbers were too few. Nothing like enough transportation was brought along. The commanding general in his official report stated that there was ample transportation. This cannot be so, for if it were, the responsibility for the failure to bring up sufficient food to the front would rest with the general. No regiment had anything like the proper amount of transportation for its needs. Whether this was because the War Department failed to send enough, or because the commander of the army failed to use aright what he had, whether the shortage was inevitable or whether it was due to a faulty system, does not alter the fact that the shortage existed. The line officers had to work unceasingly to bring forward the necessary rations and to get transportation. They also had to mend roads, to reconnoiter the country ahead so far as they were allowed (for there was little reconnoissance) and to make rough maps.

The Signal corps was unfortunately partly diverted from efficient work by the presence of an experimental toy—a balloon. This balloon accomplished nothing. There was little it could do in such a country as that in which we operated, for from hills it was always possible to see as far as a man in the balloon could see. In any event, even if the reverse had been the case, if half of the energy expended in getting the balloon at work had been expended in proper reconnoissance, we would have gained literally a hundred-fold the knowledge of the enemy's positions that was gained. Several wagons were employed in dragging to the front all the clumsy apparatus for sending up the balloon. If, instead of this, they had been employed in

bringing beans to the front for the soldiers, the result would have been in every way infinitely better.

During this week all the troops which were intended for the actual assault on Santiago were brought to the front. General Lawton was encamped nearest Santiago with his infantry division of nine regiments, all of them regulars, excepting the Second Massachusetts. Generals Chaffee, Ludlow and Miles were under him; General Bates having an independent brigade. Following Lawton was General Sumner with his cavalry division of six regiments, all regulars except the First United States volunteer cavalry. Then came General Kent's infantry division of nine regiments, all regulars excepting the Seventy-first New York, his three brigades being under Generals Hawkins and Wyckoff and Colonel Pearson.

Young's fight at Guasimas had been won so easily, the Spaniards had shown so little obstinacy, that all the army had become unfortunately confirmed in the belief that the task before us was light. This feeling of over-confidence was increased by the utter failure of the Spanish fleet to do anything, and by the want of aggressiveness on the part of their land forces. It was the old story of over-confidence, complicated with refusal to learn from the course of history. Ninety years before the Spaniards had been pitted in succession against the two greatest military powers of the day — England and France. At sea their navy had been the helpless prey of the English fleets; on land their armies had been scattered like chaff by Napoleon's marshals when they fought in the open; and yet their guerrilla warfare and their extraordinary defense of intrenched and fortified places (as at Sargossa and Gerona), had won the admiration of the civilized world. The fact that the Spanish ships were not effective fighting machines, and that their armies lacked aggressiveness and even firmness in the open, should not have been held to indicate that the Spaniards would not fight as desperately as they always had fought behind intrenchments. Moreover, we had been misled by the reports of those observers who had been in Cuba before the war. The best of them had not only underestimated the power of the Spanish garrisons to hold out when the Cuban coast was blockaded, but had wholly failed to understand the military value of the Spanish trochas, forts and block houses. A generation had passed since the Civil War and most men had forgotten how formidable intrenchments were, and did not realize the immense resisting power of even small block houses when attacked by infantry, unsupported or not properly supported

by artillery. Accordingly the whole expedition was managed in the most happy-go-lucky manner. There was little evidence of foresight, forethought, or careful planning or of preparation in advance. The campaign itself was fought by the army on the every-man-for-his-own-hand principle. Even the numerical weakness of the Spaniards in the city of Santiago and their failure to concentrate the superior numbers which they had in the province, could not have prevented disaster, had it not been for the wonderful fighting qualities developed by the line officers and enlisted men of the infantry and cavalry.

On June 30th the advance was ordered. As we faced Santiago, the outlying town of El Caney, some four miles distant from the city, was on the right. This was held by the Spaniards in considerable force, and until it was captured, we could not interfere with their water supply, or with the districts from which they drew food. Accordingly it was resolved that General Lawton should attack and take this town, while the rest of the troops made a demonstration against the city to prevent reinforcements being sent out. The plan was not worked out well in advance and as no proper reconnoissance had been made, and as the resistance of the Spanish garrison of El Caney was utterly underestimated, the result was a fight along the whole line, in the shape of an assault by our army upon that portion of the Spanish defenses which was the strongest.

Chaffee's brigade, which was to do the heaviest fighting at El Caney, had bivouacked over night about a mile southeast of the town, the men preserving strict silence and lighting no fires; the chief anxiety felt among all concerned was lest the Spanish might leave the town before there was a chance to attack and bag them. As a matter of fact, the Spaniards had not the slightest intention of leaving, and were preparing to put up as gallant and desperate a fight as the like number of men ever did put up. Captain Capron's four-gun battery of light artillery went with Chaffee's brigade. Miles' brigade was to the left, and Ludlow's close to the battery, in advance of Miles' brigade.

The brigades of Chaffee and Ludlow advanced shortly after five on the morning of July 1st, Chaffee landing. The fight was to be opened by Capron's artillery.

The town was small, with a church and plaza, as in most Spanish-American towns, the houses having high sloped roofs of thatch. It was surrounded by trenches and by various block houses. At the southeast corner, on a round knoll, was a loop-holed stone fort with deep trenches outside. South of the town was a small block house of

wood, the lower portion, however, being banked with earth to the height of four feet. On the northwest corner of the town was a similar but larger block house. On the northeast face was a line of intrenchments close to the town. There were intrenchments in the streets, and the heavier buildings were also used by the Spanish troops. A mile from the town on the side of the mountain was a very small block house which on the day in question was attacked by the Cubans, who were repulsed. The next day some of the soldiers took it.

As the troops approached on the morning of July 1st, the Spaniards could be seen lounging outside their lines. Above the little stone fort floated the red and yellow banner of Spain. The proceedings opened in a rather leisurely way, giving no promise of the desperate fight that was to follow. The Spanish soldiers, in their light blue-and-white striped uniforms and red-cockaded straw hats, looked with interest at Capron's battery as it was being wheeled into position, while the American troops, in their slouch hats, blue shirts, blue trousers and brown leggings, marched forward into position. Neither officers nor men wore jackets, and all were dusty, sun-burned, and, for the most part, unshaven. The Spanish soldiers had been for three years on the Island and had seen much fighting against the Insurgents. Half the American troops were raw recruits; of the remainder, few indeed had been under fire. But they behaved most admirably.

The action began at about seven. Capron's battery opened fire. The Spaniards at once sought cover and a quarter of an hour later Chaffee's brigade worked up close enough to begin exchanging shots with the trenches at about a thousand yards.

Fortified places and indeed intrenchments of all kinds should be reduced by artillery fire, either by itself or in combination with an infantry assault delivered when the big guns have prepared the way. Small stone forts and wooden block houses are peculiarly vulnerable to modern artillery. But unfortunately the American artillery could not properly be called modern. The black powder was a great disqualification, and partly through inferiority of design, and partly through lack of proper training among the officers and men, the fire was very slow and not very accurate; light guns can do little unless handled with exceptional vigor and skill, and but little vigor or skill was shown. The Spaniards should have been smothered by a very

rapid and accurate fire. As a matter of fact, the shooting was slow, there were frequent pauses, and for quite a time the aim was very bad.

Meantime the infantry fight became murderous, especially as regarded the Seventh and Twelfth regiments. This continued for about three or four hours, the artillery accomplishing nothing during this time. The American troops were pressed in to about six hundred yards distance from the village and were then brought to a stop, though the skirmish line was edged cautiously forward. The fire was exceedingly heavy, but, whereas the Americans could fire at nothing but the white hats which marked the heads of the Spaniards in the trenches, the Spaniards, who knew the ground accurately, and some of whose sharpshooters shot very well, were continually able to take advantage of the advance of their foes and to fire at them when they were practically unprotected. Every move by a squad of men towards the Spanish line was greeted with a drove of Mauser bullets. The fullest possible credit must be awarded the Spaniards for their defense. They were outnumbered five to one but they fought most gallantly and effectively. On the other hand too much credit cannot be awarded the Americans for their courage in the attack.

To the Seventh infantry fell the hardest task. They were deployed behind a low ridge fronting the stone fort, and were then advanced up to the crest. Immediately they were subjected to a terrible fire from their front and from the block houses, which were enabled to shoot at them from an angle. For hour after hour they lay flat on their stomachs under the intense heat of the sun, firing as occasion offered itself. Whenever one of them so much as raised himself on his elbows, he became a target for the Spanish rifles. The grim, gaunt old Indian fighter, General Chaffee, realizing now the serious task before him, and entirely careless of his own life, walked up and down along and behind the lines, encouraging and steadying his men. One of his buttons was shot away and also his shoulder strap, yet he himself was not scratched, and continued to stroll to and fro, gripping his half-smoked cigar between his teeth. Three or four of the recruits becoming unsteady began to fall back from the firing line towards a sunken road in the rear but only to be pounced upon by Chaffee in person and driven back to the front under the flail of his bitter words. Most of the men, however, showed no symptom whatever of retreating. They lay stretched out at full length, their rifles at the ready, gazing eagerly towards the trenches for the chance to get a fair shot. At last a Spaniard would show himself, and in-

stantly the soldiers who saw him would rise on their elbows or perhaps to their knees, fire, and once more stretch themselves at full length.

It would be difficult to single out men for special gallantry where all showed so much, but perhaps the bravest of the brave was Lieutenant Wansboro. He kept crawling on hands and knees along the extreme front of the firing line, cheering the men, and whenever a soldier was hit, he would jump up, help take him to the rear, and then again return to the front. At last as he started up to go to the assistance of a man who had just been hit, a bullet struck him through the heart and he fell dead. He was taken to the rear by some of his own men, aided by Captain Arthur H. Lee, the British military attache, a man who on that day showed as much gallantry and as little fear of death as any man in the American army. As they laid him under the shade beside a sunken road, a noncommissioned officer quietly drew a handkerchief over the boyish face of the dead man and said: "Good-bye, lieutenant! You were a brave officer and you died like a true soldier."

This sunken road in the rear was the point to which the wounded were brought from the firing line beyond them. Captain Lee had come over to the line held by the Seventh infantry about midday and when he reached this road and saw it full of men lying down, he remarked to an officer whom he met that he supposed these were the reserves. The officer replied: "No, by God, they are the casualties!" There were over a hundred of them, who lay in silence without a whimper or a groan, the Spanish bullets clipping the leaves of the jungle trees close above their heads. The slightly wounded were attending those who had been less fortunate, with great tenderness, and each man seemed to show the most thoughtful consideration for his fellow, as they lay in the sweltering heat without a breath of air. Gorged vultures sat on the trees around them, seemingly undisturbed by the bullets, and when the firing lulled, one could hear the buzzing of the carrion flies and the uncanny rustling of the land crabs as they scuttled to and fro in the bushes. Each soldier had a first-aid-to-the-injured dressing, and in some cases these had been applied, but hour after hour went by and no doctors could come up. They were stationed about three-quarters of a mile to the rear and were there kept so busy that they could not get to the front. Unfortunately, however, this meant that they were busy with the lightest cases, for the slightly wounded could walk to the rear, while the others could not.

The Twelfth regiment was also suffering very heavily. Two of its men during the forenoon performed an act of singular gallantry. They crept forward alone, armed only with wire cutters, and, taking skillful advantage of the cover, passed along the whole east front of the village not two hundred yards from the Spanish lines, clipping the barb wire fencing, which would otherwise have impeded the assault. They returned in safety from their dangerous task.

Colonel Haskell had led the Seventeenth infantry forward to deploy, but was himself hit three times and the regiment checked. It was withdrawn in good order and deployed to the right, where it rendered gallant service.

Meanwhile Ludlow's brigade was closing in on the south and west sides of the village. He had with him two regular regiments, the Eighth and Twenty-second infantry, and one volunteer regiment, the Second Massachusetts. The volunteers were gallant fellows, but they were armed with the black-powder Springfields. Very early in the day they were struck by some long range volleys from El Caney, and halted and began to fire. Their cartridges, of course, sent out dense clouds of smoke, and as there was not a particle of smoke anywhere else on the firing lines, either of the Spanish or American infantry, this, of course, meant that they were immediately singled out as a target by every Spanish rifle. In a minute or two they were under such a heavy fire and were suffering so considerably that they were withdrawn from the fight, not having been able to render the slightest assistance. The fate of this regiment was a very severe commentary upon the folly of the nation, and the supineness of the ordnance bureau of the War Department, in failing to provide the best kind of modern arms for all our soldiers. The Eighth and Twenty-second, however, like their fellow regulars, had the Krag-Jorgensen, and Ludlow, an excellent officer, pushed these forward until they were hotly engaged; but, of course, at a great disadvantage, in spite of their numerical superiority, for they were in the open, while their opponents were in trenches or behind loop-holed walls.

General Miles also brought up his reserve brigade from its headquarters at the great red-topped Darcoureaud house, and two of his regiments, the Fourth and Twenty-fifth regulars, were sent in to support Ludlow.

At one o'clock no perceptible advance had been made. Hitherto the Americans had lost far more heavily than the Spaniards, and the latter were holding out as stubbornly as ever, while the expenditure



BY PERMISSION OF LESLIE'S WEEKLY.

HANDLING THE DISAPPEARING GUNS.



IN THE TRENCHES BEFORE SANTIAGO JUST BEFORE SURRENDER.

of ammunition by the Americans had been prodigious. Just at this time an order was brought from General Shafter's headquarters to General Lawton to cease assaulting El Caney and move over to the help of Generals Kent and Wheeler at San Juan. To have carried out this order would have been disastrous in the extreme. It would have meant a demoralizing retreat in the very face of the enemy. Accordingly it was disregarded and the attack was pressed home, for Lawton was made of stern stuff. The battery was firing with renewed vigor and better aim and it began to make some impression on the little stone fort. Fiercer and more uninterruptedly rose the rattle of Krag's and Mauser's. The Twelfth regiment had been pushed forward close to the outworks and General Chaffee gave them the order to charge. At the word they rushed forward towards the stone fort, swarmed through and over the wire fences, over the trenches where the Spanish soldiers lay in heaps, their brains oozing out of the little bullet holes in their foreheads, and then into the fort, while the on-looking soldiers cheered frantically.

Two newspaper men were among the foremost in this charge, James Creelman and Caspar Whitney, the former being shot in the shoulder.

Inside the fort the shattered walls were splashed with blood. A dozen dead and wounded Spaniards were lying on the floor, and about as many more, including a lieutenant, who were unhurt, had been taken prisoners. The prisoners, like almost all the Spaniards, firmly believed they were going to be killed. As a matter of fact, they were promptly offered water and hardtack by the victors; but still regarded the advances with profound distrust. The lieutenant, a handsome, well-dressed young fellow, looked both anxious and dignified until General Chaffee strode through the breach into the fort, shook hands with him, and then listened impassively to the excitable, brave little Spaniard, who, under the touch of kindness, promptly lost every appearance of reserve and chattered away about what had happened, constantly making reference to the "fortune of war."

The fight was not yet over, for, with desperate courage, the Spaniards still defended the town and the wooden block houses, and the men of the victorious Twelfth had to begin firing on them. Notwithstanding, the end could not now be long averted. The other regiments of the three brigades were closing in, and as they reached the outer works the Spaniards retreated and the Americans at last got

a chance to shoot at their foes in the open and to repay the losses they themselves had suffered.

The Spaniards had fought as bravely and as efficiently as any troops possibly could have fought. No men of any nationality could have done better. Now that their opponents were on even terms with them, it was a simple impossibility for them longer to resist, and they streamed out of the northwest end of the village. This was about four o'clock in the afternoon.

Considering the greatly superior numbers of the Americans (for Bates had just reinforced Lawton), it would certainly seem that troops might have been interposed to cut off the Spanish retreat; but as it was, the survivors were allowed to retire unmolested, returning fire for fire while they were in sight. One hundred and fifty of them were captured unhurt, and in addition to these between three and four hundred were killed and wounded. The Americans lost about four hundred.



THE 25TH (COL'D) INFANTRY FIRING ON EL CANEY AFTER TAKING BLOCK HOUSE.

About three thousand five hundred men were engaged on the American side all told, though the brunt of the fight was borne by only about a third of this number. About six hundred Spaniards were engaged. The lesson taught is the very trite one, that earthworks and intrenchments, sheltering unbroken in-

fantry armed with high-power repeating rifles, can be held against very superior numbers of even the best troops, if the effort is made to carry them by assault. The Spaniards fought well and it would probably have been impossible to carry the village in less time or with less loss in the manner which was actually adopted, but a sufficiency of the right kind of artillery, properly handled, could have reduced it with very little loss indeed.

Soon after the fight was over the division which had taken El Caney was ordered to move up to the right of the dismounted cavalry at San Juan. The march was begun on the straight road from El Caney to Santiago. Both officers and men were utterly tired out and no precautions of the proper kind were taken either to scout in advance or to find out how serious any resistance that might be encountered was. After advancing nearly to their proper place in the line, the advance guard was fired on. As a matter of fact, there were no Spanish troops at the place where this fire was encountered save a few guerrillas, and it is even doubtful whether the bullets did not come from within the Santiago lines, whence at this time they were firing at Kent's and Wheeler's troops. But after the experience at El Caney there was a good deal of natural reluctance to make an attack against a foe of unknown strength, and there was a failure to try to develop the hostile strength by a proper reconnoissance. Instead of this the division was withdrawn and marched around all night by a circuitous route, so that it did not come into its proper position until the morning of the next day.

Over on the left wing the cavalry and Kent's infantry had been engaged in an even more desperate and bloody struggle. General Wheeler being sick the two brigades of dismounted cavalry were under General Sumner. General Kent led the three brigades of his own infantry. All of them were regulars except the Seventy-first New York volunteers. The original plan was that these divisions should leave their bivouac early in the morning, and, while the artillery fired on the Spanish lines, the infantry and dismounted cavalry should march to the right and connect with Lawton's division. No proper reconnoissance of the ground in front had been made, prior to Kent's taking matters in hand himself on the morning of the fight. The proposed bivouac of the foremost of Kent's brigades, Hawkins', was on ground which was actually well within range of the Spanish rifles, and the proposed line of march by which the troops were to connect with the infantry of Lawton led parallel to and within half rifle shot of

the Spanish trenches. In the actual event, the battle was left to fight itself, the division, brigade, regimental and company commanders acting each according to his lights.

The cavalry, which was to take the advance, was encamped in the neighborhood of El Poso where we had placed a battery of light artillery. Early on the morning of the first this battery was in position on the crest of the hill behind which the cavalry brigades were gathering together with some Cubans. When the sound of Lawton's guns announced the beginning of the fight at El Caney, the El Poso battery opened on the Spaniards. The black smoke hung thick and low, telling the exact spot to the Spaniards, and when they began to reply with their artillery, the shrapnel which missed the American battery, did considerable damage to the troops in the rear. Soon after this General Sumner marched his two brigades to the front. The balloon had been sent up with the idea of making a reconnoissance. What trifling information it thereby gained was more than offset by the fact that it was eventually anchored in front of the road by which Kent and Sumner's troops debouched for the attack on San Juan, and acted as a mark which enabled the Spaniards to locate their exact position.

This road was a mere muddy track through the jungle which formed a wall on either hand. Through this jungle it was quite impossible for troops to advance. The movement had to be by the road. The position of the road was, of course, well known to the Spaniards, and for at least a mile of its length it was within good range of the Mauser rifles carried by the soldiers who held the block houses and trenches we were about to assault. In consequence our troops, as they marched along, before they had a chance to deploy, were under a heavy fire and suffered a demoralizing loss.

General Wheeler was with the advance, but owing to his sickness, was not able to take command of the cavalry division until about the middle of the afternoon when the heavy fighting was over and the advance had almost ceased. Up to this time Sumner was in command of the dismounted cavalry. Kent exercised a command practically as independent as that of Lawton although two of General Shafter's staff officers were with him. Lieutenant Miley, who was Shafter's personal aide, was at the extreme front all day. General Sumner himself led his division, the first brigade in front. General Kent received orders to follow the cavalry, and his first brigade, under General Hawkins, had to wait to let the cavalry pass and get in

front. As is always the case when a long column marches down a narrow and rather difficult track, there was much delay. In places the road was broad enough to render column of fours, the natural formation. Elsewhere it would narrow so as to make it most easy to go forward in columns of twos. This, of course, doubled the length of the column, and taken together with the occasional halts for getting rid of the packs, resulted in long delays for the troops in the rear, who fretted and fumed and were naturally unable to understand what was the reason for the halts. General Kent had his division drawn up with Hawkins' brigade in front, Wyckoff's brigade second, and Pearson's third.

Sumner, having brought his brigades across the San Juan into a comparatively open reach of tree-dotted grass jungle, turned to the right to march towards El Caney. Meanwhile General Hawkins had pushed forward opposite the cavalry column and made a reconnoissance in front. He was speedily joined by General Kent himself. They saw that the strongest position in their front was that occupied by the San Juan block house. The Spaniards also occupied the slopes which, from where the general stood, lay on the left of the block house. The left of this part of the Spanish line, opposite the right of the American, was on another hill where there were some large ranch buildings and a huge iron kettle, because of which the soldiers afterwards christened it "Kettle Hill."

General Kent rode back after his reconnoissance, and, becoming impatient, pushed his infantry forward beside the two rearmost regiments of the cavalry division, the Tenth and First. General Hawkins himself led the advance composed of the Sixteenth and Sixth infantry. His third regiment, the Seventy-first New York volunteers, was handicapped by its black-powder rifles, and moreover, was not well commanded. It accordingly hung back; but many of the officers and men behaved well and came forward in companies and squads, joining the regulars.

General Sumner's first brigade as it marched to the right in front of the Spanish position, naturally attracted their fire and was finally forced to stop and return it. Meanwhile General Hawkins brought forward his two regiments of regulars and led them in person towards the San Juan block-house hill. The advance was through thick jungle—great patches of densely intertwined tropical bushes, vines and trees, alternating with glades of the tall, rank guinea-grass. The still, stifling heat made it terrible work for the advancing troops,

and in such a country it was utterly impossible to preserve the regimental or even the company formations with anything like accuracy. No man could see more than a short distance, save from some unusually good point of observation, and in the advances no officer could personally direct men more than a few yards to one side or the other. In consequence the advance soon became broken up, less into companies than into squads, each captain or lieutenant and each natural leader among the noncommissioned officers bringing forward the little group of men he himself could rally. All movements in this jungle had been made in line or in single file. Only the simplest commands could be given or could be obeyed. But each officer and the enlisted men knew that what was demanded was an advance upon the Spanish works.

As the men went forward the officers directed volley firing upon the Spaniards upon the hills. Not only did the jungle offer great obstructions, but there were barbed wire fences scattered along the foot of the hills. Meanwhile some of the American artillery had opened upon the crest held by the Spaniards in order to help the American infantry, and still more effective assistance was given by Lieutenant Parker and his battery of four Gatlings, which he fought almost ahead of the infantry.

The foremost companies struggled through the thick jungle, reached the steep open slopes of the hills proper and started upward, but in their first attempt were driven down again. By this time Sumner's whole cavalry division had been drawn fairly into the fight and had begun to advance, taking Kettle Hill with a rush. Once on top of Kettle Hill, they first of all turned their attention towards the San Juan block house, firing volleys at the block house and trenches so as to assist the infantry.

General Wyckoff's brigade was not able to get into action until some time after Hawkins had begun his advance. No sooner was it across the San Juan river than it suffered under a heavy fire. General Wyckoff was killed and the command then fell on Lieutenant-Colonel Worth, who soon fell severely wounded. The next in command was Lieutenant-Colonel Liscum, who was also wounded not five minutes later; the brigade thus losing three commanders in a quarter of an hour. Lieutenant-Colonel Ewers then took command of it. The brigade struggled forward, and as it came up, Hawkins' regiments again charged the hill. This time they went to the top, two of Wyckoff's regiments accompanying, and the Spaniards were driven,

and ran from their positions. Soon after the charge took place, Pearson's brigade charged and took possession of the hills to the left. Hawkins' brigade had suffered most and Pearson's least. Hawkins himself was wounded not long afterwards. The Thirteenth infantry of Wyckoff's brigade had the honor of capturing a Spanish flag.

ON SAN JUAN HILL — SECOND DAY.



FIRST DAY.

As soon as the infantry took the San Juan block house, the cavalry on Kettle Hill started forward at a run against the second line

of intrenchments on the hills in their front. The Spaniards fired on them for some moments, but did not wait the charge, most of them fleeing long before the Americans were at close range. A few fought to the last. From here the troops swung to the left until they reached the ridge crest overlooking Santiago, where they were halted. The cavalry were to the right and nearest the Spanish lines. As their flank was exposed, the Thirteenth regiment of infantry was later sent over to hold the extreme right. An effort was made to fight the American artillery on the front line with the infantry, but the black powder rendered this effort futile. Every gun that attempted it was sooner or later driven off.

The battle had been largely fought by the captains, lieutenants and first sergeants. Few colonels were able to exercise command over much more than a company. Generals Kent and Sumner did splendid work, the one in command of the infantry and the other of the cavalry. But from the very nature of the case, where an unplanned battle was fought on unknown jungle-covered ground, very much had to be left to the individual initiative of the troops themselves. There were three brigades of infantry and two of cavalry, and of their commanders, one, General Wyckoff, was killed, and two, General Hawkins and Colonel Carroll, wounded. Kent and Sumner out of six thousand five hundred men had lost over a thousand killed and wounded. Lawton and Bates had at El Caney over five thousand men, although Bates' brigade and two or three of Lawton's regiments were not seriously engaged. The American loss of four hundred at El Caney represented nearly as heavy a proportion of those engaged as was the case at San Juan. Lawton, a gallant and accomplished soldier, had won his fight as well and expeditiously as circumstances permitted. The individual acts of heroism were very numerous. Most of the loss at San Juan occurred before the advance was fairly begun, while the men lay in the stifling jungle grass, and the Mauser bullets seemed to go in sheets, rustling through the air and ripping up the ground. The hospital stewards took the wounded as fast as they rolled over and drew them back to the San Juan river, where they laid them in long rows under the bank. The generals and their aides were almost the only mounted men. The conduct of the wounded was extraordinary. They showed no selfishness and no brutality, never complaining and hardly ever grumbling, but waiting patiently for the few surgeons. As for these surgeons they worked all day and far into the night, until they literally fell asleep at their tasks.


The American advance when it did take place was so quick that a number of Spanish sharpshooters were left in the trees. The foliage of these trees was very thick. The Spaniards were carefully concealed and used smokeless powder. The result was that it was exceedingly difficult to place them. They were under the impression that no quarter would be given them, and, consequently, they stayed in their leafy ambush, shooting down every man who came within range whom they thought they could with safety fire at. As Richard Harding Davis, one of the correspondents, was going to the rear carrying a wounded captain with the help of one of the Rough Riders, the latter was shot from a tree almost overhead. Several of the hospital stewards were shot in spite of the Red Cross brassards on their arms, and more than once the same fate befell men who were carrying the wounded to the rear.

Many of the newspaper correspondents showed marked gallantry. James Creelman and Caspar Whitney at El Caney and Davis and John Fox at San Juan, like Edward Marshall who had been terribly wounded at Las Guasimas, behaved as bravely as any of the veteran fighters in the army.

In the afternoon General Wheeler assumed command of the forces at San Juan. No further advance was attempted. The Spaniards had brought up all of their available reserves and at one time made an attempt at a forward movement, which was instantly repelled. During the rest of the time they kept up an exceedingly hot fire from both great guns and rifles. When dark came, General Wheeler gave the orders to intrench. The weary men had been all day long without food and had fought from early morning until dark. However, they set to work with pick and shovel and soon after midnight had completed a broken line of trenches across their position. Meanwhile there had been something very like a panic in the rear. As must always be the case in an army which has fought a hard fight, things at the rear looked very bad. There were wounded and stragglers and men who could not find their regiments and other men who did not want to find them. The resistance of the Spaniards had been long and determined. General Bates had marched hard all day without being able to take any heavy part in the fighting. General Lawton after nearly reaching the lines had been fired on and had made a long circle before coming up to the right of the forces on the San Juan hills. Under these circumstances there was some gloomy talk of retiring. This would have been a fatal mistake. General Wheeler, however, put a stop to it. He

was a veteran of the Civil War who had seen fights compared to which this was little more than child's play. He knew that the Spaniards, who had been driven back, must be in a far more shaky condition than the Americans, who had steadily advanced, and he had no intention of yielding a foot of ground to the rear. Nor did the proposal to go to the rear take more than a rather vague and tentative form. I wish to state with all possible emphasis that the men at the front, the men on the firing line were never affected in the slightest degree by this talk of retiring, and, indeed, were for the most part ignorant of it. So far as I know not a single officer at the front so much as dreamed of the possibility of retiring, and those who heard the rumor were equally angered and amazed.

There were two or three night alarms of Spanish attacks, due to the enterprising nature of the Spanish pickets and sharpshooters who came up close to our lines. Soon after dawn, on July second, the fight opened again and all day long the musketry crackled and the big guns boomed at intervals. As on the day before, the black powder used by the American artillery put it at a hopeless disadvantage. Many of the Spanish guns were old muzzle loaders, but they used smokeless powder and in consequence it was very difficult to find their whereabouts. But there was one kind of wheeled gun which was fought right on the firing line with great success. This was the Gatling. Four of these machine guns had been in the battle under Lieutenant John H. Parker of the Thirteenth infantry. Parker had taken his battery into action on the day preceding. He had hammered the earthworks at San Juan while the infantry assaulted them, and had put the Gatlings on the extreme front with the cavalry division late in the



IN THE RIFLE PITS.

afternoon. Two Colt's automatic guns and a dynamite gun belonging to the First United States volunteer cavalry were now put under his

charge, and he used his motly battery with great effect throughout the rest of the siege.

During the main fight on July 1st, the Thirty-third Michigan had been detached to attack Aguadores on the coast as a diversion. The attack was not pushed home and nothing was accomplished.

The fighting on the second was nothing but an exchange of firing between the trenches, nothing of consequence being accomplished by either side, except that the American artillery with its black powder again showed that it could not remain within range of the Spanish rifles and had to be withdrawn to a commanding position well in the rear. Four thousand Spanish troops marched into Santiago. A couple of volunteer regiments were sent up to join the American lines at the front. Deducting losses this left about nine thousand Spanish troops inside the city and about eleven thousand Americans outside, at this time.

As is generally the case, each side exaggerated the strength of the other. The American commanders thought the Spaniards outnumbered their troops. One or two of the reports speak of the fact that there was "little apprehension" of the Spaniards being able to make a successful attack upon our lines. In the light of our after knowledge this reads rather funnily. The men on the firing line never felt the slightest anxiety about the Spaniards taking the initiative, and indeed hoped for nothing so much as that the Spaniards would make an attack, for this would have meant the immediate downfall of the city. Any attempt of the Spaniards to push home such an attack against superior numbers of men, intrenched, especially when these men were better individual soldiers, would have resulted in disaster so great, that the slightest energy in taking advantage of it would have meant the fall of the city.

Each side was wholly ignorant of the designs of the other, and inclined to attribute to it plans of which it knew nothing. There was also a tendency to speak of every outburst of firing from the trenches as an attack. These two tendencies are responsible for the accounts of the alleged Spanish "night attack" late in evening of July 2d. The insurgents had been burning block houses on the mountains. The Spaniards believed that these were signals between the insurgents and ourselves. We believed that they were signals between the Spanish garrison and Spanish reinforcements. Each side was on the outlook for developments, and when the Spanish pickets happened to come in contact with our outposts, a lively fire ensued, which quickly

spread to the trenches. At night it was far easier to tell the position of the Spaniards than by day, when the smokeless powder gave no sign of their whereabouts; for in the darkness the little spurts of flame were visible. The Spaniards did have an unusually large force of skirmishers out in the jungle between the lines, but their main body was in or right beside the trenches and never moved from them. A tremendous fire was kept up for some minutes after it became general, but it was very ill-directed, it being impossible to aim well at night, and what casualties there were, happened in the rear, the fire for the most part going high. The best officers on the American side speedily realized the futility of wasting ammunition, and running up and down the lines gradually stopped the firing on our side. The Spaniards continued for some time longer, doing practically no damage; then their fire also died away.

Again this afternoon there was talk of retiring, and again General Wheeler took the lead in putting a stop to it, thereby rendering probably the greatest single service rendered by any man in the campaign.

The following morning, the third, the firing went on much as usual, but by this time the American trenches had been perfected, and the men had grown used to the work, the casualties being very few. The Spanish sharpshooters, between the lines, displayed much boldness, and the guerrillas in the rear were still doing much damage, so details of sharpshooters were organized to hunt them down. A goodly number were killed that morning and several after the truce in the afternoon, for the guerrillas knew nothing of the truce and continued to shoot at our men. The truce took place about noon, a summons to surrender being sent in at that time. For a week the negotiations went on. It was not a truce all the time, however, for sometimes negotiations would be broken off, and the American troops would be notified not to make an attack. During these intervals we would strengthen our lines and extend them by the right flank until we gradually completely invested the city. At the same time a mortar battery and additional artillery under General Randolph were brought to the front. No siege guns, however, were brought up, and the transportation was so utterly insufficient that never more than a day's food in advance was provided at the front. The rest was at the sea coast.

Inside the city of Santiago there was abundance of ammunition and food for the immediate necessities of the garrison, but there was no hope of ultimate success against the Americans. Disease might ravage the American ranks and bad weather cause great suffering by the inter-

ruption to the supply of provisions, but there was not the slightest chance of breaking up the siege operations. The resources of the United States were almost literally unlimited, and enough troops could be continually sent to the front to repair any losses, while there was no hope of the garrison breaking out or of reinforcements driving away the invaders. Sooner or later the food of the garrison would give out, and meanwhile, when the bombardment began in serious earnest, the time of unavailing suffering was sure to set in. The Spaniards had fought bravely; their cause was now hopeless, and they wished merely an honorable excuse for surrendering. General Linares, the commander-in-chief in the city, had been wounded, and General Toral had taken his place. On July 3d, Cervera's fleet, which was in the harbor, and was the objective of the army, made a sortie and was destroyed. This put a final end to all hope of successful resistance, not merely at Santiago, but in the war. General Blanco, at Havana, and the Spanish home government, wished to avoid the responsibility for the surrender and cast it upon Toral. Toral was equally reluctant to accept it. On the other hand, the Americans were anxious to get the city surrendered before a serious epidemic of disease should break out. But after eight days the parties were still unable to come to an agreement, whereupon negotiations were broken off, and on the afternoon of the tenth and morning of the eleventh, the bombardment reopened. The Spanish reply was very feeble, General Randolph with his artillery completely silenced the Spanish batteries and the fire from the Spanish trenches was readily quelled. Another truce was declared and this time the Spaniards came to terms. It was agreed that they should surrender the city and be transported without their arms to Spain. On the seventeenth, the American flag was hoisted on the works.

Throughout these days of peace and war in the trenches the troops showed excellent soldierly qualities. It was essentially a campaign of the regular army. Of the volunteer organizations along with them, some did very well and some ill. But the great bulk of the work was done, and the great bulk of the loss was suffered, by the regulars.

The officers and men alike shared the hardship and fatigue, and the officers, as shown by their losses, and as was quite proper, took even greater risks than did the men under them. The lines were from time to time strengthened by traverses, and bomb proofs were put up under the hills. At night the trenches were pushed forward here and there. There was need for great watchfulness, as in places the hostile lines

were not more than four hundred yards apart. Zig-zag approaches to the trenches were made so that the troops in them could be relieved every few hours of the day. At night pickets and Cossack posts were established in a cordon through the jungle and the most vigilant watch was kept in the trenches. Dog tents were brought up and put under the protection of the hills on the side farthest away from the Spanish fire. Rough field hospitals were established.

Fortunately, from the first of July to the eleventh, when the last shot had been fired, the weather was good. During this period every effort should have been made to establish a depot of provisions at the front, but, as a matter of fact, nothing of the kind was done. The transports were still standing on and off in front of Siboney. There was a good deal of food on the beach there. The narrow jungle trail which led from there for eight or ten miles over the hills and across streams to the army received scant attention. The insufficient number of mules and wagons had all they could do to bring up ammunition and enough food to meet the needs of the army from day to day. In consequence there was always imminent danger of partial disaster. In good weather there was no trouble, but a single storm would render the road temporarily impassable, and a long spell of bad weather would have closed communications between the army and its base on the seaboard. Just after the last firing occurred there were two days of stormy weather. The road became an impassable quagmire and the streams torrents across which no wagons could be taken. Food at the front was short,—one or two of the volunteer regiments being literally without any whatever. Fortunately the weather cleared and by great exertion matters were restored to their normal condition; but if instead of two days' bad weather, there had been three, the damage to the road would have been such as to mean actual suffering from hunger of a marked kind on the part of the troops.

The condition of the hospitals was very bad indeed. There were not nearly enough doctors and the number of ambulances was utterly insufficient. A good deal of the trouble came from the fact that the stubborn and effective fight made by the Spaniards was a complete surprise. Before the battle of July 1st, the general in command of the corps was reported to have told the surgeons to prepare to take care of forty wounded men. As a matter of fact there were twelve hundred. There were only two ambulances for them and very few litters. There were but few surgeons, few hospital attendants and entirely insufficient supplies. Many of the wounded went two or three days without any

attention whatsoever. Some walked down to Siboney and got aboard the boats before they were cared for. Others were put into the hospitals and their wounds dressed, but were left without food or drink for forty-eight hours. The surgeons in charge did what they could, working until their eyes closed from utter weariness. The hospital attendants for the most part did well too, but they were all so overworked as to become peevish and irritable, and the immense amount of suffering they saw tended to make them a little calloused — at least in some instances. There were no cots, few blankets, and insufficient tentage. When a wounded man came to the rear he laid in the mud on his blanket, if he had one. If he did not have one, then he lay in the mud without it. In the most crowded hospitals many of the wounded were taken away from the operating table and put down in the high grass with no cover whatever, there to wait for perhaps twenty-four hours before they were found again. The astounding fact remains that from the wounds proper there was a very small death rate. The steel jacketed bullet, of minute size and high velocity, is anything but a lethal projectile. If shot through the heart, brain or spine death was instantaneous; but if shot anywhere else the man usually recovered. Scores of cases of abdominal wounds which would have meant certain and painful death if inflicted by the old style rifle or by a shotgun, were cured completely. One result of this was that a very large number of men who were wounded never left the firing lines, save for an hour or two to get their wounds dressed.

Far more trouble resulted from sickness. The army should have been moved north just as soon as the city surrendered. The exposure, the insufficient tentage and the improper food had severely shaken the constitutions of all the men. Half of them were more or less sick after they had been three weeks ashore and most of the remainder had lost a good deal of their snap and buoyancy. They suffered somewhat from dysentery and kindred complaints, but the arch-foe was a persistent malarial fever of an acute and recurrent kind. This was not infectious, but unfortunately a few sporadic cases of yellow fever appeared and cast the home authorities into a panic. Various so-called experts examined the cases and speedily reported that nearly every man had yellow fever. The commanders at the front found that when a man was stricken down with fever, if he was kept in his tent or in a regimental hospital, he was able to return to duty in a few days, having merely suffered from severe malaria, but if he was sent to the rear, then his case was reported as yellow fever and he was clapped into a

yellow fever hospital. With this terror before their eyes the home authorities, misled by some of the reports they received, declined to take any steps to bring the army back to the United States, and as they were familiar neither with the country nor with the conditions and needs of the troops, they directed various plans to be carried out, not one of which was possible of fulfillment. The troops kept sickening and the percentage of men who were attacked by malarial fever kept increasing, while when once attacked, though a man might temporarily recover he was sure to be stricken down again and again and to grow continually weaker. Under these circumstances the corps commander summoned a meeting of the division and brigade commanders, and it was unanimously agreed to make the most emphatic protest possible to the Secretary of War against the army being longer kept where it was, for no good end and to its certain ultimate ruin. The division and brigade commanders memorialized the corps commander to this effect and their protest was made public. The immediate result was to bring the army home, and about August 5th the embarkation began.

The voyage home was accomplished with little incident. There was no longer the slightest danger from Spanish cruisers so the ships went separately and without convoy, each making its way as best it could.

The conditions on the first transports which had gone north were terrible, owing to their crowded condition, and insufficient accommodations and lack of proper food, good water and medicines. The most crying evils were to some extent remedied afterwards, but the transport service in the main was bad. The men were all much weakened, and in consequence the sick list on many of the vessels was appalling. Some of the ships were mere floating pest houses. The water on some of them was bad, and on almost all the food was improper, chiefly owing to the fact that the meat ration, consisting generally of the canned roast beef, so-called, was at the best tasteless and at the worst nauseating; so that only a small part of it was consumed, even when the soldiers were very hungry. In healthy troops this merely meant a certain loss of strength; in sick troops it meant weakening them nearly to the danger point.

The returning army was gathered into a great camp near Montauk Point on Long Island. No thorough preparations were made in advance for this camp, in spite of the limitless resources of the country being available; but it was so near New York, and the chance for volunteer aid was so great, that the most crying defects were speedily remedied. The hard work and good sense of the officers did the rest,

and the camp was made as healthy as could possibly be desired. The fever had a firm hold on the men, and the malarial poison was so acute that the attacks occurred again and again. One of the sad features of the war was the number of men who died from disease after their return to their own country and even to their homes. Some weeks went by before any notable improvement in the health and strength of the troops became apparent.

One feature of the campaign, that is, the attitude of a section of the newspaper press, should be mentioned. A perfect shoal of war correspondents started with the army. Many of them did admirable work. Many of them represented papers of dignified tone, which only desired to know the truth and to tell it so far as it did not interfere with the success of the military operations. But there were some who represented papers which showed a very unwholesome inclination towards sensationalism, and an indifference to finding out the facts pure and simple, or to upholding the best interests of the country. The majority of the papers sought to find out the facts as they actually were; a few observed throughout an attitude of irrational optimism or irrational pessimism; but quite a number passed from one extreme to the other. During the early weeks of the campaign, that is, until after the heavy fighting had ended, the representatives of the last class apparently considered it to be almost treacherous to so much as hint that the troops were not always well led and volunteers not always in good shape to fight, or that the management of the various bureaus of the War Department was not always what it should be. Every volunteer regiment was given hysterical praise whether it did well or ill; every general called a hero bold, without regard to his acts; and every step in the matter of embarkation, transportation and the like was chronicled as of inconceivable wisdom. After this period, the very patent faults in organization and administration, and to some extent in leadership and conduct, were recognized, and soon the same papers took the opposite extreme, using quite as exaggerated language on the one side as they had previously employed on the other. The army was described as "starving to death at Camp Wyckoff" at a time when in reality there was a positive plethora not only of food, but of delicacies.

A wise and patriotic historian must, of course, try to state the facts as they are; not only for the sake of the truth of history, but because of the need, from the standpoint of the nation, of learning aright the lessons history teaches. Americans need to have brought home to them, the high quality of our Regular army, and the indis-

pensable nature of its services at the outbreak of any serious war. Volunteer regiments differ wonderfully in efficiency at the outset, and even more in the rapidity with which they learn their trade. The average American volunteer is brave, intelligent and patriotic. I conscientiously believe that he can learn the trade of war more quickly than a similar soldier of any other country; *but, he has got to learn it.* Moreover, the nation needs to be taught that even the Regular army can never show at its best unless it is sometimes exercised as a unit, and not as a jumble of small fractions. It should be sometimes drilled and manoeuvred in mass; and sometimes the quartermaster and commissary, not to speak of the ordnance and medical departments, should be trained by actual experience in provisioning and supplying large bodies of men in the march and in the field. In short, the War Department must be managed on an altogether different basis from that on which it has been managed since the Civil War, if it is adequately to serve the nation's needs in times of crisis. But when all these disagreeable lessons have been learned from the experience of Santiago, there will remain the pleasanter lesson of successful heroism. There was a good deal of blundering and some inexcusable mismanagement, but as a whole, the fighting edge of the officers and men was of the keenest and truest temper. The Fifth corps at Santiago won a great victory in a marvellously short time and added a striking page to the honor roll of American history.

Theodore Roosevelt
Col 1st U. S. V. Cavalry





